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ABSTRACT
The Anglo-French Entente received almost from the moment
of Its inception the endorsement of the British people.
Although Anglo-French relations had been steadily improving
since the end of the Boer ar and the denouement of the
Dreyfus affair, it was the warts and friendly greeting which
King Edward VII received during his State visit to Paris in
the spring of 1903 that first made the various quarters of
British public opinion desirous of a full-fledged understanding
with France. The conclusion of the colonial Convention of
8 April 1904 reinforced this desire. With the exception of
a handful of 'High fories' and Imperialist stalwarts, most of
whom complained that Britain lost more territory and privileges
than she gained, the terms of this Convention proved acceptable
to the bulk of the nation. Most Conservatives and Liberal
Imperialists saw the Convention as a development which bolstered
Britain's position in the world and which helped the nation meet
the challenge of German expansionism, while most Radicals and
Socialists saw it as a peaceful event which heralded the
beginning af a series of bi-lateral pacts among the Powers,
including Germany.
Despite these high expectations, some disillusionment soon
set in in various quarters of public opinion# Businessmen who
nourished the idea that the rapprochement was economic as well
as political in its ramifications discovered to their dismay
that the Entente had done nothing to encourage the French to
abandon protectionism. Tm short-lived tr*de boom which
followed the signing of the 1904 Agreements was little
ii.
compensation to them. Similarly, those City financiers who
continued to encounter intrigues and sharp practices made by
their French equivalents in various parts of the world were
scarcely consoled by the abandonment of the policy of 'pin pricks'
in Egypt or the increased investments in Russia# Meanwhile,
humanitarians like E.D. Morel were disturbed that the Entente
had not been used by the Foreign Office as a lever to put a
halt to the <y,pqg9ggtoaair# In the Congo. Their sense
of outrage was echoed to a lesser extent by the country's
military and naval leaders who, while on the whole pleased with
the general direction which Anglo-French relations had taken
since 1903, were nevertheless highly annoyed at France's
behaviour on certain occasions; the illegal coaling and
provisioning of Russian ships during the 1904-9 Far Eastern War
was a case in point# But it was the Left which in due course
voiced the greatest dissatisfaction. 3y the time of the
Tangier crisis, Radicals and Socialists had become uneasy about
the very closeness of Anglo-French relations and openly began
to wonder whether the Entente had got 'perverted' into an
alliance against Germany.
Precious little of this disillusionment, however, left a
serious mark oh Anglo-French relations. For one thing, the very
people who expressed the greatest concern put the blame for what
they construed to be wrong at the door of misguided statesmen on
RRIKtR
both sides of the Channel/^han on the rapprochement itself. For
another, such disillusionment ran counter to an even more
widespread feeling in Britain that Franc# was the ideal country
with which to enter into diplomatic partnership. It was a
sentiment largely fostered by the bulk of the press which in
its leader-articles propounded almost daily the thesis that French
foreign policy was essentially cautious and pacific, that
French political institutions were stable and secure, and that
the French themselves were a serious-minded and reliable folk.
But Individual writers contributed to this campaign as well by
pointing out the similarities between Britain and Trance in
terms of government, culture, and even national character.
The 4nglo-Russian Entente, however, was something of a
different matter. Here, too, there were a number of criticisms
from the Right as regards the terms of the colonial Convention!
and here, too, the Left became Increasingly uneasy about the
anti-German implications of the arrangement, not to mention
the disregard it showed for the welfare of Persian and Russian
parliamentarlanism. But unlike the 1904 understanding, the
1907 one was not based upon any real cultural and political
affinities between the two countries involved. Hence,
both the Government and its sympathisers in the press had a
more difficult time defending and justifying the latter
arrangement than they did the former. The Anglo-Russian
Entente, while not exactly unpopular in Britain, was
considerably less popular than its forerunner of 1904,
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engaged on this thesis, I have encountered a willingness to be
of service on the part of virtually all those from whom I have
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PREFACE
This study attempts to record and analyse in detail the
attitudes and impressions that existed in pre-World War I Britain
to one of the more important developments to appear in the high
politics of the early twentieth century world, the rise of
Entente diplomacy. This study also attempts to examine as
closely as possible the opinions that existed In pre-1914 Britain
about the French way of life and the French neoole. That it
could not be a purely diplomatic study hardly need any
explanation here. The diplomatic side of Anglo-French, and for
that matter Anglo-Russian, relations in the period 1370-1914 has
been too thoroughly covered by various historians to render
much opportunity to unearth anything new. By contrast, studies
of British public opinion for these years have been comparatively
neglected, thereby leaving one with a good deal of room to write
about a subject hitherto scarcely touched upon.
But apart from this consideration, there are other, equally
valid reasons for studying British attitudes to certain events
shortly after the turn of the century. For one thing, such a
study gives us a better understanding of the decision-making
process in Britain. After all, contemporary diplomatists
either tended to take public opinion into account before charting
a particular policy or used it as an excuse to justify pursuing
a certain course of action. By examining what the British
public really did think about certain Issues or developments,
then, we are in a good position to attack or defend the decisions
which these men took. For another, a study of this sort
promotes, if only in a rather small way, a clearer appreciation
of all the similarities and differences between two of Europe's
more prominent peoples; and this, at a time v/hen these two
peoples have only just been brought permanently together under
a common economic (and possibly political) roof, cannot be an
entirely bad undertaking,
Although there have been relatively few studies dealing
with British public opinion and foreign affairs for this
period, this is not to say that the following thesis touches
uoon completely virgin soil, tulte a few works, many of them
written in recent years, are concerned with more or less the
same subject matter as mine, P,J.V. Rolo's The Entente Cordisle:
IM Crl&jjjis and Negotiations of the Anglo-I'peA9.fr AffijjaiBfcl Pf
8 Anrll 1904 (London, 1969) and C.M, uidrew's Theonhile Lelcasse
bhe poking pf the '-AtpAfre CpjdjLftj,? (London, 1963) both have
something to say about the attitude of the press and certain
groups of people towards the 1903-4 understanding between the
two rowers; but not very much, for their primary emphasis is
on diplomatic events, Samuel R. Williamson Jnr,'s The Politics
of Cranfl strategy;, Britain and ranee Prepare for :%p, 1903-3L914
(Cambridge, Lass,, 1969)f on the other hand, does have a great
deal to say about the view of France and the Entente held in
high-ranking British military and naval circles, so much so, In
fact, that there is little more one can add to what he has
written, btill, as the thoughts of the Oenerals, Admirals, and
other defence experts constitute such an integral part of
British public opinion as a whole, and as the secret military
conversations of 1905-6 changed the nature of the Entente in
such a drastic manner, I felt duty-bound to devote a chapter of
ray own to this aspect of the subject. Unlike Dr Williamson
I have endeavoured, wherever possible, to place military and
naval attitudes towards the Entente in the wider context of
British nubile opinion.
The same more or less applies to what others have already
written about left-wing attitudes in Britain towards France
and the Entente. Precisely why the views of the British Left -
Radicals, socialists, and pacifists alike - have attracted the
special attention of historians is a matter for discussion in
itself. Yet whatever the reason, no one can deny that the
publication of such studies has aided oar understanding of
left-wing dissent to British foreign nolicy orior to 1914.
A.J.P. Taylor's The Trouble -lakers (London, 1957), A.J.k, Morris's
Radicalism against War (London, 1972), and Howard Welnroth's
article 'The British Radicals and the balance of power,
1902-1914' (Historical Journal. XIII, 1970), have, between them,
explained fully why the Left at first welcomed the understanding
with France and later entertained doubts about its real ouroose.
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Here again, however, there is a difference of emphasis between
these works and mine. While all three have much to say about the
Left, they make little mention of the Conservatives and the
Liberal 'Right'. All three works discuss only foreign policy
matters and not what that British Left was thinking about
other developments in France. Finally, although these works,
especially Dr weinroth's, have scrutinised left-wing attitudes
to events happening abroad, I have attempted in many instances
to analyse events in even greater detail.
All these comparisons bring me to the matter of how I
have ap roached this thesis. Having opted for- a broad study
covering a comparatively short-time snan rather than a narrower
one comprising an analysis of only one section of Jritish
public opinion over n greater number of years, I decided tc arrange
my material around leading themes such as politics, religion,
commerce, the arts, as well as diplomacy, instead of
presenting Jritish attitudes to events more or less as they
developed. ^uch an approach makes for two or three discussions
of the same event in various parts of the thesis, and as a
result cross-references from one chapter to the next abound.
It is to be hoped that this does not cause too much
inconvenience for the reader.
Since the pivot cf Anglo- reach relations at this time was
the 1904 Agreements, I have tried to keep the Lntente Cordiale
in the foreground as much as possible. In the Introduction to
this thesis and in Chapters II, III, IX, ana X, the pursuance
of this task has not been too difficult; in some of the
remaining Chapters it has proved a good deal more so. Many
contemporary newspaper editors and individual writers dwelt on
a host of internal issues in T'rance, much as if they were matters
of interest in their own right and had little to do with the
rapprochement between the two countries. To make the comments of
these writers appear more relevant to the Lntente than they in
reality were by introducing a certain amount of speculation in the
absence of definite evidence was, I felt, wrong. At the same
time, I felt it only right and proper to record and assess
reactions to these issues on the ground that this thesis is a study
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of British attitudes towards France and all things French as
well as the Entente and the later Anglo-Hussian understanding.
This, I trust, will explain to the reader why Chapter V is
devoted more to the reactions in Britain to the Church-State
quarrel in France than to religious attitudes towards the
1904 understanding or why so ouch of Chapter IV deals at length
solely with domestic events lii France, In both Chapters,
however, I have sought to stress some underlying themes that
fit into a nore general picture of France,
Other aspects of ay thesis title I have construed in a
slightly less than literal sense. Originally X intended to
have the ohrase *3ritish public opinion* refer only to the
views and attitudes of British subjects, an intention which I
believe has for the most part been realised, nevertheless,
there are a few instances in which it has proved advantageous
to draw upon the opinions of other nationals who, while not
British, were sufficiently British in their outlook to render
their inclusion acceptable. In this context I felt it safe
to mention the complaints of Australian and Canadian business
groups when discussing British commercial grievances against
France in Chapter VXI and to include the American Henry James
when talking about intellectual and cultural relations between
Britain and ranee in Chapter VIII, On the other hand, I have
not gone so far as to include "■'ranch or Russian opinions on
Entente diplomacy, except in those few instances where 1 thought
it impossible to divorce them from British opinion, on the
ground that both these areas are well and truly beyond the
scope of this study.
In much the same way, X have adhered closely, but not
rigidly, to the dates incorporated into the title of this thesis.
To abide too strictly by the dates 1903-1908 would be to cut
across some processes only Just begun as well as to leave out
others net yet completely finished. To do so would, moreover,
be to exclude the writings of certain authors whose works either
summed up well the sentiments of a certain quarter of British
public opinion or exercised a great influence on the public at
large, Norman Angell's btyppe1? Opt foal UlMpai written in
1907-8 but not published until 1909, is perhaps the most notable
work that fits into this category, Kevertheless, there are
others as well, and on balance I have regarded it worthwhile to
sacrifice distinct boundaries of this sort in order to convey a
better impression of what outspoken contemporaries were thinking
about certain Issues and developments.
In any event, the choice of the six year period from 1903
to 1908 will no doubt strike some readers as a bit curious. If
this is the case, then it must be said that this particular time
span was not arbitrarily chosen. The year 1903 was thought to
be as good a starting point as any for a study of British
attitudes towards France and the Entente Cordiale, Inasmuch as
it was in May of that year that relations between the two
nations began to improve markedly with the visit of King Edward VII
to Paris, The summer of 1907 was thought to be a convenient
stopping point inasmuch as more than four full years had passed
since the King's celebrated visit, time enough to assess British
feelings towards France after the earlier and somewhat misleading
euphoria had died away. Moreover, by that time a good deal of
the focus on Entente diplomacy In the press and elsewhere in
Britain had shifted from France towards Russia,
xii.
At this stage it would perhaps be wise to say a few words
about the inclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreements in this
study. As the third cornerstone of the Triple Entente, the
other two being the Dual Alliance and the 1904 Agreements, I
felt compelled to include this subject in my thesis. Indeed,
not only was the 1907 understanding an integral part of Entente
diplomacy, but its inception also helped to shed some more
light on the colonial arrangement with France three years
earlier. Contemporary students of foreign affairs forever
liked to make comparisons and point out contrasts between two
similar developments, and the observations which they made as
regards the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings
are revealing. Not that too much time and effort could be
spent researching into British attitudes towards Russia and
the 1907 Entente. The considerable treatment already accorded
to France and the 1904 Entente did not permit this. Nevertheless,
it is hoped that the inclusion of reactions in Britain to the
improved relations between London and St. Petersburg from the
signing of the 1907 Convention to the outbreak of the Bosnian
annexation crisis in 1908 will give the reader a better
appreciation of how popular or unpopular was the foreign policy




Any historical work which purports to examine the
attitudes of one large group of people towards another immediately
encounters some problems of theory and Afcthcd. Providing a
precise definition of the term 'public opinion' is perhaps the
most obvious difficulty of this type, but examining the various
sources of public opinion and weighing ur their relative
importance figures prominently as well# Ideally a public
opinion study should be one which represents the totality of
all the thoughts and views of a group of people towards a
particular subject. In practice, of course, this proves
well-nigh impossible. For one thing, the sheer size of the
group concerned puts the task beyond the realm of human
endeavour. No one can record the views of more than forty
million people about a certain subject. For another, the
comparative lack of anything to go by renders such an exercise
futile as well as impossible. Generally speaking, the
ordinary man in the street in Britain had, as elsewhere, a
scant and imperfect understanding of foreign affairs. More
often than not, he was willing to leave such questions to
the specialists and experts and accept their judgments.
i* Thq,prqfrU«a <Wn*ng 'puftLta ?--vupA'.
Obviously, then, the term 'British public opinion' does
not refer in this instance to the feelings in aggregate of
all those people living in early twentieth century Britain
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towards "ranee and the Entente Cordiale, But if such Is the
case, then it must he said that the term cannot refer simply
to the views of 'specialists* or 'experts' either. There were
too many people from too many diverse backgrounds who were
acquainted with Trance at this time to permit such a narrow
Interpretation. Apart from the journalists and politicians,
there had always been a significant number of people in
Britain who had taken an interest in France, and by the turn
of the century, their numbers were growing. Included in this
category would be the nearly forty thousand Englishmen who
lived in France during this period, of whom more than fourteen
thousand were engaged in various types of employment in 1906}*
the swelling ranks of British tourists, for whom Paris once
again became a favourite visiting spot after the opening of
2
the famous Exhibition of 1900} and those culture enthusiasts
who, even if they never set foot outside of Britain, were at
least becoming more and more familiar with France thanks to the
Increasing number of books, articles, and plays in evidence
dealing with that country. Needless to say, only a handful of
these individuals ever bothered to put down their reactions
and impressions on paper. Nevertheless, for our purposes their
numbers were sufficient to make the terra 'British public opinion"
amount to something more than the composite reactions of the
press and the politicians.
1 Bylvaine Marandon, Idlpap de, ,la Tr^nqq, dps I'vlctoriennc. 1843-1900, (Paris. 1957). on"102-109.
2 P.J.V. Rolo, Tj^IIntepte,, Co^la lej The ,, rj; ins
pf Aflrqeqfeflts pf (London, 1969),
p. 156. It should be noted, however, that the provinces were
gaining in popularity as well, with the South of France beginning
to attract some of the middle as well as the upper echelons of
British society by the early 19C0s. Bee Marandon, on. cit.. p. 74.
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let even these remarks are too vague and imprecise if
we are to gain any accurate understanding of what is meant by
the phrase 'British nublic opinion towards France and the
Entente Cordiale'. For the fact of the matter is that there
have been known instances in which the 'man in the street'
did from time to time give frank and outspoken expression of
developments concerning foreign affairs* Commenting in his
diary on the crisis with France over Madagascar in 1894, the
writer «• Somerset Maugham was struck by the very widespread
desire for war in Britain* Even two postmen he encountered
while on his way to visit friends were talking about the
*00anion topicThe Radical writer Norman Angell might have
been offended by the 'crude xenophobia, mainly Anglophobia' of
the farmers of the American Vest during the Venezuelan crisis
of th© same year, but in his memoirs he admitted running into
'the same kind of irratlonalisra in the France of the Dreyfus
4
affair and the Britain of the Boer War'# Both of these
gentlemen noticed a certain ignorance on the part of ordinary
folk as to why exactly there should have been trouble# Indeed,
for his part Angell was convinced that th© war which these
people desired was detrimental to their livelihood. But
neither really went on to say the obvious, namely, that such
manifestations occur only during moments of great international
stress and tension and that for the rest of the time phobias
and hatreds of this sort either remain dormant or are non-existent.
As a result, the historian is left in something of a quandary on
the matter of how much the attitudes of ordinary people should
3 W, Somerset Maugham, A writer's Notebook, (London. 1949), p. 8.
4 Norman Angell, After All. (London. 19513. op. 85,87.
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be induced in the term 'public opinion'. To the extent that
men and women from even the most uninfluential stations in
life could speak up on matters of foreign affairs they obviously
deserve to be closely considered. On the other hand, to the
extent that such attitudes were voiced only when the 'national
mind' was confronted by problems of war or defence, and even
then only sometimes, they might well be all but overlooked.
Bince it is usually only in times of deep crisis that the
passions of the people are ever aroused about foreign affairs
to any significant extent, it is worth recounting some of the
more important events of the period to see how often the
general public had occasion to vent its feelings. Certainly
Britain's relations with * ranee had of late provided a number
of opportunities for expressions cf this sort. iven before
the eruption of Fashoda, a series of colonial incidents marred
the already somewhat cool relations between London and Paris:
a minor crisis over 3 lam in 1893 J the afore-mentioned annexation
of Madagascar by the French in 1894? and the decision of the
French foreign minister u&notaux to launch in the fact of
British objections an expedition to the ^udan lr. March 1895»
Karchand's raising of the French flag on the Nile in 1898, coupled
with the anti-British outbursts of a good many Frenchmen during
the Dreyfus affair and the insulting caricatures of John Bull
and ueon Victoria in the French press during the Boer War, only
served to excite further the hostility which a considerable
number of people In Britain had already felt towards France.
Nor was sentiments of this sort directed merely at.alnst
T'ranee, iussia and Germany, too, were exposed to it, again as
the result of deteriorating relations with Britain. Like the
French, the Hussians ridiculed British reverses in the South
African campaign and, indeed, went one step further by taking
advantage of that campaign through the deliberate furthering
of their own interests in -sla. The military occupation of
Manchuria and the sending of soecial agents to Persia and
Tibet were readily accomplished while the British Government
was preoccupied in South Africa, An important section of the
British public, ever sensitive about the security of India,
demanded that steps be taken to safeguard the Empire in Asia, .
Their wish was soon realised with the formation of an alliance
with Japan in 19C2, It was more or less the same with Germany.
Here, too, the leaders of a foreign Power had sought not
merely to mock but to take the utmost advantage of Britain's
embroilment in a far away colonial struggle. In the midst of
the Boer Jar kaiser uilhelm II, with the recent success of
the Pranco-Kusso-German triumvirate against Japan apparently
still fresh in his mind, attempted to form a Continental League
of the same countries against Britain. His plans came to naught
when Prance refused to co-operate while the burning question of
Alsace-Lorraine remained outstanding. Nevertheless, to many
observers in Britain the proposal of the Continental League was
but the latest in a series of developments seeming to suggest
that Germany was bent upon challenging Britain's position
throughout the world, Wilhelm's startling telegram to
President Kruger in early 1396 w s to many minds the first step
in this direetionj von Tirpitz's concept of the 'risk theory1,
the passage of a new German naval law in 1893, and the
ever-growing demands of German imperialists for 'a place in the
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sun', were all thought to be part and parcel of the same aim.
out while all this gave rise to considerable worry in Britain,
not everyone was equally disposed to regard Germany as an
enemy} and, signif icantly, it was to tier lain rather than to
Paris or to St. Petersburg that Joseoh Chamberlain, one of the
most outspoken and influential Unionists of the day, turned in
1901 in order to remove Britain from her by now all too
dangerous 'splendid isolation'•
Up to the time of the Chamberlain-Biilow negotiations
whatever xenophobic sentiments that existed in Britain were
directed against not merely one, but several countries} beyond
this point, however, such feelings began to be concentrated
increasingly against Germany* A good deal of this can be
attributed to the abrupt, almost curt, manner in which the
negotiations were broken off. Rightly or wrongly, the German
Chancellor's continued criticisms of the Government's conduct
in the South African Par was widely held in Britain to be
responsible for this failure, and as a result various organs
of opinion in the country began to see nothing but evil in German
plans and intentions thereafter* within a short time this
attitude had reached such a pitch that the Conservative Foreign
Secretary Lord Lansdowne was finding it more and more difficult
to implement even the smallest policy of co-operation with the
Germans} the financing of the Baghdad Railway affair and the
Venezuelan debts question, both of which arose in early 1903,
were cases in point. By contrast, the Government was able
towards the end of 1902 and in the early part of 1903 to
co-ordinate policies with the Cuai d'Orsay over a host of
issues, the most notable of them being the question of
7.
Macedonian reform, without producing a public uproar. That
it was able to do this was no doubt due largely to the absence
of any recent quarrels with France, but the advent to the
throne of a king who was noted for his pro-French outlook also
played a part. Even before his famous visit to Paris in the
spring of 1903, the presence of a highly francophile monarch
on the throne undoubtedly went seme way towards making the
British people look upon France with less suspicion.
In the years immediately prior to the formation of the
Anglo-French Entente, there was © good deal of concern in
various circles of British opinion abcut foreign policy matters.
In saying this, however, we are once again confronted with the
problem of assessing how much of this concern belonged to the
proverbial *raan in the street' and how much to the press. It
is important to draw a distinction between 'public' and
•newspaper' opinion. As will be seen below, the newspapers and
journals were all too willing to take a hand in leading those
forces they claimed to represent. Bather than speaking on
behalf of the people on foreign affairs issues, they tended to
pass on the views and policies of the Government to the people.
Even those organs of opinion that did not necessarily perform
this function cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as spokesmen
for the general public} for as A.J.P. Taylor suggests, the
editorials of all the newspapers and journals, however untainted
by outside influences, represent little more than the views of a
handful of men appealing to certain sections of the reading public.
It is the 'personal, accidental factors', writes Taylor, that
count most 'when trying to study the so-called organs of public
opinion*.^ Inasmuch as we more often that not have no solid
5 A.J.P. Taylor, The Trouble Fakers. (london, 1957), P. 112 n3.
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evidence that ordinary people in Britain felt this way or that
about countries like France and Germany, save for a few
exceptional moments like the Trafalgar Square demonstrations
immediately prior to the outbreak of war in August 1914, we
are all but forced to make the term 'public opinion' synonymous
with the term 'newspaper opinion'.
Is all this to argue, therefore, that in this instance the
examination of British public opinion amounts to little more
than a study of what a select number of individuals had to say
about the Entente? To contend this would be to over-simplify
matters. For despite Taylor's reasoning, there is another
aspect of the problem to be considered as well. The press in
Edwardian Britain did consist of a multitude of newspapers and
journals, each of which expounded a particular shade of opinion
on foreign affairs and other topics. Taken together, these
opinions covered a very wide range of thought across the
political spectrum. Hence, by gleaning the files of as many
newspapers and journals as possible and by taking into account
the views of particular groups in British society - the trade
unions, the businessmen, the churches, and individual contemporary
writers - one can hope to draw a reasonably comprehensive picture
of British attitudes towards France and the Entente Cordialc
between 1903 and 1903. The views of the man in the street
might be hard to evaluate, but an assessment of the broad outlines
of British 'public opinion' and the general intellectual climate
of the neriod ought not be impossible,
2* flw prw '*3 3 spurs? sft pvteUff pplnten
The British press did not take long to pronounce the 1904
Anglo-French Convention a success. The arrangement was formally
9.
signed in Paris on 8 April, and within % day the newspapers and
journals wero apportioning credit for its consul-nation# To
King I -award Til and Resident Loubet went first mention for
having broken the diplomatic Ice with their wtate visits to
< aris anu London in 1903# To the statesmen on both sides of
the Channel - In particular, Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcasse -
went much recognition for having laid the foundations of the
Agreements by proposing a series of talks to settle all
outstanding disputes in the colonial sphere between the two
Powers. And to Paul Carabon and Sir Edward '-'onson, the
Embassadors of the two countries, went some credit for having
successfully negotiated the complex details of the Agreements#
Taken together, these various acknowledgements, along with
similar tributes made by a number of historians, have tended
to create the impression that the Anglo-French Convention,
like most diplomatic agreements and treaties of the eriod, was
almost entirely the work of the politicians and the heads of
state and owed little of its existence to the efforts of
others#
Certainly, the contemporary British press would have
rebutted this notion# Staffed by an alert and competent corps
of foreign correspondents and wielding an influence that was by
no moans restricted to their immediate reading public, the
newspapers had an important part to play in the making of
oritish foreign oolicyj and Anglo-French relations were no
exception. Tress polemics had been a major source of ill will
between Britain and France at the turn of the century, and
afterwards it was the friendlier tone adopted by the newspapers
that helped to make way for a rapprochement. Thus it is not
10,
Thus it is not surprising that when the 1904 Convention was
signed, the press claimed its fair share of the responsibility
for that agreement. In the words of J. 4. Spender, editor of
the yegtaJJMter '%• Kin8f Lord Lansdowne, M. Ielcasse,
'■I, Canbori, the Trench eputies and men of commerce who visited
Kngland, the :ngllsh I'.T.s who visited Trance, the newspapers
on both sides which determined to stop the fruitless bickerings
which had become a habit with journalists - have each and all
contributed their partBut at the sane tine the newspapers
were only too well aware that if the rapproehement was to
become truly meaningful to Britons and Frenchmen, much sore
would have to be done. For as the Mandator Q^ftT^lan
pointed out, the entente was a 'sensitive plant*, 'an
Intellectual movement', which 'has yet to take root in the
hearts of the peoples of both c untries...' and 'has still to
be converted into one of those noble pofular seals which work
miracles'.' How well the press and other spokesmen for
British public opinion performed the task of rendering the
Entente more popular will, it is hoped, be one of the major
themes of this thesis. Of more immediate importance, however,
are the character and political complexion of those newspapers
and journals that led the discussion on foreign affairs, and
it is to their background, in addition to the background of
other forces and institutions claiming to represent certain
sections of the general public, that we now turn our attention.
The newspaper industry underwent a major transformation
during the L-dwardian period. A more popular type of journalism
was being evolved to attract larger reading audiences} while
technical advances were rapidly being made in order to keep
pace with the increased circulation demands of the public. In
both cascsf the transformation had been going on for some time,
and la both cases, the changes had their origins in the social
reforms of the late nineteenth century. Between 1870 and 1891
Parliament passed a series of acts which made elementary
oducation compulsory and made attendance free at otate-run
schools till the age of ten. The impact of these reforms was
profound, particularly with regard to the problem of Illiteracy,
whereas twenty-five per cent of adult men and thirty-five per
cent of adult women in England could neither read nor write in
1861, only five per cent of adult men and six per cent of adult
women wore unable to do so by 1393» In short, a whole new
reading public had been created by the Education \ets of the
late nineteenth century, and huge financial rewards awaited
any newspaper proprietor enterprising enough to appeal to the
needs and interests of this vast group. In 1383, J.T. otead
made thy first step in this direction when he replaced
John .iorley as editor of the fall SfeU and introduced
to the paper a number of technical innovations which launched
what later became known as the 'Hew Journalism'. By contrast
with the changes which men like -illia* Randolph Hearst and
Joseph i ulitzer were bringing to American newspapers at this
time, these reforms were timid indeed} nevertheless, they
8 Helen M. lynd, England in the 1330s (New York, 194?), p. 367.
managed to shock most of Fleet street. They included the use
of headlines and cross-headings to facilitate quicker reading,
the development of gossip and social columns, and the use of
the interview, hitherto regarded by ®ost journalists as an
Q
invasion of privacy. Five years later, the iadical Irishman
T. . 'Conner followed Stead's example when he founded the Star.
a half-penny paper designed to arouse the political
consciousness of London's east Lnc. nd in 1894, \lfred Harmsworth
later Lord Northcliffe, borrowed many of otead's tec.iniques
10
not long after he purchased the flagging evening Lews. v but
as yet the 'New Journalism' had affected only the London
evening press. In order for the Education Acts of the late
nineteenth century to make a true impression on the newspaper
world, a similar transformation would have to take place in
the morning and provincial press. Not until ilarmsworth
launched the Daily fail on 4 May 1896 did this transformation
finally arrive.
To the superficial eye, perhaps, the advent of the
Daily Mail was hardly an earth-shaking affair. Small, compact,
and printed in the traditional fashion of frcnt-rage advertisements
the paper locked like a cheaper version of the 'quality' morning
papers. Indeed, every day its front page carried the caption:
' 0 Penny Lews caper for One Half-penny'. Yet despite its
conventional appearance, the Daily ail started a new era in
9 Oron J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, with unecial eference
to n. land and Germany. l99! -1914 (Gloucester, "assachusetts, I9S4)
P. 13; also . Horison, English Newspapers, 1622-193? (Cambridge,
193?)? PP. 233-284; and Francis illiams, The 2i ,ht tc Know
(London, 1969), P. 66.
10 Hale, or, cit.. pp. 13-14; also illiams, lcc, cit.t and
Kennedy Jones, Fleet Street and Downing Street (London, 1920),
P. 133.
British journalism, For of all the crning newspapers in
existence in Britain in the 1390s, it alone made a conscious
effort to attract the reading public recently brought into
being. Chatty, sensational, and informative all in one, it
offered many ordinary people hitherto ignored by the press an
escape from their humdrum existence. Special features and
gimmicks were introduced in the hope of drawing a bigger
audiences an enlarged sporting news section for men; an
entire page of news and features for women; and a series of
contests and prises for everyone. 4s for the more standard
type of news, it too was included in the parer, though in
condensed form. All news stories and articles were kept
short, editorials confined to one paragraph, and parliamentary
speeches quoted only in part. But whatever the Dally 'all
lacked In length it more than made up for in excitement.
lather than bore its readers with a detailed discussion of
political issues, the paper simply played on their imaginations.
If, as has been alleged, Barmsworth truly believed that the
nubile enjoyed nothing better than a *good hate1, then there
is no field in which he and his subordinates on the staff of
the Bally Hall developed this sentiment better than that of
foreign affairs. First France and then Germany became the
national enemy, thanks in part to the sabre-rattling columns
11
of the Mall. what is more, the impact of these innovations
and this jingoism was dramatic. In 1897» only a year after
its first appearance, the paper was selling 300,000 copies
a day. From then till long after the outbreak of the Great
War, it had the largest circulation of any dally newspaper in




No doubt the Daily j&JJL was not an entirely new venture in
British journalism, being in some respects little more than a
daily version of the cheap, large-selling organs of opinion which
grew up in the late nineteenth century. In 1880, George Newnes
founded Tit-DitsT a weekly journal which consisted of 'potted,
easily assimilated facts about a multitude of different
things'"^ and which withhthree years had a circulation of
more than 700,000 copies. Even older were the Sunday newspapers
like LjQydff - 9*' the ./cp,I,q, and jgmJL&S. lifiMAt
whose steady diet of crime and sensationalism attracted
millions of readers, Harmsworth himself, moreover, had already
drawn a large audience since 1888 with the birth of -.newers, an
unabashed imitation of Newnes's Tit-Bits. Nor can it be said
that the ..ally hall reached all of the new reading public.
Conservative to the core in both appearance and politics, the
paper appealed primarily to those with a small but still vested
12 On newspaper circulationsi there is no reliable source of
information about the sales figures for leading journals and
papers of the Edwardian period, and a newspaper historian of
the early twentieth century can only give rough estimates of
circulation figures, many of which are based on the figures
given in the memoirs of contemporary editors and proprietors,
according to A.,P. ./adsworth, editor of the Manchester Guardian
from 1945 to 1954, the historian 'can only guess at the
circulations of most of them during the period of secrecy between
the 1850s and the 1930s. Then all but a few papers jealously
guarded the volume of their sales 5 It was usually much less than
was commonly supposed. And now most of thtelr business books
have long ago gone for waste paper. Even capers with
continuous existence have, more often that not, suffered changes
of ownership and their records too have gone. And papers that,
like my own, have had continuity of ownership, have only
imperfect records', -ee A, , /adsworth, 'Newspapers
circulations, 1800-1954', Transactions of the Manchester
-^tjstical bqclefa, (1954-1955), PP. 1, 25, 35.
13 F. williaras, r^. cit.. p. 67.
interest in society, the lower middle classes. The much
larger working class was cither ignored or overlooked, possibly
because horthcliffe was not interested in the workers but
almost certainly because most of them could not have subscribed
to the ailv 'all, even if they had so wished. Great Britain
might have been the wealthiest country in Lurope at the turn
of the century, but she was still plagued by widespread
poverty? and newspapers, however inexpensive they were becoming,
continued to remain outside the reach of most people's pockets.
In the words of one newspaper historiant 'It is extremely
improbable that the purchasers of 1 dw&rdian half•penny dallies
cam© mainly from among those who could not afford enough food
to keep them in health and had nothing to spare for inessentials,.
The point is an important one? for it yet again severely
qualifies one's use of the term 'public opinion' when talking
about British attitudes to foreign affairs matters in the
early 1900s, A significant slice of the population at this
time was not even reading about, much less forming an opinion
on, such subjects as ranee and the Lntente Cordial®,
On the other hand, it would b# wrong to minimize the
changes that Karmsworth was introducing to the British newspaper
industry, fter all, the birth of the Daily Mall in 1396 did
mark a significant advance in the growth of the popular press
in the country, even if it did not constitute the revolutionary
development that is sometimes supposed, But a far more complete
break from the past than either the style or presentation of
the paper was the new sense of purpose with which It was
14 K#J, jerkin, The origin or the popular press', History Today
VII (July, 1957), 429.
Instilled when first launched. Whereas other dailies had been
started primarily in the hope of giving their owners access to
political power and influence, the Daily Hall under Harmsworth
was intended to be a profit-making enterprise. later Harsisworth
was tc alter his priorities somewhat, but in the early stages
of his proprietorship at least, he was interested almost
exclusively in the acquisition of personal wealth. Indeed, it
can be said with no exaggeration that in the beginning he
devoted all his energies to securing this aim. At a time when
most newspapers were either family-owned or controlled by
politically financed cliques, the Dally Mall was started as
a public company, complete with stocks and shares for willing
buyers. Harrasworth, of course, retained for himself the
controlling interests in the paper| but by appealing to
investors he was attracting capital in the same way that other
companies tried to do on the stock exchange. Similarly, he
made quick use of the technological advances then taking
place both in America and Britain so as to reap a larger
financial reward. Only recently a number of mechanical
improvements had been made in the newspaper fields a rotary
press In place of the traditional flat bed printing in order to
speed up production! the introduction of linotype, a machine
which hastened the process of setting up and arranging lines
of typej and the development of wood pulp as paper with
sufficient tensile strength to withstand the pressure of the
new presses. ' 3y being the first to take full advantage of
these innovations, Harmsworth and his staff were able to have
2 0,000 copies of the Ially Hall cut, folded, and pressed per
15 Francis Uilliaas, PuMtjtiTMS frafatat (London, 1957),
pp. 122-124.
hour, a feat which reduced the production costs of the paper
by thirty to fifty per cent and which enabled it to be sold in
16
great numbers for half the price of its rivals#
Of course, this acre mercenary spirit which Hartasworth
introduced did not immediately catch hold in Britain.
Newspaper proprietors tended by nature to be opposed to change,
and for many of them the Da;lly Mall was what Lord Salisbury
once contemptuously called it - 'a newspaper written for
office boys by office boys'. In due course of time, however,
this type of sentiment began to fade, and in its place came
a growing respect for Harmsworth and his business-like
techniques. In 1900, Arthur Pearson established the
Dally Lxnress. another morning half-penny paper with
sensationalized news and numerous special features. But
Pearson was simply hoping to repeat Harmsworth's success
story, host owners adopted Harasworth's attitudes and methods
for sheer survival. For the fact was that the Dally hallf
although it appealed to a different class of reader, still
struck a blow at the economic well-being of even the oldest,
most respected newspapers. The reason is simple. Commercial
advertisers invariably did business with those newspapers with
the largest readership, and the Daily ptel! and the Daily ■ SPPflfilt
because of their huge circulations, quickly began to take in
a sizeable amount of the revenues from this all-ianortant
source. \s a result, all newspaper proprietors were forced
to adopt a more commercial outlook or face ruin.^ To the
owners of the 'class* newspapers this problem posed by the
16 Kennedy Jones, or. gjt.t p. 138,
17 Hale, CP, p. 16.
Dally Ha11 and the DaUy -iftPP9ga was particularly difficult;
for the* had tc consider how to win back the advertisers
without lowering the quality or seriousness of their papers,
uorae, like C.T. Dcott of the Manchester Guardian, managed to
remain financially solvent by improving the services and
features of their newspapers; while others, notably the
owners of the naily News and the Daily Chronicle, 3imply
reduced the price of their newspapers from Id. to £d. in
the hope of boosting circulations. All, however, began to
keep pace with the technical improvements and changing
attitudes. It was the only way to avoid succumbing to the
economic pressures.
Of the newspapers affected by the 'Harmsworth revolution',
undoubtedly the most important in the coverage of foreign
affairs was The Times. Founded in 173$, ifa TlBf8 was one of
the oldest dailies in the country and certainly one of the
most influential. Almost as far back as the date of its
establishment it had been in close contact with the Foreign
Office, and throughout the years this relationship had grown
so that by the beginning of the twentieth century The Times
was regarded the world over as a national institution and the
semi-official voice of the British Government. Heads of state
read its leader-articles with particular attention, and foreign
diplomats working in London regarded the opportunity of talking
to a member of The Times editorial staff as second in
importance only to a conversation with a Foreign Office or
Cabinet figure. The man who did most during this period to
help The Times maintain its high reputation was the paper's
Foreign editor, Valentine Chirol. A former member of the
19.
Boreign Office* Chlrol was completely trusted by his one-time
companions in the Diplomatic Lervlce. He was & good friend
of fir rank Lascelles, the British Ambassador to Germany,
oir Charles Kardinge, Ambassador to Hussia, and
Cecil dnrlng-nice* xiritlsh minister at Teheran from 1904 to
1906. Chirol also visited the Foreign Office regularly and
was on good terms with such figures as Hir Thomas ^ancerson,
the permanent Under-Secretary* *illlaia lyrrel, later
Hlr Ldward orey's private secretary* and Lyre Crowe. When
Hardlnge left at Petersburg In 1906 to take Landerson's place
in London* Chirol frequented the Foreign Office even more
often and was confided in on a widening range of issues.1
Chirol* taoreover, was an experienced traveller* and, while
abroad* he came into contact on numerous occasions with
leading members of foreign governments, businessmen, and
other journalists. These acquaintances gave him an unusual
Insight Into moods and attitudes in foreign capitals* as
Chirol's correspondence in The Times Archives Indicates.
let J4w vma'» claim to fame did not rest entirely upon
the activities of its Foreign editor, Lven if Chirol had not
cultivated so many friendships* the newspaper still would have
ranked as the most informative in Britain in the coverage of
world events. For TlBW had by far the most elaborate
foreign news service of any daily paper in the country. It
alone had correspondents In virtually all the world's
capitals, and the men it sent abroad often wielded an
18 Lara Lteiner, The Foreign Office and foreign I-olicy.
93-1914* (London, 1969), P. 139.
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influence that rivalled or even surpassed that of
II.M. Government's official representatives. In Morocco,
The Times correspondent '..'alter 3. Harris constantly gave
advice to British diplomats in the country. A resident there
since 1387, Harris was recognized throughout Europe as the
10
foremost estern expert on Morocco. 7 At Vienna,
Henry Vickham Steed reputedly gained the confidence of the
Austrian Government more than did the 3ritish Ambassador,
20
Sir George Goschen. And, indeed, in all the major European
capitals the correspondents of The Times were accorded rights
and favours which were usually reserved for British diplomats.
They were granted interviews with leading members of the host
government; they attended many of the same social functions
as did the Embassy staff; and they often had important private
contacts of their own. In Paris, still regarded in Printing
House Square as the most illustrious post of ail, The Times
correspondent Billiam Lavino repeatedly made use of friends
in high places to gain access to the Quai d'Orsay. Through
Eugene Ltienne, the influential deputy for the Oran and head
of the oarti colonlalf Lavino was able to meet Dclcasse, the
French foreign minister. Later, when ; tienne became Par Minister,
Lavino had an important link with the entire Houvier Cabinet of
1905-6.21
19 The History of The Times, vol. Ill: The Twentieth Century
Test. 1884-1912 (London. 1947J. p. 410. But as Zara Steiner
points out, Arthur Nicolson, the British Aihister at Fez,
ceased to listen to Harris after 1904 once it became apparent
■that The Times correspondent was supporting the Sultan's efforts
to resist France's penetration of Morocco. See Z. Steiner,
on. cit.. p. 188 n3.
20 Ibid.. loc. cit.
21 The History of The Times, vol. Ill, p. 377.
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.he importance of -he .imes's correspondents, however,
was not confined to their ability to secure sources of
information. Under the regime of Charles 'foberly >ell, the
:lanaging director of the paper, the chief function of a
foreign correspondent was 'to comment on the news rather
22
than give it'.' ' s might be expected, such a policy tended
to grant ..he .-Traes's representatives abroad comparative freedom
to interpret events as they saw fit. - rota time to time, of
course, the Foreign editor did intervene to make corrections
with -egard to style or obvious factual errors or to make
21
deletions in order to save precious printing snac©. ^ Moreover,
any article which ran counter to the general editorial policy
of the paper or threatened to offend significant sections of
British public opinion either underwent similar modifiestions
24
or was suppressed outright. * But in the main, a correspondent
22 u•.C. hobcrly Sell, pLS ^^criL-gjL Q^.r. B&grlYr 1 hi?), 1h; r 1 s ~ MPth 1r , • . ,»*
23 .ee, for example, Chlrol's letter to Lavlno, 19 -lay 1904,
in The Times Archives F(orelgn) L(etter) B(oek), vol. IV, 378f.,
in which an article written by the Paris corresponaent and his
staff about a proposed Channel Tunnel project is criticized by
the Foreign editor as being 'not mnglish at all, but a sort of
Anglicized rench'. Chlrol continues: 'there is scarcely a
sentence which we have not had to alter to some extent. The
same thing happens constantly with dramatic and artistic
critiques *.
24 Chirol was forever urging Lavino, for example, to tone
down ids articles on the Church-Btate struggle in France because
of the indignation these articles were producing in Roman
Catholic circles in Britain, bee Chlrol to i-avino, 6 October 1904,
The Times Archives F.L.3., V, 212, And, as will be exl'ined
In Chapter III of this thesis, many of the despatches of
The Tines correspondent at Fez in the soring of 1905 did not
reach the foreign news pages of the paper because their
strongly anti-'rench outlook conflicted with Chirol's and
Hoberly Bell's view of the first ioroccan crisis.
....... ;.ulw -/■ repor > n.c xojs with restrictions
imposed upon him bp his superiors* Considering that most
provinei .X newspapers o-" the dap had pet to acquire their own
foreign news survice and of ten quoted the despatches in
a M w i t t iiiria - ro - -*.xo t a ;'uiu • ex . . -x.... c. use. -i aco, - r-
xiic iat-.-rpret:.'tions vxdLch a correspondent dor .... a- - - ^ gave
to the news helped to shape the attitudes not nly of his
own newspaper"s readers but also those w„i a good naay other
..n .cv irdtoti hsrcu&haut the cc.arury.
..rc x rnat :. 1 .. ic ....... 14.0,3 reflected ..oil this ca.,i.asis
which the editors at riatiug douse dquare placed upon wiie
acquisition and the reporting oi foreippx news. Pa-., hirst two
pages rf the paper were filled with the customary classic'led
advertisements, after which cane the foreign news items* ah©
length of 1 e:o latter entries varied from day to day,
Uc lonuiug u on the a<jount of news available, ,3 & , , Uuey
occupied one, if not two, pages. longest- despatches
tended t. 0 >e fro..; the correspondents at the major x-uropean
ca; i - ..Is - -avi:io at arir, wOCi\,c maunders at ..--rli:;,
henry ict.;,a,; -tret, at /Icnaa* -vcix il there no news of
■ rv impor irmce to to reported, these uc.a a till rant .*ouc
long tip . holes. .avi.no, tor example, often rued to
sua :'.:;g tic roccedin^u of the Chamber ... x ^e utius for lack
yt in,, -otter to re ori. In subsequent pages, -,■■>-
devoted as aucr, if not more, space to foreign business and
financial aews in conjunction with its own City notes. It
also fad detailed law and police reports and covered the
parliamentary debates with greater thoroughness than any other
23.
newspaper. Jut Its coverage of domestic news tended to be
fatchy and Inferior to that of other London and leading
provincial dailies. On the editorial page, there was
proportionately less comment on home affairs than In other
newspapers. Instead, the accent was on foreign and imperial
matters, and scarcely a weekday passed without The fines
expounding Britain's relations with the Powers or the state of
the inspire, or both. Although technically an independent
organ of opinion without any political ties, The Times spoke
on issues of the day from a strongly Conservative viewpoint.
As far as foreign policy was concerned, this meant opposition
to virtually all things German, and it can well be argued that
before 1914 the utterances of The Tinea did as much as anything
to worsen relations with Berlin. But if, as one historian has
alleged, the editors and the various correspondents of
The Times around the world co-ordinated their efforts to
present Germany in the worst possible light, then it must be
said that they also worked together to help give ""ranee and
her policies a most favourable image. ' From Paris, levino
seat despatch after despatch about the enthusiasm with which
Frenchmen greeted the Entente Cordiale and the goodwill they
felt towards Britain} from Rome, William Hubbard wrote about
the desirability of an Anglo-French-Italian tripllce in the
Mediterranean} at St Petersburg, The Times correspondent stressed
Prance's efforts to smooth over any difficulties in Anglo-Russlaa
relations} and in London, Valentine Chirol steadfastly refused
to print anything that might tarnish the Entente or hurt French
feelings. This bias continued unabated throughout the decade
25 oee Hale, 00. cit.f p. 22.
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that preceded the First World ar.
In terms of influence, the only newspaper in 'ri'tain
tliat rivalled The Times was the :ea tains ter gazette. Uko
The linesf it had a small circulation of about 50*000 and
was in deep financial trouble for neat of the years of its
existence. Its annual loss of £10*000 eventually forced the
proprietor, Gir George Kewnes, to sell the paper in 1903.
Yet despite its flagging sales, the weatrainster gazette had
a political importance which few other newspapers in the
entire history of British journalism have enjoyed, It had
been founded in 1893 simply as a liberal alternative to the
tlurce or four Tory penny evening newspapers in London. But
when d. •••• Lyender took over as editor of the paper in 1098,
^iie Westminster began to grew in reputation. Lpender was
on good terras with many of the prominent figures In the
Liberal party, particularly Grey and Asquith, and when these
two men entered the Liberal Cabinet of Leceubor 19C5, the
Westminster was quickly acknowledged both in Britain and
26
abroad as the semi-official voice of the Government.*
Spender has subsequently denied in his memoirs that Grey used
his newspaper as a mouthpiece to voice Foreign office views and
added that Berlin wrongly attached too much importance to his
relationship with the Foreign decretory.2" But the
correspondence between the two men does not quite bear this
cut. n several occasions, Grey did seek spender's help in
Z£> Lara Acincr states that there were also financial connection*
between the 'estmlnster and the Liberal Cabinet but ddes not
elaborate on the claim, oee 2. Gteiner, no. elt.f p. 19C.
27 J .A. Gnendcr, J-j/e*. Igwnrjjsr,, ^.c, I
t London, 1927), p. 170.
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aiaking the Liberal Government'3 stance on foreign policy
matters clear, and. the Garnans were right to read closely the
po
leader-articles cf the estminstor.-
The presentation of the ■ ootninatcr ^aaette, however,
differed significantly from that of The Times. To begin with,
it was much shorter than its morning rival, Hard-oressed
financially, the .'esfcuinster averaged sixteen rages a day to
,.bc Giles's twenty; it had only one leader-article a <uay
instead of the normal three; and its foreign news service
was not nearly as complete as that offered by Printing House
square, Whereas me fines sent scores of men abroad to write
daily from their posts, the Westminster uazette eaplcyed but
a handful of foreign correspondents, each of whom reported
events irregularly. The costs were so prohibitive that even
an important city like Vienna was by-passed, Austrian affairs,
it was thought, could be adequately handled by the paper's
OQ
merlin correspondent# 7 Hut whatever the ..-eatalnster -a/ette
lacked in quantity, it sore than made up for in quality.
Spender's leader-articles, for example, were among the best
in Edwardian journalism. Printed daily on the front page of
the paper, they attracted the attention of important people
in both major political parties for their argumentation and
lucidity of style, Charles deafest was the assistant editor.
His 'Motes o.t the ..-ay1 column immediately followed Spender's
23 Towards Hie end of 1905, for example, drey asked Spender
to write an editorial refuting Conservative-Inspired rumours
that an incoming Liberal Government might go back on
Lord Lanedowne *s recent agreement with France. See Grey to
Spender# 19 October 1905, in the J»A# Spender Papers, British
iuseura dd US 46, 389; sec also Chapter III of this thesis
for further details,
29 Spender, or. cit., n. 168.
editorial aid dealt with domeatic and foreign news Items
equally well# In P.C. Gould, the paper had the siost celebrated
political cartoonist of the day, and various experts were
frequently called upon to write special articles relating to
their own field. Lucien Golf, the editor of the Pally xranhlcT
gave a more penetrating analysis of foreign affairs In a series
of articles under the pen name *Diplomaticus1 for the
/astrainster gazette than he had ever done as leader-writer for
his own newspaper. Politicallyt the festal nster expounded
only a moderate brand of Liberalism, fixe free Trade controversy
was its main preoccupation, and by far the largest number of
its editorials was devoted to combating Joseph Chamberlain's
campaign for Tariff deform. Foreign affairs, of course, were
another of the paper's chief concerns, and In this field the
. 'cstrains ter Gazette was a firm advocate of good relations with
vicrnahy and lussia as well as with France. But the paper never
joined the chorus of ladlcal Journalists hostile to
Lir Ldward drey's policies. Instead, it became after 1906 one
of the few organs of opinion in Britain to express confidence
in the Foreign secretary's policies while advocating all along
an understanding with Germany.
In appearance, the gafiftUg closely resembled
the rail ./all Gazette. Undoubtedly this was because the
Westminster was In many respects a continuation of that paper.
Throughout the 1880s the J-al-l Hall Gazette had been a Liberal
party organ. Then in 1892 the American multi-millionaire
Filllam .aldorf nstor purchased the paper and converted it into
a Conservative organ of opinion. L,I. Cook, who hitherto had
edited the , all Fall azatta. resigned to write leader-articles
27.
for the newly-founded cat:-;'rioter -azette. and J. . Bpender
and P.O. Gould, who also had been on the staff of the
nail full, joined him. Behind them lay a newspaper much
diminished in stature and rrestige. For although the
rail nail Gazette continued to thrive until well into the
1920s, it never secured for itself the same degree of Influence
with the Conservative oarty that it had earlier achieved with
the Liberal party under the successive editorships of
John 'orley, ,T, Gtead, and Cook. Bather, it sank to a
level scarcely above that of the half-penny London evenihg
papers. It had no foreign news service whatsoever and relied
completely upon teuter and other agencies for information. Its
leader-articles on foreign affairs, rinted on the front page
of the paper and characterized by some particularly provocative
titles, x^ere of the more hysterical anti-German kind usually
associated with the cheaper newspapers. Between 1996 and
19-9, :cu;:las straight was the editor-in-chief of the -all -all
Gazette, and I..G, Barnard was its foreign editor.-'
One newspaper which had been steadily improving its
osition throughout this period, however, was the :.cws.
In 1901, George Cadbury, the cocoa king, bought the paper for
a princely sura of money and immediately introduced several
changes in order to reverse its dwindling sales. Consistent
with his pacifist and ,uaker views, Cadbury first of all made
the pa er adopt a pro-Boer line during the Jouth ifrican ar.
L.I. Cook, who had been editor of the paper since he left the
fall '.'nil Gazette in 1896, resigned rather than support
30 Hale, ♦ cit., p. 17
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Cadbury's anti-Government outlook, and 4#G# Gardiner was
appointed to take his place# Under Gardiner, the Gaily News
recruited a galaxy of iadical journalists talents that helped
to sake it one of the most formidable left-wing newspapers in
Ldwardian Britain# H#*'# bavinson and H#N# Brailsford were
employed on the editorial staff, ana together with Gardiner,
they spearheaded the movement of the 'new Liberals' agitating
for sweeping social reforms# The Christian socialist writer
C#F#G» iasterm&n w*s the paper's literary editor, but he too
became caught up in the campaign against social injustices
%
and soon was devoting as much of his energies for the paper
to attacking living conditions as to reviewing books# Yet
for all this emphasis on Britain's internal problems, the
Lallv Gqwa did not ignore foreign affairs. On the contrary,
it was very much interested in this field# Along with
H#W, Biassingham and G#H. Ferris, the latter of whoa headed the
paper's foreign department until 1910, Gardiner was to make
the un.ilv I-lewa one of the most consistent critics of British
foreign policy between 1902 and 1914# The attacks on
Sir ~dward Grey for his insularity and his susceptibility to
the 'sinister influence' of certain anti-German permanent
officials at the Foreign Office constituted the central theme
of the paper's criticisms in this area. Indeed, by the time
the Agadir crisis had erupted in 1911, these attacks had gone
some way towards breaking up the Liberal party,^
Ho less striking were the improved finances of the CjttJ pgMfl
during this period. Gradually losing the battle for securing
31 Ibid., p. 23-24.
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classified - •"4 eo*r:oreial advert! senento, Codbury decided to
•»."*3 n re- "••CO the ":'ico •••" c ..."~rZ'JL
front If. to Vd. in tvr hope th -t t>.- ros ! tins iner-c-tsec sales
would more than offset the paper's cheaper price,J The
gamble nid off. In 19C5» the circulation of the fly qms.
rose to about 135f9COf an increaefepff' nearly^f&Pj OCC over the
corresponding figures for 1901, Five years laterf it was
selling 20ot( C copies a day. »y contrast with other
enntoap try Liberal newspapers, its growing clientele
c -nsiotcd of tec -le who came frtvi v ryinfc walks of life rather
than from any particular section of British society. In the
words of a recent biographer of rdincr, the . -.11; ■ vs 'made
its po.wl, not like the ex .. -hn...» to the gentlemen f the
rail :11 clubs, i( •, like the ...;no. ■ •: roan. to the
educated upper middle classes, but, more widely, to the
amor' hour, suburban classes whose self-regard and dedication
to self-improvement set the tone for the era'.^
.part fr- n the . ■•-.11;- ewst the only iberal morning --nx r
in ondon luring V Is period was the . -"i.p rxilofc. Like the
hews, ' " ^ niclo cut its "rice from 1 . to L?:. ir. <n effort
to continue attracting a reasonably large slice of the reading
public in the carital. In tills instance, too, the tactic
32 T' '-ot-li be - v-d, however, tV t 'edbury i. an
; artly responsible ior the financial difficulties of the
Daily Feva. "n brrmef the lucrative li-uor advert! se.mcnts on
the grounds that they might exercise an immoral influence on the
paper'a rendin • • udi "nee. "he e 'tally nopular r x: . tl a were
likewise excluded, -ee ibid., . 23.
33 ^ • o'1» -/cidswortib 9 ^ ^
f* ■ u- hc/i < oss, t-. • 9 r hi, ,Ui£
f/3:.i ■ ■- ■ "' , ■ .
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worked, .. the ll",' Chronicle manned t: stay in x-int until
1930, when it merged with its more ladical rival to become the
ows . .•/■. ;nlclc. " olitically, the iter's sentiments belonged
to the liberal 'Right*. Robert Lonald, editor of the
-ally C. nicle thr: 0h t much of this erioc', /as a prominent
member of the National Liberal Club and a fervent admirer of
Lord -osehery. Undoubtedly this friendship helps to explain
why the paper was imbued with a strongly Liberal Imperialist
outlook and usually, though not always, echoed .osebery's
opinions on the major issues of the day. One important
exception was the Anglo-french Latent©, which the Liberal leader,
but not the .nil, h.nlcls, regarded as danger' us far its
anti*-«orman implications. hut although the paper was closely
identified with a prominent figure in the Liberal arty, it
never wielded 0 much influence as either the v. otfce
or the k.'.wis. In art, this can bo attributed to its
smaller sine. Limited to a acre twelve nages r • y, >oth its
domestic and Its foreign news services tended to be more
incomplete than those offered in Spender's or Gardiner's
newspapers, oreover, .0 ebery's sway over fellow Liberals had
been steadily declining throughout these years, and,
corres ondingly, the -hirrnlclc '3 reputation as an influential
-taper bepan to diminish, Nevertheless, its short, well-tempered
leader-articles did attract a following, and along with the
the ally Chronicle distinguished itself
as one o a handful of newspapers in krltain to support rey 's
a ente olicies without abandoning the idea of a reconciliation
with Berlin.
rounded in 1772, the koi-nLn/- cut was the oldest of the
•quality' London dailies. Its proprietor was Igernon borthwlck.
later aron Glenesk, who bought the paper in 13?6 and turned
it into the voice of the British aristocracy. .'hereas "v fines
was read by the opticians, the diplomats, the City investors,
and the imperial administrators, the -lamina host appealed
•• -inarily to the lei suae clr?sIt devote .1 an inordinate amount
of space to social and literary columns that could only interest
nen and women of oroperty. Indeed, according to l. J. ilumenfeld,
the editor of the Daily Mallf the est was 'snobbish, with
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inform-?tion about duchesses one advertisements about butlers'.
Yet the paper had a serious side to it as well. within its
twenty pages was a comprehensive coverage of London, national,
and foreign news. It had numerous correspondents abroad, more
icrhaps than any other newspaper apart from Che Times. nd it
enjoyed some important links with the "'oreign Office.
Henry enser ilkinson, the renowned military exoert and foreign
affairs editor for the paper from 1895 to 1909, was the
brother-in-law of Lyre Crowe, H. \. Gwynne, editor-in-chief of
the .'hrnln.. Lost; from 1910 onwards, was a close friend of
Cecil hiring-{ice. As might be expected, the paper was
ultra-'Cory, almost reactionary, in its political outlook. It
bitterly opposed Irish Home lule, House of Lords reform, and
virtually all the social legislation proposed by the 1906 Liberal
Government. Its foreign policy was decidedly imperialistic, and
it -;as inclinew co look with misgivings upon any arrangements with
rival colonial Powers. In 1904, It berated the Conservative
Government Cor coming to terms with 'ranee. Later, however,
the paper redressed its outlook on the Hntente Cordiale, and
by the time that Gwynne had succeeded Wilkinson as chief
35 .noted in Wilfred Hindi.'s ,:he :9n<ru, PAt,,
■'ortrnit n 'cvs- i er (London, 1937)) . 5.
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leader-writer, the 'loraim': Host was, according to its biographer,
•first for England, then the Empire, and then France'.
Also solidly Conservative in its political opinions was
the holly Telesrarh. 3ut unlike Tiy? or the Msafe :
the Daily Tele^ranh did not speak for the governing Classes or
the upper echelons of British society. Instead, it reflected
the views and tastes of the new backbone of the Conservative
party - the middle class. Everything about the appearance of
the Dally Telegraph suggests that it was geared towards
attracting this particular group* it made some important
concessions to the 'Hew Journalism1 without lowering the tone of
the paper| it greatly extended its news service to cover
unusual items of interest as well as the main Issues of the
day}^ and it improved its financial news section In order to
attract more businessmen to suscrlbe to the paper. In
financial terms, such changes paid off handsomely. Circulation,
although steadily declining throughout these years, still
managed to stay above the 200,000 mark} and on the front page
of the paper there was the proud reminder that the Telegraph
was Britain's largest selling penny dally. At the same time,
the proprietors of the paper, the Levy-Lawson family, made
significant inroads on other newspaper owners in securing
commercial and classified advertisements. Next to the Daily Mail,
the Dgqfor ISdML&Sh was the most profitable venture in Fleet
Street.
36 Ibid., p. 237.
37 The daily column •Paris Day by Day*, which Informed readers
of the social and cultural goings-on in the French capital, was
one of the more prominent special features of the paper.
38 Hale, op. cit.t pp. 25-26.
Yet les ite its unhenia* Xe financial success, the
hailv ^eie r-'-ih somehow fell short of he in/ n truly /rent
newspaper. At hone, it had an contacts with important
;overnncnta1 figures| while abroad It was represented by few
men of distinction. True, in 3crlin the ■-■5l,r Tolcrrr h did
have on its staff two correspondents who were well received
at the ilhelmstrass©. J.L. lashford, whom one historian
has described as 'the most /re-German member of the British
foreign correspondent corps',^ reported for the paper until
1904. .«T. ilcox, resident correspondent for the
• : 1" "clc ■ h at Berlin from 1906 to 1914, w.-a also genuinely
liked by the1 German authorities. But neither Sashford nor
Wilcox had any real impact on the editorial policy of the
paper, which was largely pro-French and anti-German. :!oreoverf
the loader-articles on foreign affairs seemed to lack the
forcefulness and conviction cf those of other newspapers, a
fault which sight be attributed to the staff organization, of
the paper. "Jnllke most other organs of opinion, the
n11had no single editor. Rather, it employed a
l rou •• cf - •ranlists, eac? of -non vns RistJuJ. shed c .?• . n
his own right but was unable to devote his full energies to
writing for the paper. h.L. Courtney, one of the tost
consistent contributors, gave his first priority to editing
the ortni htly Review. J. . Garvin, another leader-writer or
the ?ele/;rar)ht wrote foreign affairs articles under the
ps-udonym 'dolehas' for several I .Guardian periodicals, likewise,
Archib Id iiurd was engaged in writing on military and
diplomatic matters for numerous other journals. This
arrangement was not rectified until well after the treat ar,
39 t JiLitJi*
when the ownership of the Daily Telegraph changed hands and
a separate foreign department under the direction of one man
was ere r.ci* for the aper.
Less important in almost every respect than the
-ail:/ ..cle. -;r'h was its orning rival, the •-.r-jrhic.
Of all the London newspapers, it offered the least value for
the money. Consisting of a mere twelve ;agos, little of
»•
which contained any news or comment, the -ally oranhic was
over-priced at Id. a copy. It appealed mainly to those
who wished to see rather than read the news; for throughout
the paper photographs and drawings abounded in place of
written articles. Its foreign news service was almost
non-existent, and the paper relied heavily u; on the established
agencies for the little information it did print. editorials,
which usually numbered three a day, were short and carried
little influence. Politically, the Lailv uraphic was
Conservative, although its leader-writer, Lucien volf, was a
Liberal - a combination which aight explain why the graphic
was toe least d-ermano hobe of all the Tory papers in London,
but despite .olf 's presence on the staff, the • 1 i/ •-.•■a diic
was not authoratlve newspaper, bignificantly, ..J. btead,
then editor of the ... rio- 1' -eviews and a man intimately
acquainted with the oritish Newspaper world, gave the paper
a rather low rating in his December 1904 inventory of London
editors and organs of opinion,
40 Of the •quality* London newspapers, otend put The Times and
the estriinstcr Gazette at the ton of his list in terms of
influence, followed by the .standard, the Dally Tews, the • forming
post. the Dally Chronicle, the Mcrnlnx Leader, the ot James's ""
uaaettc, ana tne ora^hfe. in that o^-der. .urorisingly,
; ; ' iL*. .pyctte below feme . ry .cm n a
separate category of newspapers which, as Dtead put it, 'combined
,4* s 4* v*in/^ 4* 4 t 4 # i
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over-dramatization of events# Selling for a mere *j?d. a copy
and presenting the news in a highly sensational manner, the
paper offered the reading public an inexpensive and exciting
■way of keeping up with trhat wa3 happening in the world. It
achieved this effect in the field of foreign affairs by
adopting a strongly patriotic, almost Jingoist, tone on its
leader pages, After the first Moroccan crisis erupted in
1905, it clamoured for a bigger navy, array conscription, and
the conversion of the Entente with Prance into a military
alliance. Thomas Marlowe edited the paperj H.tf. /ilson
was its chief leader-writer5 and Fenton Maepherson headed
the foreign department. But behind all these men loomed the
personality of Horthcliffe.
In 1900, Sir Arthur Pearson established the Daily Express,
another half-penny paper which enjoyed a mass circulation and
which dramatized the new®. It too consisted of eight pages
and devoted considerable space to classified and commercial
advertisements. 3ut its income from such jicurces did not
match that of the Daily Hall, and for the first decade or so
of its existence the Daily Express lost quite a bit of money.
It was the only newspaper In Britain to adopt the American
practice of featuring the news on the front page. The
headlines were not too bold or striking, but by merely
challenging accepted newspaper conventions, such a presentation
was bound to add an element of sensationalism to the Express.
Its leader-articles numbered only one or two a day. like those
of the Hail, they were short, to the point, and Conservative
in political outlook. The Daily xnress never shied away
from stating bluntly Its views on all subjects, and the paper's
bitter opposition to ~ree Trade became an Important asset to
Joseph Chamberlain in his campaign for imperial federation.
The .'neaross was particularly forthright' in its discussion of
foreign policy matters, and in this field it looked upon the
1904 understanding with ranee as an instrument to curb German
expansionism. : ear©an himself directed the paper from 1900
to 1903, In 1904, R,D« Blumenfeld, an American journalist
who eventually became proprietor of the paper, was appointed
44
editor,
Of course, the coverage of foreign news in the press was
not confined to the Louden, bailie; , In the evinces, too, there
existed a significant number of newspapers w; ich strove to keep
their readers reasc n.v oly veil infc; cc -n events sbrc - e. These
were the -enny uorning dailies that were printer in the larger
cities anu distributed throughout widespread regions of the
country. Usually, they were ably edited, end the judgments
which they passed on foreign affairs in their leader-articles
could sometimes be every bit as penetrating as those made in
the editorials of the London papers, Where the provincial
press lagged behind Its counterpart in the capital was in the
reporting of foreign news. 3y and large, the newspapers of
tanchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and other major
cities found it too costly to employ a staff of correspondents
writing from the Continent or elsewhere durin0 this criou,
but each of the most important provincial papers did have- a
nondon office, which kept in touch with the Foreign Office and
secured information from the established news agencies like
44 bale, v:ti pit;., p. 29
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Reuters as well as the foreign news services of the leading
metropolitan dallies, 's a result, the provincial press
laced less emohasis on international affairs than it did on
national or local news. Moreover, the foreign news that was
wired hone frr the London bureau tended to be. stale and out of
date by the tine it appeared in print. Nevertheless, many
provincial organs of opinion had journalistic qualities in
their own right and deserve to be read for giving one a
general idea of what people outside London were thinking and
writing about foreign .offairs.
Unquestionably the most important provincial newspaper
in Britain in the coverage and treatment of foreign news was
the anc;r.;tcr -uareian. Founded in 1821 as a 7d, weekly,
the . uch' a for -uardicn was one of t.-.e longest surviving organs
of cpie ion in the Forth of . aglarid. .ith f arliamerJ;'s reaal
of the stamp duty on newspapers in 1855» the ^warair i was
converted into a daily paper. Throughout its early life it
was only uilcly Liberal in its oolitic I outlook. hen the
Home Rule issue split the Liberal party in 1886, the paper
under the editorship of C.. . ^cott made an immediate swing to
the Left in its views. Thereafter it consistently espoused
Radical causes, regardless how unpopular these causes were.
During the Louth iriean campaign, for example, the .anchester
c-uardlan ccntinued to support the ioers, despite the act that
this stance cost the paper a heavy loss in circulation. ocott's
leader-articles, ci course, were not entirely responsible for
the paper's >.. a Cinc.nciol ccru'itics . "a the case with the
London dailies, the rovincial press was 'ut under considerable
strain in the competition for sales wits the arrival of the
39.
mass circulation dailies. In 1900, the first northern edition
of the ..-ally tall was printed, and the Guardian, because it
happened to be located la the same city that Harmsworth and
later other newspaper magnates chose to distribute their
expanding newspapers, was among the first to suffer, C. . Leott,
who in addition to editing the Guardian was also slowly buying
up the paper's shares, was thus forcet* to take drastic action.
Unlike some newspaper owners of the day who were in much the
same position, he did not seek to restore his paper's profit
margin by lowering its price. Instead, he chose to iraprovs
its quality and service. The space allocated th advertisements
was greatly extended, special feature articles were introduced,
and, above all, sore attention was paid to the length and
style of the leader-articles. Yet for all these alterations,
it took a long time for the paper to refccver, In 1905, the
year when the Jcott family took over full control of the paper,
the &Mba&Ji£L fliicfliift «tm Circulating only about
36,800 copies a day, no less than 12, CO below its corresponding
figure for 1898, In subsequent years, however, sales went up,
and by 1910, the paper was able to embark upon © foreign news
service of its own,'2''
Yet like fr'kE HiJSSA and the M&a38tiM&8L v&9 the
Manchester Guardian wielded an influence that was far greater
than its circulation figures would suggest, s the only
'quality' Radical daily in the Horth-west of England, it was
the spokesman for the progressive-minded educated classes not
only in Lancashire but in neighbouring counties as well# As
the only penny newspaper in Britain to expound a truly
45 Hale, , qffr,, pp. 3 -31? also ndsworth, cm. cit.. r. 25.
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anti-im; erlalist foreign policy during the 3oer ar, it also
gained a following in London and the South-east. lor ley,
Lloyd-George, and Campbell-, annerraan frequently read the
paper and were good friends of Scott. .."hen these three sen
helped to fcrrc a government in 1906, the lane he s tcr Guardlan
had- an insi-e view of one Liberal Cabinet in operation. -cott
was also intimate with Loreburn, the word Chancellor in
Campbell-bannernan's and Asquith's Governments. 'heir
correspondence during these years was prolific and touched
upon a number of matters, including foreign affairs, where
Lorehurn frequently impressed upon ->cott the dangers of
Gir Edward Grey's policies to Anglo-German relations. Jut
to suggest, as one- contemporary journalist has done,
that .cott laced too much confidence in the Lord Chancellor's
judgment .wen writing about foreign affairs in his editorials
is to overlook the ira ortanco which the editor of the
dandiester ^uardian had always attached to viewing international
relations from a highly moral standpoint,' The spirit of
righteous Indignation which prompted ^cott to criticize the
Liberal foreign secretary tine and again during this neriod for
ailing t'. find a proper solution to Europe's diplomatic
problems was the same as that which had earlier led him to
attack the Government during the South African campaign.
Moreover, id more significantly perhaps, the lane hew-wor . wardial
had been pestering the Foreign Office with demands for such
policies as an extension of the Entente Cordiale to incorperate
Germany as far back as the summer of 1905? several months
before ci tliwr wrey or ..oreburn took office#
46 dee J. . Hammond's article 'C.w. 3cott, 1846-1932' in
edited oy . . ,'adsworth (London, 1946), . 46.
Another English provincial newspaper of considerable
importance was the Birmingham Daily Post. Like the GuardlanT
the Post had been greatly affected by the Home Rule issue in
1886. But instead of adopting a more Radical approach to
politics, the paper gradually shed its progressive views in
the light of Gladstone's Bill and supported Joseph Chamberlain
in his efforts to create a Liberal Unionist party. From the
late 1880s onwards, its political outlook closely resembled that
of the Birmingham civic leader. In 1905, it backed Chamberlain
in his campaign for protectionism; in 1898, it first sought an
alliance with Germany; but when this came to nothing, it
echoed Chamberlain's plea for an understanding with France.
The Birmingham Post was a smaller newspaper than its more
left-wing counterpart in the North. It consisted of only
eight pages and did not devote much attention to foreign affairs.
Whereas the Guardian did at least employ men of the likes of
J.A. Hobson to Beport from South Africa during the Boer War,
the Post had no overseas correspondents whatsoever. Nor did
the editor of the paper employ Scott's practice of writing long
leader-articles on either foreign or domestic questions.
Moreover, the circulation of the paper was static and averaged
only about 28,000 copies daily between 1903 and 1908.
Nevertheless, the Birmingham Daily Post was the leading paper in
Britain's second largest city and was associated with one of
the most formidable politicians of the day. As such, its
47
leaders were bound to carry some weight in the country.
47 H.R.G. Whates, The Birmingham Daily Post. 1857-1957: A
Centenary Retrospect (Birmingham, 1957), PP. 122-126, 176; also
Wadsworth, loc. eit.
Founded In 1783, the Glasgow Herald was one of the oldest
and most respected newspapers in the country. Circulating
primarily in Scotland and to a lesser extent in Ulster, it
enjoyed an immunity from the competition which many English
newspapers had to endure as a result of the •Harnssworth
revolution*. Scotland did not have a mass circulating newspaper
until the Gaily Express opened a Glasgow office after the Great
War. Hence, the sales figures of the Herald and a number of
other Scottish penny dailies did not flounder during this
period. Between 1903 and 1908, the Glasgow Herald averaged
slightly more than *>0,000 copies sold per clay, a healthy
increase of 10,000 over the corresponding figures for the
48
early 1990s. The politics of the paper, however, are
difficult to pin-point. Traditionally, the Herald was a
Conservative paper, but under C.G. "tussell and William allace,
editors of the paper from 1388 to 1909, it adopted a more
Liberal outlook towards foreign affairs.Its attitude towards
France throughout much of this period, while certainly
pro-Entente, was somewhat cofcler than that of the bulk of the
Tory press, and occasionally the Glasgow Herald took part in
the campaign of the Radicals against 'secret diplomacy' and
excessive military expenditure.
The chief rival of the nlasftow herald in terms of
political influence in Scotland was the Edinburgh-based paper,
the Scotsman. Established in 1817 as both a literary and a
political newspaper, it made its appeal from the beginning as
43 Wadsworth, loc. clt.
49 Hale, opI clt.« p. 34-35.
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a 'serious' and a cultivated organ of opinion. Like
The Tinea in England, the Bcotsnan stood apart from other
newspapers in its appeal to the propertied and leisure classes
north of the border. Indeed, the similarity of the two
newspapers in this res ect was so strong that some people
dubbed the ^ootsman 'The Times of the North*. Politically,
the oaper was Conservative and its foreign policy was highly
imperial In outlook. At first, it greeted the 1904 Convention
simply for putting an end to colonial difficulties with France,
But like many right-wing newspapers in England, it later
campaigned for the conversion of that arrangement Into an
instrument to check German expansionism. The Lcotstqan had
no foreign news service of its own at the time and relied
entirely upon Heuter and the correspondence columns of the
London dallies, chiefly The XlUfl and the g&Ug XflJjgflBki tor
information, Dr Charles A.Cooper and J.P, Croal edited the
paper between 1903 and 1908,
Apart from the leading metropolitan and provincial dallies,
the only other newspapers worth mentioning are a handful of
those in the ounday press. And even of these not too much need
be written. For in Edwardian, as in Victorian, times, the
Sunday newspapers played a far less important role in informing
and guiding .British public opinion than do their latter-day
counterparts. The explanation for this, of course, can be
found in the social and moral conventions of the day. By
tradition, Bunday was regarded as the sabbath, a day of rest.
Not only did people take the day off work, but they also
rigorously abstained from any 'frivolous' activities such as the
50 Ibid. * p. 33? also C,", Cooler, ■\n ditor's Aetm?,^ect
(London, I096), p. 151.
reading of newspapers. Although the prejudice against Sunday
newspapers was beginning to weaken, Sabbatarianism was still
a force to be reckoned with at the turn of the century. Whan
fierce competition for readers induced the owners of the
Sally 'felecraoh and the llv Stall to publish Sunday editions
for their newspapers in 1899, religious groups, particularly
the Nonconformists, protested and a considerable uproar ensued
in the country. Shortly afterwards, both papers acknowledged
the public resentment and reverted to publishing only six issues
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a week.y Those newspapers that did resist the pressure of
the churches almost invariably suffered financially as a result.
The bsorverr oldest of the Bunday papers, was selling only
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about 5,'N 0 copies when Alfred Harmsvorth bought it in May 1905.'
The huncav Times, owned by an international business syndicate
under the chairmanship of Herroann >chmidt, was scarcely doing
any better; it failed to bolster its circulation beyond th©
35 ,000-30,000 mark. ^ Of course, there were exceptions,
blr George Hiddcll's bows of the .."orId sold approximately a
million copies every Sunday in the early 1900s, but its squalid
51 R. Pound and G. Harmsworth, Korthcllffo (London, 1959),
pp. 240-241; also H. Hobson, P. KnightXey, and L. Russell,
fc'aT.l Qrr 4n Intin^te ,.9,^,,^ timifoy T1«S6»
1822-1972 (London. 1972), r>. 72.
52 By the summer of 1908, however, the sales figure* for the
paper had risen to about 30,000. oee A.M. Gollin, The Observer
and J.L. Garvin. 19C-3-1914 (London, I960), pp. 6, 61.
53 adsworth, pp, Pl.t., p. 39; also Hobson et al.. op, ftU»i
p. xv. hchnidt was a German finmcier who had controlled
most of the shares of the Sunday Times since 1897. Among the
other mgfchers on the board of directors were Sir J-asil .uaharoff,
th© munitions agent for Vickers-Armstrong; Dr Jameson, former
Prime Minister of the Cape Colony; and Sir Arthur cteel- iaitland,
later M.P. for East Birmingham and chairman of the Conservative
rarty. Leonard Rees, formerly editor of the- defunct
-unds.y fecial, wrote leader-articles for the paper.
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articles on sex and crime and only served to reinforce the
prejudice of the Sabbatarians.**4 Indeed, it was only after
several years of technical changes and attempts to create a
new image that the Sunday press began to win over the reading
public. In the main, this was due to the efforts of
Northcliffe, who halved the price of the rbierver from 2d. to
Id, and installed J.L. Garvin, the accomplished leader-writer
for the Daily Teleeraoh, as editor in 1908, thereby in effect
giving the paper more quality and value for the money, 3ut
for the time being, both the Observer and the gnMl
lagged well behind the dailies in the dissemination and the
interpretation of the news, Neither paper had any overseas
correspondents and neither devoted any extra printing space
to special articles on foreign affairs. Leader-articles,
incidentally, were limited to one per week. Less lengthy
than those in the daily papers end more often than not devoted
to national rather than international news, they failed to
provide an adequate commentary on events taking place abroad.
Far more important than either the Sunday Times or the
Observer as a weekly source of information and opinion were the
London-based periodicals which sold for the then rather
prohibitive cost of 6d. These periodicals, or •class weeklies1,
as they were sometimes called, combined some of the best
features of the penny daily newspapers with those of the less
political monthly reviews. They not only gave considerable
attention to the renorting and interpretation of the news,
but they also devoted a good deal of space to literary and
cultural subjects. Indeed, out of the thirty or forty pages
they each printed every week, close to fifteen or twenty dealt
54 liobson £jUal*> - i Uw P. 72
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with such items as book reviews, stage productions, and
West End cultural exhibitions. The format of these weeklies
was very much the same. As a rule, the first few pages were
given to summarizing the main events of the week's news.
Written in paragraph form, each entry in this section provided
a reasonably- good recapitulation of major developments. Foreign
news figured prominently, although none of the weeklies sent
correspondents abroad. Then followed the leader-articles.
These usually amounted to four or five in number and were
written carefully enough to win a great deal of Influence in
political circles. After the editorials came several pages
of feature articles and weekly columns written by some of the
most talented contemporary journalists and men of letters. The
literary and theatrical reviews were relegated to the second
half of the periodical along with the advertisements.
Oldest of the 'class weeklies • was the Spectator. Founded
in 1828, it had by this time been in existence longer than any
of its rivals to reach the twentieth century. 3ut age was not
Spectator's only claim to distinction. For throughout its
comparatively long history, the meeta tor achieved a reputation
as being one of the most high-minded and politically rebellious
organs of opinion in Britain. Its long-standing association with
the Conservative party was from time to time jarred by what one
writer has called the paper's 'left centre' politics. The same
independent spirit that led the spectator to support the
Reform 3111 in 1832 and back the cause of the North in the
American Civil *ar led ife to side with the Liberals in the
fight against Tariff Reform in the early 190r3.But with
55 wiliiam 3. Thomas, Ifr? J for? pf foe ^-ygfofoy, 1?33-I?g9(London, 1928), op. 5-o.
regard to foreign affairs in the last decade before the
Great War, it adopted an outlook that was more in step with
that of its fellow Tory organs of opinion. Highly anti-German
in its views, the Spectator consistently beat the drum for an
alliance with both France and Russia in order to complete the
military encirclement of the Central Powers. John St Loe Strachey
editor and proprietor of the Spectator throughout these years,
was a close friend of Cecil Spring-Rise and through him had
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a number of important contacts at the Foreign Office.y
Equally influential with the Spectator was the trio of
Radical Liberal weeklies - the Sneaker, the Nation, and the
Economist. The aneaker was established in 1890 by Sir John Brunner
the Liberal industrialist, as a left-wing Intellectual
alternative to the Spectator. From the moment of its first
issue, it supported Irish Home Rule, campaigned for social
reforms, and sympathised with the trade unions in their
struggle for recognition. Foreign affairs, however, remained
very much in the background cf this paper's editorial section
until J.L. Hammond replaced Wemyss Held as editor in 1899*
During the South African War, it was critized in several
quarters for its 'pro-Boer' articles and later Hammond was to
heap praise on France and her handling of the Moroccan question
to an extent that went far beyond the bounds of Radical
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enthusiasm for the Entente Cordiale. Yet despite its
56 Stelner, os. clt.. p. 189.
57 See A.J,P. Taylor in which it is sAitd that Hammond 'stood
out in enthusiasm for France and dislike of Germany' In Radical
circles in Britain, whereas C.P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian,
for example, 'was always cooler towards France, and more
restless about Morocco'. This divergence in view about
France and the Entente might well explain Hammond's
afore-mentioned intimations that Scott leaned too heavily on
Lord Loreburn's judgment of foreign affairs, particularly
after the \gadlr crisis. Taylor, loc. clt.
controv rsial opinions, the eaker was constantly plagued by
poor sales. Its circulation, which reached 4,0C0 after the
first year of publication, was never high enough to make a
profit, and Brunner, tired of financing the taker's losses,
<g
sold the paper outright in 1907. The new proprietor was
Joseph Rowntree, the Yorkshire confectionery manufacturer and
philanthropist, who rechristened the paper '.he Ration'.
Rowntree appointed H.w. Massingha®, whose weekly column 'Persons
and Politics* had been one of the highlights of the docakcr.
as editor, and almost immediately the new periodical set out
eg
to distinguish itself against its less fortunate predecessor.J
The Ration expanded its news summary section, doubled the
number of editorials from two t< four, and recruited men like
irailsford, Kevinson, Hobson, and L.T. Hobhouse, to write
special articles on the leading cue.tions of the day. Under
classingham, the Ration also assumed a more balanced approach
towards foreign affairs than did the w-pcaker under Hammond, Gone
was the excessive pro-French bias, and in its place was substituted
an ardent desire to see the 1904 Entente followed up by a
similar arrangement with Germany. The persistence with
which the Ration pursued this theme made it one of the most
dedicated and formidable exponents of a pacifically oriented
British foreign policy. Unfortunately, it too suffered
chronically from financial troubles, and after the Great ar
the paper was forced to merge with yet another Radical weekly,
the flew
J3 otephen . . hoss, Johp ..runner; Hjdicq,, .lut^pp^,1342-1919 (Cambridge, tip. 159-160. 3y comparison, the
spectator was selling about 23 ,00C copies a week in 1903. Gee
Thomas, on. clt., p. 102.
59 H.W. Hirst, jfa t?H,e (Eondon, 1947), P. 205.
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The third leading Radical weekly, the Rc-nomjst, was
founded in 1843. As its title suggests, financial affairs
were the main ore-occupation of this periodical. The
literary and cultural items that filled the pages of the
other 6d. weeklies were excluded from the Economist in order
to make room for banking news, trade statistics, and stock
market reports, international as well as Aational. But
politics also had a place in the make-up of the paper, and as
was the case with the Spectator and the Nation, the Economist
devoted several long leader-articles every week to a
thorough discussion of major events at home and abroad. The
paper's deeply engrained Liberalism and its traditional
emphasis on commerce combined to give it a strongly Cobdenite
outlook on foreign policy matters. In 1904, it welcomed the
colonial settlement with France for many reasons, not the
least of which was the improved trade that this arrangement
promised to bring to the two countries. For most of this
period, the Economist was edited by Edward Johnstone, a
journalist who had previously worked in the financial news
departments of the Scotsman and the Pall Mall Gazette.
Johnstone's narrow interest in this field led him to employ
several men to write about foreign affairs, a practice which,
like J.M. Le Page's managing of the Daily Telegraph, did not
always produce a consistent approach to this all-important
area. Then in 1907 F.W, Hirst became editor and stamped his
own personality on the paper. He wrote all his own editorials,
and as a devoted disciple of Gladstone and a close friend of
John Morley, he gave the Economist a mire Radical flavour.
Between 1903 and 1914, Hirst took up the cudgels along with
fellow Radicals Gardiner, Massingham, and ocott in attacking
/a
Sir Edward Grey's 'unLlberal' foreign policy."
Finally, there are the Socialist weeklies to be considered.
Three principal organs of opinion fit Into this category -
Justice, the Labour Leader? and the Clarion - all of which came
into being as a result of the growth in size and influence of
the organised labour movement in Britain since the last two
decades of the nineteenth century. Each of the three either
represented or became identified with a differing strand of
the movement. Justice, founded by M.M. Hyndman in 1384, was
from the moment of its inception the weekly spokesman for the
Marxist Social Democratic federation; the labour Leader, edited
by J. Bruce Glasier, was the official voice of the Independent
Labour Party. The Clarion, on the other hand, had no such
formal connectiohs. Edited since its first issue in 1391 by
Robert Blatchford, an independent left-wing thinker, this
periodical was more a forum for the various types of
Socialists - Fabians, Marxists, and others - than a spokesman
for any particular group. The strong emphasis which all three
of these weeklies placed upon changing social and economic
conditions at home precluded their spending much time on foreign
affairs. Moreover, the little that was said about diplomatic
questions was quite often out of step with the opinions of
other dissident groups. Of the Socialist weeklies, only the
Labour Leader adopted an outlook that consistently approximated
that of the Radical Liberal press, Blatchford of the Clarion
was to sound the alarm about an impending German invasion with
60 The Economist 1343-1943. 4 Centenary Volume (I^ndon, 1943),
pp. 19, 90-91.
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Increasing frequency as time went on during these years;
while Hyndman in Justice was busily advocating a citizen's
army to resist such an invasion. Nevertheless, both
Justice and the Clarion as well as the Labour leader were
representative of a movement that was beginning to grow out
of its embryonic stages at the time in Britain and as such
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form an important part of British public opinion.
By recording and emphasising such information, one can
get a general impression of the newspapers and their format,
political complexion, financial state, and comparative appeal
to the public. Yet however valuable these facts are, they
do not give one a proper idea of the interest which the
British press had in world affairs. Even a comprehensive
examination of the foreign departments of the various
newspapers does not necessarily reveal the extent to which
the press kept abreast with developments and events
happening abroad. One way of accomplishing this task,
however, might be to compare and analyse the percentage of
editorials which contemporary organs of opinion devoted to
foreign news. Of course, such a survey, when restricted to a
few papers and when intended to cover a short period of time,
cannot claim to be thorough. Nevertheless, by taking a fairly
wide cross-section of newspapers and periodicals and by
examining the contents of their leader pages, one can make a
reasonably discriminating evaluation of the interest of the
contemporary British press in foreign affairs. The table
below lists fourteen leading newspamers and periodicals of the
61 The increased sales figures of two of these journals reflect
well the growth of the Socialist movement during this period,
^he Clarion made a steady increase from 40,000 copies sold a
week in 1904 to 74,000 copies in 1906. Similarly, the Labour
Leader went from 13,000 to 40,000 between 19C4 and 1909. See
W. Stewart, f,t Kc^Lr Hard}?: a Bfrpflrapfry (London, 1921), ■ v
pp. 235.; and L. Thompson, Ba&er^ (London, 195 l)fj V
P. 179. 1 ft:
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day and compares their interest in foreign affairs for the first
six months of 19G4:^2




The Times (Conservative) 460 196 42.6
Economist (Liberal) a7 37 42.5
Tall .-'All Gazette (Con.) 15$ 63 40.6
(Gon.) 13c 51 39.2
Daily Hail (Con.) 319 113 35.4
kaAJy. (Con.) 160 46 28.8
Glassow Herald (Con.) 731 209 28.6
dirfsinfiiittia LaAX? (con. )633 164 25.9
speaker (Lib.) 72 17 23.6
Scotsman (Con.) 579 134 23.1
'all,y ^e,w,s (Lib.) 319 186 22.7
Westminster uazette (Lib.) 167 37 22.2
Manchester Guardian Uib.) 617 136 22. C
GftJLly Chronicle (Lib.) 635 105 16.5
Total 5564 149* 26.9
The first remark one might make about the above table is that it
tends to verify the '-re-eminence of The Times in the discussion and
the commentary of foreign affairs. The margin between that
62 Exactly whet is meant by a deader-article on foreign
affairs' (I.e.T the third column from the right in the following
table) is not easy to define, and in many cases a rather
arbitrary decision was made about whether or not to Include certain
editorials in this category. Generally speaking, however, all
leader-articles that dealt with British foreign policy or which
commented on any events happening abroad, whether diplomatic,
political, social, or even cultural, have been treated as if
they fit this description. On the other hand, leader-articles
on imperial matters^ unless they happened to discuss Britain's
relations with the Towers, have been excluded from this category.
Likewise, leader-articles on those questions that do occasionally
touch upon foreign affairs - such as those on defence estimates
or trade figures - have been excluded, unless they actually
Involve a discussion of British foreign policy.
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newspaper and other organs of opinion is not as wide as one
might have imagined, perhaps, hut the figures speak for
themselves. With the possible exception of the Lconomist,
whose completeness and authority in writing about world-wide
financial matters made it a keen observer of events taking
place abroad, The Times stood above all other competitors in
this respect. Rut this is only the most obvious comparison
to be made. There are others which arc of no less interest.
If for instance, one chooses to divide the fourteen organs
of opinion along political lines and compare the percentage of
leader-articles devoted to foreign affairs in the eight
Conservative papers with the six Liberal papers, one arrives
at the following results:
TYPE OF TOTAL NUMBER OF LEADING ARTICLED ON Mf,F««,Arp
W5WSPAFER LEADING ARTICLES FOREIGN AFFAIRS nU i iau
Conservative 3167 976 30.8
Liberal 2397 518 21.6
A similar division between the London and provincial press reads
as follows:
London 3004 351 28.3
Provincial 2560 643 25.1
Of course, neither of these last two tables reveals anything
conclusive} nevertheless, one can speculate upon the reasons
for the results they give. If, as the figures seem to suggest,
Conservative newspapers were somewhat more interested in
foreign affairs than their Liberal counterparts, it is not
because of any undue disregard for developments abroad on the
part of the latter group. The Liberals did like to keep
themselves well posted on events taking place outside their
country, particularly should these events have an important
bearing on political and social problems at home. Rather,
the difference can probably be attributed more to the
attitude of the Conservative newspapers. Taken as a whole,
the Conservative press did follow foreign developments very
closely, if only because of its deep - in some cases extreme -
sensitivity to the 'dangers* which these developments might
have upon national security or upon the welfare of the Empire.
Internal matters were discussed proportionately less often,
possibly because the Tories felt that these were not as
immediately important as the prospect of German hegemony on
the Continent or Russian expansionism in Asia. The even wider
discrepancy between the London and the provincial press Is no
less explicable. 4s has been pointed out before, London was
the bottleneck of virtually all the news coming into the
country. Many London newspapers, moreover, had direct access
to the Foreign Office and to the staff of the major embassies.
Thus it is hardly surprising that, taken together, they should
devote a higher proportion of their editorials to foreign
affairs than, for example, the Glasgow Herald or the Scotsman.
Yet whenever the reasons for these results, one point remains
clear: the newspapers and journals, regardless of their
political persuasion or of the area of the country in which
they circulated, all had a great deal to say about foreign
affairs. Admittedly, throughout this six month period the
Far East was in a state either of crisis or war - one factor
which undoubtedly helped to raise the percentage of editorials
devoted to foreign affairs in all the various organs of opinion
But even if there had been no conflict between Russia and Japan
It is unlikely that the press would have greatly reduced the
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number of their editorials on this all-important subject.
Great Britain had too much at stake overseas for her newspapers
to ignore or overlook for long even the seemingly most
insignificant foreign developments,
3« Parliament and the Civil service
Hence, the field of foreign affairs was sufficiently
covered by e cente r orary press tc merit an examination into
a subject like British attitudes towards "ranee and the.
Entente Cordiale. But such a study warrants our attention
all the more when considered against the background of early
twentieth century developments and the manner in which these
developments came about. The years 1903-1903 belong very
much to the period which diplomatic historians have long
since come to call 'the era of secret diplomacy'. Not only
were treaties and dinlomatic arrangements often furtively
concluded, but they were all too often executed with scarcely
any popular supeitfsion. Even in those countries where
democracy was theoretically most advanced, the public enjoyed
little control. In Britain, Parliament could debate and
criticize i .-reign olicy otters, but it deb&r ed fr-xa
vetoing or ratifying treaties unless these treaties involved
the cession of territory or financi 1 expenditure. >-i The
most that dissident M.P.s or peers could hope to do was to
influence indirectly the Government's policies, but the
likelihood of even this happening was rather slim. oreign
affairs tended tc rank low on the agenda of items to be
discussed, with the result that parliamentary debates on this
63 -tciner, c-it.. r. 192 3^.
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cll-i "'•ortnnt realm of affairs were few and far between. Moreover,
even hen such debates did take ^lace, they were hopelessly
inadequate and posed little threat to the Government. fter
1904, when the Liberals enthusiastically supported
Lord Lansdowne's understanding with the French, the two major
Parties i C .".'ered little in their a--roach to fr reign' affairs,
iiatever criticisms or queries did arise .?s'■mil ' come from
Radical Liberal, Socialist, or right-wing imperialist circles.
aced with the combined opposition of the two frent benches -
whose whins, incidentally, exerted tremendous pressure on M.P.s
to toe the official line - these groups had almost no chance of
fui
nlterirq tho course o;' ritish foreign -olicy. * Fit this was
not oil. If Parliament had little authority over the management
of rit.ish foreign olicy, then it hod still less to say about
the f"mul:;tion and execution of it. These two areas were
left almost entirely in the hands of the Cabinet and the
Foreign ffice. Is the permanent officials of this latter
institution were recruited almost exclusively from the
upper classes, this meant that the fundamentals of the
decision-making process of British foreign policy were
consistently cut of touch with pcoular sytrr nthiec and movements.
Indeed, so remote was the T'orcigc "ice fro?- the general ^ublie
that for many reformers of the period a widening of its social
base -nd a revamping of its select*on r-ccdures became urgent
necessities if Britain were to ichievo a truly democratically-
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controlled foreign policy. y
64 Fax Beloff, I.ucien Wolf and the Anglo-Russian Lntente,
1907-1 14 (London; 1951J, . 3.
6p The need to reorganize the foreign Office was argued most
forcefully by It&dicals and Socialists in ritain curing the
Great nr. iee, for example, Arthur Ponsonby*s enocracy and
Diplomacy - A Plea for Popular Control ex creikn ;olicy
(London, 1915), ^.67.
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various Restrictions placed upon the
democracy in the control of foreign -ollcy at this time in
irit-in, one question almost inevito" ly -rises. ere the
Governing class^^yK^ly^j^nns, ftp HInpnj^lifl the
ciVxl servants - influcncec at all by the more populaR
eleoent^^pjfcritish society in the for)|^||(^^in and execution
'of foreign rolicy? To answer in the i||®e1fe|^jjpuld be to
the matter; for j^rf^Mrsi to |f|
the contrary, both the Cabinet and the Foreign Office did
reiP°9!fl-.' pr«s«ur#s from-below* Thus
in 1903 the campaign waged in certain sections of the press
and by a back-benchers at Westminster did
dissuade Lord Lansdowne from working side by i|j||^MTil the
e
Thus, too, t o oreign Office felt obliged to leet and inform
joarnali8ts^|^^j^&p|A^|My|us pressure groups oa s.
person-to-^erson basis. Although such meetings tended to
WBSJ-111,31 and :*anha2ardl^ arranged,66 they did at least
--C r\ or e - U; e nJ /. . : <$c . . age
-acre was at this time no press bureau in the oreign
<ffice. Instead, journalists and editors were privately
received by senior men at the department, ineludin. the
preign gecrctary hinself on occ sion. uring ' is tenure t.
{--gn : : ice, «ir .cward -rey c: nferred eriocicaily
with the likes of Valentine Chirol of The Times and
• * • V1--' ; tin; t..ii : Ct-ce''out m - tasi of
dealing «'i th less influent i *\1 nc v; s - a^ornon to his or i vote
secretary, William Tyrrell, Neither Grey nor Tyrrell was
forced to speak to outsiders, of course, and both did so
-•-.y l. 11■-itr :nr< oi scroti on* ,.uca 'n-.Iks, moocove r, .,er--
not granted to everyone. The Foreign "Tf ice excluded all
but the most prominent journalists, and even some of thogip'
c
Harold Spender, a leader-writer in the foreign department
of the Daily News from 191? to 1914, explained in his memoirsi
' •: reign : ice did not serin j.e .. :r.e iis . 1 -31:• ' ■ tion
r " ." ; ' " .
criticized a foreign secretary too severe!. , he hoc. - very
simple means of punishment - he closed the d.-nrs of the
h oreign i ice to that noner. nho.t was a very severe blew.
For the very secrecy of the Foreign Office made the entry
all mile more desirable*. oee n. .mender. The i* ire of Life/,
and exchange ideas and opinions. The link between the
Foreign Office and the press, states 2ara Steiner, was 'a
two-way process'; while the former tried to influence the
latter 'through private contacts or public pronouncements
with V-rying degrees of success', the latter sought to
advise the former, particularly on those occasions when the
press had reason to believe that its correspondents were
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better informed than were the diplomats themselves. In
opening its doors to outsiders in this fashion, there was
a hint of recognition on the part of the Foreign Office
that the press had an important role to play in the moulding
and shaping of public opinion.
67 s a case in point, Dr Gteiner cites the activities of
G.i^. /iorriaon, the ar -astern correspondent of the limes,
whose timely despatches at the turn of the century alerted
the titish Government to iussian encroachments in China
long before did the despatches of the Government's official
representatives in that quarter of the globe. Gee ^teiner,
op. clt.. pp. 136, 188.
CHAPTER II
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-1905
By the outset of 1903 Anglo-French relations were In a
more satisfactory state than they had been for a considerable
period of time. In a sense relations had never been as poor
as they might have been, for even in difficult times Britain
and France had always been able to identify with each other
through their geographical proximity and cultural and
political affinities. But in the early years of the twentieth
century, conditions had been improving enough in other aspects
to help draw the two countries closer together. Trade was
steadily growing, and, at a time when Britain was beginning
to share the French fear of Germany, there was an absence of
any serious Anglo-French quarrels. The Fashoda crisis was by
then nearly five years old, and older colonial controversies
between the two Powers had become dormant. Even the mutual
recriminations in the press of the two countries, which in the
past had so often plagued their relations, slowly subsided
with the passing of the Boer war and the Dreyfus affair. All
that was required to convert this reasonably happy state of
affairs into something more positive was an open gesture of
friendliness on the part of one Power to the other, and
this King Edward VII provided with his successful visit to
Paris in the spring of that year.
In Britain, the press gave much publicity to the trip and
emphasized its cordial nature. Special attention was paid to
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the supposed impact of the monarchy on the course of diplomacy,
and phrases such as 'the living factor of the Crown' and 'the
genial tact of King Edward' were frequently used to describe how
Edward ¥11 had personally cemented this friendship. But at the
same time newspapers were careful to point out that the visit
had no motive other than to promote friendlier Anglo-French
relations, which for many was only logical in view of all the
similarities in the national way of life of the two countries.
The Times, for example, wrote:
Certainly there is no nation between whom and ourselves
such a sense of brotherhood seems more natural and
attainable than the great neighbour to whom we are
already bound by so many ties of common interest. French
civilization and French thought have always exercised a
profound influence upon our own development, nor can it
be doubted that the constitutional liberties so long
enjoyed by the people of this country have in turn
profoundly modified the course of French political
development.... There is no specific political purpose,
no hidden arridre rensee. in the King's visit to Paris,
nor will there be anything of the kind about the visit
which we hope M, Loubet may be able to pay to London. 1
Even the possiMLity that a settlement of the major colonial
disputes between the two Powers might result from the new
Entente initially went unraentioned. Then in the early summer
of 1903, several weeks after the royal trip, Eugene Etienne,
the French deputy for the Oran and head of the parti colonial.
and Sir Charles Dllke, the venerable Radical member for the
Forest of Dean in the House of Commons, wrote articles for
the National Review and Empire Review respectively in which
they contended that Edward VII's visit provided the proper
atmosphere for settling Anglo-French differences in Egypt,
2
Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, and the New Hebrides. Although
1 The Times. 4 May 1903.
2 Eugdne Etienne, 'The colonial controversies between France
and England' National Review, 41 (July, 1903), 732-748a; and
Sir Charles Dllke, 'An arrangement with France', Empire Review. v
(June, 1903), 439-441.
Etienne and Dilke were not in full agreement as to what would
constitute a fair deal for both Powers, their articles
prepared nublic opinion for some political consequences
arising out of the Entente.
1. The 1904 Convention: its terms and its critics.
Nevertheless, in Britain there was no serious public
discussion of such a settlement until the two Governments reached
a formal agreement on 8 April, 1904. This famous Convention was
presented to the public in the form of three separate documents.
They dealt with Egypt and Morocco, with Prance granting Britain
a virtual free hand in the former and Britain giving the same
to France in the latter; the surrender of French fishing
rights off Newfoundland in exchange for British territory in
West and Central Africa; and, lastly, a document settling
various Anglo-French disputes in Siam, Madagascar, and the
New Hebrides. The nineteen-page declaration on Egypt and
Morocco was not only the longest of the three treaties but
the most important as well. In it Britain recognised that
France had the right to penetrate Morocco for the purpose of
civilising the country and subduing lawlessness. In return
France promised that she would no longer protest against the
British occupation of Egypt and agreed to support any necessary
financial reforms there. The articles regarding Morocco
contained several additional stimulations. France was required
to guarantee the 'open door' and free trade there for at least
thirty years; she had to pledge that no new fortifications
would be erected on the Moroccan coast between Melilla and
'the right bank of the River Sebou'; and she promised to
take into account the special interests of Spain in Morocco
in a later Franco-Spanish agreement. Both Powers made the
important promise not to alter the political status quo in
either of the two North African countries, and by the terms
of Article IX they agreed to give one another diplomatic
support in the event that an outside Power should challenge
this portion of the Convention.
The second document settled what was by 1904 the oldest
of all Anglo-French disputes - the exclusive right granted to
French fishermen by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1?13 to bait and
dry fish on Newfoundland shores. The 1904 Agreements ended
this privilege, thereby placing British and Canadian fishermen
on an equal footing with the French. As compensation, the
British Government promised an unspecified financial indemnity
to those Frenchmen affected by the Convention and gave the
French various pieces of British territory in Africa. These
included a slice of British Gambia which became part of an
enlarged French Senegal; the addition of a sizeable tract of
land in the Sokoto region of Northern Nigeria to the territory
already held by France near Lake Chad; and the cession of the
lies de Los, a group of islands off the French Guinean port
of Konakry. The third agreement did not involve the exchange
of any territories and merely recognised on paper certain
existing facts as they were. The two Governments agreed that
the French and British spheres of influence in Siam lay
respectively east and west of the mouth of the River lienam.
In Article II Britain withdrew her protest against the French
customs tariff and trade monopoly in Madagascar. And in
Article III both Governments agreed to appoint a future
Commission to settle the disputes of their nationals living
63.
In the New Hebrides.^
The form in which the two Governments drew up the 1904
Convention is of some importance because it had considerable
bearing on the way the press discussed the final terms. Most
British newspapers could find some criticisms to make, however
trivial, and these were generally conducted in the same context
as the three treaties. What Britain gained in Egypt was
usually compared to what she lost in Morocco; Newfoundland
and West Africa were similarly mentioned together; and the
arrangements involving Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides
were again discussed separately. The newspapers and other
organs of public opinion in Britain by no means always regarded
the Anglo-French Agreements from the simple point of view of
gain or loss. But on those occasions when they attempted to do
so, the general conclusion was that Britain surrendered more
than she gained.
This assessment particularly holds true of the
Egypt-Morocco barter. There was considerable surprise that
British diplomats could put the Egyptian and Moroccan questions
on the same footing and settle them accordingly. Since 1882
Britain had in effect been in occupation of Egypt, reorganised
its finances and government, and, as far as many were concerned,
generally raised the standard of living there. All that she
4
lacked was formal French recognition of her position. In
contrast, Morocco was still open to the rivalries of the Powers,
and French interests there, though growing by 1904, were far
from paramouht. Only recently, for example, had France begun
3 Accounts and Papers: State Papersf CIII (1905), Cd.2383-85.
4 Observer, 10 April 1904.
to compete with Britain in lending money to the Sultan,
Moreover it was Britain, not France, who was still Morocco's
leading trade customer. It appeared to much of the press,
therefore, that Britain was making substantial concessions
in Morocco merely in order to consolidate further the already
strong position she enjoyed in Egypt,
The criticisms directed against other parts of the
Convention were not so widespread. They were, in fact,
largely raised by two newspapers, the Horning Post and the
Observer, whose concern for the 'regrettable absence of
mutuality about the concessions made in Morocco' led them
to scrutinize every detail of the treaty. They concluded
that the transfer from British to French hands of several
thousand square miles of African territory in addition to
the large indemnity to French fishermen was too high a price
n
to pay for France's renunciation of the 'Treaty Shore'.
And while both papers were reasonably satisfied with the
provisions pertaining to Siam, neither was happy with
Britain's recognition of the French tariff in Madagascar
br with the exclusion of Australia from the proposed Commission
on the New Hebrides question.^
5 Scotsman. 9 April 1904.
6 Gaily uraahic, 23 March 1904; also Aberdeen Free tress,
13 Anril 1904; and Economist. 16 April 1904,
7 In fact, the ceded portions of Gambia and Nigeria were
from the British point of view quite worthless. They were
unproductive and of little strategic importance. France
desired them only because they provided better access to her
trading osts in the interior of Africa# However, the
lies de Los, because they contained a fine natural harbour
and were located off rench Guinea, would have been of some
strategic value in the event of an Anglo-French war,
_o Horning "ost, 9 April, 1904; also Observer, loc.cit. The
dispute between the two Powers in the New Hebrides" "was a
complicated one involving land claims and jurisdiction. Neither
I rench nationals nor British subjects would accent each other's
rule, with the result that the conflicting claims which had
arisen about property went unsettled. Australia over the yearshad meanwhile built up a growing trade with the islands and had
particular reason to believe that French plans to erect
65.
Moreover the 1904 Convention had its shortcomings when
taken in its entirety. Despite the ambitious attempt to
settle all the outstanding colonial differences between the
two countries, it fell short of being comprehensive. There
still remained several minor disputes involving the complaints
of private British firms which had encountered unfair practices
from their French competitors abroad. The most serious of
these occurred in the French Congo, where since 1899 the
so-called regime concessionaire enabled French capitalists
to seal off large portions of the colony and claim as theirs
both native labour and the natural wealth. In response to
public concern about France's contravention of the Berlin Act
of 1885, which created a free-trade zone in the Congo basin,
and the exploitation of native Africans, the British Government
were obliged in 1903 to ask the French Government if the Congo
question could be included on the agenda of items to be
settled.^ But the latter declined on the ground that it was helpless
to coerce local French officials, who were responsible for the
10
situation. ~ The fact that the concessions system was allowed
fortifications and convert the New Hebrides into a penal colony
would damage her interests there. She therefore wanted a say in
any settlement. But in October 1906 a purely Anglo-French
solution was reached, whereby a British and French High
Commissioner were appointed with authority over their own
nationals and the natives only. A mixed Tribunal was created
with the King of Spain choosing the President of the Court to
handle the disputed land claims. Both countries promised not to
establish penal settlements or erect fortifications. Gee Accounts
and Papers: State Papers, XCIX (1908), Cd. 3300«
9 See Lansdowne's letter to Monscn, the British Ambassador in
Paris, in which the Foreign Secretary gives some details of the
pressures he was subjected to to raise the Congo question to the
French. Lansdowne to Monson, 7 July 1903, F(oreign) O(ffice) 27/3616.
10 This was the explanation given to the Commons by Karl Percy,
the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in reply to
questions raised earlier by Lancashire MPs on behalf of Liverpool
firms as to why the matter had been excluded from the Convention.
Percy's statement was also directed to Sir Charles Dilke, whose
questions had shown more interest in the plight of the Africans.
Hansard, Pari. Debates, H. of C., Fourth Series, vol. CLI
(3 August, 1905), 146.
to continue in the French Congo was seized upon by the Morning
Post as a major flaw in the Agreements. For it was convinced
that, if left unattended, this 'intolerable and humiliating'
11
situation would do serious harm to Anglo-French relations.
A more recurrent criticism dealt with the almost blithe
manner in which Britain and France parcelled out territory and
concessions to each other. In Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland,
and Siam the two Powers effected changes with little or no
consultation of native opinion. Not unexpectedly, left-wing
Journals like the Clarion regarded such considerations as
12
one of the many vices of colonial politics, but, as will be
seen, their annoyance was overshadowed by the belief that the
Entente heralded a more important peace-keeping arrangement
in the world. Others took note of the possible consequences.
In a book written to rouse public opinion against the coming
1^
settlement, Mousa Aflalo, an Anglo-Moroccan businessman, J
warned British investors that the by-passing of the Sultan in
this arrangement could only serve to incite further the already
existent native hostility to foreign influence. He suggested
that Britain and France assume an 'associated control' over the
11 Morning Post, 19 November, 1904.
12 Clarion. 15 April. 1904.
13 Aflalo's family background and the position he held at the
time of the signing of the 1904 Convention are somewhat obscure.
It is known, however, that he worked in England as unofficial
agent for the late Grant Vizier, Mulai-Bl-Hassan and that he held
this post for about a decade. After falling from favour at Court
circles in Fez with the accession of a new Sultan, Abdul Aziz,
Aflalo appears to have become involved with various British
financial groups, and in early 1903 he became the London Agent
of Legation Bankers, a financial syndicate whose avowed purpose
was to prevent Morocco falling into complete financial dependence
on France by issuing loans to the Moorish Government at low interest
rates. See the letter of Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Minister at
Fez, to Lord Lansdowne, 30 September 1903 F(oreign) O(ffice) 99/431*
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country in order to inhibit an uprising. The idea never gained
much support, however, as the bock was not published until the
summer of 1904, too late to have much impact on the British
public, which, if it was worried at all, paid more attention
to the possible repercussions in Europe rather than in North
14
Africa. There was considerable fear that Spain or Germany
might demand territorial compensation to counter-balance the
French gain, in which case Britain might be expected to pay
19
the difference with one of her colonies. y Certainly
Lord Rosebery's chief complaint against the Agreements was that
they would have an adverse effect upon other major Bowers. On
10 June 1904, he told a large gathering of Liberal League
members at the Queen's Hall, London, that 'this Agreement is
1 /
much more likely to lead to complication than to peace'. u
Unfortunately for Rosebery, he did not elaborate upon this
remark. In a letter w! tten to Sir Edward Grey in the summer
of 190$ at the height of the Moroccan crisis, he indicated that
he meant by this that the French Entente would inevitably lead
17
Britain into a clash with Germany. ' But at the time his
vagueness was treated in the press as an unfortunate indiscretion.
And Rosebery, despite the reputation he hitherto had a3 the leading
Liberal spokesman on foreign affairs, saw, like Iflalo, his
warnings go unheeded.
14 Aflalo also contended that an Anglo-French condominium would
spare both countries the burden of excessive financial investment,
while a British presence in Morocco would guarantee the security
of Gibraltar. Mousa Aflalo, The Truth about Morocco (London, 1904),
pp. 26-28.
15 Hansard, Pari, ebates, H. cf C., ourth Series, CXTHV
(1 June 1904), 555.
The Times, 11 June 1904.
17 R. R. James, Rosebery (London, 1963), p.449.
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Apart from citing the possible side-effects that the
Convention could have in Europe or Morocco, the press in Britain
was blind to few of the treaty's imperfections and made little
attempt, when reviewing the terms, to hide their belief that
18
materially speaking France fared better than did Britain.
*
Yet most newspapers managed to give their whole-hearted support
to the Entente without much contradiction. A good deal of
emphasis was placed on the specific advantages of the new
arrangement for Britain: the final and permanent delimitation
of the growing French sphere of influence in Siara; the
renunciation of French claims in Newfoundland and Egypt, where
Britain would now be able to pursue unhindered her own programme
of administrative reforms; and the satisfaction of seeing the
French perform the unenviable service of establishing law and
order in Morocco without compromising Britain's strategic and
19
vested financial interests there. 7 But primarily it was the
tonic given to the relations of the two countries and the belief
that much had been done to reduce international tension that
induced public opinion to look upon the Agreements so favourably.
It was immediately recognized, for example, that the Russa-Japanese
war would almost certainly be localized to the Far East; for
neither Britain nor France would take an active cart in the war
without considering first the damaging effect such a move would
20
have on the Entente. And, as the Agreements were thought to
18 The Times alone of the influential dailies failed to see how
anything better could have been extracted from the French and
justified the substantial British concessions as having been made
'on the sound understanding that in those cases where French
interests were unquestionably superior British interests should
give way, The Times. 11 April 1904.
19 ■■estminster Gazette. 11 April 1904; also Glasgow Herald.
13 April 1904; Dally Graphic. 9 April 1904; and Economist, loc. cit.
20 Edward Dicey, 'Last Month, II' Nineteenth Century and After. LV
(May, 1904), 876.
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be little more than a liquidation of colonial differences,
the diplomatic and military status quo in Europe -would remain
unchanged. They were not directed against any member of the
Triple Alliance, nor were they meant to detach Russia from
France. Indeed, relations with St. Petersburg might some day
be improved now that Britain and Russia had a common friend in
21
France. Their greatest achievement, however, was that they
guaranteed the goodwill of a nation whose democratic institutions
and inherent liberalism so closely resembled Britain's. Another
Anglo-French war was now unthinkable. Viewed from this angle,
22
French friendship had been purchased at a cheap price.
The quickness with which all major political groups
supported the Government's treaty gave the impression that the
Entente had the genuine approval of the entire nation. In
Parliament, the Liberals engaged in a few, almost perfunctory,
criticisms of the terms. Those with strong Free Trade views
pointed out the Government's apparent disregard for British
interests abroad: the thirty year time-limit to the Open Door
in Morocco; the continued existence of the concessions system
in the French Congo; British recognition of the French tariff
in Madagascar; and the inevitable loss of British trade in
Siam due to the enlarged French sphere of influence, were all
greeted with reservations.2^ But important Liberals like
Campbell-Bannerman and Grey felt that securing French goodwill
21 Westminster gazette. 9 April, 1904. But the possibility that
improved Anglo-Russian relations through France might work against
German interests was generally overlooked at this time.
22 Scotsman. loc. cit.: also St. James's Gazette. 9 April 1904;
and Observert 5 June 1904. The conversion of the Observer after
nearly two months of opposition to the treaty illustrates the
appeal of this argument.
23 Hansard, on. cit.. 540-43, 549-559 passim, 566.
was more important than these considerations, and the debates
on the Agreements went without a division.
The liberals, in fact, seemed to have additional reasons
for welcoming this turn of events. In a recent study of left-wing
attitudes to pre-World Far I diplomacy, it has been pointed cut
that British Radicals 'gave their own twist to the Convention*.
Steeped in the tradition of Gladstone and Cobden, they felt
that they had a special affinity with an agreement that not only
settled colonial disputes with a fellow-liberal nation but also
signalled the wane of imperialist rivalries as a major factor in
foreign affairs. They maintained that the Entente inaugurated a
new era in which a succession of bi-lateral agreements settling
the differences of all the major Powers would eventually lead to
international harmony and co-operation. y Is
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, the Entente was *a model
for arrangements with other countries','" and the British Left
as a whole saw no reason why it could not be a prelude to an
equally important Anglo-German entente. This hope persisted
long after it became apparent to everyone else that an
understanding with Berlin was out of the question. Even as late
as the summer of 1905 in the midst of the first Moroccan crisis
the Labour Leader was writing:
The democratic movements of both France and Great Britain
should join to approach the same movements in Germany, so
as to show to the world that our friendship with France is
not a move in our game of emnity against Germany, but the
first stage of a united, peaceful, disarmed, and, let us
say boldly, republican and Socialist Europe. 27
24 Ibid.. 517 and 566.
25 Howard S. Weinroth, *The British Radicals and the balance of
power, 19C2-1914* Historical Journal. XIII, 4 (1970), 657-8.
26 Hansard, on. cit.. 5^7*
27 Labour Leader. 25 August 1905.
The word 'disarmed' gives an indication of what the British
Left expected the first tangible result of the friendlier
relations with France would be. Virtually all those of
progressive opinions in Britain - Liberals, Radicals, and
Socialists alike - thought that the armaments race among the
leading Powers had been getting out of hand to the point of
imposing heavy burdens on the average taxpayer. Anglo-French
enmity had always been used to justify such expenditures, and
now that the bad air between the two countries had been cleared,
a reduction in spending was in order. The Manchester Guardian
spoke bravely of 'an alliance between the two democracies against
pO
the common enemy, militarism' and the Daily News demanded an
pQ
•instant arrest of armaments'. ' But apart from trumpeting these
appeals there was no suggestion as to how such ideas could be
implemented. The Westminster Gazette advocated in 1903 that
in addition to a settlement of colonial disputes Britain and
France might make naval and military estimates 'a regular subject
RO
of diplomacy before they are carried out'.-' And two years
later a committee of the Cobden Club under the chairmanship of
G. Shaw-Lefevre published a book entitled The Burden of Armaments:
a nlea for Retrenchment in which it was argued that, in the light
of the Entente Cordiale, Britain could afford to take the first
step and reduce those forces which she hitherto had held poised
R1
against France,J But at best these remained hopes; for there
28 Manchester Guardian. 2 May 1903. '
29 Daily Dews. 2 June 1904.
30 Westminster Gazette. 6 July 1903.
31 G. Ghaw-Lefevre, et. al.. The Burden of Armaments: a Plea for
Retrenchment (London: 1905), p.17?. The Committee - the remainder
of which consisted of well-known radicals BUch as Lord Welby,
Sir Algernon West, Sir Srencer Walpole, F.W. Hirst, J.A.MurrayMacdonalc
G.H. Ferris, H.M. Williams, and T.Fisher-Unwin - also took note
of the annihilation of the Russian fleet in the Far East in the
spring of 1905 as an additional reason for reducing naval
expenditure.
was no way the Liberals could effect such changes when out of
power, hid even when in power, there was no means of coercing
any foreign power to follow suit.0*3 Nevertheless, the thought
of such economies added to their approval of the Convention.
In view of the general enthusiasm expressed in virtually
all quarters of public opinion, it is somewhat ironical that
Lansdowne encountered his most persistent attacks from a
leading Conservative paper, the iteming Tost. explanations of
its antipathy to the entente have traditionally been based on
the paper's High Tory reputation. The historian Wilfred indie
has written that as regards the French Entente the MginiM 22JZ
had conflicting sentiments between its natural liking for
•continental friendships' and its own 'imperialistic jealousies'
in which the former was bound to lose,00 As has been seen, the
Morning Post was opposed to virtually all of the concessions
Britain made in the greements.- 1 Yet its underlying disapproval
of the Entente was based on something more than the simple
judgment that Anglo- 'rench colonial disputes had not been settled
32 Nor could radicals, Socialists, and pacifists in general agree
amongst themselves about the motives for disarmament and how far
it should be carried out even after the advent of a Liberal
Government to power in 1906. For a perceptive and illuminating
discussion on these points, see H. Weinroth, 'Left-wing
opposition to Naval Armaments in Britain before 1914', Journal of
Conte-r.orar.v fishery. VI. 4(1971), PP. 93-120: also ..J.A. Morris,
Ftfldjcalism a^lnst .$r (London, 1972), op. 33&, 347.
33 'ilfred Kindle, The Morning lost. 1772-1997 (London. 1937), p.230
34 This is not to say that the pnper^had a special dislike for
France. According to the French Charge d'affaires at the London
Embassy, M. Geoffray, the "oming Post's proprietor, Lord Glenesk,
was a well-known Francophile. " Geoffray to Delcasse, D(ocuments)
D(inlomatlques) F(rancais)« serie 2, V, 22. And desnite its
extensive criticisms of the final terras, it was always careful to
value cod relations with °ronce. 'It is because we are anxious for
sincere goodwill and co-operation between the two Towers', ran its
editorial of 11 April, 1904, that we regret an agreement which
leaves most of the questions only half settled'.
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fairly. The Morning Post believed in keeping matters in
perspective. Its attitude to treaties and alliances was not
only determined by their content but also by how favourably or
how adversely they affected what it considered to be Britain's
proper and traditional role in European affairs - the maintenance
of the balance of p&wer. Certain arrangements could be arrived
at, but only if they did not upset this balance. Thus the 1903
Japanese alliance was acceptable because it did not produce any
adverse effects in Europe. But a written settlement with the
French was altogether different. For in its 'desperate hurry
to make friends with someone' the Government had associated
itself with one of the two major alliance systems in Europe and
■3 5
appeared to be abandoning Britain's traditional role. ^ The
Morning Post never went so far as to say that Germany was
threatened with war by this situation, but until June 1905 it
did believe in an Anglo-French collusion against her. It was
only after Germany continued in her demands for a conference of
the Powers to settle the Moroccan question even after she had
forced the retirement of the French foreign minister Lelcasse
that the Morning Tost began to reassess the Entente. Mhereas
hitherto an alignment with France was thought to be upsetting
the equilibrium, it was now - especially in view of the Russian
collapse in the Far East - regarded as a substitute for the
weakened Dual Alliance to preserve the balance of power in the
36
face of German aggressiveness.3
The Morning Post's views on the Entente and the 'German problem'
contrasted especially with those of much of the Conservative press.
In the early stages most right-wing organs took the developing
35 Morning Post, 15 April 1904
36 Ibid.. 19 June 1905.
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rapprochment and the subsequent 1904 Convention at face value.
Unlike the Liberals and the Socialists, they did not see it as
a stepping-stone to similar agreements with other major rowers,
although they did believe that in liquidating colonial differences
Britain and France were removing 'sources of friction which at
17
any time might endanger the peace of the world'. Thus
emphasizing its pacific nuroses, Conservative newspapers were
not likely to see the Entente harbouring evil designs against
other Powers. There were, however, a handful of organs -
notably The Times, the Spectator, and Leo liaxse's ultra-chauvinist
monthly, the National Review - in whose opinion the Anglo-French
Entente represented not Just an expression of friendly feeling
but also an understanding on the part of both Powers that they
had a common foreign policy objective in the containment of
Germany,^ For them, the Entente re-established the independence
of British foreign policy, which in their eyes had become much too
subservient to Germany's.^ /hen the Anglo-French Agreements were
finally consummated, The Times warned Berlin:
The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some
shadow of plausibility that in the larger questions of Internationa:
politics Great Britain must follow in the wake of the Triple 40
Alliance, and that the attitude of France might be ignored...
Similarly, the National Review spoke with characteristic
abrasiveness of 'the emancipation of England from the German yoke...'/
37 Scotsman, 9 April 1904.
38 National Review, 41 (June, 1903), 521; also Spectator, 4 July
and 5 December 1903. At first The Times did not subscribe to such
views and insisted that the Entente was not directed against any
Power, including Germany and Russia. See The Times. 9 July 1903.
39 Only recently Lansdowne had been under attack in right-wing
Journals for not taking British interests sufficiently into
account when dealing with the Germans in settling the Venezuelan
dispute and the Baghdad Railway negotiations.
40 The Times. 12 April 1904.
41 National levlew. 43 (May, 1904), 349-50.
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But these were only reminders of the diplomatic rather than
the military implications of the Entente. As yet no one had
advocated an Anglo-French alliance against Germany. Indeed, the
present arrangement seemed better; for Britain and France could
concentrate on checking German expansion without formal
commitment to each other, except as was specified in the
42
Egypt-Morocco provisions of the 1904 Convention.
2. France and her colonies: a prelude to the 1905 crisis
" The extent of the British commitment to France was not
to become fully known until the following spring with the
eruption of the first Moroccan crisis. The reaction in
Britain to this crisis cannot be understood without first
examining her attitude towards events in Morocco prior to
and immediately after the 1904 settlement. Before 1904 Britain
was in the anomalous position of having to support often the
expansionist policies of her chief competitor there. For
although Britain ana France had a longstanding trade rivalry
in Morocco and were vying for influence at the court of the
Sultan Abdul Aziz, both had a stronger interest in seeing that
the country did not fall into the hands of tribal leaders like
Bu Hamara or Mulai Ahmed ar-Ralsuli, whose xenophobic rebellions
were directed against the Europeans as much as they were against
the Sultan. The total disregard of these tribes for the
Algerian border coupled with the presence of a large number of
troops she had in North Africa gave France both the excuse and
the means to begin her military occupation of Morocco. In June 1903»
42 Calchas (J.L. Garvin), 'The bankruptcy of Bismarckian
diplomacy', Fortnightly P.evlewT 75 (Jan.-June, 1904), 767-68.
Jonnart, the Gcvrrnor-General of Algeria, ordered the first major
expedition across the border to quell disturbances in the
Moroccan border town of r'iguig. Prior to the 1904 Convention,
reactions in Britain to this and later efforts on the part of
the French to end the uprisings were invariably mixed. No one
doubted that T:>rance was acting out of self-interest; the
question seemed to be to what extent the expansionist motivation
was le- ding her to intervene. Some thought that France was
doing so merely in order to safeguard the passage of trade
41
caravans or make the Algerian border more secure, J particularly
as the overthrow of the Sultan might start a general uprising in
44
France's other North African possessions. Others suspected
that Jonnart's punitive expedition was a cover for plans to
4t>
absorb all of Morocco at Britain's expense. y The consensus
of opinion was that France should send a temporary expedition
involving, as the nall Mall Gazette put it, 'as little bloodshed
as possible, as thick a velvet glove as may be'. Such a course
of action might be ineffective in the lrng run; nevertheless
it was preferable to a permanent occupation, which would unite
the resistance of the various tribes and possibly provoke a
crisis among the Powers."3^
After the 1904 Convention, the British press made a
remarkable shift of opinion on this question and, with the
notable exception of the Morning PostT it fully endorsed
Delcasse's programme of penetration naciflGue as the best means
43 Iq,e 1'lnjep, 3 June 1903; also St. James's Gazette, 2 June 1903;
and Daily KeySt § June 1903.
44 Economist. 2© September 1903.
45 Observer. 7 June 1903; also tterdeen Journal, 4 June 1903.
46 Pqll .^11 4 June 1903.
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of establishing order in Morocco, whereas hitherto a French
occupation had been deemed unwise, it was now accepted without
question and even urged on the grounds that the Convention
47
incurred special moral obligations on 'ranee to intervene.
The Entente suddenly bestowed on France the most altruistic
task of •civilising' Morocco on behalf of all the Powers. Her
new role was clearly defined by The Times:
France has been placed by the Anglo-French Convention in
a position of unchallenged predominance in North-Western
Africa, and Europe will look to her to find means of
putting an end to the state of affairs which endangers
valuable lives, renders commerce precarious, and makes
economic development of the country impossible. 48
There was no need for any nation to fear that the French would
abuse this privilege and turn Morocco into a vassal state.
For the 1904 Agreements contained ample guarantees that the
French would respect the rights of others, and it was
assumed that if Britain, with her 'considerable' strategic
and commercial interests in the area, found these guarantees
AO
satisfactory, then any third Power would do so as well."'
Few people in Britain had any illusions about the
difficulty of the task which the French were about to undertake
in Morocco. Nevertheless, as time passed British opinion
became increasingly hopeful about the chances France had of
successfully subduing the rebellious tribes. It was an
optimism based largely on the reassessment the British had
been making of the French as a colonising nation. Traditionally
47 In contrast to its earlier cautionary advice, the Pall Mall
Gazette was now criticizing the French for not acting drastically
enough in their military operations against the tribes. See
Fall Mall Gazette. 4 July 1904.
48 The Times, 8 December 1904,
49 Daily Telegraph. 9 April 1904.
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they had been regarded with contempt in Britain as half-hearted
imperialists, reluctant to leave home, and, once abroad, too
lethargic to develop profitably the material resources of the
country. Their inability to export colonists and sufficient
capital had still not been overcome, but by the end of the
nineteenth century France was introducing a series of
administrative reforms, the benefits of which were beginning to
be reaped by this time. The trade monopoly which the French
were securing in West Africa, for example, was attributed to
their systematic construction of railway networks in conjunction
with navigable rivers. By 1903, the French had managed to
link the Senegal with the Atlantic via the River Niger in this
manner, and if everything went according to plan, they would
soon be competing with Britain for the commercial and political
control of the 'Western Soudan. What made this extension of
French influence over such a vast area possible was the
regroupment of all the West African possessions into a single
administrative unit under the direction of one Governor-General,
who could devote his time and energies to several colonies at
once, thereby getting an overall view of how communications
8 1
should be established.^ Likewise in Indo-China the French
used administrative changes to further internal development.y
50 Scotsman. 30 September 1903.
51 Horning Post, 7 April 1905.
52 In this instance, there was no need for regroupment; for
Indo-China was already one colony. Rather, what was required
was tighter fiscal control over the various territories within
Indo-China, and. this the Governor-General Doumer achieved in
1898 by introducing a general budget for all of Indo-China,
using the money saved for the construction of public works.
Alleyne Ireland, The Far Eastern Tropics (London 1905), PP» 150,
153-54. Ireland, a British subject, made these observations
while on a tour of the Far East in 1901 as Colonial Commissioner
of the University of Chicago. The figures he gives in his book
about trade and finances in Indo-China should be treated with
caution, however, as they are based on uncited French sources.
France's improved efficiency in the management of these and
other colonies made it fairly certain in the opinion of the
British press that she could turn Morocco into 'a prosperous
country with stable Government...'. J All the more reason,
therefore, to give support to Delcasse's plans for the
country, which envisioned administrative reforms as well as
the establishment of law and order. Thus Germany's failure
40
to dc^in the spring of 1905 was regarded in Britain not
only as a challenge to the Entente but also as an unfortunate
set-back to the course of progress and civilization.
53 The Times. 30 August 1904
CHAPTER III
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ENTENTE CCRDlAlE, 1905-1907
As far as most of the British press was concerned, the
year 1905 began well for Anglo-French relations. The colonial
Convention signed in the previous April continued to be the
focal point in the affairs of the two countries, and its terms
still went unchallenged by any third Powers, Even when Germany
did put the Entente to the test with the sudden visit of Kaiser
• ilheim II to Tangier on 31 March 1905, the newspapers did not
seen to think that the relationship between the two Western
Powers would suffer greatly. Indeed, if anything, they were
inclined to argue that Germany's action had helped to bring
Britain and France closer together. But If the first Moroccan
crisis forged stronger links between London and Paris, its
aftermath left a sense of uneasiness and mutual suspicion in
both capitals. For although the two Powers joined hands in
opposing 'Bismarckism' in the spring and summer of 19^5, each
soon began to suspect that it was being embroiled in a
diplomatic conflict with the Wllhelmstrasse in order to idvance
the colonial objectives of the other In North Africa. Moreover,
it was later discovered In Britain that the friendlier feelings
which had been the guiding spirit of the Entente Cordial©
applied only to those areas covered by the 19^4 Convention. In
other parts of the world, most notably, in Abyssinia and In the
Congo basin, the uai d'Orsay pursued its own programme of
overseas expansion at Britain's expense with the same ruthlessness
and determination that characterized French imperialism
throughout the late nineteenth century,
1. The Tarter imbroglio
From the outset of the Moroccan episode of 1905, the
British press was fully aware that the Kaiser's visit to
Tangier portended something more than a simple reaffirmation
of German commercial rights in the country. German economic
interests in Morocco were, argued the newspapers, Relatively
trifling*j but even if they had been substantial, the press
felt that the terms of the 1904 Convention had made it
abundantly clear to all third Powers that the Open Door would
be guaranteed. Indeed, had Germany any qualms about the
proper safeguarding of her commercial interests, she should
have spoken up about them sooner than this - notably a year
earlier when the Agreements were first published."*" It was
thought that clues to the real German motives could be
detected in the timing of the visit, which coincided both with
the negotiations the French were engaged in with the Sultan
Abdul Aziz concerning the financial reorganisation of the
p 9
country " and with the collapse of Russia in the Far East.-'
Intervention at this moment would, it was thought, be highly
propitious from the German point of view for two reasons: it
would lead to some sort of territorial compensation from the
French, who feared that a disruption of the negotiations would
4
result In a large-scale rebellion by •reactionary* tribesmen;
while it afforded Germany the opportunity to test and break
the Anglo-French Entente without fear of a two-front war.
T The Times. 31 March 1905; also Pall Mall Gazette. 1 April 1905
and Dally News. 6 April 1905.
2 Scotsman. 30 March 1905.
3 Daily Mews, lpq, ci%
4 Spectator. 1 April 1905; and Glasgow Herald. 1 April 1905.
5 Spectator, loc. cit.; also Daily Graphic, 31 March 1905.
There was little doubt in Britain that the Germans would
fail to achieve either objective. Although she night be able to
foment trouble in Morocco, Germany was not in a position to
prevent French forces in neighbouring Algeria crossing the
6
border and re-establishing law and order.' The only tactic
which she might employ with success would be to threaten war
in Burope, in which event Germany knew as well as anyone that
•the sovereignty of Morocco would bo quite an inadequate
7
prize1. In any case if such was the German plan, the French
were meeting the psychological test of strength with complete
self-possession and showed no signs of capitulating. Delcasse
was praised for having answered Bulow's charges against the
Entente with tact and moderation? his reply in the French
Chamber was a quiet reaffirmation of France's 'right' to
p
carry out her penetration naclfloue of the country. More
impressive still was the fact that this level-headed response
was seemingly not confined to leading members of the French
Government. The Times congratulated the French press for
having retained 'a cool head and calm temper' in face of the
German challenge.' Kor were the French people exerting any
pressure on their Government to over-react to the situation.
'The French, in fact, ' the Spectator commented, 'were as
placid and as firm as Teutons and Englishmen suppose themselves
to be'.^
If the press seemed reasonably assured that the French
penetration of Morocco would continue unhindered, it was even
6 Glasgow Herald. 2 Aoril 1905? also Sneaker. 8 April 1905.
7 Lcjonci-A^^t 1 April 1905.
° Spectator. 8 April 1905-
9 The Times. 28 March 1905.
19 Gpgqfratpp, loc. cit.
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acre confident that the Entente would weather the storm in
tact. 'The newspapers made it clear from the start of the
crisis that British policy would be to adhere to Article XX
of the Egypt-Morocco declaration, in which Britain promised
11
France diplomatic support in Morocco. Mo one thought that
Britain would h© required to offer more assistance than thisj
for Germany was not likely to force a war. nevertheless,
certain right-wing organs warned that if the situation did
deteriorate France would not be left In the lurch. Consistent
with its pro-French views, the Spectator wrote that if Germany
•were deliberately to provoke a war with France over a matter
arising out of the Angle-French Agreement, the British people
would be by no means content to remain indifferent to the
contest, or allow a Power that has of late shown herself so
12
friendly as Trance to be overwhelmed•. Recent events such
as the announcement in London of the coming exchange visits
between the British and French fleets and the sudden meeting
of French Tresident Loubet 'and Kind Edward VII at lerrefitte
while the latter was on his way to a holiday in the South of
Franc© were interpreted as demonstrations of Anglo-French
solidarity."^ The Entente was not going to be broken up by
threats| on the contrary, the sheer 'abraslveness* of German
diplomacy was welding Britain and France closer together. As
the rail Fall Gazette noted on 1 April: 'The German Sovereign
could hardly have taken more effectual steps to consolidate
the friendship and community of Interests which happily exist
between France and England*.
11 the Tines. 21 "arch 190?.
12 3r»ctatar. 1 torll 1905.
13 Pall ■;.?! .tazette. 1 Ar-rll and 6 April 1905.
These impressions were somewhat shaken on 6 June 1905>
when Delcasse's forced retirement from the Quai d'Orsay
exposed French nervousness and the length to which Germany
was prepared to go to secure her alms. Lansdowne seemed to
think the British public regarded Delcasse's fall as a
supreme act of cowardice on the part of the French and
concluded a letter to the British Ambassador in Paris with
the remark: 'Of course the result is that the "entente" is
14
quoted at a much lower price than it was a fortnight ago'."
In fact, newspapers in June 1905 expressed regret rather than
anger at the French decision. Any ill-feeling that appeared
in print was not directed at France, but rather at Germany,
15
whose bullying was thought to endanger peace. - Delcasse's
dismissal, so they maintained, was due more to his association
in the minds of the French public with the increasingly
unpopular Dual Alliance than to his diplomatic wrangle with
Berlin.1' But if the newspapers made such statements outwardly,
inwardly they felt otherwise. Thus Valentine Chirol, Foreign
editor of The Times, was not at all assured about the course of
French foreign policy. He understood Delcassd's dismissal to
mean a French surrender to the 'big stick' and privately
suspected that Rouvier, the new French foreign minister, was
17
conniving with the Germans behind British backs.
14 Lansdowne to Sir Francis Bertie, 12 June 1905, F(oreign)
O(ffice) 800/127.
15 See, for example, the Horning Tost. 19 June 1905.
16 Daily Express. 7 June 1905jalso Birmingham Dally Post,
14 June 1905.The ascribing of Delcasse's fall to Franco-Russian
relations rather than to events in Morocco was part of a
widespread belief in the British press at this time that the
Dual Alliance was a waning force in European politics. For
further information on this point, see Chapter IX of this
thesis.
17 Chirol to Gilliam Lavino, 19 June 1905• Quoted in
The History of The Times, vol III: Tfre .Twentieth Century Tpg.fr,
1884-1912. p. 420. Lavino was the Paris corresponaent of
1'ne limes.
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Whatever the misgivings they had in private about this
episode, the newspapers continued net only to support but to
praise the manner in which the French were handling the
crisis. Originally opposed to the idea of s conference of
the "overs tc deal with the Moroccan question as little more
than a German ploy to gain a foothold in Forth Africa, the
press now quickly seconded loavier's decision to accede to
German demands on this point, citing his success in getting
Berlin to recognize beforehand France's special position in
Morocco and the need to implement the broad outlines of the
IB
1^04 Agreement. Indeed, having been consoled with these
guarantees, British newspapers suddenly became anxious that
a conference should convene as soon as possible lest the
situation in Morocco take a turn for the worse. To delay a
conference, they argued, would be to create the impression
that Europe was still disunited on the Moroccan question and
possibly induce the tribes to further rebellions. orse
still, it might afford the Germans an opportunity to strengthen
1q
their bargaining position before the talks actually began.
Hot surprisingly, therefore, the delay that did ensue in
convening a conference was attributed primarily to Germany's
13 2 July 1905? also jhg Ijjatf 11 ^"iy 1905.19 The limea 31 4ugast 1905. In -articular, the newspapers
were afraid that German bankers might conclude a £500,000 loan
which they had been negotiating with the Sultan since the early
summer of 1905. Should the loan be issued, these newspapers
argued, Germany would be able to attend the conference claiming
that sue had important financial interests in Morocco, which
France*s policies were threatening to destroy. Gee all .nil
29 July 1905| also Westminster Gazette, 16 August 1905,
'unreasonable demands' when negotiating the items tc be discussed
on the genda. By contrast, French policy throughout the late
months of 1905 was characterised as an admirable blend of
•patience* and self-restraint' on the one hand with firmness
on the*other. The French, it was said, were trying to be
20
conciliatory without sacrificing national interests or honour,
Alth ugh the newspapers generally supported the French in
their efforts tc subjugate Morocco, this is not to say that
everyone in Britain supported their policies or entirely
opposed the idea of German intervention in the matter. On the
contrary, there always had been lingering doubts in some quarters
of British public opinion about the wisdom of allowing France
to penetrate Morocco singlehandedly, and by 1905 these doubts
were being voiced more and more openly by the Morocco
correspondent of the limes, *<alt#r 3, Harris, Harris had been
working in this capacity for The Times since 1887 and thus
had a profound knowledge of Morocco. Not only was he
intimately acquainted with the tribesmen, their language, and
their customs, but he also had connections at the court of
Abdul Asia. Indeed, by 19^1 he had reputedly become, alo®g
with .»lr Harry riacLean, the Commander-in-Chief of the oultan's
army, the best informed Westerner about events in Morocco, He
was also thought to have been 'emotionally inclined to champion
21
Arab independencethough his sympathies for this cause are
a little suspect and seem to reflect a concern more for the
well-being of his friend the Bultan than any strong interest
20 The Times. 18 August and 9 October 1905, also WcotsaanT
13 Aogust I905 J and OfrU./ TglSSfaPh, 18 December 1905. ™~
21 This at any rate was the assessment of The Times's official
biographers, Bee The History of The Times. Ill, 410.
In the nationalist sentiments of the Muslims in general in
North Africa. Yet whatever his views on the subject, Harris
keenly followed the diplomatic events leading up to the 1904
Convention, Initially, Harris supported France's efforts to
penetrate the country^ arguing that 'geographically,
politically, and morally, Morocco forms an extension of her
pp
African possessions'; ' he disputed the notion that the
Convention 3pelt trouble for Britain's commercial interests
there; but at the same time he recognized that the Agreement
weakened the Sultan's power, and he reproached the British
Government for having played Abdul Aziz 'a shabby trick
After the Convention had been signed, he reiterated this
theme for weeks on end, convinced that Delcasse's policy of
penetration nacificue would stabilize Morocco. But when it
became apparent that France's 'civilizing' mission was
producing more chaos instead of less, Harris reconsidered
his views: he questioned the effectiveness of penetration
nacifiaue as a means of maintaining law and order; he
condemned France's unwillingness to respond more forcibly to
the disturbances; and he called upon other European Pollers
to intervene to ensure that the Sultan retained his rule over
24
the country. As for the welfare of British commercial
interests in Morocco, Karris now began to note that the French
'have annexed to some of their demands monopolies which are
contrary to the spirit - if not to the letter - of our
agreement with them'.^ Hence, when the Kaiser did intervene
22 Walter B. Harris, 'England, France, and Morocco' Natlonal
Review, aL (November, 1903), 396-397.
23 Harris to his mother, 14 April 1904, The Walter 3, Harris
File, 1887-19H> in The Times Archives.
24 See, for example, the letter of Harris to Chlrol,
16 June 1904. Envelope marked '1894-1906' in the Harris File.
25 Harris to Chirol, 21 March 1905, The Times Archives.
by landing at Tangier on 31 March 190$# Harris not only
rejoiced but promised the Germans his co-operation. Throughout
the spring of 1905 he told Kuhkmann, the German Minister at
Fez, that he would do his best to enlist British support for
Berlin's request for a conference of the Powers to deal with
a/
Moroccan question.
Given his reputation as something of an expert on Moroccan
affairs, Harris might well have made a significant impact on
public opinion in Britain had not his comments provoked such
a strong reaction at Printing House Square. Valentine Chirol
for one did not approve of Harris's words and actions, and
when the time came to publish the latter*s despatches in the
foreign pages of the paper, he took steps to bring them in
line with the editorial policy of The Times. At the time
of an infamous kidnapping incident in May 1904, for example,
the Foreign editor of The Times told Karris that he found
his despatches criticizing the French 'a little vehement1
and toned them down so as to make it appear that Harris
27
had not given 'too personal a role' to his remarks. Later,
xfhen Harris's despatches against the French became increasingly
vehement, Chirol and others highly placed on the staff of
The Times reacted even more harshly. Thus cn the eve of the
Kaiser's trip to Tangier, G. Moberly Bell, the managing
director of the paper, instructed Harris to limit his article
about the visit to only three hundred words. Wilhelra's visit,
wrote Bell, was one which 'wc can hardly Ignore altogether* but
26 History of Tftq '^s, III. 411.
x ,27 Chirol tc Harris, 25 May 1904. The Times F(oreign) L(etter)
3(00k), vol. IV, 382f, The Times techives.
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it was a visit which 'Is only offensive to good taste...'.""
Whether or not Bell and Chirol ordered Harris to limit his
articles in a similar fashion during the ensuing crisis is
difficult to say. /hat is known, however, is th:t large gaps
in the news from Morocco appeared in the foreign pages of
The Times throughout the spring and summer of 190?, gaps which,
as even the official historian of that newspaper concludes,
•eneourage the guess that many despatches were probably
90
suppressed altogether'."7
Nor is it absolutely clear why The Times should be so
sensitive about criticizing the Trench in Morocco, though a
letter of Valentine Chirol to Harris, written on the eve of
the Kaiser's visit, is revealing:
I telegraphed you last week asking you to bear in mind
that the policy of The Times is to support the ">ench in
Morocco. I was rather alarmed at the tone of some of
your messages and at the construction, not altogether
unnaturally, placed upon them in Paris. The "rench
may not have acted in every way wisely, and they will
probably commit many blunders before they have done,
but that is their business, not ours. What we have
to recollect is that our attitude towards them in
Morocco will be the touchstone, as far as they are
concerned, of the Anglo- rench rapprochement, and we
cannot allow the slightest suspicion to be cast upon our
loyalty to the Agreement, The Trench in Egypt have
accepted their dialnutio capitis with such complete
loyalty and good grace thr>t our people in Morocco
ought to show themselves equal to a similar sacrifice
of their old prejudices and prepossessions. 30
In other words, the freedom of the Moroccans and the welfare
of British interests in Morocco were less important than the
balance of power in .. uror e. The solidarity of the Anglo- reach
Entente had to take precedence, even though its implementation
25 paoted in T^tory 9f Th,e T^e?, III, 412.
29 Ibid.. . 414.
30 Chirol to Harris, 27 torch 1905. The Times F.L.B., V,
56-57£f. 'he Times Archives.
was producing dire results in Worth Africa. Admittedly,
contemporary attitudes to imperialism, particularly in
Conservative newspapers like The Times. were such that the
nationalist sentiments of the Moroccans could easily he
brushed aside without much compunction, Moreover, Harris was
an cxaggcr:; tor of the first order whose periodic distortions
of the truth lest hi® the confidence of certain high-ranking
officials,Nevertheless, not everything he said was lies,
and it is significant that other members of the British
colony in Morocco who were far more sympathetic to the
ultimate alms of pfafargtiffB pftfiiflfittC than Ifeft Tj^g
correspondent held similar views. To J.L, Budgett-Meakin, a
former editor of ^ Tjflftg frf r'TTPCgfl and one cf the least
partial observers of events in that country, the only 'outward
evidences of the new position' in 1905 were 'the over-running
cf the ports, especially of Tangier, by Frenchmen of an
Undesirable class, and by an attempt to establish a French
colony at the closed port of ehediya by doubtful means, to
say nothing of the increased smuggling of arms',^ One is
inclined to think, therefore, that as a policy, advanced almost
daily on the editorial pages of The Times, the stubborn refusal
to place the understanding with France at anything but a premium
could only result in controversy and embarrassment - controversy
because it exposed The Times to charges of wilfully abandoning
31 See. for instance, 2far& St^ey *8 The Foreign fff.id.S
Forgirn A^,g>I?X4»Ta°ndon. 1969), p«188n,~ "3? J.F.. Budgett-Meakin, Ufff ^
(London, 1905;, p.300,
yj.
the cause of free trade and the opto door in Moroccoj
embarrassment because it eventually forced Harris to write in
other journals, thereby revealing to all that tils despatches
p"l
in The Tires did not reflect his sentiments accurately, J
.hit while Harris and his superiors were disagreeing
about the course of action to be taken in Morocco, a new
development arose which for the moment ra&d© any more quarrelling
on their part pointless t France and Germany agreed to settle
their differences at the small Spanish town of Algesiras* It
now appeared that the Powers would decide for once and for
i
all how far the French should proceed with their penetration
of the country#
2. -vlweciraa and aotae subsequent disillusionment in An^lo-French
The convening of the Algeciras Conference on 16 January 1906
meant different things to different people in Britain, To
Conservatives and some right-wing Liberals it implied German
acceptance of the Entente Cordiale, and It gave Britain and
France the opportunity to demonstrate to the world the strength
of their friendship# To Badical Liberals and Socialists, on
the other hand, it promised to usher in a new chapter in the
diplomatie relations of the Great Powers, particularly between
Britain and Germany, Still others, most conspicuously the
Glasgow Herald, regarded the Algeclras Conference as a
favourable occasion to press for the removal of the clause in
33 Gee, for example, Harris's article in B^Ky.opd^ -<Unbfflrfft
..aeazine entitled 'The Morocco crisis1 (August, 1905)$ in whicn
he berated Delcassse and his policies and argued that it was
•England's loyalty to France1 that •blinded public opinion to
some extent to the question at issue, anc still more so to the
manner in which the existing crisis has come about1, (p.2935.
the 1904 Convention which imposed a thirty year time-limit to |
the Open Door In Morocco. If such a step is taken, this
pro-Free Trade Geottish newspaper wrote, 'everybody will be
pleased except those ' renchaien who really aim at the exclusive
exploitation' of the country.^4 Yet however varied the hopes
and aspirations in Britain about the Conference, public opinion
seemed to be united on one point: it constituted the best
chance of averting a collision between the Powers. In fact,
some organs of opinion like the deotsann went so far as to say
that 'even should the Conference break up without solving the
questions ... in dispute, it by no means follows that war
would become certain'.^
This, too, seemed to be the attitude of fetes new Liberal
Government, although the Liberal leaders gave no indication
of what their policy would be if the Conference did come to
an early end. If past statements were anything to go by, the
party leadership seemed to be divided into two camps on such
subjects as the entente and Anglo-German relations# Thus in
the heat of the 1905-6 election campaign, Gir Henry Caapbell-Banneraan
delivered a speech at the &lbcrt Hall in London stressing
the differences between Tory and Liberal on foreign policy
natters in general and promising that his Government would
seek to extend the Entente Cordiale to incorporate Germany.-* '
Two months earlier, however, Gir Edward Grey told a group of
City Liberals that, once in office, the party would continue
Lord Lansdowne'a policies in the field of foreign affairs and
34 silaafcqw March 1906.
35 Scotsman. 9 February 1906.
36 G«arfllan» 23 December 1905.
mottle lead ritain ir-to .... repproehcaent with deraacy only If
it was c*.rt.il.. that such an isnic lin. would do no Isara
to tli© nation's good relations with 'rmcc, 'nidst such
conflicting r©narks, it is perfectly understandable that
tews,-a era and Jetirnala should each place their own
construction upon #.'♦© implications of the Algecir&s Conference
fur .higlo- reach &i*d u^glo-heraan rels wXv**i>>0# ^OlWwwCI 9 in biixs
content where was a tendency throughout the first few heaths
oi 1., ..d tor i..c ...rcso to discuss the. ..orocean ouu. fcion only
in uiucr diplomatic aspects, its sore technical aiuc such
as the policing of -tarocean ports and the re-organia&tlon oi
the sultan's finances attracted lass attention, ,-vtfha;>s
because these questions did rioc appear to have such a crucial
bearing on .>ritain's national interests# As >.ae ..ines put it:
'It is the uoropean, not the hocrich, significance of toe
conference that is uppermost in ail sines,.., Lorej.o is more
tna' i oroeco, and# ##a.. 1 the cr un trie a cunecrn© t. ar e b. • un^ to
ash t ;emsclv«s how the Conference has affected their siutua.1
relations *
this belief that the -orocean question need be discussed
primarily in terns of its «orc international dimensions lost
svsae currency in Jrltaln as events in AoroQco itself ^ugan to
37 .»-« ;na. 21 October 1905, P.5. Heal ther or 1tain • s
relation-" *th crsfi *crnrr.;r aov* f r.roi n *•*•"■* *a- *"* ^tts
in general constituted ouch of a bone of contention between
""T * p* Starlxr t^^C" •."•i cc * **
everthelei:, there was a tendency in certain Conservative
newspaper® to slals credit cm behalf of *'■:■■*.** ^arty ,vt t-
. ntonte with rence. it was tr offset this claim and to
T*rymInt?T^fyni^ui^s tihii't t*ti0 Llb^fOkXii wot^Xd sor&p
the 19"s wdwstandiitK in favour cf another with C-errmny that
men like dray and Canrbell-Tt• nnerman had 'roa time to time to
nake . •»*.■ . s<>e«ches. .--et urey to o.a. opeiKier, 19 . etcher 19^5,
in the ". . "vendor ;- "ere, British laseu- 'fid ''V 4',3!V\
38 U.*»». 9 Til 1906.
take a turn for the worse, is a people, the Moroccans had never
been too happy at the prospect cf European Intervention in
their country, and new that the Acta General# of the Algcciras
Conference had more or less formalized this Intervention, their
disapproval turned into anger. In 1906-7 there occurred in
Morocco a series of anti-foreign incidents which in effect
hindered any plana the French had for penetrating the country
peacefullys the murder of a French merchant at Tangier in
June 19065 the raiding and pillaging of European property at
Casablanca and Mogadcr three months later; the death of
It Mauchanp, head of a French •scientific expedition', by a
3tone-throwing mob at Marrakesh in March 1907I and the murder
of eight Europeans, including the resident French Consul at
Casablanca in August of that year, Eor were these outbursts
confined tc a few large towns. The Glasgow pfPllifl pointed out
how far the various rebellious tribesmen, never really
subjugated by the French, had now gained control over widespread
regions of the country: Halsuli, the tribal leader who most
persistently opposed France's expansion, was in virtual
possession of Tangier5 Mulal hafId, half-brother of the Sultan
and Pretender to the throne, was more active than ever in the
South; marauding groups continued to create havoc and confusion
along the Algerian border; while nomadic hill tribes remained
unsubdued on the northern and western coasts. Indeed, to the
herald it seemed that the only tranquil area cf Morocco was in
the vicinity of ez, and even there the French only shakily
maintained their authority,
How did events in Morocco manage to get so far out of
control? Two differing answers were in turn put forth in
39 Sitoagft tforalfo 10 November 1906
Jritaln on this question. Initially, the general feeling had
been that the prevailing chaos and disorders could be traced
directly to the compromise reached at Algeciras in April 1906.
For had not the Conference 'internationalized' Morocco in the
sense of forbidding any one rover tc intervene militarily in
that country without the consent of the others, "ranee, the
newspapers argued, wo .Id have long ago been able to
40
re-establish law and order. 4s it was, the French could
only 'flutter on the margins of Moorish territory' or else
risk creating fresh antagonism with Germany if they went
further.41 but as time passed and as the French continued
to make feeble, almost half-hearted, responses to the
disturbances, some began to wonder whether or not the troubles
could be attributed entirely to the diplomatic machinery set
up by the Powers. If newspapers like the hentaaan fell short
of accusing France of shirking responsibilities in Morocco,
they did point out that she was reluctant to act because this
would give her 'all the labour', while 'the spoils would be
42
shared by the Powers signatory to the Algeclras Conference'.
The vttartiiaa we or less hit upon the same
explanation when it speculated why the French had occupied
part of Morocco after the murder of Dr Maucha&p but had only
sent warships to the Mediterranean during the Casablanca riots#
The former concerned France alone, wrote the Cnar^j«r}f but the
latter Involved working on behalf of European lives and property
in general.4^ Even The Timesr normally one of the stauachest
40 PflU ■-9,3,1 Qaagtitat 25 Farch 1907? also ~C9,taW» 6 July 1907?
forfltan 3 August 1907? and V,Us sow log, .pltj.41 May 1907.
42 Scotsman, 20 August 1907, X
43 Manchester Guardian. 2 and 10 iugust 1907.
defenders of the policy of penetration ^acificue in Britain,
indulged in criticisms of the French now and again for their
reluctance to act in North Africa. In the late summer cf
1906, the paper rebuked the Chamber of Deputies for having
risen in July for the summer recess without ratifying the
Acte uenerale of Nlgeciras. ~*uch a move, I'he lines complained,
was tantamount to leaving Moroccan ports unpoliced and exposed
44
to raids. These remarks did not necessarily herald a shift
in British newspaper opinion away from France and towards
Germany on the Moroccan question, but they indicate that the
press was not totally biassed in its understanding of the
problem.
As Morocco drifted more and more into a state of an*ichy,
the newspapers paused for a oment to consider the reasons for
France's presence in that country. The need to restore law
and order, protect European lives and property, and safeguard
the Algerian frontier from raiding tribesmen, were all regarded
as obvious factors in DelcassS's original decision to penetrate
and 'civilise' the country. But the desire to establish a
protectorate there and secure a firm grip on Moroccan finances
confounded some people in Britain, particularly the more
left-wing students of imperialism. Indeed, for this group
France's endeavours to gain a permanent foothold in Morocco
seemed to be almost wholly without logic. The Nation explained
why this appeared to be the case. Burveying the entire range
44 The Tines. 19 September 3906.
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of economic factors and internal stimuli which it thought
prompted most huropean nations to assimilate the? 'backward1
regions of the world, and aoplyin0 these- factors n ' stimuli
its crlwPmJjfe judge Trance's need to expand into North Africa,
this Radical weekly wrote?
■ ranee may in the end he forced to assume some direct
responsibility for the government of Morocco. Jut the
two chief .ofcives which overn the expansion of other
nations are in her case absent. .ho lias no teeming
population which must seek an outlet beyond the seas,
no landless peasantry in search o fields to till, no
eager bro< d of younger sons in quest of careers and
op ortunities... .N jr decs the n ..cr- of acquiring fresh
markets appear to her so vital as it Is to the .eraans
and ourselves. H r natural industrial develo;.sent toes
not fit her to compete with -rig land and -era-my for the
custom of - primitive market, .'he riches of ounce
depend not on the export of va3t quantities of the
exigencies of 11c. but rather on n o.nsll but skilful
i reduction of its luxuries, -.he has neither the raw
materials, nor the mineral reic rces, nc" the sea-trade
which fit her to be a manufacturer on a large scale of
choar anc* elemontary wares,..-lor nrturnl c" ' nts are
not the primitive races to which Liverpool and Hamburg
export so largely, but the older peoples, the more
refined communities...The acquisition of a raw tract
of '.frican desert ond ountain, pec;-led by a race ;hlch
has as yet no elegant needs, cannot be for ranee a
c it-1 object k* her economic policy. 45
Presuma' ly, then, t ere was a less apparent reason far the
IPPKnMprsayrs nfenfetratfon nacifloue of the country. If the
Nation and other left-wing organs o^fjpfliion remained baffled
by t' 1;:. r bl< , '\e ...ncrcr t ■ , u ".j n was quick to offer an
explanation, khind the whole affair, it said, were cot any
internal pressures Inherent in the Tench economy but simply
f *."!* y» 7*» ?* <"* p n 1 f> *sV ^ f" 4 ^ Plf '5 y 111 f"Tl T* «•yft T* (-• f* i f* f ' "J n *? o 1w a n.- tg . JL tt ./ -i. k-A-1. '• ' ^ O1 «*. - L gi j JL «.i*w .i .i, j,. t.j, V/X - LX v. * »,i. cX Jw
ii rjF Wei1l>rt|li conjunction with money-grabbing flnancldwpf
and individual speculators. It w^ibj^nese people |jj^vaad first
urged the rench overn,ment to onetr a to the country; it was
they . •oped to corner ill of Morocco's trade f-:r
t' ^ ^ * ■ ( •
themselves; and it was because of their recently established
interests and Investments in Morocco that France's 'zealous
men cn the spot' - the political intriguers and the 'fanatical
colonels* - had threatened a formal conquest of the country
46
and risked endangering the peace of Europe# Of course,
there was nothing really new in these statements# Already
J# i. Hobson in his major work on imperialism had traced the
origins of that phenomenon to greedy individuals who exported
capital in the hope of gaining a profitable investment
overseas#'17 But much more than Hobson, the Manchester Guardian
thought that the need for markets and raw materials abroad
genuinely figured in the rise of the New Imperialism of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries# Indeed, it
seemed to be drawing a fine moral distinction between this
type of expansionism and the more speculative variety
practised by France in North Africa# While not exactly
approving of the former, the •lanfihsgtar vHflrflLan cou3-d apparently
accept it, provided it kept the doors open to free trade and
did not create friction amon the Powers# The latter, however,
was clearly objectionable; for its fulfillment would
'infallibly mean the loss of another neutral market'. No
wonder, then, that by 1905 the was speaking out so
strongly against Delcasse's policies. There was little doubt
in Its mind that, if carried out, they would eventually squeeze
British traders and Investors out of Morocco altogether,
despite the existence of a thirty year free trade clause In the
1904 Convention# Indeed, it was for this reason that the
*
paper openly welcomed ^erman intervention into the matter# 'The
46 9 August 1905; also 23 March and
19 April 1907#
47 bee the chapter entitled 'Economic \ arasites of im; ©riallM*
in his fopqriaUgffl? \ fiUtfly (Iondon# 1905), pp. 42-56, for
details of .obson's views on this point.
Kaiser', commented C.P. Scott one week after the Tangier visit,
'is acting in the soirit of the Agreement, not against it. His
methods are open to criticism, but the substance of his policy,
so far at any rate, is sound'.
Apart from the Manchester Guardian, there were others in
Britain who voided complaints about France's colonial policies
during these years. Ever since the signing of the 1904
Agreements, there always had been a*latent fear in some
sections of British public opinion that the French might one
day renege on the friendly spirit of the Entente Cordiale by
advancing their own commercial and financial interests abroad
to the detriment of British traders and investors. After all,
prior to 1.904 the French hod engaged in unscrupulous commercial
practices in the Congo and elsewhere with scant regard for
British capitalists, not to mention the native population. It
was quite conceivable, therefore, that they might continue
these practices, despite the existence of a written colonial
settlement with Britain. And, indeed, between 1905 and 1907
the French proceeded to do just that. Not only did they
continue to sea}, off in the fashion of the Belgians much of
the Congo basin from all outsiders, but in 1905-6 French
capitalists went ahead with the laying of an extended railway
system in Abyssinia which in the minds of some of their British
and Italian competitors there was the first step in the
48 Manchester Guardian. 8 April 1905. Despite early reservations
about the thirty year time-limit clause of the 1904 Convention,
the Manchester Guardian did not fully condemn Delcasse till
June 1905.Howard Veinroth is probably right when he attributes
this change in outlook on the part of the Guardian to the French
foreign minister's fall from power and 'the mounting attack of
the French left upon him for arousing German anxieties of
isolation'. Bee Howard 3, tfeinroth. 'The British Radicals and





In Britain, a number of peorile were quick to criticize
the French for their behaviour overseas. Conservative
newspapers, always sensitive to imperial issues, were among
the first to speak out. Upon learning of French pressures
on the British Government to support the railway venture in
Abyssinia 'on rain of injuring, if not, indeed, destroying
BO
the good understanding between the two countries', the
Scotsman wrote that France 'cannot advance without danger to
51
herself and to others'. Earlier, the horning Post made
a similar warning, only in somewhat less uncertain terms.
The French, it said, 'should definitely abandon the idea that
it (the Entente) can be used as an instrument for political
52
aggrandisement*. Oddly enough, British businessmen and
the imperialist press had little to say about the Congo
question. Instead, the protests that were made in Britain
about French malpractices there came primarily from
humanitarians who were interested In the plight of the
Africans. Spearheading the campaign against the French in
the Congo was E.D. Morel, a man born in France and well
acquainted with French colonial administers. Morel first
became Interested in the Congo question when working in the
49 In 1894, the largely French-owned Compagnie Imperiale
d'Ethiopie secured a concession from Emperor Menelik II to
construct a railway line from Jibuti to Dire Dawa in eastern
Abyssinia. In 1905, the French began to extend this line
from Dire Dawa to Adis Ababa, a move which T. Lennox Gilmour,
then a Managing Director cf the Mozambique Company In London,
labelled as an attempt to make Abyssinia become 'a French
colony in all but name'. The extension of the railway line,
Gilmour was certain, would, if completed, give France political
and commercial predominance throughout all of Abyssinia. See
T. Lennox Gilmour, Abyssinia; The Ethiopian Railway and the
Lowers (London, 190(>), pt>. 8-9.
BO Ibid., p.55.
51 --icctsman. 4 January 1906.
52 Morning Post. 28 November 1905.
I 90s .. h sirs. ..I. er : caster a.ic t ran;-, a . ..nc. a' ire
shi, ing ir : which operated steamers between Liverpool and
t c cshrican coast. ha tales of a. Igiu;. .nd r-onch
atrocities allien he heard while- employed for the .. :ra prompted
t ■ -.■.....a .1 . " 1 'a the , ... . . ax /•a the .. - : i.riaj
a u re. . 1 is unded and bee a. .e secretur; of the
. „ac,o .... .: ... ... j .a evguniz... Li-'-n hh,,.:, s. 1 1. to
rouse british public opinion on behalf of the African
! ej-a
,'Ui.-.t: Xi.' initially, iorel concentrate; ;..i nodi iizin0
public feeling against the Belgian King Leopold II f r his
,u;l_,r; . .... ...v. ;.an, „eli. . _ 1... t Ln .;. hi
could rc induced to alter their says in -. heir part c the
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bongo as a r. suit of t:.e atente bordiale. tut when it
became ♦,-.parent that the 1901 Convention -was lot having any
e c' .. the ".'reach OV'. ' i.e.. . c in ...is si sction, rel and
his fellow nc-mbors or the Congo deform 'ovesent reconsidered
their outlook! public hostility was to be stirred up against
the un. .o well „..w tu igiansj die she Id.,-. . or . .anding
■ i.w .•••u4>,,r...s-t at a virtually us. less instru....-nt ..1
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-ovcro.i at and ?o in favo ' .... s. all. r unvn^ .eat with
an--,.urn bower that ; us ...re willing to hcl, the ."ricwris. be
secur' t; f * roe's , sit ion In .'orocco depends u.-on ritain,
53 .lso k .oers : b' , c ongo -rb m .ssociaticn were
Jir Charier Tlike, t! c ^dical for r-est -f ' ;r.i,
K.h. Fox-Bourne, secretary of the Aborigines Protection Societyf
bill 1 n , " uTbury o " the cocoa fir"1, J-an T" 'It, owner ~f u
prosain nt Liverpool shipping c< many, and the writer
Sir \rthur Conan bay In. >e Ltuis end J. itengers (odi 'ors),
L^-whii ' ' Ll.! o the .on.,0 :cf'ora. .iovuaent xford, 1963),
pp. ix, x, 57
54 • . i .Iiv.', '• . . -urol ,uid the crusade against the . oreign
Office», Journal of Modern istorv. 39, no. 2, (June, 1967), 129.
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Morel once wrote a friend, 'and the situation on the
international chess-board is such that the Anglo-T'rench
alliance is her sheet anchor.... At the oresent moment the
Entente cordial© is the order of the day; but international
politics are constantly fluctuating'. y let although Morel
was equally, if not more, orovfcked at the :>ench than were
either the .e^tsnan or the Morninn host, his efforts, unlike
theirs, came to naught, v/hereas the "'oreign Office responded
to newspaper pressures by coming to an agreement with the
French over Abyssinia, neither it nor many leading
newspapers like The Times would denounce the Trench in the
Congo for fear of damaging the Entente.^ The result, of
course, was that much cf the British public knew little or
nothing about the atrocities in the French Congo; and Morel,
like .-alter B. Harris in Morocco, remained something of a lone
voice in the wilderness during these years.
The most persistent criticism of the French at this time,
however, was that made by many Liberals with regard to the
55 Morel to Colonel E.D. Blake, 9 January 1907, in the C.D. Morel
Papers. Box labelled *F (S); Foreign Cffice, 1903-1913% British
Library of Political and Economic Science.
56 On 13 December 1906, Britain, France, and Italy signed an
agreement in London in which it v.-as stated that France could
proceed with her extension of the railway line in Abyssinia,
provided that British and Italian nationals *would enjoy in
all matters of trade and transit absolute equality of treatment
on the railway and in the port of Jibuti' and provided that
British and Italian representatives were appointed to the
Board of the ^rench railway company. See Accounts and Earners:
wtata xcix (19C7) cd. 3298.
57 A letter of Valentine Chirol, Foreign editor of The Timeq.t
to Morel dated 9 August 1906 is fairly typical# 'With regard
to the French Congo I see the force of your argument*, wrote
Chirol, *but 1 confess I am rather doubtful as to the expediency
of dispersing your fire, especially as there is the added danger
of reviving Trench prejudices which the Congo people have only
too successfully exploited in the past for their own advantage*•
See the ^.D. Morel Papers, box marked *F. (8); Sir Valentine Chirol
file, 1906-1912*.
role of Tench diplomacy In Europe, Jince the earliest days
of the rapprochement with "'ranee the Liberals had been anxious
to see the friendlier feelings between the two vestern Powers
extended to "nclude other nations as well, particularly
Germany. Jhen this development failed to materialise, the
Liberals, though admittedly only s~me of them, were at first
inclined to lay the blame en the light in their own country.
Thus in the spring of 1905 j they accused the 'English Tory
press' of adding unnecessary fuel to the tensions of the
Moroccan crisis. It was the unabated anti-Teutonic invective
of these newspapers, they claimed, that not only exacerbated
Anglo-German relations but also frightened many Tenchnen into
thinking t ^olcnsse sr b! ■ be dismiss d becwi.n 'is licies
were being used by the British press 'as a cover for attacking
eg
Germany', Jut a number of liberals soon began to change
their minds somewhat in the light of the disapproval expressed
in some Trench newspapers at Anglo-Gernan attempts to seek a
reconciliation. During the general election campaign of 1905,
for example, a number of Tench newspapers expressed alarm at
oir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's foreign policy speeches, many
of which promised improved relations with Berlin under a
to
Liberal Government.J7 In 1906, when .agio-German relations
did begin to improve with a series of exchange visits held at
the grass-roots level, many Tench newspapers warned that an
understanding between London and Berlin could only come at the
53 Manchester Guardian. 22 April 1905? also bcatminstcr Gazette,
9 "-ay, 1 and 7 June 1905; and II.... flassin^ham's column * her sons
and politics' in the ■-ncakerT 10 June 1905.
59 In particular, it was the afore-rientioned foreign policy
speech which Campbell-Bannerman delivered at the ilbert ball
in late -comber 19^5 that caused the greatest stir in rr.nce.
Jee . Las,Gerald, 26 ecember 1905.
60
«» Jvt-. j. jLc4wXXS «>v g^jgOax -i^-AUon guic! oris,
..rid in 19-7, the officially-inspired ..c« '. s, angered by
Camobell-. r,merman1 s proposals for* a drastic linitoti-vn of
arraamr.-nfc:; at the fortdeeming iague Conference, recuse the
Tritish- rioc Mnister of naivete arid imnlioc that his
suggestions were based upon an excessive trust in the goodwill
of uernany, " 9c those and other remarks in the rench press
the reaction was swift in Britain, no of tne most indignant
newspapers was the ulasgow ..eraid. 'he have made friends with
•ones and are prepared to assume all the responsibilities
which friendship and specific agreements let upon us', went
its leader-article of <7 bctobor 1905♦ 'hut we must demur to
this perpetual invention of horrible anti-German tales, the
chief end of which is to persuade the world, ant. tiiis country
in particular, that ueruany is the blackguard of Lurope'*
her was this sense of irritation at the reach confined to
newspapers like the Arald. Grey himself, states the liberal
boreign secretary's latest biographer, 'felt their touchiness
was extreme',
60 Toward3 the < pf of 1905, Lord -\vebury and Lord Courtney, two
pacifically inclined Liberal neers, founded the 4nglo-Ger»an
friendship ;o».v\lttee- to -ronote better relations between the two
countries by fostering exchange visits for various trade union,
religious, .:.rf civic delegations, v the s ring >£ 1996 these
visits were in full swing, desoite the deplorable impression
they were ere ting in right-wing circles in ranee, ice
Weinroth, on, cit.y on, 661-662,
61 'he outburst on this occasion was ' romp tod bj an article
of Con bell-Tnnnermnn In the new Radical weekly the I'ntion
entitled 'the ague Conference one the limitation oh armaments'•
In this article, the 9'riae Minister rro-'-osed that Britain set
an oxa ]c ; or ell n tiens involved in the arms race by making
substantial reductions in naval expenditure. (bee lotion,
2 arc:. 19-'7») fhe .c;.usT however, challenged the. .. acts end
figures woich Canobell-Bannerman used to su~-ort bis arguments
and conduct c. that the article achieved nothing, apart : roa
revealing 'the extent of the imrrudent confidence to which the
responsj -.1* he. a r t; c ritish government gives way', (quoted
in The times. 4 March 19C7, o, 5,)
62 if 5 th -bins, Wtfg, - WflfV nfto • • , •igfifttBidr Ucauon, I., 71),
p. 155.
3ut although the indignation at the T1rench was becoming
fairly widespread in Britain during these years and for a
host of reasons, this is not to say that the press anr the
public at large were on the verge of demanding a dissolution
of the Entente Cordiale. Admittedly, there was by the
summer of 1907 much less euphoria about the friendship with
France than there had been in the earlier days of the
rapprochement, however harmless it was originally thought
to have been in some circles of British public opinion, this
was s on forgotten with the eruption of the first Moroccan
crisis, and almost to a man British journalists ceased to
speak of the Entente after 1905 as an instrument that would
inevitably promote world peace. But at the same time British
assurances of goodwill towards ranee both at official and at
popular levels were as firm as ever, and hardly anyone suggested
that the recent understanding be laid to rest. Undoubtedly
the selectivity and care which a great many newspapers exercised
when reporting the news helped the Entente to retain a reasonable
degree of popularity. By falsely ascribing to rench diplomacy
certain qualities which it did not have, as happened during the
Tangier crisis, and by deliberately ignoring or suppressing
certain inf rnation about French policies abroad, as happened
time and again between 1905 and 1907, some newspapers,
particularly The Times, were in effect projecting an unduly
favourable image of Prance and the Entente Cordialef This was
a fact tthich men like alter 3. arris and . . 'orel were only
too quick to discover.
Yet even if The Times and other newspapers had acted
otherwise and revealed as much as they knew about the course of
events in ♦.orceoj aru. elsewhere, ! t is still open to rebate
whether or not the result would have been a public wroar
culminating in the end or the '.nglo- r cd - itc. !:• 1 tain,
there were too many people who supported the i ntcnte for too
many reas. no for this to ha pen. True, the re- ns • . iced were
not onX varied but often at cross-pur; oses. Thus Conservatives
backed, the entente because for them it was a prop upon which
Britain could shore up her flagging Lapire and concentrate
instead on staving off the German challenge in Europe; while
liberals welcomed it because the} believed that it signalled
the wane of imperialist rivalries and marked a new era in
international relations in which all the major cvwera,
including nritain, ranee, and Germany, would eventually come
to terms aru settle their differences. If in the ease of the
Liberals, Particularly the Radicals, the ntente hud yet to
fulfil its pacific mission, it was only because some iisguidod
men in the foreign offices in London and aris along with a
few of the newspapers in both countries were attempting to
convert the understanding into something akin to a military
alliance. The solution then, as they saw it, was not to
destroy the entente but to pat it safely into the hands of the
two peo.i les. This explains t..e subsequent ca: palgn by left-wing
newspapers not only for the dismissal of sir Edward Grey and
an end of his policies but also for the co plete denper-tlz tlon
of the oreign office. This also explains why foreign p-licy
dissidents in Britain were at pains tc. single out the ,.uai d*Orsay
rather than the drench people as the source of many of the
short-comings connected with the Entente in Morocco and
elsewhere; between the two, emphasized the Erie Tea En~ Tuardlan,
A "3
'there is a great deal of difference'. J Equally important,
it seemed plausible tc a number of people in Britain -
Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, and Socialists alike, -
that "or the '"rench, too, the Entente Cordiale had not lived
up to expectations. There is no definite change of opinion,
but there is a change of feeling...', wrote .L. Courtney,
editor of T e - r tail. ,hti:/ Vcview. 'A large number of the
French people begin tc feel that they have been used - that
we have Egypt, that they have not got Morocco, and that the
on boat o copPfTe cannot help them to secure it.... In 'ranee
and elsewhere human nature ought not to be human nature; but
64
It is'. by constantly drawing attention to this ooint and
by hastily passing over any difficulties between the two
mowers, the newspapers were more than able tc offset any
criticisms levelled at Trance and the Entente during these
years.
63 Manchester w-uardlan. 3 May 1907.
64 bee Courtney's unsigned colunr in the 1'ortni -htly Review,
T ui (-c :.c -.bc.r, 1907), entitled. ' oreign affairs* a chronlque'
PP. " -r ,
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CHAPTER IV
BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS DOMESTIC FRENCH POLITICS, 1903-1907
It perhaps almost goes without saying that, even during the
most ordinary of times when there was comparatively little
diplomatic activity between London and Paris, the British as a
whole took a reasonably strong interest in what was happening in
France. Nor were they wrong to do so. After all, France was an
important nation in Europe, a Great Power at close geographical
proximity to Britain and one whose political ideals and sentiments
had a tradition of influencing her neighbours. In the light of
the Ehtente Cordiale, however, this interest in French political,
cultural, and social life underwent something of a transformation.
Not only did the various organs of British public opinion report
the news from France in more detail and with greater enthusiasm,
they also presented it in such a fashion as to convey certain
impressions to their readers that did not necessarily square
with the facts. In particular, the newspapers and periodicals
of the day were virtually unanimous in proclaiming the stability
of the Third Republic at a time when political and social tensions
were rife in France. It is the purpose of this chapter to
examine why the press chose to pursue this and other dubious
themes, as well as to find out the reactions in Britain to
day-to-day events in France.
1. The question of the instability of the Third Renublf
Taken in its entirety, public opinion had been in two minds
about the Third Republic around the turn of the century. On the
one hand, there were those who looked upon the political
institutions of France as being basically progressive and
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largely fulfilling the democratic ideals of the 1789 Revolution.
For them, there was no more favourable contrast between French
liberalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
and the oiore autocratic, if not despotic, spirit of government that
prevailed at Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Indeed, in the
eyes of some, France was a bulwark against reaction and oppression
on the Continent, At the same time, however, there were others
who felt that the Third Republic was almost too democratic in
its principles and hence apt to be volatile and untrustworthy.
Those who thought along these lines pointed out that France
was the only major country in Europe not to be headed by a
monarch or an emperor. This, they averred, made French government
even more alien to the British mind than the backward regimes in
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. The exponents of this
point of view were, of course, few in number and came primarily
from the aristocratic wing of the Conservative party; nevertheless
they had all too frequently occupied the positions of power and
influence in Britain in recent years. In the late nineteenth
century, their chief spokesman had been Lord Salisbury, who
during his four tenures as Prime Minister opposed a formal
understanding with France for several reasons, not the least of
which was his belief that the elected governments of the Third
Republic were too short-lived and too vulnerable to the whims
and caprices of the public will to come to terms with on a
long-term basis.
Whether or not Salisbury's notions about France lingered
on in high circles in Britain after his death is difficult to
say. Certainly the press behaved as if they did. Time and
y
Christopher M. Andrew, Theonhile Lelcasse and the Making of
the Entente Cordiale (London, 1968), pp.214-215.
again British newspapers and periodicals devoted editorials
and special articles to refuting the late premier's line of
thinking by arguing that recent events had shown France to
be a stable country, even by British standards. According
to the Birmingham Daily Post, for instance, the internal
disorders, 'which had made France a byword among the nations'
were gone, and the task of 'advancing the Republic towards
consolidation and solidarity' was now finished. 'Practically
speaking...', this newspaper continued,
France has enjoyed five and a half years of settled
government and the result is seen in greater stability in
domestic affairs and increased international prestige. Such
a record compares by no means unfavourably with our own
political experience, bearing in mind the fact that the
Constitutional systems of the two countries are not equally
conducive to long-lived Administrations.... In France the
upholders of the Republic have to meet an Opposition, not,
as in this country, composed of one or two parties, but
embracing numerous and most diverse elements.2
Britain, it concluded, had entered into diplomatic
partnership with a steady and thoroughly reliable neighbour.
No doubt there was much to be said for these statements
of the Post in early 1905. By this time only two premiers,
Waldeck-Rousseau and Emile Combes, had been governing the
country for a period lasting longer than five years. As both
men had more or less striven towards the same goals, the
succession of the one to the other at this time was widely
understood to have rendered a certain continuity to France's
domestic policies, just as Delcasse's seven year tenure at
the Quai d'Orsay over the same period of time was thought to
have steadied and given a greater sense of purpose to French
foreign policy. Meanwhile, Loubet was well into his sixth year
''Birmingham Daily Post. 19 January 1905*
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as President of the Republic. Yet despite these encouraging
signs, not everything was running as smoothly in France as
was being suggested. For one thing, expressions of political
discontent were becoming increasingly audible in the Chamber
of Deputies. In the main this was due to Combes's anti-clerical
policies, which alienated not only the Nationalists and the
various parties of the Right but also the Socialists and the
Radical groups in the legislature, for whom the premier's
excessive efforts to curtail the power and influence of the
Church were coming at the expense of more pressing reforms
concerning old age pensions, a graduated income tax, and a
reduction of military service from three to two years. Moreover,
the intrigues and political infighting that had bedevilled earlier
ministries of the Third Republic were by the end of 1904 beginning
to undermine Combes's authority in the Chamber. Prominent
cabinet ministers were quietly working behind the prime minister's
back to further their own future.^ By January 1905 the
combination of these two factors had forced Combes from power;
in March 1906 his successor Rouvier retired for similar reasons;
and in October 1906 Rouvier's successorj Sarrien, stepped down
from office in favour of Clemenceau. In the meantime, Theophile
Delcasse, the French foreign minister and a chief architect of
the Entente Cordiale, had been dismissed from office because his
Moroccan policies had led other members of the French cabinet
into thinking that war with Germany was close at hand.
If the newspapers and journals in Britain did not overlook
these developments, they did argue that, despite the rapid
turnover of Governments in France, nothing had really changed.
a
Interestingly, Emile Combes In his memoirs acknowledged tnat
parliamentary intrigues played an important part in his downfall
but denied that his successor^was involved to any great extent.
See Combes, Ron Ministere: Memoires. 1902-1905 (Paris, 1956),
pp. 260-261.
The Manchester Guardian was one of the first organs of opinion
to explain to its readers why it thought this to be the case.
Writing at the time of M, Combes's retirement in January 1905*
this newspaper argued that the 'insignificance' of the event
could best be understood when one recalled the differences
between the British and French parliamentary systems. In
France, 'the doctrine of the cohesion of the Cabinet' never
had quite the same force that it possessed in Britain. Instead,
in French government there existed the 'group system* in which
largely the same cabinet members continued to work together
under a succession of premiers without altering the ministerial
programme, As for the comparatively short life of most French
Governments, the Guardian attributed this to 'a natural jealousy
i
of the Executive and of the large administrative powers possessed
by the ministries' which 'had made the Legislature very ready to
resort to the expedient of tripping up a Ministry on an
interpellation'. 'Therefore*, it concluded, 'while M, Combes
must go, his colleagues, or the majority of them, will remain'.
At the time of Rouvier's fall from power, the Westminster Gazette
said more or less the same thing, albeit in a somewhat less
complicated fashion, when it wrote on 8 March 1906: 'the case
is by no means so bad as we might suppose from the analogy of
our own Governments. The defeat of a Ministry signifies more
often a change of personnel than of policy'. Indeed, as far as
the Economist was concerned, this sudden spate of short-lived
Ministries only went to show the degree of unanimity of opinion
and the common sense of purpose that existed among high-ranking
French politicians. The group system, It argued,
4 Manchester GuardianT17 January 1905.
makes every successful Minister in turn the victim of some
unforeseen combination. The more homogeneous French policy
becomes - and at present it is very homogeneous - the less
important it seems to be thought by what Ministers it is
carried out. The moment of success is apparently the
moment when the man who has achieved it is destined to see
himself abandoned by the very men who have helmed him on
the road, 5
In making such statements, the Economist and others were
obviously trying to put the best face possible on a phenomenon
which at times must have been a trifle perplexing to the casual
observer of French politics. In particular, they were trying
to assure their readers that the fall of a Ministry in Paris
implied no serious breach of continuity in French foreign
policy, 'Certainly the Anglo-French understanding will not
suffer,..from a change of Government in France', wrote the
Daily Chronicle at the time of Clemenceau's replacement of
Sarrien in October 1906, 'any more than it has done so from
a change of Government in England', ^ But although British
newspapers and Journals advanced these arguments as often as
possible, not everyone was inclined to agree. Thus the
Conservative Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne refused to
regard these ministerial reshuffles in France as unimportant
and privately expressed the belief that they bore out the
7
warnings of the late Lord Salisbury against a French entente.
5 Economist, 12 March 1906.
6 Daily Chronicle. 20 October 1906.
7 'The instability of French Governments is much to be
regretted', wrote Lansdowne to his ambassador in Paris in the
aftermath of the French cabinet shake-up during the Tangier
crisis, 'and affords an argument to those who do not believe
in the possibility of an enduring understanding with France.
The machine worked^(or seemed to work) so smoothly while it
was run by Delcasse and Cambon, that one was apt to forget this
danger'. See Lansdowne to Sir Francis Bertie in the Lansdowne
Papers, F(oreign) O(ffice) 800/127.
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2. React.1 onarles In decline
Much more indicative in the opinion of many people in
Britain of France's internal stability was the fate being
suffered by the reactionaries and the anti-republican forces
of the Right at this time. 4s far as a good number of Britons
were concerned, the ability of the various French Governments
of these years to meet and overcome the challenge posed by the
Nationalists and the various royalist groups showed far better
than any detailed arguments about the nature of the French
political system that all augured well for the Third Republic.
On several occasions since 1870 had the forces of reaction -
Bourbonist, Orleanist, Bonapartist, and Boulangist alike -
threatened to destroy the existing social and political set-up
in France. In the 1890s, the forces of the far Right had
come close to wresting control of the Army from the Government.
Of the failure of right-wing groups to achieve this and other
ends little need be said here, except to mention that in the
eyes of the bulk of the British press a repetition of such
events was most unlikely. For the newspapers, the gradual
vindication of Dreyfus and the resounding victory of the
parties of the Bloc in the general election of 1902 were
sufficient proof that this was the case. The Times, writing
on the he«ls of President Loubet's State visit to London in
1903, proclaimed that the passions 'generated during the
Panama crisis and the Dreyfus controversy. «sr« dead or dying,
and the irreconcilables on both sides who would uproot the
foundations of the State for narrow and perverse objects are
becoming feeble and discredited minorities'. The French
royalists, while not exactly endeared to the Third Republic,
were now beginning to see that it was 'the only form of
government which divides Frenchmen least'* Consequently,
The Tiaes argued, they would In future be sacrificing 'family
prejudices' to 'public duty' in order to ensure that existing
O
political institutions remain standing* What most impressed
the Spectator, on the other hand, was not so much that French
Governments had succeeded in withstanding these attacks and
intrigues from the extreme Right, but that they had apparently
emerged from them much stronger than they had been before.
'An entire generation has passed away', it wrote cn IS April 1903»
and the Republic still subsists, and is still as popular with
the people as it ever was. Its rulers have spent money
rather recklessly; but they have maintained peace; they
have so remade the Army that France no longer fears invasion;
they have restrained the bitterness between poor and rich
till property is as safe in France as in England; and they
have secured for the electorate a firm, and, as it has
proved, a trancuillising, hold on their representatives*.. •
Nevertheless, British onlookers of events in France
could not be certain; they had no way of knowing for sure
whether or n t the threat to the Republic from the extreme
Right had been completely overcome; and, significantly, when
the Combes Ministry fell in January 1905, the Spectator and
the Dally News, two organs of opinion with strikingly
different views of the world at large, both momentarily came
to the conclusion that the latest turn of events presaged a
Q
revival of Nationalism in France*7 Did such remarks amount
to a tacit admission on the part of British newspapers that
they had been exaggerating their confidence in the stability
of the Third Republic? It would be difficult to say; for the
8 The Times. 20 July 1903*
9 Dally News. 16 January 1905; and 3peq^q1;op? 21 January 1905.
Both organs of opinion had taken Combes's resignation over the
anti-clerical issue very much at face value and assumed that
it was due to the pressure of the Church's political allies
on the Right rather than the Impatience of the Left* They soon
altered their views, however, as soon as it became apparent
that it was Rouvier, and not the right-wing Douaer, who was
coming Into office.
press, despite its claims to accuracy and objectivity in the
reporting and the discussion of the news, did from time to
time over-indulge in its praise of France and the Entente
Cordiale during these years, //hat is undeniable, however, is
that at least some people in Britain were alive to the strength
and resiliency of French royalism and ultra-conservativisra.
Laurence Jerrold, the Paris correspondent of the Daily Telegraph
and one of the most astute observers of the contemporary
political and social scene in France, in particular held this
10
view. Writing in the summer of 1906 shortly after the
general election of that year had yet again reduced the
number of Nationalist deputies sitting in the French Chamber,
Jerrold warned his readers not to become too complacent about
the results. It was a carious feature of French politics, he
pointed out, that the Nationalists never numbered more than
forty-nine in the legislature and yet 'made one hundred times
more more noise than the same number of any other politicians'.
That so few could make so much commotion was due, he explained,
to the diffusion of Nationalist principles and ideals through
several parliamentary groups. Although there was but one
self-styled Nationalist party, reactionary thinking found its
way into ibfcher parties as well. Moreover, Nationalism was in
his opinion 'the one powerful re-agent' in French politics.
1C Born in London in 1873 as the grandson of the prominent
nineteenth century man-of-letters, Douglas Jerrold, educated at
the Sorbonne, and married to a Frenchwoman in 1908, Jerrold in
many ways belonged, along with Hilaire Felloe, Edmund Dene Morel,
and a few others, to that small group of men whose personal
background and experiences on both sides of the Channel made them
equally expert on both the British and French ways of life at
this time. Jerrold spent his first few years after university
writing in French journals on English and American literature
as well as in British journals on French literature and social
questions. In 1902 he succeeded Campbell Clarke as Paris
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. where he performed his
duties well enough to earn himself the tribute of that newspaper's
biographer as b man of considerable brilliance and almost equally
considerable indolence, whose scholarship and great knowledge of
It either attracted or repelled all other bodies'. If
during the previous Chamber it had managed only to repel,
this was because its 'fearsome aims' and subversive methods
had produced a widespread revulsion which in turn managed to
keep the Bloc goihg. But once the Nationalists had shed their
anti-republican objectives, their other goals, like a war with
Germany over Alsace-Lorraine or a great extension of France's
colonial empire, stood a chance of being realised: 'there
11
always will be an audience in France for furious rhetoric...'.
The view is an interesting one and not altogether without
substance; for it helps to explain the 'New Nationalism' and
virulent revanchist politics that sprang up in the Third
Republic under Poincare's leadership on the eve of the Great
War. Still, for many British organs of opinion at this time
Nationalism was very much a waning force in French politics.
The fortunes of the creed, it seems, were to be identified
solely with the fortunes of a single political party.
Indeed, if anything, this notion that French Nationalism
was dying seemed to gain currency as time wore on. It emerged
once again in the British press during the first Moroccan
crisis when both the French Government and the French people
studiously refused to heed the belligerent calls of the
Nationalists to take up Germany's challenge over North Africa.
It reappeared in connection with the disestablishment struggle
in France, in which a prominent ally of the reactionaries, the
Roman Catholic Church, suffered repeated defeats. And it came to
the fore in the spring of 1906 when rumours of a royalist plot
France well maintained the standards of the Paris office in the
easy years between the establishment of the Entente Cordiale and
the cataclysm of 1914'. (Gee Edward F. Lawson, Peterborough
Court: The Story of the Daily Telegraph (London, 1955),p.57«)
Jerrold died in Paris in October 1918.
11 L. Jerrold, 'French polities and the French people',
Contemporary Review. 90 (July 1906),58.
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willing not to increase the importance of their office.
According to the Spectator. all this could be explained in
terms of past events. 'Their history', it once wrote of the
French,
gives them a certain dread of the dominant Person,
whom we, with our different history, do not fear; and
they have a liking, though their earlier history did
not reveal it, for the man who is not brilliant, for
the temperate man of affairs - the notaire, as they
would say,...who is always trustworthy, though seldom
original....The French people wish, in fact, neither
for a great statesman, nor a great leader of any party
so much as for a dignified Moderator, who will keep all
parties within the boundaries marked out for them by the
present Constitution. 13
Needless to say, virtually everyone in Britain even
vaguely familiar with Loubet thought that he fitted this
description to perfection. At the time of the French President's
State visit to London in 1903, for instance, The Times and other
newspapers showered praise on Loubet for his 'calm good sense,
his power of hard work, his blameless private life, his
preference for the solid rather than the superficial and the
showy, and his power of steering the ship of state on an even
keel'.1*1 That allieres possessed the same steady, bourgeois
qualities the press had no doubt. But it was his succession to
the highest office in the land without causing, as the Scotsman
15
put it, 'more than a ripple on the surface of French polities',
that impressed British onlookers the most. This, they maintained,
implied a continuity in France's domestic and foreign policies,
and it indicated that Frenchmen had a strong faith in the
13 Spectator. 13 January 1906.
14 The Times. 6 July 1903. See also Daily Express. 6 July 1903
and St. James's Gazette. 9 July 1903? for similar sentiments.
15 Scotsman. 18 January 1906.
safeguards built into the Constitution. The election of
M, Fallieres to the French Presidency, wrote the Horning Post,
is the more significant because it is not a sensational
event. Everybody expected . . Fallieres to be elected.
He was elected because France wishes for the continuity
of its Republican Government, for the avoidance of
adventures, and for peace and quiet at home and abroad.
It is a commonsense election, and it has been received
in France in a commensense way. That this election
should have taken place in the legal manner, without
any special excitement, without fuss, just as a matter
of course, is the sign that the French nation has
attained to political stability under the Republican
institutions xich have proved themselves so well suited
to the practical needs of France. 16
3• The Rise of Socialism
The British press, then, was well inclined to discount
any nbtion of the Republic succumbing to a right-wing coup
or even being threatened by another Boulanger-type figure
with an appreciable following. But it was not only the
Nationalists and kindred groups that the newspapers feared.
At the opposite end of the political spectrum there was another
force which posed an equally serious challenge to the parties
of the Bloc and possibly the Republic itself. This was, of
course, Socialism, whose creed, unlike that of the Rationalists,
was attracting an increasing number of followers in France,
particularly in the more industrial regions of the country.
The growing appeal of Socialism to France's working classes
is perhaps best reflected in the steadily rising number of
left-wing deputies elected to the French legislature. Whereas
in the early years of the Third Republic there were only a
handful of Socialists sitting in the Chamber of Deputies, by
1902 there were forty-six. Four years later there were
seventy-six. But despite this comparative success at the
polls, the French Left was not wielding more influence in
16 Morning Post. 19 January 1906.
the Chamber. Indeed, in recent years it had been able to
secure the passage of only a few minor measures on behalf of
its supporters: a much-delayed law in 1898 on workers'
accident insurance; a relatively unimportant piece of
legislation regulating hours of work shortly afterwards;
and an act in 1905 granting an eight-hour working day in the
mines. In the meantime, Alexandre Mlllerand joined' the
Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet as Minister of Commerce, an act
which made him the first Socialist in the world to become a
member of a government. Not only did this decision provoke a
fierce debate within the ranks of the French left, thereby
weakening the Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies; but the
purpose for which it had been made, to initiate social
legislation which would put striking workmen on a more legal
footing, came to naught in the light of the disestablishment
controversy. Given these circumstances, it is understandable
why a number of French left-wingers should turn to militant
trade unionism rather than parliamentary Socialism as a means
of achieving social justice. In 1903, the Confederation
^ ^ 17
Generale du Travail, ' founded only eight years earlier to
bring together under one organisation all the national and
local trade unions in France, adopted revolutionary syndicalism
as its doctrine. The C.G.T. not only preached 'direct action*
tactics to bring abcut a general strike, but it declared
itself indifferent, if not hostile, to reforms achieved by
parliamentary methods. As a result, there ensued a series of
internal quarrels which racked the French Left as a whole. Was
syndicalist agitation the best means of emancipating the French
17 Herein cited as C.G.T.
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proletariat, or did the 'gradualist' beliefs of the
parliamentary Socialists offer a more likely chance of success?
Could men like Jaures and ilillerand intervene constructively
in the Chamber of Deputies and take a stand on the issues of the
day without sacrificing their Socialists principles, or did
such intervention automatically make them collaborators with
bourgeois politicians? And, indeed, were there any instances
in which French Socialists might be justified in coming to
the defence of the Republic?
Contrary to what might be expected, the British press,
when writing on the subject of Socialism in France, did not
dwell on these quarrels and divisions. They did not even
take seriously the argument that these quarrels would
permanently divide the French left. On the contrary, British
newspapers never ruled out the possibility that the 'pragmatic*
and the 'doctrinaire' Socialists in France might one day sink
their differences and confront the existing leaders of France
with a challenge much more formidable than that posed by the
Nationalist Right. 'It is not thought by observers that the
reactionary forces will greatly recover from their present
condition of comparative harmlessness', wrote the Scotsman
in early 1906, 'But Socialism is supposed to be a growing
power in France as in Germany, and If it can effectively
combine its forces and agree regarding leaders and programme...
it may succeed in so disturbing the political balance as to
cause another change of Government, and may create a new
danger to France and to the Republic...'. 0 To be sure,
there were those who thought otherwise. It was the opinion
1# Scotsman, 13 January 1906.
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of the right-wing Tall /'all Gazette, for instance, that 'the
"Haves" are toft numerous in laborious, provident ranee for
19
the hunger of the "Have nots" ever to become popular'. y
The mere threat of triumphant Socialism, it argued, would.
be enough to throw France into the arms of a new *saviour
20
of Society, Similarly, The Times thought that the
average French workingman had been too inculcated with
bourgeois #alues for the Left in France to be able to topple
the Third Republic. The impulse to save and own property in
France, it noted, 'may be said to permeate almost every class.
It is most conspicuous in the traditional attachment of the
French peasant to his plot of land, but it is in no sense
alien to the new industrial population, even if among them
it has to struggle with the presence of competing influence.
This national devotion to the oetltc erar^e Is so much
deadweight for H, Jaures and his friends. It is, on the other
hand, the strength behind M, Clemenceau and all other statesmen
21
who virtually defend the existing order'. On balance, hov?ever,
the various organs of opinion in Britain felt that Socialism
was much more of a force to be reckoned with in France than
was Nationalism,
One reason for this belief war the rise of Jean. Jaures to
the leadership of the French socialist movement. In the eyes
of many people in Britain, it was J*ures more than anyone else
in France who could claim credit for the gains of the Left in
the Chamber of Leputies, Unlike the 'dry-as-dust' Jules Guesde,
who also held considerable sway over left-wingers in France at
19 i'all all Gazette. 20 June 1906.
20 Fall Fall Gazette, 20 June 1906.
21 The Times. 20 June 1906.
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this time, Jaures had a practical rather than a theoretical
approach to politics. It was this approach, the newspapers
declared, that allowed Socialism to become acclimatised to the
Third Republic and give the movement an aura of respectability
in the eyes of the all-important French electorate. •Socialism
during the last Chamber, under Jaures one might say,* wrote
Laurence Jerrold, 'stepped out of its sanctum of principle
and theory into ordinary everyday life, and the apparition
22
was a revelation so the level French mind'.
Certainly Jaures had done much of late to earn the
admiration of non-Socialists in Britain like Jerrcld. In
the late 1890s Jaures, much to the disgust of the more
doctrinaire left-wingers in France, threw himself whole-heartedly
into the Dreyfus affair and sought to enlist Socialist
support for the Republic against the subversive efforts of
the extreme Right. In 1903 he further antagonised those
to his Left when he accepted a nomination for the post of
Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies and promised the
various parties of the Bloc his co-operation in passing all
legislation that was not blatantly contradictory to the
Socialist ideal. And at the Amsterdam congress of the
International in August 1904, Jaurds clashed head on with the
German Social-Democrat Bebel and others on the matter of
whether or not such co-operation inevitably protected and
reinforced the existing capitalist order. Needless to say,
with regard to these and other similar controversies, British
organs of opinion took care not only to impress their readers
with the difference between Jaurds and his critics on the
Left, but also to explain to them that it was his views that
prevailed in most Socialist circles in France. Shortly after
22 L. Jerrold, op.cit.. p.60.
the closing of the Amsterdam congtess, for example, the
Daily Hews pointed out that in French Socialism 'there is
comparatively little of the acrid, irreconcilable spirit
which distinguishes Socialism on the other side of the Rhine.
The typical French Socialist is the greatest orator of
contemporary France, and one of its finest thinkers -
Jean Jaur&s. And the policy of Jean Jaures and of the
powerful party which he leads is loyal, patriotic co-operation
with the Republic which had already achieved so much in the
sphere of social reformation'. 'Not class war, but class
association', it continued, '- not brute force, but the
force of education, of reason, is what the majority of
French Socialists hold by'.2^ A month later The Times made
a passing description of Jaures and his followers who, it
claimed, 'for want of a better name are called Socialists,
although neither he nor they are advocates of that Socialism
which is better described as Communism. They are in reality
only the advanced advocates of social amelioration, who are
thinking to-day many things that a far larger number will
24
think to-morrow'. Indeed, in sum it can be said that
taken in its entirety British public opinion looked quite
favourably upon the French Socialist leader. Conservatives
and Liberals regarded Jaures as an upholder of the
Constitution and the Third Republic; Radicals admired his
pronouncements on international politics and saw him as a
2^
spokesman for peace; J and people of all political outlooks
23 Daily Hews. 20 October 1904.
24 The Times. 29 November 1904.
25 See, for instance, the article of H.S.Weinroth, 'British
Radicals and the balance of power, 1902-1914', Historical
Journal. XIII, no.4 (1970), p.673, in which it is stated that
Jaures's desire to bring Britain and Germany together through
France made him 'the idol of left-wing pacifists in Britain'.
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in the country appreciated his considerable intellectual and
oratorical abilities. But to some Socialists in Britain,
notably H.M. Hyndman, leader of the Marxist-oriented
Social-Democratic Federation, Jaures's views on co-operation
with the State were all too reminiscent of those of Millerand
. 26
and smacked of 'revisionism*.
None the less, there was real cause for worry. Despite
all the calm assurances about the comparative harmlessness of
French Socialism, the Left in France was not accepting
conditions as tamely as the newspapers had said it would. In
the Nord department, coal miners, angered by a fatal explosion
at Courrieres killing more than a hundred workers in April 1906,
went out on strike in protest against the negligence of the
owners and proceeded to ransack the home of the director of
the mines. In the neighbouring Pas-de-Calais, coal miners
staged a sympathy strike with their fellow workers in the
Nord, an action which led to clashes first with the police and
then with the Army. And two weeks earlier at Fressenville,
striking ironmonger workers burnt down their employer's
chateau and then pillaged the homes of the overseers. Nor
was this all. While the workers in the industrial North were
becoming more and more restive, prominent Socialists and
trade union leaders were organising May Day demonstrations in
Paris, demonstrations which were ostensibly being held for the
introduction of a general eight-hour working day in France, but
which some Frenchmen suspected were politically motivated.
Similar suspicions were to emerge once again in January 1907
when left-wing groups demonstrated in the French capital on
behalf of a six day working week. But it was the continued
26 See the article of Hyndman in Justice, 5 September 1903.
spate of strikes in 1906-7 that did most to bring about a
domestic confusion unparalled in Prance since 1871. It was
the building workers at Clermont-Ferrand who first went on
strike after the coal miners in the North. Postmen and
teachers in Paris soon followed, and by the end of the year
Lorient, Toulon, Alais, and Bordeaux, had all undergone
considerable syndicalist agitation. The year 1907 was
scarcely less strife-ridden. In March of that year, Paris
went dark because of an electricians strike; in April,
there was trouble in the provisions trade in the capital; in
May and June, the ports of Marseilles, Le Havre, and Dunkirk
had to be closed because merchant seamen refused to board
ship; and by the end of 1907» building workers in Paris
had also downed their tools.
With regard to these and other disturbances, the reaction
of the British press was one of bewilderment, ./hat, the
newspapers asked, prompted this sudden agitation? Why had
it assumed such a violent and revolutionary character,
particularly in the North? A host of different explanations
was put forward: the genuineness of the labour grievances
which the strikes and the demonstrations had intended to
redress; the rise among Socialist intellectuels in France,
'impatient of the delays of the past eight years constitutional
democracy and impressed by the gigantesque Russian strikes'
in 1905, of a belief in violence as a political method; the
example set by right-wing extremists in connection with the
07
recent Church-dtate struggle;"' and the poor method of
reconciliation between capital and labour in France,
27 Sneaker« 28 April 1906.
especially its tendency to rely upon brute force rather than
arbitration as a means of overcoming difficulties. 4s if to
emphasise this last point, a number of organs of opinion in
Britain like the Birmingham Daily Post and the Glasgow Herald
pointed to the 'immaturity' of French trade unionism, a
movement which they acknowledged was growing but which by
British standards was still in its 'apprenticeshipThe
Government in France was all too willing to use soldiers in
these instances, conceded the Herald, but it was the unions,
'impinged upon by the crude Socialism of the class war' and
prevented in their 'xilEfcural development towards the orderly
struggle for the workers' rights which we know in this
28
country', that were most responsible for such confrontations.
These statements of the Glasgow Herald and the Birmingham
Daily Post might have been true as far as they went, but
they did not go nearly far enough. Once again it was
Laurence Jerrold, that most penetrating observer of early
twentieth century French politics, who had the most to say
on the subject.
Writing in 1907, Jerrold described from a strictly
British viewpoint what he construed to be wrong with the
French trade union movement. At the bottom of the matter,
he insisted, were not the unions themselves but the
parliamentary Socialists in France. Unlike the various
Labour groups in Britain, which were 'social first and
political afterwards', French Socialists were 'political
first and foremost'. As far as he was concerned, this
meant that the Left in France had 'gone the right way about
to wrest power in French politics, but not to coax vitality
28 Glasgow Herald. 24 April 1906; also Birmingham Daily lost.
26 April 1906.
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for their cause from French life'.2^ Not only did the
Socialist bloc in the Chamber of Deputies overlook the unions,
but it 'played a double game with them'. At first it
ignored the unions because it felt that they lacked
respectability; later, when it could no longer help but
recognise them, it tried to patronise them, and now in 1907
it had become 'violently distraught' by the unions and split
over the issue of whether to take the lead of Syndicalism
or dissociate itself from that movement.^0 Hence in his
opinion the French trade union movement had been 'naturally
driven to extremism', and the C.G.T. had to talk revolution
because if it did not, it would be ignored.^1 Not that
Jerrold believed that all French workers were extremists.
'Syndicalism', he hastened to add, 'has a bad odour with
the respectable artisan'.-^2 Nevertheless, Jerrold did
believe that there were strong revolutionary tendencies in
the French trade union movement and that these tendencies
were likely to grow until the parliamentary Socialists had
ceased their condescending attitude towards the unions.
Clemenceau helps 'save' the Third etmblic
Whatever the roots of the disturbances of 1906-7, the
press in Britain was virtually unanimous in agreeing that the
Third Republic would survive it all intact. The various
organs of opinion based their confidence on this point on
two different factors: one, what they conceived to be the
high degree of resilience of France's political and social
29 L.Jerrold, 'France and Socialism', Fortnightly Review,
LXXXII (July-Dec., 1907), 823.
30 L.Jerrold, 'French strikes and alarums', Contemporary
Review. 91 (June, 1907), 780.
31 Ibid., p.778.
32 Ibid.
institutions to attacks from withinthe other, the emergence
of Georges Clemenceau as a prominent political figure in Prance
during these years. 4s of the time, Clemenceau had only just
entered cabinet ranks when he became Minister of the Interior
under Garrien in March 1906; nevertheless, he was far from
unknown either in France or abroad. He first rose to
prominence in 1898 when, as editor of the radical newspaper
L'Aurore, he thought, up the explosive headline •J*Accuse* to
Zola's famous letter on behalf of Dreyfus to the President
of the Republic. During the Boer Gar he once again came to
the fore as a journalist when he defended Britain against the
rabidly Anglophobic attacks of the bulk of the French press.
And, indeed, throughout these years Clemenceau's outspoken
criticisms both in the press and in the Chamber of Deputies
of various French Governments had earned him the reputation
of being one of the most formidable politicians of the Third
Republic. It was these more positive aspects of Clemenceau's
career that the newspapers and journals in Britain stressed.
Of his dubious connections with men involved in the notorious
Panama scandal, on the other hand, they had little to say,
just as they tended to ignore the fact that over the years
Clemenceau had acquired as many enemies as admirers. At the
same time, they refuted outright the notion that Clemenceau was
as yet too inexperienced a politician to become a successful
Minister of the Interior and countered that the sheer force
of his personality was more than enough to see him through
33 See, for instance, the comment in the Sneaker, loc.cit.:
'The counterinstinct, which even in France, has always come
out on top after very short submissions, is the instinct of
social solidarity. In England this seems to be stronger than
in France, but in France it is strong. Men refuse to see
their society's wealth recklessly destroyed, however unjustly
minute is their own share in it'.
any trouble. Doubtless this was what the Dally Chronicle
was suggesting when it wrote in March 1906 that 'the most
notable feature of the new Cabinet is the inclusion in it
of M.Clemenceau..•'. Clemenceau's obvious political
qualities, together with his unquestioned liking for Britain,
would, it added, make English Liberals 'watch with the
liveliest interest his career as Minister
Clemenceau's subsequent perforaffltnce in office more or
less fulfilled these expectations of him. Certainly he was
not averse to dealing almost singlehandedly with the series
of labour disturbances that arose in the spring of 1906.
When the course of events in the Nord and the Pas-de-Calais
threatened to get out of control, it was he who intervened
personally by first dispatching troops to quell the riots
and then by visiting the striking miners and their families
to hear their grievances. Similarly, when rumours began
running wild in Paris a few days later about the nature of
the forthcoming May Day demonstrations, it was Clemenceau
who took precautions for law and order by issuing a public
curfew and stationing troops about the French capital. And
in the spring of 1907> it was he who showed almost equal
firmness ?n dealing with the wine-growers revolt in the
Soltf&h of France. The only difference was that whereas in
the first two instances Clemenceau did not hesitate to use
34 Daily Chronicle, 14 March 1906. Clemenceau's stature in
Britain can perhaps best be seen when measured against the
comments which the newspapers were making about other political
figures in France at the time. They never regarded him, as
they did M.Combes, as 'a spirited party leader and a born
fighter, but not exactly a great personality or Commanding
intellect'. (See Manchester Guardian. 14 January 1905.) Nor
did they see him, as some did M. Rouvier, as 'a wily, tactful
personality, an "old Parliamentary hand"', capable of dealing
with rivals but relying on cunning rather than force of
character to keep his Government going. (See Daily News.
18 January 1905)
force, in the last he waited before dispatching troops to the
affected areas because at first he 'failed to recognise the
seriousness of the situation'. y
In the main, such confrontations ■were treated by the
British press as solid evidence that lemenceau had definite
qualities both as a politician and as a national leader. As
far as the i/ailv Lxnress "was concerned, Cleraenceau's actions
at the time of the 1906 May Day celebrations were 'brilliant'
because they had intimidated fche demonstrators and gained the
35 Glasgow Herald. 24 June 1907. The story of the wine-growers
crisis in the spring and summer of 1907 is a long and complex
one, and many contera-orary organs of oninion in Britain were
at pains to explain it to their readers in great detail.
Briefly, the revolt, which was more or less confined to the
Midi, was caused by an excess production of wines, At the turn
of the century, Midi wine-growers, whose vineyards had only
just been cleared of the dreaded phylloxera plague, were
confronted with stiffer competition from growing areas,
particularly Algeria, and the- adulteration of their oxm netltfl
vins by the sugar producers of the industrial North, The v/lne
thus made was largely poor in quality as well as cheap in
price, and the growers maintained that they could not grow and
sell enough of it to hold cn to their property or pay their
taxes. ccordingly, the growers began to demand in the early
years of the twentieth century full scale _>tate action in the
form of subsidies, temporary tax exemption for the growers,
and an adulteration bill to limit the watering and the
sugaring of wine by the northern manufacturers, hen in early
1907 the Chamber of Deputies passed a bill that complied with
only some of these demands, the wine-growers, under the
leadership of a M. larcelln Ibert, began a series of protest
meetings and demonstrations in various southern towns and
cities. it first the demonstrators were few in number, but
soon farm labourers joined the ranks in droves so that by
mid-June 19C7 no less than seven hundred thousand people were
marching through the streets of Beziers and Montpellier
threatening to stage a tetal insurrection if all their demands
were not immediately met. It was only at; this point that
Clemonceau decided to act, and even then the initial steps he
took seemed to worsen the situation. The Drench premier ordered
the 17th Infantry Militia to suppress the mob, and fatal clashes
ensued. To make matters worse, a large number of the soldiers,
many of whom were natives of the affected are%s, mutinied rather
than obey Clcmenceau's orders. It was not until fresh troops
from other narts of the country were sent in that the insurrection
finally subsided. At the end of June, Cleaenceau sent for \lbert
confidence of public opinion.^ a week later, when the
results of the 1906 general election gave the Sarrien Ministry
a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the Daily Chronicle
argued that it was Clemenceau who had earned the victory because
'it was in his department that prominent events immediately
before the elctions belonged'And during the 1907 crisis
in the Midi newspapers like the Scotsman praised Clemenceau
as a man who 'does net shrink frofc responsibility' and who
•can be bold and unflinching alike in deed and word',-^ Even
left-wingers in Britain, while deprecating Clemenceau's
'uncalled for' attacks on French Socialists and his 'mishandling'
of the 1906 miner's strike, acknowledged the attributes of his
character. 'He has never abandoned a cause on account of its
unpopularity, nor has ho ever failed to take up a case (sic)
because it might damage his position', wrote H.M. Hyndman
of Clemenceau upon the latter's accession to the premiership
in October 1906. 'Skilled in every physical as well as in
every intellectual exercise, his only drawbacks are that he is
an individualist and an anti-Socialist'.^ But while British
editors and journalists put forth all this on behalf of
to meet him in Paris, where further concessions to the striking
wine-growers were agreed upon. Nevertheless, there can be
little doubt that, at its height, the revolt "was one of the
worst ever to confront the Third Republic.
36 Daily Express. 2 May 1906.
37 Daily Chronicle. 9 May 1906. Cn the other hand, the
Manchester Guardian (2 May 1906) felt that Clemenceau had
over-reacted to the announcement of the 1906 workers' May Day
parade, protesting that their object all along had been 'to
demonstrate, not to revolt; to urge an economic demand, not
to subvert society, law, and order'. Later, Laurence Jerrold
accused Clemenceau of deliberately over-reacting so as tc make
the Government appear stronger than it actually was on the eve
of the elections. See L. Jerrcla, 'M Clemenceau', Contemporary
Review, 90 (Nov. 1906), 684.
38 Scotsman. 21 June 1907.
39 H.M. Hyndman, 'M. Clemenceau's administration', Justice,
27 October 1906.
Cleraenceau in connection with the disorders of 1906-7} there
was another, and in their minds, more important, point which
they sought to press home to their readers. They maintained
th t the strikes and insurrections of these two years were
only passing phenomena and that, far from shaking the social
and political foundations of the country, the recent
disturbances had only served to demonstrate how capable
France was of meeting any challenge from within. The chief
result of these troubles, wrote the Economist at the time of
the Midi revolt, .
has been to exhibit once more the stability of the
Republic. M. Glemenceau's Ministry had been threatened
with overthrow ever since it took office, partly by
jealous rivals, partly by a section of its advanced
supporters for whom its policy, socialistic as it is,
has not been socialistic enough. It has surmounted
dangers which seemed a priori the gravest possible for
any Ministry in any country of Western Europe. It has
been in conflict with the whole forces of the Roman
Church, and with all that Church's auxiliaries outside
the sphere which is properly political. It has had to
face profound discontent in the higher ranks of the army,
serious labour troubles, and now a movement which has run
counter to all the centralising tendencies of French
Governments since the first Revolution, and which has
affected the most law-abiding class of France. Yet it
has come successfully through them all, even, so far as
can be seen, the last. 40
Once again, the British press showed its determination to
portray France as a highly stable country. Regardless of all
the troubles in France, whether they be major insurrections,
labour and religious disturbances, or merely a succession of
short-lived governments, the newspapers and journals, by virtue
of their own peculiar twist of logic, insisted that at bottom
all was well in France. Rut this was not all. The nress
maintained that in the realm of international politics as well
46 ■ -canonist, 29 June 1907.
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as domestic affairs the French Government and the bulk of the
Trench people were on the side of law and order and in favour of
pursuin their objectives in a peaceable fashion.
5. T.g..gi#biUs&U l.nf.Xasace^a.v.'crlv. affair?
That tao various organs of opinion in iwitaln shoulc regard
France as a peaceful and stable force in world politics is
perhaps in itself scarcely surprising. s has been pointed
out elsewhere, .ranee's desire to cone to a comprehensive
settlement with Britain on colonial raatters in 1904 and her
willing ess in the end to accede to German demands about a
conference of the Powers to handle the Moroccan question in
1905-6 were both taken as signs in Britain that "ranee was a
pacific-minded nation. Yet for some organs of opinion there
was more to the matter than this. s they saw it, ranee's
'pacificism' did not stem from any new diplomatic policies
cnana tin from the wuai d-'Orsay so much as it did from certain
deep-rooted forces at v;ork in French society. In particular,
they stressed the 'depopulation question', a roblem which had
long afflicted 'ranee, most noticeably since the end of the
Franco- russian Bar, hereas in 1871 there were roughly as
many 'rc nchnon as there were Germans, by the early years of
the twentieth century there were nearly half again as many of
the latter as c the former. For was it only the Germans who
were outstripping the "rench in this respect. . ritain, Italy,
Russia, and Austria were all enjoying a substantially higher
surplus of Firths over deaths than was France at this time, 41
41 The surplus of births over deaths . s so low in ranee during
these years that between 1396 and 1901, for ei:no It, the population
increased by only 5 , 0, and almost half of f is figure could be
accounted for by the influx of immigrant workers from Italy, Spain,
and elsewhere. (Gee Charles bawbarn, 'The depopulation question
"rue, trends such as these did net necessarily sac I11 disaster;
oopulntien, the 1;r . u. c. _• 7 7 once wrote, ' 1 not in itself
o
o ' .• v" : " p "av"' '. ' • >• " ere
only too well aware, they d&&;- )&XdJHWne ominous inirlicatioHi,r'>
f" ■it'. ■ uc>. . Id .. to. i lo os t o - o
5 ' US : " li . a'. ;.-. J OS SI'l ■ .C i Ht
so ly " ii i.i c j . ' u u ......,
failing to do so* This portended a possible slackening of
■ >nce's a ricultural rc action, v renin, c. :cv already
Insufficient industrial strength, ant cv. .■ , loss s it f
her s. ts 'ioy .arsons - s ,to..7 • us. -ct i or-. •,
even more nressing danger connected with this roblem. Trance's
static uhotinn threatened to uneer the : :'. . tot-nee
of power in Europe, It was ointed out that already by 1905
the Germans were recruiting 45 , 0 soldiers a year to "ranee's
3 , o" c onto orarj biserrors were c nvinced ' • t, h,
the oresend rate of regression, dormant would eve trice as
in France*, binetecntu Century and fterr LVIII (hoc., 19'5), 966,)
, ■■ g, n to
t ;c "r'noh , r?: v; b* -v b' c r g I ' uence
of j.-jul.-h ,.-k tn-, t ah ects the popul tirn curve' in r nee
(p.963), ->ut he thought that the rise of feminism in "'ranee
also 1 -t in c 'be . ic urea's ' h. . v- cnt
in France not as c ncerncd as was 5 s nglish counter-art
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many conscripts as France by 1916. Given these comparisons
and predictions for the future, it is not surprising that a
number of contemporary writers should see a new role for
France in the ranks of the Powers of the world, As one such
contemporary writer put it: 'The sense of her growing weakness
has completely altered the character of the French nation. Her
rulers and the people think less of glory than they used to.
France is no longer a military nation. She no longer aspires
to rule the Continent. She has become a peaceful and
conservative nation which will do everything she can do to
avoid war'. y
Indeed, there were a number of events happening in France
that seemed to bear out this statement. Between 1903 and 1907
French pacifist groups were busy publicising their cause.
Particularly active were the anarchists who, under the
leadership of one Gustave Herve, sought to promote desertions
and disruptions within the ranks of the army and navy by
spreading anti-military propaganda in the barracks. Their
Af>
activities were not entirely without fruit," French Socialists,
if somewhat more divided than the anarchists as to what their
attitude would be in the event of war, were scarcely less
anti-militaristic. At their Congress at Chalons in November
1905, they overwhelmingly condemned the armaments budget passed
44 Dawbarn, or. cit.. p, 966,
45 0, Eltzbacher, 'The balance of power in Europe', Nineteenth
Century and After. LVII (May, 1905). 795. For similar views,
see Perseus,'France and the eauinoise of Europe', Fortnightly
ReviewT 78 (Nov., 1905), 771.
4bIn February 1903 there occurred a minor munity at Poitiers
as a result of anarchist newspapers and pamphlets being distributed
at the garrison there. And according to the Annual Register, 1907>
(p. 277)> some Frenchmen felt that the mysterious explosion on
the battleship Jen&, in which more than a hundred men were
killed while it was in dock in Toulon, was due to anarchist-inspired
indiscipline in the Navy.
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by the Chamber of Deputies earlier that year. Meanwhilef
even the French Government seemed to be getting in on the act.
In "arch, 1905, the Rouvier Ministry secured the passage of a
long-delayed bill that reduced military conscription from
three years to two.
Did all this indicate that France was becoming a
'dangerously' pacifist country? s far as most organs of
opinion in Britain were concerned, the answer was in the
negative. While not going so far as to deny the significance
of the above developments, contemporary observers in Britain
argued that at most these developments amounted to a mere
strong distaste in France for aggressive policies and an
attempt on the part of the people to insure that the army
remain well under the control of the State. Thus in the
opinion of the Pall Mall Gazette there was in France a 'deep
and strong current of revolt against the intolerable burden
of militarism'. But the 'noble instinct of a man to fight
"for the little t ings he cares about",' it hastened to add,
'would suffice to disappoint the expectations of those who
affect to believe that Frenchmen and Germans, if face to face
48
in the field, would either fraternise or flee'. Likewise,
one writer, while admitting that in France 'the Dnglo-French
understanding would be ruined if it were once believed that
it was intended to be used for aggressive purposes',
nevertheless argued that the reat majority of Frenchmen were
neither pacifist nor anti-militarist.'^ Needless to say,
47 Ibid.. 1905, p.267
48 .all -."all ^azette. 23 September 1905.
49 Robert 'ell, "'rench politics and the coming elections',
f'ortni;- itly ievicw. 79 (Jan., 1906), 69.
remarks such as these had the effect of Increasing nublic
confidence in Britain about the stability of the Third
Republic and the soundness of its institutions. hat is more,
they helped to support the notion that ranee was the ideal
nation for Britain to enter into diplomatic -artnershi >; for
althou h the French weee still stron; enough tc count in the
political and military councils of the world, they had
sufficient doubts about their strength not to consider
perverting the Entente into an alliance for some selfish aim
like the recovery of Isace-Lorraine. ioove all, France
simply wanted oeace, T'or a war, 'even if it were victorious,
would mean the temporary suspension of many of her democratic
liberties, while should it be disastrous the political door would
be omen wide to all those importunate pretenders and sinister
^0
advent'' ors who a she has hitherto so successfully Inched nut1,''
In the early years of the twentieth century, the main
concern of the various organs of opinion in Britain in their
comments on domestic events in France was that of the stability
of the Third Republic, That the newspapers and journals became
preoccupied with this theme was due, to a large extent at any
rate, to the lingering influence of the late Lord Salisbury's
outlook on foreign affairs. Certainly at least some people In
Britain at this time still retained so le of the former
Conservative premier's reservations about coning to an
understanding with a government of the Third Republic, and it
was these reservations that the press set out to overcome in
its leader-articles on 'ranch politics. Between 1903 and 1905,
the news p.a ers and journals had comparatively little difficulty
in erfor;.in: t lis task. Be longevity 0;" the Combes iinistry,
50 Rowland strong, 'M. Rouvier and the French people', .est:
•Cazette. 11 Ceo temper 1905, op. 1-2,
the continuing decline in political fortune and popularity of
the parties of the extreme Right, and the superficial calm on
the labour front, were all readily cited to show that France
was a contented and orderly country. After 1905 > when the
tensions of French politics and society began to manifest
themselves more and more openly, the press undoubtedly began
to find the pursuance of this theme a bit more difficult,
Nevertheless, it was their approach rather than their tune
that the newspapers altered. Whereas earlier they measured
the stability of France in terms of her supposed domestic
tranquility or the durability of her ministries, later they
did so only in terms of the capacity of the various French
premiers to continue governing within a democratic .framework
despite the numerous internal upheavals. No doubt it does say
something for the Third Republic that it could be confronted
with a succession of short-lived ministries, an unprecedented
series of industrial strikes, a major insurrection of farm
workers, and the open hostility of the extreme Right and the
Roman Catholic Church, and yet survive. But to argue this
point, as so many of the newspapers did, at a time when in fact
France's internal troubles seemed to be mounting and showed no
end in sight was to do little other than to give the British
reading public a false impression of the country. One can only
presume that this was done to keep the Entente Cordiale in the
highest esteem of British public opinion.
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CHAPTER V
DIITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION ISSUE IN FRANCI
On the fact of it, the struggle that took place between
Church and State in France in the early years of the twentieth
century ought not to have attracted particular notice in Britain.
After all, the two opposing sides in the struggle, the parties
of the Bloc and the Roman Catholic Church, wc?re either relatively
unknown or regarded with suspicion in Britain. Moreover, the
conditions which gave rise to the conflict were deep-rooted,
complex, and unlike anything in Britain's recent history and
thus did not readily lend themselves to the attention of the
average British newspaper reader. And yet, despite this, the
various organs of opinion in Britain were to report and comment
on the Separation issue in France in depth and with an unusual
degree of interest.
Why was this the case? The answer, it seems, is many fold.
For one thing, a number of British people were increasingly of
the opinion at this time that, although the relationship between
Church and State in Britain differed greatly in form from that
in France, the former country had much to learn from the latter
in the matter of dealing with an established religion. In
particular, this was the feeling in Liberal and Nonconformist
circles throughout the country, where many drew striking
parallels between French efforts to secularise education and
their own attempts to repeal the 1902 Balfour Act. But
interest in the matter also prevailed in Wales where the
disestablishment of the Anglican Church was already becoming a
major political question, as well as in Ireland, where the big
part played by the Catholic Church in local affairs resembled
to some extent the situation in France, For another thing,
many newspapers in Britain saw in the Separation issue the
seeds of a conflict which could one day bring considerable
strife and disorder to France, This threatened to destroy for
good the peace and stability which they said the Third Republic
had more or less enjoyed since its founding in 1870, Still
another reason for this interest was the possibility that the
quarrel between the Vatican and France which accompanied the
disestablishment question would have wide repercussions in
the sphere of international politics and intensify the already
fierce rivalry of the Great Powers in the Rear and Far East.
It was the combination of these three factors which more than
anything else induced individual writers as well as the
newspapers and journals in Britain to study the disestablishment
issue in France very closely.
!• *background of the qt^rrej,
Of all the writings that appeared in Britain on the French
Church-State question, one of the most authoritative and
informative was J.E.C, Bodley»s book, Th^e Flange.
Published in 1906, when the conflict between the Vatican and
the Third Republic was still very much in progress, this work
sought to give a thorough exposition of the relationship
between Church and State in France from the time of the 1801
Concordat to the passing of the Separation Law In December 1905.'*"
1 The book was, in fact, little more than a printed version
of two lectures which Bodley gave in January 1906 to the Royal
Institution in London. These lectures, which were attended by
a number of prominent people, including the Archbishop of
Canterbury, were perhaps the most impartial account rendered in
Britain on the subject. Bodley, a Protestant, could not in
accordance with the regulations of the Royal Institution present
his own views on the matter. Nevertheless, what he did say
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Bodley argued in his work that the latest round of difficulties
between the Roman Catholic Church and the French Government
could be traced directly to the Dreyfus affair. The 'scurrilous*
role played by a few French clergymen, particularly those in
the religious orders, had created a situation which allowed
the French people, once they discovered that they had 'gone
mad' over the Dreyfus affair, to make a scapegoat of the entire
Clerical party 'for an infatuation which it shared with
nine-tenths of the population'. The Ralllement which Pope Leo XIII
had promulgated iti 1892 was suddenly at an end, and as had been
the case in the earlier days of the Third Republic, the Church
was once again publicly linked with the forces of reaction and
subversion in France, The hostility against the religious
associations, 'always latent in the majority of French minds',
was roused once again, and it was at this point that
W'aldeck-Rousseau re-entered politics 'to rid the nation of the
nightmare of the Dreyfus case... and regulate definitively the
question of the 4ssociations, lay and religious'. This he more
or less managed tr do with the passage of the Associations Law
in July 1901, which placed a great many restrictions on the
Orders. When the French people In effect gave their sanction
to this Law by voting for the various parties of the Bloc in
the general election of 1902, Waldeck-Rousseau resigned the
premiership and was succeeded by Eraile Combes, a man who had
creates the impression that he sympathised with the Church of
Rome. A brief summary of the two lectures can be found in
The Times. 22 January 1906 (p.3) and 29 January 1906 (p.3),
which later praised Bodley for having brought to the subject
'a mass of knowledge accumulated by study and personal
residence In France', (See The Times. 2 February 1906.)
none of his predecessor's 'impartial qualities'. Combes then
began his term of office by applying the 1901 Law in the
most vigorous manner possible and, indeed, supplemented it
with other legislation in 1904 which suppressed the teaching
orders altogether. In the meantime, Pope Leo XIII, 'a
diplomatist of penetrating sagacity', had died and was
succeeded in the summer of 1903 by Pius X, 'a prelate of
unexampled piety* but 'inexperienced in politics and
diplomacy, and unacquainted with the people of France and its
language'. Taken together, the obstinacy of the new Pope
and the fanaticism of the new French premier managed to
intensify the conflict, and on 11 December 1905 the Chamber
of Deputies passed a law which formally brought the century
p
old Concordat to an end.
2 J.E.C. Bodley. The Church in France, (London, 1906),
PP5> 50, 52-60, It is perhaps best at this point to sum up the
nature of the relationship of the various churches with the
State in France prior to the December 1905 Law and to explain
the changes that the Law introduced. Throughout most of the
nineteenth century, all the major religions of France,
Protestantism and Judaism as well as Roman Catholicism, were
subsidised by the State. Secular clergymen of all denominations
were paid salaries out of a Budget for Public Worship, the
estimates of which were determined annually by the legislature,
kpart from financing clerical salaries, the Budget for Public
Worship also subvented the upkeep and expenses of the various
parish churches and synagogues throughout the country, though
not the monasteries or convents. With the Roman Catholic Church,
which during the Bourbon Restoration had become the official
Church in France, the French Government had a special relationship
arising largely out of the Concordat of 1801. Under the terms of
this agreement made by Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII, the
French Government secured the right to nominate, subject to
papal veto, ecclesiastical candidates to fill vacant French
bishoprics. The Government was also conferred with, amongst
other things, the right to intervene in the nomination of
French Cardinals and the right of jurisdiction over French
religious establishments at Rome. It was for these privileges
that the French Government undertook in exchange to guarantee
a suitable salary for all Bishops and pariochal clergymen within
France.
Virtually all of this, however, was drastically altered as
a result of the 1905 Separation Law. Without denying freedom of
conscience or of public worship, provided that its terms were
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2. Anglican and Roman Catholic views on the matter
Up to this point there -was a general consensus of opinion
in Britain; beyond that, however, contemporary organs of
opinion disagreed about the origins of the struggle as well
as about what was at stake. For their part, Anglicans were
adhered to, the new Law did away with Roman Catholicism as
being the official religion. The French Government renounced
any of its claims to investiture, intervention in the nomination
of Cardinals, and other privileges. The 1905 Separation Law
also did away with the yearly Budgets of Public Worship, and
churches of all denominations were now to finance themselves
through subscriptions, weekly collections, and fees for
religious ceremonies. In return, the Government promised to
grant pensions to retiring clergymen, the amount of which
would depend upon the age and length of service in the pay of
the State of the individual concerned. Likewise, those
clergymen not qualified for a pension were granted state
subsidies, to be paid in diminishing proportions in';the first
four years following disestablishment. Those chaplains
performing duties in secondary public schools, hospitals, and
prisons were, however, to be continued to be maintained by the
State. In addition, all religious establishments were to
reorganise themselves along lines stipulated by the 1901 Lav;
into associations cultuelles. or 'associations for public
worship'. By the terms of this particular clause of the
1905 Law, all parish churches, like the monasteries and convents
before them, had to apply for special authorisation from the
French Government before they could re-open. Priests, ministers,
and tabbls were obliged to make a preliminary declaration of
a public meeting with the authorities each time they wished to
hold service, a requirement which later had to be modified in
view of the opposition which this clause provoked in clerical
ranks. This same clause allowed agents of the Ministry of
Fiaance to inspect yearly the accounts of the churches and to
limit their funds on a scale proportionate to their revenues.
Article III of the 1905 Separation Lav; empowered the Government
with the right to take an inventory of all the possessions of
the Churches in order to determine the value, origin, and
legal ownership of any ecclesiastical property. For a full
account of the 1905 Separation Law, see ibid.. pp.145-170.
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largely sympathetic with the cause of the Catholics in France,
3one, like the Church Times, the voice of •High1 Anglicanism
and one of the largest-selling religious weeklies in Britain,
felt this way because they viewed the struggle as fundamentally
one of Christianity against atheism. The Boman Catholic Church,
it argued, was locked in mortal combat with a group of
•malevolent and irreligious* politicians who, along with the
Freemasons, were aiming to destroy not only Catholicism but
also all forms of religion in franc© as such. It was these
men who first whipped up the •formidable amount of venomous
hatred' of all the rellglcms in the Third Republic, and it was
they who were keeping such sentiments alive with their 'shocking
blasphemies* in the press. The Roman Catholic Church •means
religion in France*, wrote the Church Times, and 'any defeat
4
it suffers is a defeat of religion'.
Others, while not entirely disagreeing with this, were
more inclined to see the struggle primarily as on© between
Catholicism and Socialism, In a specially written article to
the Westminster Gazette. D,C. Lathbury, editor of the
Anglo-Catholie weekly the Guardian, noted this to be the case
and argued that the contest was important enough to affect not
only the future of religion in France, but also the very way of
life as most Frenchmen then knew it. At the moment the real
3 Church Times, 15 Hay 1903 and. 24 August 1906, By contrast,
the Church of Rome was portrayed as an organisation innocently
defending its own interests and property throughout France,
see Church Times, 17 July and 20 November 1903.
4 Ibid., 24 August 1906.
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issues at stake had become blurred because the separation of
Church and State in France was an integral part of the
legislative programme both of the Socialists and of the Liberals
in the Bloc. Lathbury contended, 'But when the religious
revolution is accomplished the other half of the Socialist
programme will come to the front, After doing their utmost
to destroy one great institution they will take in hand a
second. Will the French nation be as patient under an attack
on private property as they have shown themselves under the
Cy
attack on religion?'. No doubt lathbury was presenting only
one side of the coinj for there can be no question that
anti-clericalism helped to keep the troubled Combes Ministry
together at least as much as it helped lead France down the
path of Socialism, Whatever the forces behind the campaign,
however, it would not be too much to say that Anglicans in
general regarded them as posing a far greater evil to the moral
fibre of France than the Roman Catholic Church, It was for this
reason that Church of England members sympathised so much with
the latter in its struggle with the republican politicians,
although It would only be correct to mention that the analogous
position of the two religions in the two countries also played
its part, Nevertheless, as will be seen later, hatred of
atheism and fear of Socialism were not enough to prevent
Anglican opinion In Britain from redressing its outlook on the
matter in the light of Pius X's later uncompromising stance with
the leaders of the French Government,
British Roman Catholics adopted much the same outlook.
5 D,C, Lathbury, 'The Concordat and disestablishment',
Ga^ta, 23 August 1904, pp, 1-2,
14".
The leading Catholic organ of opinion in Britain at the time
was the Tablet, and like the Church Times, the was
convinced that the struggle was essentially one against atheism.
•The Republic's refusal to recognise any religion', it wrote in
early 1906 after the Separation Bill had finally become law,
'is nothing short of a national apostasy'." Like D.C. Lathbury,
it pointed an accusing finger at French Socialistsj behind the
whole affair, it said, were 'the rabid anti-Clericals of the
Left', who year by year had brought up the question of the
denunciation of the Concordat despite the reluctance of the
Government and the Chamber alike.' Of course, British
Catholics had good reason to be concerned about the course of
events in France. Not only did the brunt of the anti-clerical
struggle fall upon the shoulders of their French co-religionists,
but even some members of their own ranks had been directly
affected by it. Hence, it was their aim to take positive steps
on behalf of their religious brethren across the Channel,
Spearheading this campaign of the Catholics in Britain was
Cardinal Bourne, Archbishop of Westminster and a prominent
figure in the fight against the 1906 Liberal education Bill
as well as the struggle for Catholic 'rights* across the Channel.
Bourne's primary intention was to seek some sort of compensation
on behalf of British Catholic clergymen in France like the
Benedictines at Douai, whose property had been confiscated by
the French Government. With this in mind, he made personal
representations to the Foreign Office, But at the same time,
Bourne was anxious to criticise the more general aspects of
6 Tahiti, 6 Janu&ry 1906,
7 Ibid.. 19 July 1905.
the disestablishment campaign in France, and from the pulpit
he delivered a series of sermons denouncing the French
q
anti-clericalsNor was the Archbishop of es trains ter the
only Roman Catholic in the country to adopt such tactics.
In the House of Commons, a coterie of Catholic M,P,s, most
of them Irish Nationalists, beleagured whichever Government
that happened to be in power with a battery of questions
similar to those which Cardinal Bourne had been posing first
to Lord Lansdowne and then to Bir Edward Grey: How many
British subjects owned church property in France? To which
religious denominations did they belong? To what extent
would these people be affected If the proposed Reparation Bill
became law? And if worst did come tc worst, would the
Q
British Government take any steps on their behalf?-' Meanwhile,
individual laymen and the Catholic weeklies like the Tablet
continued to give the reading public their view of the broader
Issues Involved through a series of editorials, specially
written articles, meetings, and lectures.
Heedless to say, none of these representations had any
real impact on Anglo-French relations. Roman Catholic pleas
8 Many of the Cardinal's remdfeks about the Church-Btate question
in France were quoted in the French press and produced much
annoyance and embarrassment in high-ranking British diplomatic
circles. The British ambassador to France, Sir Francis Bertie,
for instance, complained to the Liberal Foreign Secretary Grey
on 24 December 1906: 'I see by the I atin of this morning that
in a sermon at a church in Warwick Street he (Cardinal Bourne)
has been abusing the French Government, This seems from the
point of view of the worldly interests of his seminarists
proteges rather short-sighted*. Bee the Bertie Papers,
F(oreign) O(ffice) 800/49.
9 Hansard, Pari, Debates, H, of C,, Fourth eries, CXXVI
(29 July 1903), 682} CXLIX (20 July 1905), 1370-71} and
CLHVII (19 December 1906), 1529.
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on these points either went ignored or were answered by a
Foreign ffice 'non cssumusIn 1903, for instance,
Lord Lansdowne refused Cardinal Bourne's request forrcompensation
on behalf of the Benedictines at Douai on the ground that it
was difficult to ask Paris 'to make an exception in favour of
10
the English community*. Three years later, Grey made more
or less the same point when the fate of a number of British
and Irish-run seminaries in France became uncertain because
they did not comply at first with French law by forming
agSPffAaUPM 'All we could do in such a case*,
he later explained, *was to ask that the institutions in which
British subjects were interested or British property involved
should receive the same treatment as the French Government
11
gave to their own subjects*. It appeared to British
Catholics that nothing wot;Id stir the Foreign Office to act
on behalf of what they considered to be Justice. To
Francis •>» Gasquet, the Abbot-President of the English
monastery at Douai, it was an 'unheard of* argument of the
Balfour Government that, if British subjects went on their
own will tc live abroad, virtually nothing could be done to
defend their property and Interests there. *Kecent cases in
Venezuela and elsewhere*, Gasquet contended, 'seem tc throw
considerable doubt upon this as s principle of British
1?
diplomacy*» Hot that Gasquet, or any other Catholics in
Britain for that matter, allowed the disestabllshjaent issue
in France to affect their Judgment of the Entente Cordlale.
On the contrary, they welcomed the 1904 understanding with
10 quoted in Witt, 9 May 1903.
11 Gee Grey's letter to Bertie, 18 December 1906, in the
Bertie Papers, P.O. 8(h/49«
, J;2^€€ Oasquet*s letter tc the editor of the spartly ffrylOTt193 (July-Oct., 1903), pp.543-544.
France just as warmly es any other section of British public
opinion.1^ "lather, their complaint was that 'English
ecclesiastics in France should alone be exempted from the
benefits of the entente, and that while it disables the
British Government from asserting their rights, it has no
affect in modifying the sour and surly persecution by the
14
Republican Government of all who wear the religious habit'.
In any event, it is unlikely that, even had British Catholics
clamoured for an end of the close diplomatic partnership
with France, they would have succeeded; for as the Economist
pointed out, the sufferings of the Roman Catholic Church in
France, if it was really suffering, 'could only affect only
a .section of English opinion, which would be more than
counterbalanced by other forces at present powerful in
British politics.,15
3. Views of other Protestant groups
Nonconformist opinion in Britain, howevor, adopted a very
different view of the matter. Almost from the outset of the
struggle, dissenting Protestants in Britain had sided with
those Frenchmen favouring disestablishment. Their reason for
13 lablet. 16 April 1904.
14 Ibid.. 19 August 1905. In the House of Commons, however,
one Catholic P.P., a Jlr McKean representing Monaghan South,
asked in view of all that was going on in France whether the
rime Minister would 'advise his Majesty, King Edward, to
annul •nd dissolve the alliance between this country and France
generally known as the entente cordiale unless and until the
French Government undertakes to respect the rights of conscience
on the part of, and the rights of property belonging to, French
citizens'. The request was greeted with outbursts of laughter,
and the Deputy Speaker refused to table the question, Gee
Hansard, Pari. Debates, H, of C., Fourth eries, CLXVII
(19 December 1906), 1929-1530.
15 Economist. IB august 19°6.
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doing so was twofold. In the first place, they were inclined
to look upon the controversy over the Separation Bill as but
the latest In a series of rows between the Vatican and the
Third Republic in which the former was trying to prevent the
latter from becoming master in Its own house. For them, this
was the Middle Ages all over again, and Combes and his
supporters were entirely correct in trying to expel the
16
religious orders and put an end to the Concordat. In the
second place, many British Protestants were hoping that out
of the struggle would arise a new national religion in France
which would reject the Papacy and would re-organise itself along
a framework more familiar to them. 'What one would think most
desirable', wrote the Methodist Times, 'is that France should
follow in some degree the lines on which the English Reformation
proceeded, should by force separate the Church from Rome,
reconstitute the Galilean National Church, abjure the Pope,
and establish Catholicism throughout France on a democratic
basis. That would be to bring religion to the national side;
it would rapidly tend to bring enlightenment and reform into
the Church itself, and prepare for a complete separation of
Church and Mtate so soon as the Church had learned to walk
alone'.1'7 Not that British Protestants were unaware that the
proposed Jeparation Bill was also a blow to the Reformed
Churches In France. In a report to the 1905 General Assembly
of the Church of Scotland at Edinburgh, it was pointed out
16 Bee, for instance, Methodist Times. 26 March 1903 and
26 May 1904.
17 Ibid.. 26 May 1904. At the same time, however, the Methodist
Times admitted that the chances of France beoo&fcng Protestant
or even experiencing revived Gallicanlsra were remote: 'The
true difficulty Is that neither the dominant party nor the
country generally has seriofcs hold of any religion outside the
Roman Church. The Protestants are few, respectable and Inert}
too rich and well placed to become popular. Most of the
Liberals, if not actually atheists, have no institutional
religion'. For strikingly similar views, see the Church of
Bcotland Assembly Papers (19^6), pp.303-804.
that the Huguenots alone in France stood to lose £73>600 a
l8
year if the State subsidies were withdrawn. " 'lather, they
merely felt that in this, 'as in countless other ways, the
;rotestant Churches have to share the penalties provoked by
19
the travesty of religion presented by the Church of Home,'
Clearly, then, this was the sort of issue in which
sectarian passions in Britain could become easily aroused.
Indeed, on certain occasions they reached a pitch of near
hysteria, /hen it became known, for example, that some of the
expelled French monks and nuns were resettling in England, many
Protestants in the country sounded the alarm, As they saw it,
this was a repetition of events after the Civil Constitution
of the Clergy of 1792, the only difference being that the
French emigres might this time cross the Channel in even
greater numbers, s a result, a number of M.P.s at
Westminister demanded to hear from the Home Secretary the
exact number of French monasteries and convents that had
transferred their Institutions to Britain once the closures
20
in France had begun. On several occasions between 1903 and
1905 did Protestant organs of opinion beg the Conservative
Government to widen the scope of its Aliens Bill so as to be
18 Church of Scotland, Assembly Paoers, 1906, loc. clt.
19 Methodist Times. 5 August 1905. By contrast, British Jews,
whose French co-religionists were enduring much the same fate as
the Protestants, placed no blame whatsoever on the Roman
Catholic Church for the situation in France. They merely
regretted the action of the French Government and expressed
the hope that, in the long run, the freeing of French Judaism
from its official connectiohs would make for its 'increased
strength and efficiency'. (See Jewish Chronicle. 26 January 1906.)
20 Hansard, Pari. Debates, H, of C., Fourth Series, CL
(1 August I905)> 1149, The Home Secretary Akers-Douglas could
not provide his questioner with the appropriate information.
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able to limit tils new influx. 'The question of the
immigration of aliens is not a sere question of poor Polish
21
Jews', wrote the Methodist Times; 'it has many sides'." ' Only
as time wore on did English and elsh rissentors and Scottish
: resbyterlans begin to shed their anxieties on this point when
it became apparent that French clerical emigres were not
arriving in droves after all. 3ut even then they did not
desist from using the Church-Gtate reparation issue' in
France as an excuse to vent their spleen against 3cman
Catholicism.
4. ffiatafong
In addition to the various organs of religious opinion
in Britain it was the secular press, assisted by a few
individual experts on ecclesiastical matters, which took the
lead in discussing the subject. As a mere issue in itself,
the collision between the Vatican and the French Government
over the rights of .the Church in France would probably have
attracted at least some interest on the part of a few Liberal
and Conservative newspapers in Britain. Yet it was to do
raore - to start a lively debate in virtually all their leader
columns precisely because of the similarities between it and
another political/religious struggle that was taking place
at home, as well as because of its possible repercussions on
the relations cf the Great Powers. Only recently had the
Balfour Government passed an act which, among other things,
placed the burden of maintaining denominational secondary
schools on the shoulders of the rate-payer, thereby pleasing
the Englicans and Boman Catholics but infuriating Free
21 Fethodlst Times. 23 April 1903.
Churchmen, most cf whose children attended the State-run or
'orovided' schools. Equally outrageous to the Nonconformists .
was the failure of the 1902 Act to do anything about the
'single school* areas, in which many of their children were
forced into being taught the Anglican creed for the lack of
other educational facilities. s religion and education had
combined to make for a burning political controversy in
France, it is not surprising that prominent British politicians
and influential British organs of opinion should look across
the Channel for a solution to their own difficulties.
(a) Liberals, adicals. and oocialists
This was particularly true of the Liberals, many of whom
were Nonconformists and therefore anxious to do away with what
they construed to be the more contentious clauses of the 1902
pp
Education Act. The Liberals were well aware that no precise
imitation of French methods of dealing with an established
Church would do for Britain. The political and social
conditions in the two countries were too diverse, the
conceptions of law and order prevailing in them were too
dissimilar, and the type of religion they were up against was
too different from the one in France, for this to take place
with any hope of success.Nevertheless, British Liberals
did insist that the course of events in France did bear some
resemblance to what was happening in England and .'ales with
22 According to the Free Church Year Book. 1906, (pp.306-311),
there were in the new Parliament of that year about two hundred
Liberal Dissenters in the House of Commons, out of which no less
than 193 favoured a reversal of the 1902 Education Act. This
latter figure included thirteen Scottish Presbyterians (not
connected with Established Church) and Utilitarians as well as
those belonging to the Evangelical Free Churches.
23 See, for instance, H, Halliday Sparling's article in the
Liberal monthly, the Westminster Review. 167 (Feb., 1907), 125,
on this point.
regard to education. They argued that in both cases there
was an intrusion of clerical pretensions into the political
sphere and that in both instances the people were siding with
the Government. '.hat the right honourable Gentleman sees in
England', said Lloyd George to Sir Arthur Balfour in the ldst
cf a heated debate on the Liberal Education Bill in the House
cf Commons in the spring of 1906,
is only part of a general movement which occurs in every
democratic country in the world. There are three great
democratic countries, namely, America, France, and
England, What dc you see in France? It is a great
Catholic country, and what have they done with the
schools? What have they done with the Catholic religion?
They had an election fought there substantially upon the
same issue - the issue of clericalism# What happened
there? Exactly the same thing as in a Protestant country.
Go to Jtaerlca. That is a country to which Catholics flee
from the tyranny of denominational countries like Germany
and this country.•.What do they get there in denominational
instruction? They would not get a four-fifths clause,
America would not look at it.... It is mart of a great
movement. Democracy has come to the conclusion that
clericalism is its enemy. It is no use saying that this
is hatred towards an individual Church. It is the instinct
of three great democratic peoples moving in the same
direction towards what they believe to be real liberty
of conscience and the only guarantee for continuity of
liberty of conscience. 24
Not that Lloyd George, or any other Liberal for that matter,
ever ventured to say that a dissolution of the Concordat was the
panacea for France's problems with the Church; for as the
Manchester Guardian noted, a ccmnlete break with Bone did not
necessarily spell an end to clerical intrigue or political
subversion. Indeed, it might Increase such activities.
24 Hansard. Pari. Debates, H, of C,, Fourth Merles, CLVI
(8 May I9O0), II86-H87. It perhaps should be mentioned here
that a number of Liberal newspapers fully endorsed the
President of the -oard of Trade's views on the relationship
between Church and state in democratic countries and
enthusiastically quoted parts of his speech to the Commons in
their leader columns the next day. See, for example, vestminster
fiftg&fcfca and Daily Chronicle, 9 May 1906.
nevertheless| both this and a good many other liberal organs
of opinion in Britain felt that the Separation Bill would make
for a definite improvement on the existing state of affairs
in France, since Its implementation would 'undoubtedly mark an
advance towards the ideal of a tolerant lay State'.2"'
British Liberals, then, were very much in sympathy with
the efforts of those who sought to divorce Church and State
in France. Yet despite its rather pronounced views on the
subject, the Liberal press as a whole did not become as
exited as the various organs of dissenting Protestant opinion.
In the first place, being concerned primarily with secular
rather than religious matters, it was more Inclined to see
the struggle as a political rather than a religious one. As
many Liberal newspapers saw it, the 'revolt' of the French
Government and people was not against the spiritual authority
of the Pope as such, but against 'foreign interference in the
political sphere*. "reach Freethinkers, it is true, had
played their part in the affair, but their role had been
'provided for them by the Vatican and nobody else'.2'7 Unlike
the Methodist rimes, most Liberal writers and journalists of
the day were not even going to consider the possibility of a
resuscitated Galilean Church. In the second place, it began
to dawn on many Liberals In Britain, particularly the more
left-wing ones, that the Church-State struggle in France was
not all that it appeared to be. While most Nonconformists and
others regarded the contest as one with nothing less than the
25 FMPhegtpp 25 February 1905*
26 Pally ■CtffiqjUsJLq, 6 April 19f<7.
27 H. Ha211day Sparling, or. clt.f p. 131.
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question rf France's national sovereignty at stake, many
Radicals began to suspect that the whole affair was little
more than a tnanlere d'etre In French politics, a convenient
means of keeping together the constantly bickering parties
of the 13loo. It was a theme which first found expression in
the Radical weekly the Sneaker« which at the time of Combes's
fall from power in January 1905 argued that the only reason the
French premier lasted so long was because 'with all his vigour,
he did so little1. Combes knew that anti-clericalism was a
cause common to the various factions within his Government
and so deliberately kept It to the forefront, this journal
reckoned. But he cane to the end of his resources when he
was forced by dissident left-wingers in France to enter upon
pO
some truly constructive social legislation, ' British
Socialists, of course, subscribed to the same line of
thinking and, Indeed, ehlarged upon It; for whereas the
Radicals accused certain French politicians of using the
disestablishment question merely to further their own ends,
the Socialists accused them of employing it to obscure 'the
real struggle* in Prance, that of egalitarianism versus
2q
privilege. 7 Taken together, these suspicions did not
Induce the Left in Britain to Ignore France's Church-Btate
issue entirely, but they did tend to make the Left feel more
indifferent about the outcome than others.
Co) CongqffvatftYqg
Conservative opinion in Britain, on the other hand, did
not take such a cynical view of the disestabllshment issue in
France. Indeed, if anything, most right-wing organs of opinion
28 Breaker, 21 January 1905-
29 Lftboqr matter* 27 April 1906.
■were inclined to think in virtually the opposite terras, namely,
that the bourgeois parties of the Bloc were playing a dangerous
game in asking Socialist support to deal with the Church. Nor
were British Conservatives as inclined as were their Liberal
counterparts to draw distant parallels between the ending of
the Concordat and the education controversy at home. To be
sure, there were plenty of those on the Right who perceived
'the seeds of the same trouble' in Britain as was happening in
France. The Church Times, for instance, felt that the demand
of the Nonconformists for a uniform type of religious and
secular education in all schools maintained by the State, and
the demand that this education be of a type 'which they approve
and which we reprobate', were 'steps, feeble and slow, but of
direction unmistakable, towards the policy of monopoly which
is now being worked in France in religion'; hence, as far as
that paper was concerned, it was advisable 'to study the end,
RO
in order that we may understand the beginning•,J Another
writer, a George Arthur, presented the interesting and highly
individualistic argument that the diverse courses of the
anti-clerical struggles in Britain and France reflected
fundamental differences of temperament and character between
the two peoples. In France, the fight was being waged between
the Roman Catholic Church and a 'highly aggressive atheism',
French logic, 'incisive, clear-cut, relentless, uncompromising',
saw no third position 'intermediate between the magnetic poles
of religious opinion'. In England, on the other hand, the
'national way of looking at things the practical side of things
30 Church times. 20 November 1903.
rather than the theoretical' tended 'to modify the external
aspects of the religious question, and perhaps to obscure its
true import', dtlll, as Arthur felt that the prospect of
secularism was •well and truly before England, and since
'Secularism spells Indifferentisra*, he could only conclude
that 'the example of France should warn us in tine that the
non-belief cf one generation may easily become the unbelief
of the nextAnd even the King in his private correspondence
noted some similarity between the Liberal Government's 1906
Education Bill and the disbanding of the religious teaching
orders in France and privately questioned whether
Campbell-Bannerman and his colleagues were trying to copy the
French*nevertheless, these were only the opinions of certain
individuals. By contrast, prominent Tory newspapers and journals
were reluctant to make comparisons between events in Britain and
France, Instead, they concentrated on what they considered to
be other, more frightening aspects of the anti-clerical
campaign in France,
Almost from the outset Conservative organs of opinion in
Britain expressed doubts about the wiidoia of the civil
authorities in France pursuing an anti-clerical programme.
Their reservations arose for two distinct reasons: one, what
they considered to be the utter senselessness of destroying or
even tampering with a compromise which in their view had lasted
more than a century without really hurting either side that had
31 George Arthur, 'Anti-clericalism in France and England',
w 55 (Hay, 1904), 731-73?.
32 o©e the letter of the King to Viscount Baher, 14 April 19^6,
quoted in Philip Magnus's Kinr Edward the Beventh. (London, 1963),
P.353.
entered into itf-'J the other, the manner in which the campaign
was actually being conducted. Like the c .tholics in their own
country and in 1 ranee, they had cog© tc see rench prettier
Combes and a deed number of his followers as little other than
fanatics. The eviction of the monastic orders struck sot.c of
^4
then as being 'neither more nor less than persecution',-" just
as the very terras of the 1905 Separation -ill later struck
-> c
others as being exceedingly harsh and unfair.-" These beliefs
were in themselves sufficient reason to cause a number of
Conservative newspapers in Britain to think twice about
welcoming the anti-clerical campaign in France. But there was
an even more pressing fear at the back of their minds in
connection with this i sue. The campaign against the Homan
Catholic Church, they maintained, threatened to upset the entire
political and social fabric of Trance. Those Tranchmen who
have gone ahead with these suppressive policies, warned the
Bnectator, 'will in the end be visited by the natural penalty.
The reaction which always cones in France will cone more speedily,
33 lilLliMii 11 <ay 1903.
3d wiicc tatorf 28 Lovember 19^3 •
35 The Horning dost, for instance, noted on the eve of the
passage of the Bill that whereas Coeialists and Anarchist® could
hold meetings in France to discuss methods for subverting the
Btatc, a priest or Bishop who publicly criticised any French
Government official was, under the terns of article 31 of the
Bill, liable to a fine from five hundred to three thousand
francs. 'This alone seems sufficient to justify the complaint
so often made', wrote the Tost, 'that special Interpretations
are given to the law of Associations when it Is applied to a
religious association. But there is more to justify the complaint.
While, under the new law, the Church boards are corporations with
"civil personality*1, capable of owning and managing property,
their property must be invested in stocks upon which the Btate
can lay hands'. Thus as far as this newspaper was concerned, if
the above two provisions 'are duly a precisted it will be seen how
nominal is the religious liberty ostensibly given to the Church',
^ee I'fcynte, pg.t> 7 December 1905)
and will direct itself more decidedly against the form of
government under which such legislation is possible'if
this reaction was not in the immediate offing, wrote
Sir Edward Monson, Britain's ambassador to France in 1903>
then one could not help but think that it would eventually
17be provoked.-^' Equally worrisome was the prospect that the
Separation Law would throw the entire political weight of
the Roman Catholic Church on the side of monarchisrn and
reaction, thereby bringing renewed dangers of subversion to
the Republic. Certainly there was little doubt in the minds
of some Conservative organs of opinion that the whole affair
had spelt an end to whatever measure of Gallican independence
the Church had under the terms of the Concordat.^ Yet
whatever form the conflict took, Tory newspapers were inclined
to think that it would in any case be a serious one*, for as
the Fall Mall Gazette pointed out, 'the Catholics, knowing
their enemies will not allow them any real liberty, will
certainly cling with desperate tenacity to the comparative
protection which the Concordat affords them*.^
Nevertheless, one could not be certain. Those who
asserted most positively that a grave confrontation loomed
ahead rested their case on the notion that France was too much
36 Spectator. loc. cit.
37 See Monson's letter to Lord Lansdowne, 1 December 1903,
in the Lansdowne Papers, F.O. 800/126.
38 Scotsman, 22 September 1906. It should be noted that this
view of the Scotsman conflicts with that of the Methodist Times,
the Glasgow Herald, and others, namely, that the Church was
already under 'the iron rule of the Vatican', and only through
a dissolution of the Concordat could it regain some of its
earlier distinctive French character. (See Glasgow Herald.
16 August 1906; also Methodist Times. 26 May 1904.) However,
J.E.C. Bodley, on.cit.. pp.3-4, wrote that 'Gallicanism, long
declining, has received its final death blow' from the 1905
Separation Law.
39 "all Mall Gazette. 7 May 1903.
of a Catholic country to view with equanimity any unnecessary
punishment inflicted upon the Church. A great many Frenchmen,
it was said, were going to he outraged once they realised that
dissolution meant paying the stipends of the pariochial clergy
out of their own pockets. In particular, it was the frugal
4n
peasantry that was going to resent this. But could such an
assumption be taken for granted? The Lconoqist thought not.
It felt that France was a Catholic country only in the sense
that most Frenchmen happened to be born into the Church of
Rome and that the Protestants were few in number and had a
limited influence on the conduct of affairsj beyond that,
however, the student of French affairs fou d himself in a
'vista of uncertainties'. True, in the Vendee and Britanny
and in some parts of the rural .est and Bouthwest of ranee
the mass of people were devout Catholics; but at the same
time, there were in other regions of the country 'whole
provinces in which it seems possible that all the churches
might be closed and all the clergy banished without the
peasantry being seriously disturbed - certainly without their
being moved to any active manifestation of their displeasure*.
Nor could the economist suppose for one moment that even the
practising Catholics in France would put up much of a fight.
The Royalists wished to see the Church powerful, but they did
hot desire a civil war; the educated Catholic laity was still
less disposed to violence; and much of the secular clergy were
good republicans as well as good Catholics.41
Laurence Jerrold, the Paris correspondent for the Daily
Telearaoh. strongly agreed. In a special article to the
40 Chttrcn T&BPBj *5 Hay 1903j also Tablet. 28 March 1903.
41 economist. Ip December 1906.
Monthly Review. Jerrold strove to show how the Roman Catholic
Church in France had succeeded over the years in alienating
itself from virtually every major social class# With the
bourgeoisie, hostile enough towards Catholicism since 1789,
it had incurred still more antipathy because of its
identification with the forces of intrigue against the
Republic. With the workers, increasingly in need of some
social justice rather than the mere workings of charity, it
had incurred other, more widespread and deep-rooted
misunderstandings. And even with the peasantry, 'the
backbone of the French nation', all was not well. In the
rural regions of France the cure was still looked up to;
but he was being regarded more and more as a meddlesome
figure in family life, and many of his excursions into the
realm of politics had only brought damaging results to the
Church. Indeed, in France only the monarchists completely
supported the Church, and it was their very support that had
precipitated its dwindling influence amongst the other classes.
In a word, the situation for the devout Catholics was
'inextricable', and the Church was bound to lose ground 'with
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the nation at each step she takes' in the current struggle.
Undoubtedly it was the force of these and similar arguments
elsewhere in the press that induced some Conservative newspapers
\
like The Times to adopt a more cautious approach to the subject
and declare that in the end. the intensity of the struggle would
be determined by the manner in which the Government in Paris
41
carried out its anti-clerical legislation. J
42 Laurence Jerrold, 'Church v. State: the real French view',
Monthly Review. 16 (May, 1904), 35-38.
43 The Times. 4 August 19C4.
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For much of right-wing opinion In Britain, however, the
most frightening aspect of the disestablishment campaign in
France was neither the harsh legislation of the Government
against the various Churches nor even the possibility that
such legislation might produce a political and social upheaval.
Bather, it was the impact that the struggle was likely to have
on the rivalry of the Great Powers throughout the world,
particularly in the Hear and Fat East. In China, Gyria, the
Lebanon, and parts of Palestine, France had managed to acquire
over the years an economic and political foothold largely
through the blessings of the Holy Gee, which granted her,
as 'eldest daughter of the Church', the right to protect and
adjudicate in the disputes of all Catholics and all other
Christians with rites in communion with home in those areas.
Although the French had long since held this privilege in many
of these areas, this is not to say that their position
vis-a-vis the Christian populations of Asiatic Turkey and
China went unchallenged. By the turn of the century, Italy,
Germany, and even Russia, had questioned the exclusive
44
protectorate which the Vatican had conferred upon the French.
In the opihion of many Conservatives in Britain it was quite
44 In the late 1880s, the Italian Government sought to gain
recognition from the Vatican of the right to protect its own
nationals in the Ottoman Empire. Pope Leo XIII refused to
consider this request in an encyclical written in 1888. By
the late 1990s, German involvement among the Christians in the
Near fast had become so great that the Pope felt obliged to
issue a similar, though somewhat more discreet, refusal to
Berlin on the eve of a well-publicised visit of the Kaiser to
the Holy Land, Despite these Vatican pronouncements, neither
Germany nor Italy gave up in their efforts and scon began to
pressurise the Porte into putting them on a par with France in
this respect. As for Russia, her influence at this time was
confined to the Eastern Orthodox Christians, chiefly in Gyria,
but it was of sufficient scope to cause some "reach diplomat#
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possible that Tranced anti-clerical policies at hone would
ultimately work to the advantage of all these Powers, especially
the Germans, who, as they saw it, had a finger in virtually
every pie at this time.
Indeed, everywhere they looked, Conservative newspapers
saw Berlin ready to step in and take over from Paris as the
sole protector of Catholics abroad, '/hen it first became
apparent in 1903 that Ccmbes's anti-clerical legislation
might cause France to lose 'one of the strongest props of
her power' overseas, The Times put Germany at the head of a
list of States 'which would be glad enough to enter into her
45
(France's) inheritance should she decide to abandon it,,,',
./hen Kaiser Wilhelm II held an ostensibly ceremonial meeting
with the leading Roman Catholic prelates of the German Empire
at iletz in the spring of 190?, the Gnectator declared that the
purpose of the meeting, was more probably twofold: to give the
Emperor a 'new hold over his troublesome and powerful party of
the Centre' and to further the cause of Geltpolltik by arranging
a deal with the Vatican whereby Germany would replace France as
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the protector of the eastern Christians. Even the election
of Cardinal Sarto to succeed Leo XIII as to the Papacy as
Plus X was deemed as part of the German scheme of things,
According to Lee Maxse, the rabidly anti-Teutonic editor of the
National icview, Pius X 'owed' Ills victory at the Conclave to
a great deal of worry. For more details on such diplomatic
intrigues, see Gilliam I, Shorrock's article, 'Anti-clericalism
and French policy in the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1914', European
SjqdtW lenwt vol. 4, no. 1, (1974), 36-37, 37n 13.
4? T^e Tjjjjjgt 23 Parch 1903.
4o Spectator. 20 May 190?.
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the Austrian Cardinals, who, 'on a suggestion from Berlin1,
vetoed the nomination of Cardinal Bempolla, the former
Vatican Secretary of State and the French candidate, so
that relations between the Holy See and the Third Republic
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might become even more strained. Given this tendency to
see German diplomatic machinations at every twist and turn,
it is scarcely surprising that so many right-wing organs of
ooinion in Britain should seek to remind the French Government
of Garabetta's dictum that 'anti-clericalism is not an article
for exnort'. If some Tory journals like the Saturday Review
did not condemn French politicians outright, they did complain
that the 'madness' of the politicians in their refusal to
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compromise was bound to 'wreck a traditional policy'. The
Pall Fall Gazette said more or less the same thing, only in
somewhat less uncertain terms. On 21 September 1904, it
reflected ruefully on the French Government's obstinacy in
dealing with the Church, which in its opinion meant *a
distinct weakening of French influence oversea'.
And yet, despite all these misgivings, Conservative
opinion in Britain, cr a good deal of it at any rate, was in
time to come round to the side of the anti-clericals. Whereas
in 1903 it largely sympathised with the Church, by 1907 it had
long since begun to support the Otate in this matter. Precisely
what precipitated this remarkable, if somewhat gradual, shift
of opihion is difficult, though not impossible, to ascertain.
Doubtless the dismissal of Combes in January 1905 had its
effect; for his replacement, whoever he was to be, was
virtually certain to be more moderate and therefore less
47 See naxse's column 'Episodes of the month' in the National
Review. 44 (Oct., 1904),v244. J.E.C. Bodley's oo.cit., n. 6l.
makes a similar accusation.
48 Saturday Review. 27 May 1905.
likely to provoke unneccessary trouble. No doubt, too, the
growing realisation that the Church-State struggle was not
going to produce the dire consequences for France that some
had predicted also played its part. Neither the dreaded social
and political reaction at home nor the further invigorated
German challenge to French interests in the Near and Far East
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ever really materialised. 7 But it 'was the behaviour of the
Vatican more than anything else that brought about this
volte-face in British Conservative opinion. For a period
lasting longer than two years Pope Pius X took a series of
controversial and seemingly aggressive steps in his quarrel
with the French Government: the breaking off of diplomatic
relations with Paris as a result of President Loubet's
state visit to the Quirinal in May 1904; the bringing to
book two months later at the Court of Rome of two leading
French prelates, the Bishops of Laval and Dijon, for daring
to speak out in favour of the Government in the midst of
the controversy; the issuance of the encyclical Vehementer Nos
in February 1906 condemning the passing of the two month old
Separation Law in no uncertain terms; and the issuance of a
49 In point of fact, there had been trouble in France in the
earlier months of 1906 when State officials, acting in accordance
with the terms of the recent Separation Law, tried to take an
inventory of all goods and valuables in the churches and were
confronted with hostile crowds in Paris and some of the
provincial towns and cities. In most instances, the crowds
gave way, though at BoeschSpe near the Belgian frontier clashes
did occur and one demonstrator died. This incident was directly
responsible for the fall of the Rouvier Ministry in March 1906.
(See The Times. 8 March 1906.) For the most part, however, these
demonstrations amounted to a 'feeble protest'. (Bee ocotsman,
2 February 1906.) As for the impact of the quarrel on France's
position in the Near and Far East, Shorrock, on. cit.. p. 39>
notes that there was at about this time 'an increasing concern
on the part of the French with Italian religious penetration
of Turkey. The record indicates, however, that the German
threat to French missionary preponderance was regarded in France
as virtually negligible...'.
second encyclical in 1906 urging the clergy and the faithful
in France to refuse point-blank to sanction the formation of
the associations cultuelles. Ml this greatly excited
Conservative opinion in Britain, particularly the last step
which had the effect of reversing a decision made a few weeks
earlier by a conference of French Bishops at Paris to accept
the Separation Law with a few modifications.
ks a result, the Conservatives were now inclined to
concur with the view of their Liberal counterparts that what
was most at stake in the struggle was not freedom of religion
as such but the right of France to govern herself without
foreign intervention. The Spectator. which previously had
been among the most outspoken critics of ministerial
'fanaticism' in 'ranee on this matter, was one of the first
to redress its thinking. With the crisis reached in 7"'rance
after the second papal encyclical of 19'<6, it argued that it
was Pius X rather than the French Government who ought to
submit. The situation in 1'ranee, it noted, was highly analogous
to that in England at the beginning of Henry VIII 's reign, at
which time people asked 'whence foreigners could derive any
en
right to interfere with internal legislation*. To The Times,
at one point equally antagonistic to rench anti-clericalism
as the ooectator. the weparation Law suddenly became in the
light of the Pope's actions nothing less than 'the penalty
which acclesiasticism has to pay for having gathered to itself
every form of anti-hepublican intrigue...', the only answer to
'a fight for retention by the Vatican of the purely sec lar
power of negotiating upon equal terms with the "'rench Mate
5° Spectator. 25 ugust 1906. The emphasis in the quote is the
Spectator's.
upon all sorts of subjects which belong to the province of
the State'. 'On that ground the Law is obnoxious to
HItramontanes in all countries', it continued; 'but it is
not obnoxious to the mass of the French people, and, if it is
unpalatable, it is by no means intolerable to the bulk of the
*>1
French clergy'. Even the Church Times reconsidered its
views. After still another refusal on the part of the
Vatican to compromise on the formation of the associations
cultuelles in December 1906, it accused the Curia of 'plunging
French Catholics into intolerable difficulties, merely to
gratify a diplomatic amour pro-ore'.^
Of course, similar reactions to these developments were
to be found in other quarters of British public opinion. Upon
hearing in May 1904 that a breach in diplomatic relations had.
erupted between the Holy See and the Third Republic as a result
of Loubet's visit to Rome, the Daily Hews voiced its displeasure
for several reasons, not the least of which was because it
believed that 'such a style at the Vatican threatens the whole
structure of Europeans polities'. 'The only people who will
be really pleased will be the enemies of the Papacy in every
part of Europe', wrote this left-wing Liberal daily. 'The
storm which has burst over France shows how completely the
Pope has miscalculated the strength of the new national feeling
which has grown up in the modern world. M. Combes will be
Co
immeasurably strengthened in his war against the Congregations'. J
In connection with this incident, 4.G. Gardiner, editor of the
51 The Times, 5 January 1907.
52 Church Times, 14 December 1906.
53 Daily News. 23 May 1904.
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Daily Hews, was portraying the Pope as something of a
well-intentioned but obstinate man whose policy of stubborness
was playing straight Into the hands of the enemy. ther
Liberals, however, thought worse. When Ilus X issued his
second encyclical of 19< 6 calling for reach C the lies to
fight the formation of the ppsociations cultuellcs. the
Dally Chronicle accused him, amongst other things, of
'inciting ranee to a Holy ar in defence of the extreme claims
04
of the Church1.' the -speaker, in much the same fashion as
fiie limes and the spectator, dragged up some of the more
sordid episodes in the annals of the Third Republic and
reminded its readers that the Roman Catholic Church had
involved itself in 'all the unpopularities and worst causes
in French politicsTo the ^ea trains tor uaze t te. on the
other hand, it was the French Bishops who most deserved
sympathyj for they were in 'the unfortunate position of having
to fight for a policy which is not their own and which all the
world knows to have been forced upon them by the foreign power
which controls the Church, and which is itself apparently
r* f
controlled by influences hostile to the French Republic
And so it went on. In recording these statements, it is
interesting to note that in all of them there -is a tendency to
side against the Vatican not only because its position seemed to
be untenable in its own right, but also because its stance had
failed to gain the support of the bulk of the French people.
54 T a: I:/ Chronicle. V F: ust 1906.
55 Soaker. 9 June 1906.
56 cot '':isto.y tlx. 33 December
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Indeed, in many respects this was the crux of the whole
Issue. Tor despite their often very pronounced views on the
disestablishment issue in France, the various organ# cf
inion in .ritain had ittle means of judging ' r h corta'nty
which side was right anci which wrong in the natter. In factt
until the spring of 1906 they had no definite neans of
ascertaining this whatsoever. Then In lay of that year a
general election was held which returned the anti-cleric 1
i 'cos t the h i; :a -f o • hh wit'' a c nsiderahle n j rity.
In the eyes of . ay nc l.c in iritain this ''k k at striking
piece of evidence there was to show that the policy of
en
separation of Church and tate was the proper course f r *one#."
Nor did those who had most consistently supported the. Church
disagree, tccording to the Catholic weekly the 'hiblot, the
results of the 19 6 general election constituted an enornou#
defeat far the Church, "here cc Id be \o gin. bach, no v. t.. the
days " the C aicorda t j hence fort? , the * c would have ask
the fai ..h 1 in "renee t -/.he the best that they c • :. of
the Reparation law.
Thus hi t had once amounted tc c very wide difference of
opinion In Britain on a question of much importance to the
Third Republic had by 1906-19f7 narrowed to the point where most
onlook rs e~ ;3.d f'nd at least sent u^rc• -out. 'It* ou.h citish
Catholic, had far froo given up sup orting the Vatican in Its
stance on the disestablishment issue in "ranee, the; had by
this ho orurrcf . "h ho vixn -xcY.iflag ha ?s
57 t.gs.tmlqater *nd fhe T3r>og,
^ 1. • 5 t- ■ 3 to. her I, ■5B Xal&gjb 9 June 1906, x
of British public opinion that it would be best for the Church
to accept the decision of the French electorate as final.
Laurence Jerrcld and the .. conoraist had been right. Yenchmen
were not going to allow their religious sentiments interfere
with their political thinking, however much this thinking
diverged from one class to the next on other issues. ..'rue,
in the spring of 1906 there had been some disorders over the
Church-otate question, and some people in Britain, albeit a
minority, felt that these disorders were a portent 0^ beings to
come, et in t.ie main, the feeling was bh t -once was .. very
stable country, populated by folk who were not likely to rush
headlong into either reaction or revolution. Lven those who
were most erplexed by the 1906 general ©lection results
admitted this, hence one contemporary writer, baffled at how
the peasantry and the devout members of the middle class in
'ranee could protest one moment against the slightest attack
against the Church only to turn round the next and vote for
anti-clerical candidates at the polls, was forced to conclude!
those who know ranee well, who have mixed with the people
of all classes and of all parties, arc by no means
despondent of the future.... the future is...uncertain,
full nf possibilities for pood and for evil; hut
underneath it all there is that toiling, laborious r nee
which works quietly and unostentatiously. It is In this
1 ranee that all hope for the future must lie. The
unexpected nay therefore bo awaited with some neararc of
confidence. 60
fhe Church-Btate question in . ranee, although it provoked
a good deal of discussion in the more informed circles of
British public opinion, did not in the final analysis arouse
59 ■ &U -apotpfi, 0 <larch 1906.
60 Pee the unsigned article entitled 'The .-oner 1*7 1 0:in
France *, . ..oviow. 20$ (July- ct., 1996;, 2Bo
m.
much emotional feeling in the country between 1903 and 1907.
Nor did it produce any fundamental changes in British
attitudes towards Prance during these years. Certainly no
one allowed the disestablishment issue to alter his or her
own feelings about the Entente Cordiale. Even British
Catholics, from whom one could most expect such a change of
heart, continued to endorse the 1904 understanding. None of
this is to say, however, that the anti-clerical campaign
which the French Government conducted during these years was
without interest to many people in Britain. On the contrary,
it was generally regarded as an important issue in its own
right and one with wide-ranging implications for Britain
and the world at large. This was immediately recognised
in virtually every quarter of British public opinion. Whatever
the difference in viewpoint between Conservatives, Liberals,
Catholics, and Protestants about the day-to-day events
surrounding the disestablishment issue in France, they all
agreed that in its broadest context it held some important
lessons for Britain. Just as they maintained in other
leader-articles that France had something to learn from
Britain in the field of labour relations or in the art of
putting together long-lived ministries, so they now argued
that Britain had something to learn from France in this
domain, even if they could not agree about what conclusions
ought, to be drawn from the French experience. At the same
time, the various organs of opinion in Britain were aware
that the disestablishment issue was important because of its
possible repercussions in the sphere of international politics.
Not only did It bring a new element to the rivalry of the Great
Powers in the Near and Far East, but it also threatened to
upset Europe's delicately balanced diplomatic and military
equilibrium should the tensions it engendered within ranee
get out of control and bring the country to its knees.
Doubtless this is what the Economist was suggesting when it
wrote on 15 September 1906:
The prosperity and tranquillity of France, the stability
of her government, and the permanence of her institutions
are matters of genuine concern to us. France is more
than a neighbour, she is a friend, and a friend whose
interests are in some important particulars closely
associated with our own. That France should be saved
from religious strife, still more £feom religious strife
which is political alike in its origin and in its objects,
must be the wish of every Englishman who recalls the
disastrous part that religiop. has occasionally played in
secular controversies.
Believing that such high stakes were involved, the newspapers
and journals in Britain felt duty-bound to follow the
Church-^tate struggle in France as closely as possible.
CHAPTER VI
liiilii-Eli »HLIi-.if Al.D NAVAL ATTITUEEL a . kd> u i*RALCr >-.iiD THE
ENTENTE CfRTIAlE
Up t< tais point we havs.- examined the attitudes towards
ranee and the Entente Cordisle of certain writers with
considerable sway over the general nubile but .ore often hnn
not with only a limited impact on the Government and the
official • olicy-nakers. This chanter, however, deals with a
group of men who exerted much influence over both the
high-ranking politicians and the man in the street. Indeed,
if any thin; , Britain's military and naval leaders were, by
virtue of the highly professional .and secretive nature of
their work, on a closer footing with the members of the
Cabinet an< the ernanent civil service than they were with
even >, mat prominent 1-et street journalists. overt eless,
they did c iltlvate f riends in the newspaper world$ and their
unique nsifcion vis-a-vis U.e vov-- r-> ierit a a , 'n ' " ;t , the
people makes them an integral and crucial oart of contemorary
British nubile opinion, certainly one worthy of our attention,
iut there is another reason for studying the attitudes of the
General;.;, -.dairals, and defence experts toward3 Anglo- Tench
relations in the early years of the twentieth centuryI fuch
wore than any other of the various sections of British oublic
opinion, they tended to view the durability of the Entente with
a good deal of scepticism, and while they welcomed its
inception for a host of reasons, they were cautious en ugh not
to allow the heady euphoria that surrounded the ra prochement
to impair air judgment --b- o; the defence repuirrmeuta of the
nation.
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That military and naval leaders exerted a good deal of
influence in the uppermost political circles in Britain can
perhaps best be seen by the role of the Committee of Imperial
Defence in the decision-making process# Founded in
December 1902, the C.I.D# was in many respects a manifestation
of the insecurity which arose in Britain in the early years of
the twentieth century in the light of the reverses of the Boer
war, the new merman naval challenge, and the continued
imperialist rivalry of the ureat Powers in various parts of
the world# At first, it was little more than a remodelled
version of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet set up by
Bord Salisbury in 1895# True, unlike the latter institution,
the C.I.D. from the outset included professional heads of the
iirray and the ><avy as well as prominent Cabinet ministers, but
the two interdepartmental committees that had existed at the
turn of the century to < eal with such problems, the Colonial
Defence Committee and the Joint Military and Tiaval Committee,
were allowed to continue in much the same form and with the
same heads as sub-committees of the new C.I#D. The
publication of the report of the Esher Committee on the
Reconstitution of the War Office in January 1904, however,
changed much of this. This report was highly critical of
the existing means- of co-ordinating national defence, and
as a result of Its recommendations, the Prime Minister
radically altered the structure of the C.I.D# four roonths
later. Whereas initially the Lord President of the Council
(then the Duke of Devonshire^ presided over its meetings,
1 Herein cited simply as C.I.D.
the rime Sinister himself was appointed chairman and for a
while sat as the only permanent member of the new body*
Moreover, the Prime inister was given sweeping powers in the
selection of other members. This reform made it possible
for the C.I.D. to bring in experts on the most far-ran|£ng
subjects, military and non-military alike, and seek out their
advice on specific problems while Ministers cross-examined
them. Finally, a permanent Secretariat was created as a
result of the findings of Lord Esher's Committee, and the
first Secretary of the C.I.D., Sir George Clarke, was
responsible for the day-to-day paper work of the organisation
and for keeping the Prime Minister abreast of the recommendations
of the various sub committees. Taken together, these changes
did not enhance the position of the C.I.D. beyond that of
being merely an advisory body. Nevertheless, they did, along
with the sheer score of the C.I.D.'s operations, make it very
difficult for leading Cabinet Ministers to ignore that
organisation's findings and recommendstiens5 and, as will be
seen shortly, in 1902-3 Lord Iansdowne closely abided by the
suggestions which the C.I.D. made with regard to the colonial
p
negotiations then in progress with France.
2 For further details on the scope and structure of the C.I.D.,
see Balfour's paper entitled 'A. Note on the Constitution of the
Defence Committee', delivered to the Cabinet on 3 March 1904, in
the Esher Papers 16/12. As regards attendance at C.I.D. meetings,
it was the opinion of Sir George Clarke that during most of
Balfour's premiership, the Prime Minister sat in on the most
important meetings, as normally did the Secretary of State for
War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for
India, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Foreign Secretary.
Of the professional members, the ir t Sea Lord usually took part
in the more important C.I.D. sessions, along with the Chief of
General Staff and the Heads of the Military and Naval
Intelligence Departments. In a letter to Viscount Esher, Clarke
intimates that on a number of occasions the principal Cabinet
Ministers were summoned to attend, if only to spare the Committee
from requiring its ideas to be sanctioned by the entire Cabinet.
See Clarke to Esher, 9 October 1905» In the Balfour Add MSB 49719.
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In another sense, too, prominent C.I.D. members held
considerable sway over the Government. Men like Sir George Clarke,
the Secretary-General of the C.I.D,, and Vigcount Esher, the
only other permanent member of the organisation apart from
the Prime Minister, wielded an influence over and above that
which they exerted at their official posts by virtue of their
rather close links with ministerial figures, in particular,
Balfour and Lord Lansdowne. Some, not content with merely
having strong ties with certain Cabinet Ministers, developed
friendships with Fleet Street and provincial journalists so
as to ensure that their views got the widest possible airing.
This was especially true of the First Sea Lord,
Admiral Sir John Fisher, whose 'glorification in releasing
blazing indiscretions' to the press gave J.L. Garvin, editor
of the Observer, 'more secrets that his paper usually dared
to print'.^ In addition to such personages,there were the
periodicals of the armed services, which, if they did not
make such a strong impact on eminent politicians and the
public at largo, did at least reflect the views prevailing
in the lower officer ranks on the more Important Issues of
the day connected with defence. The Broad Arrow and the
Artqy apd %yy G^?e^te, for Instance, both sought to give
advice through their weekly leader-articles, and they, along
with other organs of military opinion like the Journal of the
RQyql United Serv^, jetton, printed pertinent articles
dealing with the condition of the armed services of foreign
countries and the like. Throughout most of this period It
was, of course, the C.I.D, sitting In its official capacity
3 Christopher M. Andrew? Th6ophlle Delcass€ and the Making
of the entente CordialeT (London, 1963), p.283.
that played the greatest role in shaping Government policy
on matters of defence; nevertheless, private expressions of
military and naval opinion as well as those vented in the
newspapers did assume an importance of their own at this time
and indeed, if anything, probably assumed an even greater
importance between 1906 and 1908 when the C.I.D. underwent
something of a decline in importance during the
4
Campbell-Bannerman Ministry.
2. The Terms and Implications of the 1904 Agreements
4s regards the possibility of improving Angle-French
relations by means of a comprehensive settlement of colonial
disputes between the two countries, the various sections of
military and naval opinion began to express their views as
early as 1902. In September of that year, the Conservative
Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne, after just having been
approached on the matter by the French Ambassador in London,
Paul Cambon, sounded out the Service Departments for their
reactions to the proposal. The insistence of the Intelligence
Divisions of the Military and Naval Departments that Tangier
should not fall into French or Spanish hands, their desire
that the French should be excluded from the Moroccan coast
altogether in the interest of safeguarding Gibraltar, and
4 The Liberal Prime Minister pursued his task as Chairman of
the C.I.D. with a good deal less enthusiasm than either his
predecessor or his successor. Whereas eightyfctwo formal
meetings of the C.I.D. were held during Balfour's tenure as
premier, for example, only fifteen were held while
Campbell-Bannerman was in office. The latter was quite happy
to leave most matters connected with defence in the hands of
Haldane, his Secretary of State for War, and to allow the
sub-committees of the C.I.D. to undertake more and more work
without having to report their findings to the Committee as
a whole. (See F.A, Johnson, Defence by Committee, (London, i960),
p. 82.) Nevertheless, Fisher, Clarke, and others were still
frequently expounding their views on a host of subjects to
several Liberal Cabinet Ministers, much as they had done with
Conservative Ministers prior to December 1905.
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the belief, of the Military Intelligence Division of the
./ar Office at any rate, that Germany should also be allowed
to stake her claims in Morocco, all had the effect of making
Lansdowne put off M, Cambon.^ But with the successful State
visits of Kind Edward VII to Paris and of French President
Loubet and M. Delcasse to London in the spring and summer of
1903, and with Anglo-German relations having taken a turn for
the worse as a result of the Venezuelan imbroglio earlier
that year, these same Departments were much less inclined
to take such a tough bargaining stance when Lansdowne again
asked their opinion on the matter almost twelve months later.
At a meeting of the C.I.D. held on 14 December 19D3> it was
decided that a few substantial concessions could be made to
the French after all without prejudicing Britain's interests
in the Mediterranean. True, the Admiralty members present
r«a*Aned Insistent that Tangier be kept independent of any
European control and opposed the building of any new
fortifications or naval bases on the Mediterranean coastline
of Morocco to the west of that cityj but unlike in September 1902,
they were not now nearly so adamant about keeping the French
entirely away from the Moroccan coast and were even willing
to countenance the construction of a Trans-Sahara railway line
between Algiers and Tangier, provided that this line would
not be used as a cover for a new naval base on the Mediterranean.
Equally true, the Military Intelligence Division of the War
Office continued to v ice doubts about handing any part of
Morocco over to Prance or to Spain, since In its mind the
occupation of even the smallest part of that country posed an
additional threat to Gibraltar. Nevertheless, the Military
5 P.J.V. Rolo, fntr.enbe Cordite: The rJ^*n3 gnq
negotiations of the Anglo-French Agreements of 8 April 19C4
(London, 1969), p» 141.
Intelligence Division had by this time shed its earlier suggestion
that Germany should also be consulted about Morocco; and if it
still had reservations of a strategical nature about the
proposed colonial convention, it did not in the end demur to
the view of Sir Louis Battenberg and other naval members present
at this particular session of the C.I.D. that such reservations
were 'mainly of a kind affecting naval rather than military
interests' and were in any case of insufficient importance 'to
outweigh the advantages which this country would derive from
the adoption of the Agreement as a whole'.^
Thus by the end of 1903 there was something of a consensus
of opinion in military and naval circles that Britain had, in
the final analysis, little to fear strategically from exchanging
Morocco for Egypt or from resolving disputes in certain other
overseas areas. With such general agreement behind him,
Lansdowne felt safe in pressing ahead at full steam with the
colonial negotiations, and as he continued the talks with
Caabon in early 1904, he all but treated the recommendations
7
of the C.I.D. with regard to Tangier as orders not to be defied.
Nor was it merely over Morocco that the Foreign Secretary felt
obliged to carry out the suggestions of the C.I.D. Cver the
6 Oab, 38/3/85. 'Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the C.I.D,,
14 December 1903'. In point of fact. Lord Lansdowne and
Sir Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign
Office, had questioned the Admiralty and the Par ffiee about their
attitudes towards the pro osed negotiations as early as July 1903.
The replies from Sir Louis Battenberg (7 August 1903) and the ar
Office (31 July 1903) were more &r less the same as given In
December 1903. The Bar office, in fact, was in favour of
permitting Spain to have all that she could persuade France to
give her in Morocco, 'since territory in her possession Is far less
likely to be used to our detriment that If it be in the possession
of France'. See F(oreign) O(ffice) 27/3765. Battenberg at this
time was Director of Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty.
7 It probably would be more correct to say that the
recommendations of the C.I.D. on 28 December 1903 only reinforced
the Foreign Secretary's determination, seeing the Cabinet on
several occasions Insisted on a neutral Tangier,
question of suitable territorial compensation for Trance's
withdrawal from the 'Treaty Shore', he accepted the recommendations
of the C.I.D. without any questions and bargained along the lines
it urged so stubbornly that he came close to destroying the
8
negotiations altogether. ' In view of I-ansdowne's ultimate
success in securing concessions from the ^rench on both these
points, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that many spokesmen
for the defence services in Britain were highly critical of the
Anglo-French Convention when it was finally published in
April 1904. Yet this is orecisfcly what happened. Military
journals like the Broad Arrow and the Army and Navy Gazette
poured scorn on the Government for having got the worse of the
arrangement. Britain gained considerably, they acknowledged, but
9
not nearly in the same proportion as Prance. To Sir George Clarke,
a man who had figured prominently in the C.I.D.'s pronouncements
about Tangier and West Africa, the Agreements were something 'for
which we have paid pretty heavily Some even onposed the
Convention for reasons having little to do with politics or
defence. Thus Admiral George Tryon, then an Instructor at
Camberley ^taff College, criticised those clauses of the
Convention pertaining to Morocco partly because he feared that
they would give offence to third Powers, partly because he
8 At the twenty-ninth meeting of the C.I.D. held on
4 January 1904, it was agreed that Lansdowne should refuse Cambon's
proposal that France should receive territory on the right bank of
the River Niger extending southwards as far as the River Moussa,
thereby gaining access below the rapids of the Niger, in exchange
for the 'Treaty Shore' right. Instead, the C.I.D. offered by
way of compensation a rectification of the Anglo-French colonial
frontier to the north of Bokoto, (Gee Cab. 38/4/1). In the end
it was :ore or less this latter arrangement that was accepted,
but not before the negotiations reached an impasse in January
and February 1904.
9 Bjrpfrd Ayrpw and Irmy and Navy Gazette. 16 April 1904.
10 Clarke to Fshcr, 4 .'ay 1904, Fsher apers 10/33.
thought Morocco showed a potential for grain-growing and might
11
one day be valuable to Britain as a source of food imports.
In the main, however, Britain's military and naval leaders were
disturbed by the one-sidedncss of the arrangement rather than by
its moral or commercial implications, inly the awareness that
there were other possible advantages to be derived from the
Agreements seemed tc console them.
Indeed, if anything, uattenberg's belief as expressed at
the 13 December 1$K3 n eting of the C.I.I), that the broader
considerations of the Anglo-French Entente outweighed its more
technical aspects grew during the first few months of 1904.
Others besides prominent members of the Admiralty began to speak
of 'advantages which this country would derive from the adoption
of the Agreement as a whole'. Was this a tacit admission on
the part of the C.I.D, and others that they had envisaged almost
from the very start some anti»Gercjan possibilities arising from
the rapprochement? It would be difficult to denyj for although
the nation's defence experts were usually circumspect in the
matter of linking the Entente with European power politics,
they were worried about the growing German challenge and had
begun to contemplate, if only in private, the need for some sort
of accommodation with France, As early as Hoverabc* 1901
Admiral Sir John Fisher, then in command of the Mediterranean
squadron, was advocating an alliance with France to be directed
against Germany. 'They have never and will never Interfere with
our trade,' he wrote of the French to a journalist friend. 'It's
11 Major-General George Asten. 'The Entente Cordial© and the
"military conversations'", carter!./ 258 (April, 1932),
3o6-3o7. ^ston does gc on tc say, however, that in the rinds of
most- of his colleagues the arrangement gave more tc Britain than
it did France, since the former did gain a free hand in Egypt,
whereas the latter could not be sure of the same in Morocco.
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not their line and, really, we have no clashing of vital
12
interests....The Germans are our natural enemies everywhere',
k little more than a year later, Lieutenant-Colonel William Robertson
then the head of the Foreign Bectjon of the : ilitary Intelligence
Division of the 'War Office, had become alarmed enough at the
recent German naval programmes to commence preliminary planning
for an Anglo-German war, with amphibious operations against
German colonies or Heligoland being considered as the Array's
most likely task.*^ And as early as 1897 James M. Grierson,
at the tine the military attache at the British Embassy in
Berlin, was expressing the opinion that 'England must go to
war with Germany and that soon',*4 Nor was It merely
prominent military and naval personnel who thought along these
lines. Their political counterparts in upper echelons were almost
equally belligerent towards Germany. In Gepteraber 1902,
H.O. Arnold-Foster, the Parliamentary and Financial Gecretary
at the Admiralty, was so alarmed by the naval construction he
had seen at Kiel and Vilhelmshaven earlier that year that he
drafted a memorandum warning of a future conflict between the
two countries and urging a redeployment of the various fleets
and a revision of war plans. One month later Lord Melbourne,
the First Lord at the Admiralty, informed his colleagues in the
Cabinet that he was convinced of the Kaiser's intention of
building up the German Navy 'from the point of view of a war
3 8
with us'. J But it was General Henry Wilson, later to become
Director of Filitary Operations at the ..ar Office, who first
12 .uoted in Hiehard Hough, F&ygt Lpp^; Ap. Authorised
Biography of Admiral Lord Fishery (London. 1969), op. 136-137.
13 Wamuel H. Williamson Jnr., Ihe Politics of Grsnd strategy» , vBritain and 'ranee Prepare for art 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Wass.f1969)
14 J.E. Tyler, The. British Army and the Continent. 1 >04-1914. P
(London, 1033), p. 15.
15 illiaason, oo.cit.T p. 17.
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spoke of the Anglo-French rapprochement in an anti-Teutonic
light. Writing in his diary at the time of Loubet's State
visit to London in 1903, Wilson observed:
This visit of the French President is History. I have for
many years advocated friendship with the French as against
the Germans because in ray opinion there is no legitimate
cause to quarrel with the French...whereas the Germans,
who have an increasing population and no political morals,
mean expansion and therefore aggression. 16
What Wilson quickly jotted down in private he soon expounded
more fully to those around him. Others, hitherto more reticent
on the subject, also began to remark on the possible consequences
for Berlin arising out of the Entente. Given this tendency of
prominent figures in the defence services to see Anglo-French
friendship as a device to contain what they construed as
German expansionism, it is scarcely surprising that some of them
should all but leap at the opportunity of holding secret
military conversations with France during the Moroccan crisis
of 1905-6.
Of course, it was not only Germany that stood to be
affected by this diplomatic development. The recent rapprochement
between Britain and France was almost bound to leave its mark on
Russia as well, if only because she had made an earlier alliance
with France. In some quarters of public opinion the latter Power
was suddenly being cast in the role of an intermediary between
17
her friend and her ally. Did all this therefore mean that the
Generals and Admirals also saw the Entente Cordiale as a
convenient stepping-stone to an equally positive understanding
16 quoted in oasil Collier, Eyagshqt: , A alogrftpto of
Field -lajshqlX ,Glr Henry -il?oa (London, 1961), p. 85. The
emphasis in the quotation is Wilson's.
17 The nation that 'a friend of a friend is our friend'
became a favourite and oft-repeated theme of many newspapers
not long after Kind Edward VII's visit to Paris in 1903* This
was particularly true of Conservative organs of opinion. For
further details on this point, see Chapter IX of this thesis.
with the Russians? It would be difficult to say; for despite
the obvious benefits of reaching a friendly accord with Russia
through France, Britain's high-ranking military and naval men
did not openly advocate such a $0ve between 1903 and 1905.
Rather, they were at the time quite content to have France use
her good offices in at. Petersburg to help secure a detente In
Anglo-Russians relations, a detente aimed In part at reducing
tensions between the two Powers in Asia, but primarily at
keeping Germany at bay in Europe while war was being waged in
18
the Far East. Indeed, it was not until the Russo-Japanese
war had been concluded that figures like Sir George Clarke began
to speak openly about converting the Anglo-French understanding
Into a Triple Entente, and even then their motives for doing so
were not entirely clear. Thus the Secretary-General of the
C.I.D, wrote to Lord Esher in the summer of 1905 that 'our
present relations with France ought to be used to secure an
arrangement with Russia which would secure the peace of the
East for a long time and give us leisure to put our house in
Order. This - after the A(rnold)-F(oster) regime - will be a
long task'.^
Although Britain's military and naval leaders gave grudging
acceptance to the terms of the 1904 Agreements and on the whole
looked favourably upon the implications that these Agreements
18 On the eve of the outbreak of the Far Eastern conflict,
for Instance, Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty,
pleaded with the Government to co-operate with France to halt
somehow the drift towards war. Otherwise, the twe Western
Powers sight be dragged in to the delight of Berlin. See"
Selborne to Lansdowne, 21 December 1903* in the Balfour Papers
Add MSS 52518.
19 Clarke to Esher, 1 September 1905, Esher Papers 10/36.
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hold for Anglo-German and Anglo-Russian relations, this is not
to say that they were altogether happy about the course which
Anglo-French relations had t^ken since the inception of the
Entente. Far from it. The defence services, like many other
sections of official and public opinion, did from time to time
express annoyance, if not outright anger, at the way in which
the French had behaved on certain occasions. In 1905, the
Broad "rrow waged a campaign of protest against France's policy
of 'exclusiveness' in Abyssinia. The extension of a ^rench
railway line from Dire Dawa to Adis Ababa in contradiction of
earlier treaty arrangements, it wrote, was not only a slap in
the face to British capitalists there, it threatened to ruin
20
the Entente, Two years later, articles appeared in the
military journals complaining about French encroachments at
the ex;ense of British interests in Siam, particularly in the
21
Menam Valley, 3ut it was the French practice of coaling
Russian ships for more than twenty-four hours at a time during
the Far i astern conflict that produced the greatest outcry.
'-filltory journals like the road Arrow felt that French
behaviour in this respect amounted to a "violation of the
principle on which International Law is based", if not "an
op
outrage on neutrality itself. Lord elborne sympathised
with the French desire to acccmmodate Russia as best as possible,
but argued that the practice put Britain in an even more awkward
x PR 74
nosition vis-a-via Japan, ^ Sir George Clarke felt likewise.
Jroad Arrow, 22 April 1905 and 2 December 1905.
21 Gee, for instance, Angus Hamilton, "Slam and the French
Colonial Party", Upjted--ervj.ee (April - Gent., 1907)49:
22 oroad Arrow. 13 ay 1905.For further details on the legal
aspects of this question and criticisms of the French practice
made in other quarters of British public opinion, see Chapter IX
of this thesis.
23 Selborne to Balfour, 2 January 1905, Balfour Papers Add
MSS 49708.
24 Clarke to Balfour, 29 April 1905, Balfour apers Add MSS 49701*
Not that the Admiralty or ar Office were so intent on making
France change her ways. At a sub-committee meeting of the
C.I.D, held in June 1904 it was decided that France's departure
from neutrality in this respect was not of sufficient gravity
to be construed as having an effect on the course of the war;
therefore, the casus foederis Contemplated by the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 would not necessarily arise'; and
even if Japan went to war with France in consequence of such an
25
action, Britain would not be compelled to follow suit, y
Nevertheless, Britain's military and naval leaders could at
times be annoyed at France, and they showed their annoyance
by constantly urging the Government to put pressure on the
French to behave more in the spirit of the Entente,
If prominent members of the defence services were not as
pleased as they might have been about the nature of Anglo-French
relations in the first few months after the signing of the
1904 Convention, they did not entertain any wild illusions about
the relationship between the two western Powers in the long run
either. Whereas many politicians, journalists, and editors of
varying political outlooks in Britain tended to see the Entente
25 Cab, 38/5/63, 'Note on the conclusions arrived at by the
sub-Committee appointed tc consider certain questions of
International Law arising out of the Russo-Japanese War', June 1904,
Although this sub-committee of the C.I.D, never admitted as much,
it is more than probable that this particular instance of bending
over backwards to avoid being dragged into the Far Eastern fray
was determined at least In part by fear of Germany. During the
Halacca incident of a month later when the Russians illegally
seized a P. and 0. liner, Sir George Clarke went to great lengths
tc convince Balfour how Britain could, if the worst came to the
worst, enter the struggle without involving France. Anglo-French
co-operation was absolutely necessary at such delicate moments,
Clarke told the Prime Minister, If only to prevent Germany from
using these complications to advance her cause in Europe, Gee
Clarke to Balfour, 19 July 1904, Balfour Add MSS 49700.
Cordiale as a diplomatic edifice upon which permanent Anglo-French
friendship was being built, Britain's military and naval leaders took
a more qualified view of the matter. The same near obsession
with the threefold theme of security, strategy and defence that
caused these leaders to look so closely into the proposed colonial
settlement in 1903 had not abandoned them, and throughout the
next few years they never completely lost sight of the fact that
Britain and France might one day be enemies again. Articles
written long after the conclusion of the 1904 Convention appeared
in the military press cautioning the nation not to allow amicable
diplomatic arrangements to upset or interfere with the most
carefully laid plans for defending the Empire and the Home
Islands, One, written in the autumn of 1905, bluntly stated
that all nations were Britain's potential adversaries. The
recent colonial understanding might have improved Anglo-French
relations, went its message, but it was not a guarantee against
any future wars between the two Powers. " Another, written
primarily as a plea on behalf of a conscript army, went even
furtherj it Insisted that France remained along with Germany 'the
most formidable of our probable enemies'.^ Meanwhile, defence
experts at the War Office and Admiralty were busy contemplating
the possibility of a French Invasion of the British Isles. True,
many of these memoranda were written at the time of the Boer War
when Anglo-French relations were particularly bad and only kept on
file for lack of any up-to-date memoranda. But others, written
well in the aftermath of Kln$ Edward VII's successful visit to
Paris, still considered the likelihood of an Anglo-French war:
26 James R. Thursfield, 'Imperial defence: the strategy of
position'. United Service Magazine. XXXII (Oct., 1905), 24.
27 Lieutenant O.K. Browning,*A permanent army on permanent
principles', United .:ervice Magazine. XXXI (Apr. - Sept., 1905), 643.
a study authorised in 1903 by Karl Roberts, then Chief of
General Staff, examining France's chance of success in a
surprise attack across the Channel} a War Office Intelligence
Department paper prepared for the C.I.D. in November 1903
considering the possibility of a "'ranco-Russian attack on
India} another War Office memorandum written at the end of
1904 reviewing tactics concerning an amphibious assault on
French colonies overseas; and still antther study of a
possible French invasion of the Home Islands written at the
end of 1905.28
Why were such studies conducted? The military historian
d.R. Williamson has suggested that it was all due to the
preoccupation of the armies and navies of both Powers with
renovation rather than with strategy. It was 'problems of
organisation, morale, material, and reform', writes
29
Dr Williamson, that 'were everywhere the order of the day', 7
No doubt there is much to be said for this point of view; by
comparison with all the efforts then being made to reorganise
the War Office, reconstitute the Defence Committee, and improve
the fighting quality of both the men and the equipment,
strategic considerations based on recent diplomatic and
political changes were lacking. The reverses suffered during
the Boer War and the critical self-examination that occurred in
military and naval circles after that struggle made much of
this inevitable. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to attribute
all War Office and Admiralty memoranda written about France in
such terras during these years to a form of neglect or oversight
26 David James, Lord Roberts, (London, 1961), p. 426} Cab, 38/3/76,
28 November 1903, 'Defence of India: Memorandum oil the
possibility of a French advance from Indo-China into Burmah'}
and Williamson, op.clt., p. 21.
29 Williamson, Qg,^., p. 15, >
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on the part of the nation's defence experts. The authors of
some of the above memoranda, far from falling to take the
Entente Cordlale into account, chose to ignore it. 4s they
saw it, all such memoranda required consideration of the most
adverse war conditions, and France, if only because of her
close geographical proximity, had to be regarded as a potential
enemy. The portrayal of France as an adversary in these
memoranda was not to ignore or overlook the recent rapprochement
between the two Powers, Britain's military and naval leaders
insisted, but merely to frame the invasion hypothesis in the
least favourable way for the nation's defence experts. 'And
if we can show that the navy is equal to this, the more
difficult task', wrote Lord Esher after one such memorandum .
in 1903, 'we need not waste argument over any easier one'.^°
For similar reasons, Bir George Clarke was willing to consider
what he regarded as the 'extreme case' of France and Germany
being allied with each other as a measuring rod for the Two
Power Standard,^ More likely than not both Esher and Clarke
had the best intentions in mind when examining these
improbabilities. But if such was the case, then it whould be
noted that their portrayal of France in this light was later
used by others as an excuse to bolster Britain's already large
expenditure on armaments.^2
30 Bee the memorandum marked Confidential A. 'Draft report on
the possibility of serious invasion*, dated 3 December 1903» in
the Esher Papers 16/10.
31 Bee the 'Note on comparative naval strength' dated June 1907
in the Sydenham Papers Add MBS 50836.
32 As early as the spring of 1905 Balfour tried to justify his
Government's proposed Increase in the defence estimates at least
in part on the basis of the amount of naval tonnage found to be
in the French Channel ports by the C.I.D. in a memorandum written
earlier that year. See Hansard. Pari. Debates, Fourth Series,
H» of G., CXLVI (11 May 190p/, 73*
JJ *
For the most part, then, Britain's military and naval
leaders were cautious about the Entente Cordiale. In
recording this it is important to note that they had reacted
in this manner, not because of any innate suspicion of the
French Government, but simply because plans involving strategy
were slow to change with the times, or because geographical
and other non-political considerations dictated such an
approach. And yet, despite their protestations of good faith
in the durability of the Entente Cordiale, several members
of the armed forces were in due course to reveal a mistrust
of France that went far beyond anything being voiced in
other quarters of British public opinion. What brought their
misgivings on this point to the fore was the Channel Tunnel Bill
laid before Parliament and the country in late 1906 and early
1907* A number of businessmen and financiers, hoping to make
a profit out of the recently improved relations between Britain
and France, resuscitated this time-honoured scheme not long
after the 1904 colonial Convention had been signed. Their
clamour had been such that within two years a number of M.P,'s
introduced legislation on their behalf to the Commons. That a
submarine railway link was never laid between the two countries
at this time does not need emphasising here; what does need
stressing is the role the defence experts played in killing the
Bill, Their reasons varied. Some, like the Army and Navy
Gazette, expressed their disapproval because in their view such
a link exposed Britain to the Kaiser's army. A war between
France and Germany was not at all impossible, this newspaper
argued, and even if Britain should remain neutral, she would
be threatened with invasion once the German army had overrun
JL •
the north of France.^ Others felt that If Britain was willing
to risk this danger by constructing a Channel Tunnel she would
need a conscript army, and conscription, Sir John Fisher added with
a touch of resentment, would inevitably increase the annual Array
Estimates without necessarily reducing the Naval ones. Still
others were against the idea because they regarded the supposed
•at
commercial benefits to be of doubtful value. y
But for all these explanations, there was another, that of
uncertainty about the permanency of the Entente Cordi&le, which
s eeaed to lie at the core of their opposition to the Channel
Tunnel scheme. Anglo-French relations had been on a solid
footing on a number of occasions in the past, they noted, but
not for any great length of time, and as far as they were
concerned, it would be little else than folly or self-deception
to think otherwise of the latest rapprochement between the two
Powers, As the Broad Arrow put iti 'the friendship of nations
is a notoriously unstable quantity, and no sane politician will
regulate his conduct upon the supposition that present
friendships will never suffer from coldness, however earnestly
both parties may strive to avoid such a calamity'. In
making such statements, the Broad Arrow and other journals like
it were not, of course, predicting a quick end to the Entente
Cordialej rather, they were merely trying to prevent the
Government from rushing head-long into an undertaking which
they felt the country might one day regret. Their opposition
to the Channel Tunnel scheme thus differed in a sense from
33 Amy frnd navy Gflg^ta, 22 December 1906.
34 See Fisher's secret memorandum entitled 'The Channel Tunnel'
(January 1907) in the Balfour Papers Add MSS 49711*
35 Et.-Col, Walter H James, 'The Channel Tunnel', Contemporary
Review. 91 (Feb., 1907), 213; also the memorandum written by
Sir George Clarke for the C.I.D. dated 19 June 1906, Cab. 33/12/31*
36 Broad ArrowT 22 December 1906.
that of the civilian press, much of which did campaign against
the project on strategic grounds, but without singling cut
France by name as a possible future enemy, ./hat is more,
thdir opposition revealed a lack of confidence in high-ranking
British military and naval circles in the fighting ability of
the French army in a war against Germany, a lack of confidence
which in turn perhaps explains their insistence upon some Sbrt
of military and naval accommodation with France during the first
Moroccan crisis. It is to this all-important area that we now
97
turn our attention.
37 Throughout these years, Britain's military leaders had
been in something of two minds about the state of the French
Army. On the one hand, they clearly recognised that
improvements had been made since the 1870-1871 war. Better
defences had been constructed on the frontier with Germany;
French military equipment was thought on the whole to be of
higher quality, even relative to Germany's, particularly in
the area of field guns; and visiting British officers were
invariably impressed with the drilling which they saw in the
! French manoeuvres. (See, for instance, D.S. Macdiarmid, TfaP
Life of Lieut.-General Sir James Boncrieff Grierson.
(■Lonctewy-1923), pp.218-219.) Nevertheless, certain doubts
existed in ,.ar Office minds. Many of these doubts arose
. simply from the fact that the French Army was smaller
than its German counterpart and was falling further behind in
numbers wit the rassing of each day. But there was the
question of morale as well. At first it was felt that the
association of some aristocratic officers with the
anti-Dreyfusards had discredited the Army too much in the
eyes of 'patriotic' Frenchmen for it to be a totally
effective instrument. (See Broad Arrow. 14 February 1903.)
Later, when this issue began to recede from the forefront
of rench politics, some military journals began to express
concern about the impact of anti-militer'sm and pacifism
in the barracks. See (Army and Navy Gametic. 27 July 1907.)
Still others argued that the 'highly strung, imaginative
Frenchman was 'too intelligent and quick-witted to make an
ideal warrior'. (See E. Ashmead Bartlett, 'The French
army on campaign; an account of this operation in Morocco',
Blackwood's Magazine. 183 (Jan.-June 1908), 13-14, 16-17.)
Taken together, these doubts were of sufficient strength to
induce a number of British military leaders to ruestion the
fighting ability of the French army, but they were not
strong enough to make the Far Office think that Britain's1
siding with 'ranee in a land war with Germany was a lost
cause. Indeed, as will be seen shortly some British
Generals argued on behalf of an alliance with France, if
only to boost the morale of French soldiers. (^ee below,
footnote 49.)
3. Ifrc .-egret military Conversations of l?0g-6
Taken in itself, the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier in the
spring of 1905 did not give rise directly to the military and
naval conversations that began between the two countries several
months later. Bhat did were the subsequent rumours that the
Germans intended to secure a coaling-station at Mogador as
compensation for France's gains in Morocco secured in the
1904 Convention. The news of this German Intention greatly
disturbed a number of Government ministers, particularly
those who were aware of the C.I.D.'s warnings made in
December 1903 of the need to keep Moroccan orts out of the
hands of foreign lowers for the sake of Gibraltar. Balfour,
always sensitive to matters involving strategy and defence,
was so alarmed that h© asked Admiral Bir Charles Gttley, the
new Bireetor of Naval Intelligence, precisely what the dangers
would be to Britain if Germany did secure Mogador for this
purpose. The answer, if not immediately forthcoming, was none
the less disturbing as far as the Prime Minister was
concerned. Not only would Britain's position in the Mediterranean
be threatened if such a turn of events happened, went the report,
but the Home Islands themselves would be put at risk, since
Germany would then be able to strike both from the North and
*5 A
couth Atlantic,J Lord Lansdowne, on the other hand, could
not even bear to await the Director of Naval Intelligence's
findings. He was sufficiently alarmed by the rumours to
instruct his Ambassador in Paris to inform the French of his
desire that the two Governments 'should continue to treat one
38 oee Ottley's paper dated 6 July 1905 in the Balfour Parers,
Add MSS 49711.
197.
another with the most absolute confidence...'. Vaguely
worded as this message was, it seemed to encourage some
members of the French Government in the belief that the
Conservative Foreign Secretary was aiming at some sort of
military arrangement between the two countries. Certainly the
French foreign minister construed Lansdowne's words as such
when trying to shore up his position in the Cabinet a few
weeks later/ jut when in early June 1905 Delcasse was
replaced by the more pro-uerraan Houvier, weeks passed without
any French reply to the offerj and by July Lansdowne was at
a loss about how to proceed with the notion of joint military
and naval planning. 'we have been giving a good deal of
thought to the question', he wrote to one official at the
British Embassy at aris, 'but until it is asked I doubt
41
whether we should be wise tc volunteer a statement'.
His sense of disappointment and vexation resembled that of
Cir George Clarke, who wrote to Viscount Esher shortly after
the fall of Delcasse: 'Cur policy must be to support France,
42
if she so desires, but of course not to press support upon her'."
The rench, then, were silent on ritish hints of aid in
the event that the Tangier crisis erupted into war. Nevertheless,
this did not prevent Britain's military and naval leaders from
making further studies into the matter on their own. Indeed,
throughout the sprin^ and summer of 1905, many of them pressed
ahead with the idea of Anglo-French military co-oprration much
as if the -ov rnment in aris had consented to Lansdowne's
proposals. In July, Admirals Fisher and ttley asked Balfour
39 British) D(ocuqents) on the riglns of the (ar), III,
no. 90, p. 72.
40 Williamson, on.cit., . 39.
41 Lansdowne to Geoffrey Lister, 10 July 1905, . . 800/127.
42 Clarke to Esher, 19 June 1905, Esher Papers IO/36.
to create a permanent sub-committee of the C.I.D, 'to consider
and elaborate schemes for joint naval and military expeditions
even though the French had as yet given no indication that they
were interested in such co-operation.4^ Meanwhile, Fisher and
others keot harping in their letters to the Foreign Secretary
on the supposed dangers that would result for Britain should
44
the Germans get a foothold in North Africa. Fart of their
anxiety had been based on the conviction that Germany would,
if the worst did come to the worst, invade Belgium in order
tc strike at France, thereby infringing the 1839 Treaty of
London. Already a war game worked out in the recesses of the
v'ar Office had it that the Germans would violate the Belgian
frontier after first being repulsed by the French following
AK
an attack from Alsace-Lorraine. y sir George Clarke was
inclined to agtee. It was his impression that 'the Inducement
to Germany to violate Belgain territory in the event of war
with France is greater by far now than it was in 1370' because
of the extensions recently made In the French fortress system;
this was enough in itself without taking into account additional
defensive preparations made by the French since the crisis had
46
begun. .daittedly, a new sub-Ccmraittee of the C.I.D. set
up by Balfour in the summer of 1905 to examine this particular
43 oee the memorandum entitled 'Formation of a permanent
sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider
and elaborate schemes for joint military and military expeditions
dated July 1905 in the Balfour Facers, Add MSB 49711.
44 Fisher to Balfour, 17 June 1905, Balfour Add MSG 49711.
45 Gee the 'Records of a Strategic ar Game' dated 24 May 1905
In the Field-Marshal William Robertson Papers, 1/1. Although
not completed until May 1905, this war game was started in
January of that year. General J.M. Grierson, then the Director
of Military Operations in the War Office, played the part of the
French force5 Robertson, then only a Colonel, the German;
Major Lyden-3ell, the Belgian; and a Colonel C. live11 and a
Major Hills, the British Expeditionary Force.
46 Clarke to Sanderson, 16 August 1905, in the Sanderson Papers
F.O. BOO/116; also Clarke to Balfour, 17 August 1905. Balfour
Add MSG 49702.
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question more thoroughly thought somewhat differently. It
felt that either France or Germany might be tempted to invade
Belgium if war did break cut, although it added that neither
was likely to do so until a stalemate had resulted in the
fighting on their common frontier, and even then the possibility
of British Intervention might make them think twice. Still,
of the two Powers the sub-Committee felt that it would more
likely be the Germans who would violate Belgian neutrality and
47
cause Britain to enter the struggle, '
Part of their anxiety, however, had been based simply on
the belief that Germany was out to destroy France as a Great
Power, and this, some military and naval leaders maintained,
had to be prevented, r< gardless of whether Belgium had been
dragged into the conflict or not. 4s early as July 1905,
Admiral Sir John Fisher was arguing that 'should Germany
attempt to push France to extremes over the Moroccan Imbroglio,
Great Britain would almost perforce have to come to France's
assistance'; this in a memorandum which failed tc mention
48
Belgium. Certain members of the Gar Office, on the other
hand, seemed to take it for granted that Britain would be
able to side with her Entente partner in a purely Franco-German
struggle, should the occasion arise. In a privately written
memorandum dated 4 January 1906 General Grierson, the Director
of Military Operations, stated:
47 Cab, 38/10/73, 29 Beptember 1905.
48 See Fisher's memorandum entitled 'British Intervention in
the event of France being suddenly attacked by Germany' In the
Balfour Papers, Add MSS 49711.
If, therefore, the Germans do not violate Belgian
neutrality, our only course will be to send what troops
we can to reinforce the French Army in the field and so
help stem the tide of German invasion, and there is no
doubt that their presence side-by-slde the French Army
would exert a great moral effect on soldiery especially
prone to such influences. British aid to the French
field forces must come at once, owing to the fact that
the moral effect of a first success would have an
enormous influence on the course of the war. 49
In other words, honouring Palmerston's time-hallowed
agreement was no longer the only, or even the basic, reason
for despatching an expeditionary force to the Continent.
Britain's commitments in Europe were not merely now a matter
of protecting Belgian independence, but also of shoring up
France's Great Power status. Admittedly, a number of other
people in Britain were In favour of rendering military
assistance to France in the event of the latter Power becoming
Involved in a war with Germany. The Morning 'ost. for instance,
warned that 'In case of an unprovoked attack upon France' by
the Germans, 'this country could not remain an indifferent or
CQ
inactive spectator'.' For its part, the Observer, while not
anticipating war, argued that 'it would be well for the
British Government to prepare for such a possible issue' by
establishing closer links with France. Both of these
statements were made, however, in connection with the Moroccan
Imbroglio. Grlerson's memorandum, by contrast, seemed to be
calling for military aid to the French as a matter of course.
Moreover and perhaps more important, there were seme people
in Britain who were against any such aid, however qualified
and tentative, a point which shall be taken up later. Indeed,
49 See Grierson's memorandum entitled 'Memorandum on the
military forces required for oversea warfare', p. 7, in the
Field- arshal llliam Bobertson Papers, 1/2/6. The emphasis
in this quote is Grierson's.
5° Piornlm. Post. 1 January 1906,
51 Observer. 2? June 1905,
it is highly open to question whether Fisher and Grierson were
correct to make the assumptions that they did.
As for the French, if they had given no rerly to Lansdowne's
overtures, they also did not rule out the possibility of
military and naval co-operation between the two Powers. Indeed,
the official French attitude towar s this all-imnortant matter
oscillated throughout the last nine months of 1905. In March,
even before the intention cf the Kaiser to visit Tangier had
been announced in the press, certain Frenchmen had been
pressing for an alliance with Britain to counteract the
weakening of the Dual Alliance in the light of the
Russo-Japanese ar. Valentine Chirol, the foreign editor of
The Titles, noted this after stopping off in Paris on his way
home after spending aholiday in Egypt. During his visit to
the French capital he met, amdngst other people, Combarleu,
President Loubet's Chef de Cabinet, who 'hinted very
plainly at a still closer understanding between England and
France in view of German ambitions - Holland, Austria-Hungary,
the Hear ?ast - which the impotence of Russia would certainly
52
stimulate'.' Once it became apparent that Morocco too was
part of the German scheme of things other Frenchmen welcomed
the idea, most notably Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to
Britain, and I. Delcasse. As against these views, however,
were those cf men like premier Rouvier, who opposed any such
conversations lest they antagonise Germany further, and
General Pendazac, the French Chief of Ftaff, who estimated
the fighting value of the British rmy in rather low terms and
next to worthless to "ranee should a war break out over Morocco,^
52 Chirol to Hardinge, 20 March 1905, in the Hardlnge of
Fenshurst Papers, volume 7.
53 Major Huguet, Britain ana the ->arT translated by
H. Cotton 'inchin, (London, 1928), p. 4.
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1905 It was the
feelings of these latter figures that prevailed In France, and
it was not until late November-early December that the views
of the Cambon-Delcasse constellation began to regain the
ascendancy. One reason for this shift was undoubtedly the
continued demands of the Germans for a conference of the
Powers to settle the Moroccan question even after the fall
of Delcasse at the C^ual d'Orsayj another, the newer and more
favourable assessment of the British Army made by certain
Frenchmen, In particular, it was Ma^or Huguet, the Military
Attache at the French Embassy in London, who did most to
bring about this latter reappraisal. Persuaded by Cambon
in the sujjmer of 1905 into believing that Germany was in
an especially aggressive mood and ready to launch an attack
on France, Huguet decided to fcake a personal look into the
state of the British Army as a fighting force. He noted with
satisfaction that Britain was aware of the mistakes she had
made during the Boer war and that she alone of the Great Powers
had drawn certain tactical lessons from that ca-paign. He
concluded that Britain could muster 150,010 men for
mobilisation and have them deployed on the Continent within
thirty days. Above all, he was convinced that Britain was
still willing to enter into military conversations in secret
with France, provided that the Rouvier Government was willing
to do the same. Impressed with these findings, Cambon passed
them on to Paris, where they were read with great interest,
especially by General Brun, the new French Chief of Staff. In
early January 1906, the French Government authorised Huguet to
sound out British military experts on the matter.^ France was
54 Ibid.T p. 5,
now ready to take the initiative in pressing for secret military
and naval co-operation between the two countries.
Yet despite their sudden willingness to hold such
conversations, the French could not be entirely certain of the
attitude of the British, Recent developments had raised the
possibility that London might no longer be prepared to enter
into secret dealings. In October 1905 sensational revelations
appeared in the Parisian press emanating from the- retired
Delcasse himself and alleging that, at the height of the Tangier
crisis, the British Government offered tc land 100,000 men on
the Schleswig-Holstein coast, seize the Kiel Canal, and sign
an alliance with France, True, throughout much of 1905
Admiral Fisher had spoken publicly about launching a preventive
attack against the German Navy along these lines; articles
appeared in Journals like Vanity Fair and the Aymy ppd T-Iflvy
Gazette advocating much the same thing; and in February of
that year, only two days before the Japanese attacked the
Russian fleet at i ort Arthur without making a formal declaration
of war, Arthur Lee, then Civil Lord of the Admiralty, delivered
a speech at his Lastlelgh constituency which, if it did not
urge a 'Cop^nhagening' of the German Navy, did at least warn
Berlin that the Royal Navy was in a position to launch an
immediate attack against any Power,^ But Lansdowne and the
Foreign Office denied the French newspaper reports, and a good
many British organs of opinion dissociated themselves from the
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First Sea Lord's extremely belligerent proposals. Meanwhilef
the Conservative Government was steadily losing its grip in
55 The Times. 5 February, 1905.
56 See, for instance, The Timesf 9 October 1905; Daily
Chronicle and Birmingham Dally -ost, 10 October 19051and
Spectator. 14 October 1905.
Parliament thanks largely to the Tariff Reform issue, and in
early December ialfour gave way to oir Henry Ca pbc11-Rannerman,
a renowned francophile but a rarm whose foreign policy speeches
of late had also stressed the need for an Rnglo-Ccrman
rapprochement similar to the Anglo-French one. -ere both of
these events indications that Britain was edging away from the
idsa of secret military conversations with " ranee? Tc find out
the answer to this and other, equally important questions,
Huguet dined out with Colonel Charles a Court ;eping ton, the
military correspondent of The Times, on 28 December 1905 in
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London. Over dinner, Hepington managed to ease most of
Huguet's worries. He maintained that the British people had
not altered their pro-French outlook on the Moroccan question.
Ke denied rumours then afloat in Paris that the new Liberal
Foreign Decretory Gir Edward Grey was about tc embark on new
policies for Britain. He even went so far as to say that both
public opinion and the new Liberal Government in Britain would
almost certainly rally to France's aid should a war erupt over
the Moroccan crisis - quite a striking remark, considering that
the press was deeply divided over this point and that the Liberal
58
Cabinet had net even studied the matter.
57 Huguet's choice of Hepington rather than someone more official
was probably determined by the latter's well-known enthusiasm
for some sort cf military accommodation with France. Throughout
the whole of the Tangier crisis, The Times correspondent produced
a variety of reasons for an Anglo-French alliance, including the
notion that a British Expeditionary force could fill the vacuum
in the Dual lliance created by Russia's collapse in the Far East.
The Royal Wavy alone, Remington once boasted, 'is worth more than
5 0,000 bayonets to the French Army'•
58 Huguet to i.tienne (French ar Minister), 30 December 1905,
jiagaasafeS-jJrlnpatlgpes VraflCaAg (herein cited «S D.L.F. ),
21 erne sdrie, vol. VIII, no. 3 0, . 414.
Up to this point events moved slowly, with the two sides
making tentative approaches towards each otherj after
28 December, however, the pace began to quicken. Repington
in particular seemed determined to get the secret conversations
under way at this stage. Cn 29 December, only a day after his
meeting with Huguet, the military correspondent of The Times
wrote Grey, then electioneering in Northumberland, informing
him of what had taken place and asking for further instructions.
The Foreign Secretary's reply, which reached Repington on
January 1st, invented the latter with the power to continue the
conversations unofficially till the election results were known.
Two days later Repington dined out with Grierson and a
Major Gorton, also of the War Office, to discuss how best to
convert the hitherto reluctant Admiral Fisher and Sir George Clarke
to the notion of military co-operation with the French. On
5 January, Repington invited Huguet to lunch at his house and
there heard assurances that France would not under any
circumstances be the first to violate Belgian territory, a
point which Repington had raised at the 28 December meeting.
That same evening The Times's railit*ry correspondent managed
to convince both Clarke and Lsher of the need to hold secret
conversations with the French. Cn 12 January Repington, this
time accompanied by Esher and Clarke, once again met Huguet to
enquire about France's defence plans and learn the exact nature
of Huguet's proposals. And so it went on. Indeed, it was not
until 19 January, the date when the conversations finally
became official, that Repington once again devoted his energies
to writing for The Times: and even then he did not entirely lose
touch with the proceedings.^
9^rles ® Cou^t RePington, The World ./ar>1914-1918, I (London, 1920), pp.2-6.
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Repingtcn's efficient handling of such matters undoubtedly
made the pursuance of the same task by his successor,
Major-General Grierson of the War Office Intelligence Branch,
much easier. Upon assuming the rcle of Britain's official
negotiator with the French, Grierson found that he had
little difficulty in starting where The Times's military
correspondent had left off. But perhaps even more instrumental
in allowing the Director of Military Operations to proceed
smoothly with the arrangements for co-ordinating Anglo-French
planning were the workings of the C.I.D. The efforts of
Fisher and Ottley to form a permanent sub-Committee of the
Defence Committee to examine schemes for Joint military and
naval expeditions had borne fruit, and by the end of 1905 Bsher,
Flehch, Clarke, Ottley, and Grierson had all ageeed to consider
the technical and logistical problems arising in the event of
Britain being involved with France in a war with Germany. Between
raid-December and mid-January these men held a series of
conferences with this intention in minds a conference held on
19 December weighing up the various naval plans put forward by
members of the Admiralty to be taken against Germany, in which
the scheme to despatch a large expeditionary force to the Baltic
was ruled out as impracticable; a meeting on January 6 arranging
a time-table for the possible mobilisation of the 50,000 strong
Aldershot Army Corps if hostilities did erupt; a meeting held
on 12 January in which Ottley presented the Admiralty's views
on the pros and cons of transporting troops to France as
against Belgium; and a conference held on 19 January dealing
with the problems of disembarkation and Joining forces with the
I 60
French and Belgian armies. On occasion the recommendations
*
put forth by this sub-Committee produced some friction and
misunderstanding between Huguet and Repington,^"1" But in the
main, they served as a useful guideline for Repington and
later Grierson in their dealings -with the Military Attache of
the French Embassy in London, ..hat is more, they revealed the
lengths to which most of Britain's military and naval leaders
were willing to go to help France in a future war with Germany.
There was, however, at least one figure opposed to the
conversations as they then stood. This was Admiral Sir John Fisher,
First Sea Lord and one of the most outspoken personages in
Admiralty circles. Fisher's opposition to the conversations
stemmed largely from his conviction that they threatened to
undermine Britain's supremacy on the seas, that most essential
criterion for the successful defence of the nation and one
which the First Bea Lord had been willing to guarantee by
launching a preventive war against the German fleet. As far
as he was concerned, it was ridiculous to talk about despatching
an expeditionary force to join up with the Belgian Army or the
60 Cab, 38/11/4. 'Notes of Conferences held at 2 Whitehall
Gardens on 19 December 1905? 6 January, 12 January, and
19 January, 1906'. It perhaps should be added here that not
all five men attended the four meetings, Esher, French, and
Clarke did so? but Ottley sat in on only the first three
meetings, while Grierson attended only the last two,
61 Huguet, for instance, took exception to the suggestion
made by Grierson after the 19 January meeting that in the
event of the British Expeditionary ""or ce being employed on
the French frontier, its status 'would be that of an
independent body under a general control of the French
Commander-in-Chief', Huguet was in favour of Britain commanding
the French Navy, while the French would head both armies, Grierson
thought the plan dangerous inasmuch as it would lead critics to
suggest that Britain was fighting on behalf of the French rather
than the Belgians, Bee J.E. Tyler, The British '.rmy and the
Continent, 1904-1914 (London, 1938), pp, 42-44.
left wing of the French forces. In the first place, the Germans
were strong enough to rout the French and Belgian forces within
a matter of weeks, if not days. In the second, the proposed
fore# would be too small to play a decisive role, even assuming
that the French and the Belgians somehow managed to avoid defeat.
To send such a force to fight along side the French or the
Belgians in this manner would be, in short, to send it to its
destruction. Indeed, its defeat in France or Flanders in the
early stages of the war would in turn compromise Britain's
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naval efforts and expose the country to invasion. To his
way of thinking, it would be far better for Britain to land
men on the Schleswlg-Holstein coast, seize the Kiel Canal, and
attempt to march on Berlin, If sufficient numbers of French
and British troops took part in this scheme, Paris would
almost certainly be saved, since the Germans would be under
enough pressure to divert precious manhood resources away from
the French capital towards th*ir homeland.Had Clarke, Esher,
French, Pttley, and Grierson approved of the idea in their
secret meetings of late 1905-early 1906, there can be little
doubt that Fisher would have supported the notion of holding
military and naval conversations with the French, Is it was,
they found the scheme unlikely to succeed, and Fisher, presumably
out of pique, did his utmost to prevent the conversations from
progressing. He refused to help Repington secure the new
62 J,A, Fisher, Lprfl ^Isfter or Sayy, (London, 1919), p.5.
63 Fisher had advocated this plan at least as far back as
July 1905 when he wrote to the Prime Minister asking for a
sub-Committee of the C.I«D. to be formed to examine various
plans for despatching an expeditionary force to the Continent,
In this memorandum, the First Sea Lord urged the Government to
withdraw, If need be, troops from the garrisons of the North—test
frontiers of India to fight in Schlewwig-Holstein, surely an
indication that some military and naval leaders regarded Germany
rather than Russia as the primary enemy of the country. See
Fisher's memorandum entitled 'British intervention in the event
of France being suddenly attacked by Germany', dated July 1905,
in the Balfour Add MSS 49711#
Liberal Government's official sanction for the conversations!
he held but one meeting with Captain Mercier de Lostende, the
Naval Attache at the French Embassy in London, on the possibility
of naval co-operation between the two countries, a meeting in
which little was achieved. He even refused to promise the
Admiralty's co-operation in working out the details and
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problems of cross-Channel transport. Only as time wore on,
when it became increasingly apparent that the British Government
was never going to endorse the Schleswig-Holstein scheme, did
the First Sea Lord guarantee the passage of the British
Expeditionary Froce across the Channel.
Despite the First Sea Lord's dissent, the conversations
continued. Throughout the remainder of January and all of
February Grierson held several meetings with Huguet, meetings
in which the Director of Military Operations found himself having
to defend several of the C.I.D.'s recommendations about the
deployment of British troops in northern France and the conditions
under which they would fight in the first place. It was not until
the French did finally agree to these conditions that Grierson
was able to proceed on to the next stage of the C.I.D.'s
contingency planning - the inspection of the French Channel
ports as possible disembarkation sites. On 2-3 March Grierson
and Huguet visited Boulogne and Calais for this purpose. A
week later, Colonel Robertson, also of the War Office
Intelligence Department, accompanied Grierson on a tour of
the northern French frontier from Lille to the Ardennes, And on
10 March Grierson held his first meeting with General Brun, the
64 Replngton, oo.cit.f p. 11j also Williamson, on.cit.. p.69.
new French Chief of General Staff.^ All of this was done in
comparative haste whilst the Algeciras Conference was still in
session and the fate of Europe in the balance. As the Conference
drew to a peaceable close, however, the conversations began to
grind to a halt. On 5 April, for instance, the very day that
the Conference delegates began to return to their respective
capitals, Grlerson finished writing a prdcls of all the
arrangements which he had made with the French since January;
in his diary entry of that date he noted that further such
arrangements 'will now be hardly necessary'. '-'our days later
he went to the Foreign Office and asked for a 'detente of war
66
preparations'.
Nevertheless, some military oourparlers did go on after
Algeciras, if at a slower race. In early Fay 1906, Huguet
brought to Grlerson the French Government's railway plans for
transporting troops from the Channel ports to the front,
whether in Belgium or in northern France. In August, Grierson
attended the French and Belgium manoeuvres, the former being
a rather Important visit, in that it ended with a meeting
67
at Solssons -with M. Etlenne, the French Minister of Far.
Nor was it merely Grierson on the British side who was
interested in retaining the links between the two General
Staffs in the aftermath of the first Moroccan crisis. His
successor, Sir Spencer Ewart, also favoured continuing the
conversations and held odd meetings with Huguet reviewing
65 Tyler, pp.42-53.
66 D.j, Macdiarmld, o?.cit.. p.217
67 Ibid., pp.217-213.
the status of the exchanges. Meanwhile, the C.I.D, for its
part continued to examine in detail matters of logistics
that arose out of the Grierson-Huguet conversations, and in
the spring of 1907 a General Staff memorandum stated its
preference for sending a British Expeditionary Force to
France rather than to Belgium in the event cf war with
Germany, 'The Belgian Array is by no means reliable as
a fighting machine', this document noted, 'and close
co-operation in the field with the actual French Army might
perhaps be a more effective way of ridding Belgium of her
invaders, than direct support to a force which might only
too soon become demoralised and panic stricken'. Still,
as the railway lines from Calais, Boulogne, and Le Havre
could lead troops with equal facility to the Belgian right
or the French left, it was agreed to postpone a definite
decision on this point 'until the very last moment'.
4. Conclusions,
Out of the details of the history of the secret
Anglo-French military conversations of 1905-6, one or two
points emerge which require some stressing. First, by
advocating and seeking a clearly defined military arrangement
63 Bee the entry in the Sir Spencer Ewart Diaries dated
31 July 19f7, in which mention is given of a meeting between
Ewart, Huguet, and Sir Seville Lyttleton, the new Chief of
General Staff, concerning the status of the conversations,
It should be noted that this entry contridicts the statement
made by Huguet, oo.clt., pp, 6-9, that between 1906 and 1910
he and fcwart never met face to face to discuss any further
contingency planning. Instead, Huguet claims that he had to
deal with lesser men in subordinate positions, willing to
get things done but handicapped by a lack of any real
authority,
69 Cab, 38/13/18, General Ctaff memorandum entitled 'Our
position as regards the low Countries', 8 April 1907.
with France, men like Repington, Grierson, Ottley, and
Sir John French were only doing what a number of other people
in the country wanted them to do. Ever since the outbreak of
the first Moroccan crisis a considerable section of British
public opinion, especially right-wing opinion, had been
clamouring for some sort of military and naval accommodation
between the two countries in order to contain what they
construed to be blatant and unwarranted German expansionism.
Indeed, some fiery chauvinist writers had for some time been
calling for the substitution of an alliance for the 'vague'
Anglo-French understanding, 'which does not give sufficient
guarantee of mutual assistance and of national security either
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to Great Britain or to France'.' Certain Conservative
newspapers, on the other hand, might not have gone so far as
to anticipate war in the spring of 1905, but they did argue
that 'It would be well for the British Government to prepare
for such a possible Issue, hastening to add that 'we are
committed to the support of French diplomacy in the controversy
with Germany*.'71 Even a few left-wingers like II.M. Hyndman
from time to time declared themselves to be in favour of a
•defensive agreement between England, France and Italy, running
athwart the Triple Alliance, expressly in order to keep the
European peace'.'72 Given the existence of these views, it
is difficult to portray Britain's military and naval leaders
as men who were out on a limb vls-a-via British public opinion
on the subject of converting the Entente Cordiale into
70 0. Eltzbacher, 'The balance of power in Europe', Nineteenth
Cliffy ^pd 57 (May 1905), 796.
71 Observer. 25 June 1905.
72 See Hyndman's article entitled 'France and foreign policy',
In Justice, 12 November 1904, p.4.
something more than a mere settlement of overseas colonial
disputes. The second striking feature of these conversations
is that the men who conducted them from the British side,
namely Repington and Grierson, always exercised a good deal of
caution in their dealings with Major Huguet, Despite the
considerable pressure exerted by the military attache of the
French Embassy in London for a stronger and more clear-cut
British commitment to ,;,rance neither negotiator would promise
anything more than he had been authorised to promise.
Admittedly, not all of Britain's military leaders behaved so
responsibly when talking to the French about this delicate
subject.^ They, however, were more the exception than the
rule. In the main, the Generals and the Admirals refrained
from encouraging the French to believe that the conversations
would eventually lead to an alliance. Indeed, in his handling
of Huguet on this matter, Grierson was masterful to the point
of perfection. He allayed the Frenchman's fear that Britain
might one day leave France in the lurch over the Moroccan
issue by telling him that neither the new Liberal Government
nor the British people would tolerate such a turn of events,
while at the same time he dismissed the notion of an alliance
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as unnecessary in view of the easing of the Tangier crisis.'
Grierson's behaviour was all the more impressive in view of his
73 In the spring of 1906 a General Maurice gave an interview
to a French newspaper describing at length how in the event of
another Franco-German war Britain would as a matter of course
join France and operate against the Germans from Denmark, not
the Schleswig-Holstein coast. The interview outraged
Campbell-Baimerman, who demanded that Maurice be severely
reprimanded and that his views be publicly repudiated. See
Campbell-Bannerman to Grey, 25 January 1906, F.O. 800/100.
74 Williamson, op.clt., p.84.
own personal belief in an Anglo-French alliance* Deference to
a higher authority, it seems, compelled the Director of Military
Operations to ignore his own wishes and desires.
Nevertheless, despite these more positive aspects of the
conversations, it can still be said that they presented real
cause for worry. The very vagueness of the military
preparations of 1905-6 made it unclear to all concerned
precisely under what conditions British troops would land on
the Continent to fight on the side of the French or the Belgians.
Uncertainty of this sort was not in Itself necessarily an evi}.,
inasmuch as it discouraged the French from thinking that they
could invariably rely upon British military support in any
confrontation with Germany. But at the same time such
uncertainty did give rise to misunderstandings with several
foreign Powers. Thus while on an official visit to Paris in
the spring of 1907, Campbell-Bannerman, never very happy about
the conversations, reputedly told the French premier Clemenceau
that the people of Britain 'would be totally averse to any
troops being landed by England on the Continent under any
circumstances'. The latter, who had been hoping to convert the
Liberal Prime Minister to the idea of an Anglo-French-Spanish
triplice against the Germans, professed to be shocked and
regarded Campbell-Bannerman's remakks as 'the virtual end of
ye
the Entente Cordiale'. ^ An even more serious complication
75 R.B. Jones, 'Anglo-French negotiations, 1907* a memorandum
by Sir Alfred Milner', Bulletin of the.Institqte of History,!
Research. 31 (1953), 224-227. As a point of interest, it perhaps
should be mentioned that Campbell-Jannerman later insisted that
he made no such statement and only warned Clemenceau of the
reluctance, not the total aversion, of the British people to
undertake such commitments. (See Grey to Sir Francis Bertie,
13 April 1907, F.O. 800/50.) It is Just possible that the French
premier, out of pique after having seen his hopes for a three
Power alliance against the Germans dashed, deliberately
exaggerated the British Prime Minister's remarks.
was to arise for Anglo-German relations. In 3erlin, rumours of
the conversations confirmed suspicions of an alliance between
the two Western Powers and not long afterwards leading German
generals began to take it for granted in their war plans that
Britain would be in the enemy camp.^
In other words, the Anglo-French mi1itary conversations,
while not amounting to an 'entangling alliance', did produce
entanglements which in the long run tended to restrict
Britain's freedom of action in dealing with foreign Powers.
But serious as this was, there was another, equally unfortunate
aspect of the military conversations. 3y engaging in furtive
negotiations with the French, the Government was helping to
promote that most undemocratic of practices in foreign affairs,
secret diplomacy, thereby misleading the general public about
the real nature of the Entente Cordiale. True, some sections
of the British public had expressed a willingness to see
military overtones added to the Entente, but by no means everyone
in the country felt this way and it is significant that a number
of organs of opinion in the country expressed alarm upon hearing
rumours of the conversations and demanded that the Government
reveal everything, if only as a matter of principle. As the
Manchester Guardian put it! 'We have a right to know whether
Lord Lansdowne, by written or spoken word or in any other way,
committed this country to future military co-operation with
France in certain eventualities, and, if so, what these were'.'7'7
Yet whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, the
76 iJiHiamson, QD.clt., pp. 340-342.
77 Manchester Guardian. 23 November 1906.
direction which the Anglo-French conversations of 1905-6 took
are not as important to this study as the more general attitudes
of Britain's military and naval leaders towards France and the
Entente Cordiale in the early years of the twentieth century.
It is with this all-important area that we must concern
ourselves. Taken together, the nation's defence experts and
Journals had a far more dualistic approach to the Anglo-French
diplomatic rapprochement than any other section of British
public opinion. They disliked the losses involved in the
1904 colonial Convention; yet they endorsed its strategic
implications. They were quick to take note of these strategic
implications but were slow to act upon them. They outwardly
professed trust in France and faith in the workings of the
Entente Cordiale but inwardly entertained suspicions about
French motives and had misgivings about the durability of the
friendlier relations between London and Paris. Much more than
any other group in Britain they kept all possible eventualities
in mind when contemplating the future of the Entente.
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CHAPTER VII
COMKERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
1903-1908
Commerce and finance, both of which had done so much
to put Anglo-French relations on a good footing at the time
of the Cobden Treaty of i860, once again played a positive
role in the affairs of the two countries in the early years
of the twentieth century. Even before an Anglo-French
diplomatic understanding had been realised in 1903-4, a
number of businessmen in Britain had been doing their
utmost to improve the bonds between the two countries. Thus
at the turn of the century they refrained from participating
in the passions and fervours being generated by the Boer War
on both sides of the Channel. '1900 had become a record year
for cross-Channel trade in both directions, and during 1901,
1902, and the early months of 1903| at a time when England
was facing a serious drain on her gold resources, French
financiers, anxious to profit from the high English bank
rate, invested about 1,000,Of. 0,000 francs (about £40,000,000)
in England'.^ Some even ventured to agitate for something
more constructive. In the autumn of 19* 0, Sir Thomas Barclay,
then Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
organised a meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of
the U.K. in the French capital to strengthen the ties between
the two countries. A year later, the Association, under
Barclay's leadership, passed a resolution at Nottingham in
favour of this proposal} this after no less than twenty-seven
British Chambers had discussed and passed special resolutions
1 Christopher H. Andrew, Ifrqpphjle ie^sse and thq .feKita.B Pf
(London, 1968), p. 202.
2
on the same subject.
Such representations, of course, became even more frequent
once Anglo-French relations did begin to improve. Scarcely
had King Edward VII commenced his well-publicised State visit
to Paris in the spring of 1903 when leading members of the
British Chamber of Commerce there proposed the negotiation
of an Anglo-French commercial treaty.-^ In London, the
Commercial Committee of the House of Commons, headed by a
Sir William Houldsworth, at once extended an invitation to
its equivalent group in the Chamber of Deputies to visit the
4
British capital. Somewhat later in Paris Barclay began
to prepare the arrangement of 'municipal ententes' between
dignitaries of certain British and French cities in which
local businessmen were to figure prominently. Manchester
and Lyons were the first to take part in the scheme; the
corporations of Ldinburgh and Olasgow were soon to follow,y
Meanwhile on a more national level, plans were being laid by
businessmen in both countries to promote joint trade
exhibitions, still more visits, and an underground freight
and passenger link across the Channel. Accompanying all
this activity was, of course, an underlying belief that
profits could be made out of the diplomatic rapprochement
between the two countries, a belief which, as will be seen
shortly, was to become substantiated to some extent by
record cross-Channel trade. Nevertheless taken as a whole,
2 Sir Thomas Barclay, Thipty-Yepr?: foglo-Fr^pcft ^
lemlniscences. lo76-19C6 (London. 1914). pi>. 214-215.
3 Sir Edward Monson to Lord Lansdowne, 14 May 1903, F(oreign)
O(ffice) 27/3629.
4 See the 'Who's who in the world of commerce' column in the
September 1903 edition of the Magazine of Commerce.
5 Barclay, op.cit.. p. 298.
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businessmen and financiers were to become more disillusioned
with the Entente Cordiale than perhaps any other group in
Britain, Precisely why and how this came to be the case, will,
it is hoped, be explained in this chapter,
i, relaUpna
The conditions under which trade between Britain and Prance
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were on the whole favourable. Apart from the sheer volume of
trade b»#ween the two countries, which as has been seen grew
even during the Boer War, there were other circumstances which
made it possible for the commercial classes of the two
countries to get along with each other quite amicably. To
begin with, British and French manufacturers and exporters
were by and large still concentrating on developing and
exporting two different types of goods at this time. While
British exports largely consisted of heavy industrial goods
or everyday necessities, French exports mostly comprised luxury
items or long-recognised special!tie*. This meant that
British and French manufacturers could seek an outlet for
their goods either across the Channel or in overseas markets
without facing too much competition from one another. Of
course, France was making rapid steps towards complete
industrialisation at the turn of the century, and the French,
like their counterparts in Britain, Germany, and the United
States, were beginning to produce plainer and cheaper
commodities for export in sizeable quantities. But even
these goods, 'shipped mainly to the reserved markets of her
expanding tropical empire, did not often trip up the British
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merchant in places where their appearance would have seemed to
him an intrusion'.^ Moreover and scarcely less important,
British overseas trade rivalry with France tended to be less
marked than with other Powers simply because the French at
this time still were not expcrting ea Ital goods in great
amounts.' In addition, there had been something of a
tradition of co-operation and friendliness between businessmen
of the two countries, a tradition punctuated by several free
trade agreements made in the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. On the basis of all this evidence, then, it was
possible to conclude in 1903-4, as many contemporary organs
of opinion in fact did conclude, that commercially speaking
o
Britain's relations with France 'were of the best'.
Such conclusions were, however, quite often far from
justified. It would be more correct to say that commercial
relations between Britain and France stood on a reasonably
good footing but were nonetheless in need of considerable
improvement. At the core of much of the difficulty was the
probWttl of regulating the commerce bvtteen the two countries.
A commercial treaty had been signed between the British and
French Governments in 1382, but its most important clauses
related to shipping and had little to say abou- tariff
matters, which were left to the devices of the two
legislatures. Had Parliament and the French Chamber of
Deputies erected more or less equally high protective walls,
there could have been few qualms about the matter. As it was,
the latter turned out to be a good deal more protectionist-minded
6 J.H, Clapham, /fr H^opy, of Modern Britain (3 vols
Cambridge, 1926-1938), 111, 38.
7 , ri£»fn t
3 See, for instance, Spectator, 5 December 1903.
2. j.
than the former. In 1892, the French Government introduced the
'Meline Tariff', a schedule of duties described by one
economic historian as 'one of the stiffest in the world,
9
though not so stiff as those of Russia and the United States',
Hot only did this tariff fix rates on imports into France at
10
a much higher level than did its British equivalent, but
it did so in a very uneven fashion. Instead of setting up
a uniform schedule of duties, a two tier system was created:
a fixed minimum rate for France's commercial 'friends' and
a fixed maximum one for others. As friends like Britain were
only awarded a minimum rate, not a set level of duties,
precious few British manufacturers in Britain could be certain
how their exports would fare in French markets from one sitting
of the Chamber of Deputies to the next. Another annoying
aspect of the Meline tariff was the surtaxe d'entrcr.otT a duty
imposed over and above all other duties upon products of
non-European origin imported into France ffiom European
countries and one which obviously worked to the detriment of
British traders living in the Empire, Meanwhile, exporters
of manufactured goods on both sides of the Channel were
complaining of the false marking of products.*"*"
9J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of "ranee apd ucpnarg,
(Cambridge. 1936), p.264.
10 With the exception of a few articles like sugar, wine and
spirits, the British Government allowed French products, in
common with those of other nations, into the United Kingdom free
of duty. By contrast, the French levied duties on virtually all
imports, and in the case of British imports into France, one
historian has calculated that these French duties averaged 34$
ad valorem in the early years of the twentieth century. (See
IW-s tot )
11 Apparently a number of French firms were putting British
labels on certain goods to mislead their consumers, while a few
bottling firms in England were placing French labels on cheap
colonial wines. See the Memorandum on Commercial Relations
with France, Annex A, p. 12, (17 July 1908) in the
Asquith Papers, MS 98.
For their part, French businessmen were very wary of the
Tariff reform issue in Britain. That a system of high tariff
barriers guarding home produce coupled with preferential
treatment for the countries of the Empire was being mooted
about in Britain at this time does not need much stressing
here, Joseph Chamberlain had formally advocated the idea in
the autumn of 1903 j almost half of the Conservative party
endorsed his subsequent campaign for imperial federation}
and a good many organs of opinion in the country nailed their
flags to the mast of protectionism as well. What does need
some emphasising, perhaps, is that the Balfour Government
was already takinf. some steps in this direction. In the
early years of the twentieth century, duties had been levied
on corn, coal and sugar. Intended merely as a temporary
measure to help rid the country of its deficit caused by the
Boer War, they nevertheless lasted for a considerable period
of time and were widely regarded both in Britain and abroad
IP
as a step towards protectionism. Similar duties were
rumoured to be on the way. A number of Liberal newspapers,
invariably ready to seize upon any line of thinking to discredit
Chamberlain's campaign, argued that the introduction of Tariff
Reform would reduce French imports into Britain, produce a trade
war between the two countries, and possibly destroy the Entente
itself.^ Meanwhile the rebuttals of the Tariff Reform press
were singularly unimpressive and made little Impact upon the
12 Howard Weinroth, 'Left-wing opposition to naval armaments
in Britain before 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 6,
no. 4 (1971). 117.
13 The Westminster Gazette. 28 November 1903, for instance,
found it "surprising' that anyone could even think France would
not be a^gry if we adopted Mr Chamberlain's proposals.
14
reading public. All this tended to excite French businessmen,
many of whoa depended upon Britain as the one sizeable market
in which they could easily sell their goods. Indeed, some took
the Tariff Reform campaign in Britain so seriously that they
felt compelled to issue warnings to the Balfour Government,
specially written articles appeared in the Temps, the
semi-official organ of the French Government, taking note of
Chamberlain's intentions and threatening reprisals if the
1«5
scheme was carried out# J In the end, of course, French
businessmen did not have to live up to their words because
the British public rejected the notion of tariff reform at
the time of the 1906 general election# Nevertheless, the
rise of protectionism as a major issue in Britain did produce
anxiety in certain French business circles and played a part
in making commercial relations between the two countries a
shade less cordial than they otherwise might have been.
There were, then, elements of discontent in the links
that brought British and French businessmen together#
Accordingly, a number of commercial and financial figures in
Britain sought to redress the situation by putting pressure on
their Government to have the French sign a new treaty# As has
1'hQ Times, for instance, tried to argue In an article of 28
November 1903 that, while the duties advocated by Chamberlain
'would in some degree diminish our imports, alike from France
and other countries', these countries would 'clearly recognise
that the right would be on our side, and that, even if they
regretted the change in the interest of their own nanufoctures,
they would not assume any right to blame us for Ming what
might be greatly to the advantage of our own'. Presumably it
was this kind of over-simplification that made the Tariff
Reform press appear politically naive in the eyes of many
informed readers and voters#
15 See the letter of Maurice de Bunsen, first secretary of
the British Embassy in Paris, to Lansdowne, 21 August 1903?
also ilonscn to Lansdowne, 21 November 1903, F,0. 27/3629.
already been seen, they had for some time been advocating
such a move and now that the two Governments had sewn the seeds
of a political rapprochement the moment for realising an
arrangement regulating the commercial affairs between Britain
and France suddenly became opportune# As one official of the
Board of Trade put it, if rather matter of factly; *Th©
possibility of negotiating a favourable commercial treaty
with Franc© arises from the feeling of friendliness that now
16
exists between the two countries'# Given that this was their
ultimate aim, it comes somewhat as a surprise, perhaps, that
individual British businessmen and the various chambers of
commerce which acted on their behalf strove more to stabilise
French customs duties than t|i reduce them. As far as they
were concerned, it was not the height of a given tariff that
did the most to damage British trade in France, but the fact
that such customs duties were forever undergoing fluctuations#
Time and again they sought to impress upon the British
Government their preference for 'a regime of slightly heavier
duties, with the certainty of knowing how they stood for a
definite period of years, to one under which they would have
to pay slightly lower duties with the fear that those duties
17
might be subjected to constant fluctuations'. f British
exporters, it seems, were able to do a 'permanently satisfactory
business' with foreign countries, profided that they knew
beforehand under what circumstances goods of one kind were
going to be prohibited, while goods of another were going to
16 Harold Cox, 'flemorandura on a new Commercial Treaty with
France', December 1906, F,0# 800/106.
17 Bee the aforementioned memorandum on Anglo-French commercial
relations dated July 1908 in the Asquith Papers, MS 98# (pp#2-3)»
225.
IS
be admitted. Of course, pressure was being applied to get
the French to lower their tariffs as well, John G, Filter,
a member of the Board of Directors of the British Chamber of
Commerce in iaris, asked His Majesty's Embassador to France,
oir Francis Bertie, what could be done to convince the French
to lower their duties on Imported items. The high tariff
barrier, complained Filter in 1906, 'has proved especially
19
unsatisfactory in view of increased Anglo-French trade'.
But even he felt that the primary reason for negotiating a
new commercial treaty with the French was to give *a fixity
66 regime' to the business and financial links between the
two countries so as to ensure for British traders 'the
certainty of the morrow and not of being suddenly deprived
of the fruits of their many years' labour in establishing
PO
themselves in this country as importers of British goods'.
Apart from the Injustices of the feline tariff, there
were other anomalies in Anglo-French trade relations which
British businessmen hoped to get rid of by exerting pressure
on their Government. Among the most notorious of these
anomalies was the practice of falsely marking goods, a
practice which was carried on by disreputable companies on both
sides of the Channel, but more commonly in ?ra.«ce. At first
British firms were willing to take the matter up through the
British Chamber of Commerce in I aris. After this failed to
produce results, they sent representations to their Government
in London. By 1907 their annoyance and frustration had
become such that they took the rather unusual step of having
13 Harold Cox, 'Memorandum on a new Commercial Treaty with
France», December 1906, P.O. 800/106,
19 Filter to Bertie, 3 November 1906, P.O. 800/49.
20 Ibid.
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the influential Associated Chambers of Commerce in the
United Kingdom adopt their cause and demand that the
Campbell-Bannerman Ministry immediately provide for the
21
protection of British marks in Prance. British shipping
companies, constantly facing fines for not accurately
classifying their goods for the awkward French customs, took
22
a similar course of action. But the commotion stirred up
over these comparatively minor matters was nothing when
measured against the efforts of colonial exporters to have
the fittftaare u'Qntrmt abolished. 4s the was being
levied only on those raw materials or foodstuffs being
manufactured or processed in European countries like Britain,
not all exporting businesses in the British Empire had sought
to repeal the measure. Nevertheless, their number was
sufficient to draw the attention of the British Government#
Canadian timber firms had been among the first to complain}
the tea growing associations of Ceylon and India were quick
to follow} and within a short period of time of the
successful visit of King Edward VII to Paris in 1903 a host
of exporting and shipping companies throughout the Empire
began to demand that the Foreign Office exert its new-found
influence with the French Government to get rid of this
particular duty. The most notable attempt to achieve this
aim came in the winter of 1903 at Montreal when the Fifth
21 Memorandum on Commercial Relations with Prance1,
17 July 1903, Asquith Papers, MS 98, p.3*
22 Financial Times. 29 April 1907. The French apparently
had a myriad of classifications for each type of article that
entered into the country and expected foreign shipping companies
to know both these classifications and their exceptions, all of
which were contained in several large volumes of Customs
drainistration books. In the opinion of the Financial Times,
the number of these 'cautions' was such that 'one begins to
wonder at the existenco of any export trade at all from
England to France'.
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Congress of the Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire
passed a resolution condemning the surtaxe as unjust and
urging the Government in London to do all in its power to
secure its removal,2^ But there were other attempts as
well, and as late as December 1906 the tea-plantation owners
in British-held Asia were threatening to close their exports
to France altogether if something were not done about the
surtaxe d'entrepot.'?4
Indeed, colonial businesses and those British firms which
operated in the various parts of the Empire seemed to have their
own grievances against the French. While British merchants
engaged in purely cross-Channel trade had to deal with high
and fluctuating tariff barriers, colonial businessmen were
confronted with an even worse aspect of French protectionism,
the denial of the Open Door, In places like .lgeria and
Madagascar the French had long since set up monopolistic
preserves. In Tunis, British trade, if not as yet destroyed,
was on the verge of extinction. Meanwhile, in the Congo Basin
and Equatorial Africa huge tracts of land were being
systematically sealed off from outside competition. Even in
those comparatively few areas of France's overseas empire
where the doors had not been completely closed to foreign
traders there were injustices. The exceedingly narrow scope
of the 'minimum rates' of the French Customs Tariff as
applied to New Caledonia, for instance, proved so vexatious
23 See the letter of a Kenrick B. Murray, a representative
of the London Chamber of Commerce to the Montreal Congress,
to Lansdowne, 15 December 1903» F.C, 27/3751.
24 See, for instance, 'Memorandum on the "Surtaxe d'entrepot"
and Franco-British Commercial Relations', 15 December 1906,
F.O. 800/92.
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to a numbir of Australian businessmen that the Governor-General
of that Dominion felt compelled to writ© to the Colonial office
in London protesting against the situation in view of Australia's
own free trade policies,"' In the province of lonquin and in
certain parts of west Africa, on the other hand, it was the
transit duties which the French imposed upon British goods
being shinned into the hinterland that gave rise to the most
fljM
complaints. Ho wonder, then, that a great many colonial
businessmen and British shipping firms reacted so favourably
to the news of each step in the developamt of friendlier
diplomatic relations between London and Paris* There was
little doubt in their minds that what had been achieved in the
political sphere could be achieved in the economic one as well*
This was particularly true of the Liverpool shipping firms,
whose weekly runs to the West Coast of Africa and trading
posts in the interior of that continent had suffered
tremendously at the hands of the regime concessionaire in the
Cong.o,^''
Of course, none of this is to say that all British and
colonial businessmen who had overseas dealings with the French
welcomed rumours of the "Entente Cordial©* Companies like
Messrs, Forwood Bros, and Co,, the London shipowners, and
25 See the letter of H, Austin Let of the Colonial Office to
Sir Edward Monson, 16 August 19C4, F,0, 27/3671,
26 Hansard, Pari, rebates, Fourth cries, H* of C,, CXXXV
(1 June 19^4). 558,
27 On 15 October 1903, only one day after an important
Anglo-French arbitration agreement had been signed, E,H, Cookson,
Managing Director of the Liverpool trading firm, Hatton and
Cookson, Ltd., sent a letter tc the Foreign Office congratulating
Lord Lansdowne on the success and enquiring whether his
company's dispute wit! the French over the retention of a
trading post at Libreville might be considered as a suitable
case (C okson to Lansdowne, F,0, 27/3762). Cinilarly, when
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Bmmotts and ,ail3hawf Ltd., the Lancashire cotton-spinning
firm, both of which did a thriving business in Worth Africa,
were earnestly opposed to a comprehensive colonial settlement
between Lritain and France. Convinced that the impending
barter of Morocco for Lgypt would spell disaster for their
respective businesses, they organised towards the end of
1903 a series of protest meetings, first at the Accountants
Hall in ilanchester, then several more in London, and, finally,
after all else had failed, they appealed to their M.P.s to
challenge the thirty year time limit to the Open Door and
other 'unfair* provisions pertaining to Morocco included in
pQ
the 1904 Convention.*" Meanwhile, the tiny colony of British
merchants living in ilorocco itself took up the matter with His
^iajesty's Minister at Fez, Sir Arthur Hicolson/ ^ In the main,
however, such opposition was far more the exception than the
rule in commercial and financial circles, whether one speaks
of those businessmen who were engaged in purely cross-Channel
trade or those who had experiences with the French abroad.
press reports had it in the spring of 1904 that the two countries
were on the verge of a comprehensive colonial settlement, several
Liverpool shipowners sent notes of approval to Lord Lansdovne and
begged him to consider their claims against the French Government
in the Agreements. See, for instance, the letters of John Holt,
President of John Holt k Co., to Lansdowne, 25 March 19045 the
President of Messrs. Taylor and Cc. (operating in Africa under
the name of the Anglo-French Trading Co., Ltd.), to Lansdowne,
20 April 1904j and E.H. Cookson to Lansaowne, 16 and 30 March
1904, P.O. 27/3763.
(28 March 1904), 838-839, 920 and CXXXV (1 June 1904),
551-552, 558.
29 Kieolson to Lansdowne, 17 April 1904, P.O. 300/135.
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Only as tine wore on with no apparent change in France's
protectionist colonial policies did the bulk of British
shipowners and colonial tradesmen begin to feel that Lansdowne
and the Foreign Office had cheated them,
And yet, despite all these protests and complaints,
scarcely anything was done to rectify the situation. Not
until 1910 did the French eventually agree to reduce their
tariffs, and even then the downward revision applied to only
some goods.Much of the blame for this unfortunate state
of affairs lay with the British Government whose willingness
to exert pressure in Paris depended upon the nature of the
grievance, the moment when it was lodged, end occasional^
even the political views of the people making the protest.
How these three factors arranged themselves in the minds of
men like Lord Lansdowne and Gir Edward Grey usually determined
whether or not the Foreign Office would act. Broadly speaking,
the Government was not averse to taking up specific infractions
committed against British or colonial firms operating in "ranee
or the French Empire but was most hesitant to try to force the
French to alter or abolish some of their longer-standing
commercial and financial policies. Thus when in late 1906/early
1907 the London Chamber of Coramerce passed a unanimous
resolution calling upon the Foreign Office to make urgent
representations to the French Government concerning a new tax
about to be levied on all foreign companies in France, the
latter complied and managed to secure from the French a
3° J.H. Clapham, The ::<?qqonlc Development, of France
Germany. 1815-1914 (Cambridge, 1936), p. 264, n.l.
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modification of the original measure.British South African
mining firms were similarly rewarded in their struggle to
defeat a bill then going through the Chamber of Deputies aiming
•50
at the ultimate take-over of foreign concessions in Madagascar.
But when it came to encouraging the French to scale down
some of the higher duties of the Meline tariff, abolish the
surtaxe d«entrepotr or create an Open Door policy in the French
colonies, the Government was strangely reluctant to take up
the case. The reasons varied, ..uite often the Foreign Office
or the Board of Trade simply argued that nothing good could
come out of approaching the French with a suggestion to get
rid of these measures because the latter were too intransigent
in their stance or because Britain w*s too weak in her
bargaining position and had nothing to offer in return. Hence
the Montreal Congress of the Associated Chambers cf Commerce of
the British Empire was told that nothing would be done about
the surtaxe on the ground that this duty had for too many years
formed an important part of the 'general fiscal system of France'
for any protest to be iffective,^ In reply to the request of
31 Financial Timesf 9 January and 29 July 1907. V/hat provoked
the outburst from the London Chamber cf Commerce in this Instance
was not so much the principle of the proposed tax but the manner
in which it was to be levied. The bill as it originally stood
in the Chamber of Deputies aimed at the levying of s tax not on
the capital of the branch of the company in ranee but at the
entire capital of the parent company. This proposal was scaled
down when the bill finally passed the Chamber in July 1907 so
that foreign companies already established in France had to pay
the tax solely on the basis of their holdings in the country.
32 See the letter of a Mr Selborne of the British High
Commissioner's Office in Johannesburg on behalf of the South
African mining companies to lord Percy, Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, 8 July 1905, and Percy's reply,
31 October 1905, F.o. 27/3753.
33 See the letter of H. Llewellyn Smith of the Board of
Trade to the Foreign office, 8 January 1904, F.C. 27/3751.
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the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris for the negotiation
of a commercial treaty between the two countries, on the other
hand, oir Francis Bertie pointed out that, as His Majesty's
Government had few such concessions to offer the French in
return for a reduction of the ..eiinc tariff, the Trench
might be tempted to insist on a defensive military alliance
between the two countries as compensation, and this, he
■54
intimated, was for the time being out of the question.In
a similar vein the British colony of merchants were urged to
swallow their apprehensions about the 1904 Convention on the
argument that a French take-over of Morocco was inevitable
and that in a decade's time Britain would have had nothing to
offer France in return.^ Lven the 1S71 Treaty of Frankfurt
had sometimes been used as an excuse for not attempting to
negotiate some sort of accommodation along commercial lines
between the two Western lowers. The most-favoured-nation
treatment accorded to Germany by France in this arrangement
made it a bit pointless, or so the argument went, for the
British Government and businessmen to try and persuade the
French to change their ways merely so that the burgomasters of
*>£
Hamburg and Berlin could reap a profit as well. Meanwhile
the Government refused outright to consider the possibility of
imposing retaliatory measures against the French on the ground
that such a course of action would only lead to a tariff war
between the two countries, and pointed out that nations which
34 Tortie to John G. liter, 19 November 1906, ?#0. 800/49.
35 Lansdowne to 31r rthur fllcolson (then the British 'Minister
at Fez), 21 April 1904, P.O. 80C/135.
36 Bee the 'Memorandum on Commercial delations with France',
17 July 1908, in the Asqulth Papers, MS 98.
had already done so enjoyed access to the French markets on even
37
less favourable terms than did exporters of the United Kingdom#
f these various arguments advanced by the Government it
can be said that many of them were sincerely presented, in
seme instances the logical outcome of several sustained but
fruitless attempts to reach a commercial treaty with the
French;-"" nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that more often than not little or nothing was
done simply because the Foreign Cffice and the Board of Trade
regarded these complaints as trivial or annoying, at the most
of secondary importance when measured against the political
and diplomatic benefits that would accrue to Britain if
relations with France were kept on as smooth a f oting as
op
possible,-y
Since their pleas for help to the Government by and
large proved unavailing, a good many British businessmen
began to net on their own initiative to secure improved
commercial relations with '"ranee. They were perfectly well
37 Hansard. Pari, Debates, Fourth series, II, of C,, CXXV1
(29 Julylto), 686.
38 as early as the spring of 1903 M# Mouvier, then the Minister
of Finance in the Combes Government, had been telling prominent
Britons that it would be wise to leave Anglo-French commercial
relations 'well mione', as the present Chamber of Deputies
'was altogether protectionist and not likely to consent to
more favourable treatment being granted to Great Britain..,'.
Bee Monson to Lansdowne, 14 May 1903, F.O. 27/3629#
39 That the Foreign Office looked upon such outcries as little
more than a nuisance can be seen from the reaction of Lord Lansdowne
to the grievances of British firms in the French Congo, The
Conservative Foreign Secretary did duly take up the protests
of Messrs, Holt and others with the French Ambassador in
London, but only grudgingly, apologising to M, Cambon that
the problem could not be overlooked because of 'the influence
of the commercial element in the British House of Commons and
the mischief which was created by the constant complaints which
we had received as to the treatment of these firms'. lansdowne
to Sir dward onsen, 7 July 1903, F.O, 27/3616.
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aware tut it warn futile to approach the French Government
without the support or knowledge of their own, hut they did
feel that it night be worth their while to establish and
strengthen contacts with their business counterparts in r-nce.
Such a stove, they reasoned, almost certainly would not bring
about a full-fledged commercial agreement between the two
countries, but it could well achieve an increased volume of
trade and thereby compensate in some way for the lack of any
written commercial agrangemcnt. In the summer of 19rv6
E.G. Collins, chairman of the City of London International
Commercial Association, launched a scheme to hold a
Franco-British Trade Exhibition on a ninety-eight acre cite
In Shepherd's lush. The proposed Exhibition, which quickly
won the backing of an impeding array of politicians and
businessmen from both countries, including the Lord Mayor
of London, Gir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Arthur Bal#our,
Lord Rosebery, haul Cambon, and the President of the "reach
Chamber of Commerce in London, had for its aim the opening
of new avenues of trade - not only for Britain, but also
for India and the Colonies so that Trench visitors will
see and learn to appreciate the magnitude and producing
40
capacity of the various components of the Empire*.* It
was also about this time that British businessmen became
increasingly attracted to 3ir Thomas Barclay's notion of
Tunicio-1 ententes *.
But it was with the revival of the Channel ?ohnel
project that the greatest expectations were raised in some
commercial quarters in Britain. Apparently a M. Peltcreau
renewed the campaign for it in a specially written report
40 Bee the 'Botes of the nonth* column in the Mag,
Commerce, August 1906, p. 84.
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prepared for the Paris Chamber of Commerce; prominent
businessmen on both sides of the Channel soon expressed an
interest in it; and in Parliament Lord Burton, Vice-Chairman
of the South-Mastern Railway and Chatham Company, and
II.H. Marks, the Conservative member for Kent, Thanet, went so
far as to introduce a Bill for such a scheme towards the end
/ P
of 1906. Unhappily for all these people the Bill never got
past its first reading; the Government simply would not
countenance a project which involved obvious military risks
but which did not necessarily offer any compensating advantages
to trade and industry,Still, if improved /Ingle-French
trade was their real objective, then their efforts were not
entirely in vain; for as will be seen shortly, both the
amount and value of British exports to France began to
increase sharply after 1905. On the other hand, for many
British and colonial businessmen this was not enough; and as
late as July 1908, at a time when the cross-Channel trade boom
was still very definitely taking place, Winston Churchill, then
the Resident of the Board of Trade, was complaining to the
Prime Minister of 'being pressed almost daily' by British and
colonial businessmen 'to make representations to the French
Government in respect of various articles in which tariff
increases are apprehended,,,,', A 'public avowal of impotence',
Churchill warned, 'would be scarcely less detrimental to the
41 Birmingham Daily Post. 25 May 1904,
42 financial Times, 21 January 1907; also Hansard. Pari,
Debates, Fourth Series, H. of C., CLXIX (25 February 1907), 1272.
43 Ibid.. CLXXI (21 March 1907), 1209 and (26 March 1907), 1673.
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cause of Tree Trade than an abortive negotiation'. "
2. .rtiLatona
The British Government, then, more or less remained
deaf to the complaints made by manufacturers both at home and
throughout the Empire about 'ranee's commercial policies.
Nevertheless, there was one group of businessmen whose
grievances against the Trench did prompt the Foreign Office
to take some action. This was the financiers whose overseas
investment projects from time to time produced some friction
with the Trench. More often than not this friction involved
the financing of some public works programme, and more often
than not the true victim in the affair was some crumbling
empire in sia or Africa. Beyond these general characteristics,
however, the instances of Anglo-French financial rivalry in
the early years of the twentieth century differed both in their
origin and in their resolution. The first such outbreak of
friction to occur after the diplomatic rapprochement between
the two Towers had begun was in Morocco, There the triumphant
visit of King Edward VII to Paris in the spring of 1903 had
little impact on the clandestine activities of British and
French financiers. The latter, apparently convinced that
their influence at the court of Sultan Abdul Aziz was
paramount, suddenly decided to discontinue the policy of
co-operating with their British and Spanish counterparts in
issuing loans tc the insolvent aghzen and draft their own
instead. To those Britons who either lived or had their
business dealings in Morocco, the move was but the first of
a series of calculated steps on the part of the French aiming
44 Bee Churchill's letter initialled ''./.B.C. ' to Zsquith,
17 July 1908, accompanying the 'Memorandum on Commercial
Relations with France' of the same date in the Asquith
Papers MS 98.
at the ultimate dismemberment of the dherifian "moire; hence,
they decided to net. A.t Fez, t aid 'acLean did his utmost to
dissuade the Gultan from accenting the "ranch loan; In
London, prominent City financiers like Sir Lrnest Cassel and
Lord Revelstoke of the House of Raring offered to advance
LI million to the 'forocean Government or, failing that, to
raise a loan in concert with the lanque !e aris et Res hys-Bas
under the auspices of the two Government?; meanwhile for his
part, the shipowner Mrnest Forwood was busy writing letters to
the Foreign effice, admonishing it for having permitted the
French in Morocco 'tc get the whiphand especially when it was
4F
within our power to prevent it'. * Not that these pleas
produced any degree of real confrontation between London and
■v
Paris, n at least one occasion Lansdowne did broach the
possibility of floating a 3oint Inglo-French loan to the
Sultan, but in the end the Conservative Foreign Secretary
acquiesced in the insistence of aris on going it alone in this
matter, treating the submission of the Sultan tc ^rench
oressure3 as the result of a force majeure. Nevertheless,
the entire episode did leave a bad impression of the 'rench
Government in the minds of some Rritish bankers and
undoubtedly goes 3oae way towards explaining the pro-German
and anti-French actions of men like Sir Mrnest .Cassel in
subsequent years.
The duplicity and intrigue that took lace between British
and rench financiers in Morocco in 1903 occurred on an even
grander scale in ibyssinia shortly afterwards. hie details of
"5 ' - " - -'f to -ir --'as . •• nderson, 27 J :ly 1?C3, 99/431;
also .... .f loc. clt., and serie 2, vol. 4, no. 72, . , n.l.
46 I.".' . , s^rlc 7, v 1. 4, o •. 3 * ? " • 43-14.
the affair need not concern us here, suffice it to say that
in 1905 Trench capitalists went beyond the terms of an
agreement concerning railway concessions accorded to them in
1394 by building a new line from hire Dawa to dis oaba, The
move greatly alarmed tiieir British and Italian competitors, and
in 1906 T, Lennox Gilmour, a Managing Director of the London-based
oaambique Company, published a book exposing the expansionist
designs of the French capitalists. The public notice which
this bGok attracted induced the Foreign Office to demand from
the French at least a share in the new spoils in Ethiopia,
and in December 1906 an Anglo-French-Italian treaty was
signed to this effect,4'7 What does require some mention here
are the instances of sharp business practice that continued to
go on behind the scenes even after the tri-partite agreement
of December 1906 had been approved by the British, French and
Italian Governments, French financiers, apparently working
with the connivance of the Clemenceau Government, embarked
upon a series of obscure financial transactions in which
British and other foreign investors were to be deprived of
their proper return, British and Italian representatives,
whose appointment to the Board of Directors of the Compagnle
Imperlale d'Ethiopie had been one of the principal features of
the 1906 treaty, either had unwittingly endorsed these
transaetions or were Ignorant of them. Like the Moroccan
affair of 1903, this episode did not lead to any serious rift
between the Governments of the two estern Powers, Not only
was the Foreign Office inclined to turn a blind eye towards
the whole matter, but many British investors were apprehensive
47 For further details of this episode, sec Chapter III of
this thesis.
23?.
about pressing their case as far as they might have dene for
fear of injuring the good diplomatic relations between
Governments," Still, the Ethiopian railway question
amounted to yet another thorn in the side of the financial
relations between the two countries, and yet another group of
British businessmen were left with the feeling that the
Entente Cordiale was not all that it was intended to be.
Neither in Morocco nor in Abyssinia did Anglo-French
financial rivalry produce anything more than a semblance of a
showdown between the two Governments, Two areas of the world
where such rivalry did bring about some quarrelling, howeverf
were China and the Ottoman Empire, In the former country the
issuing of loans and the financing of public works programmes
by Europeans in exchange for commercial concessions had long
since been a commonplace. The competition for such concessions
had always been keen among the Powers, but never so acute as It
had become in the early years of the twentieth century with the
entry of the United States and Japan into the field. It is
scarcely surprising, then, that British Investors in China
should all but leap at the chance of financing a public works
scheme without consulting their counterparts in friendly
countries like France, And in China in 1903 this is precisely
what happened. When the Imperial Government at Pekin asked
British and other foreign bankers to finance the construction
of the Canton-Hankow railway, the City agreed, floating loans
in conjunction with several Continental banks to the exclusion
48 Jce, for instance, the letter of a Lord Chesterfield
to 3ir Edward Grey, 17 November 1908, F.O. 80C/106, (Chesterfield
was Chairman of The International Trust Company, a leading
British financial syndicate in this part of Africa.)
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of the French. 7 In Turkey, on the other hand, it was the
French who were financing a number of projects in an attempt
to isolate and outmanoeuvre their British counterparts.
Here the focus of much of the activity was the construction
of the Baghdad Hallway, but there were other instance* of
financial foul play as well. In 1906 French and other
financiers had begun to grant private leans to the Porte at
Usurious rates of interest without admitting the British#
A year later, the French Government had Refused to support
the Liberal Foreign Secretary Sir Ldward Grey in his plans
5o
to forco internal reforms upon the Ilamldian regime.
Had all these instances of intrigue and underhandedness
involved only Britain and France there might well have been
little trouble. As it was, in each case the offending party
had resorted to asking the Germans, the most expansionist of
peoples in the eyes of many contemporaries, for help in
excluding the other. The result was a considerably more
strained relationship between the two Western Powers.
Sir dwara Grey, upon learning of the threat to British
commercial and financial interests in the Near ~ast as a
result of the actions of the Franco-German syndicate, reacted
angrily and hit upon a provocative counter-measure. In August 1908
he urged British capitalists to withdraw their support from
the Anglo-French Cttoman Bank, hitherto the main source of
49 Details of this episode can be found in E-Tu Zen Sun,
ChineseRailways and British Interests. 1898-1911 (New York, 1954),
pp • 93**X0o #
50 Most of the grievances suffered by British investors in
Turkey are summarised in a memorandum written by a Mr Block,
the British delegate on the Council of the Administration or
the Ottoman Public Debt, tc the Foreign Office in British
ftPSWfita Pfl the of bt-jc ,cg, V, ed. Gooch and
Teraperley, no. 147, P# 179.
funds for the Gultan, and start a new and entirely
British-owned institution, the National hank of Turkey, under
the direction of ^ir Ernest Cassel. Meanwhile, the French
had become equally upset over Anglo-German manoeuverings in
China. On one occasion the French premier Clemenceau went
so far as to say that the loan floated by London and Berlin
bankers for the construction of the Canton-Hankow railway
<2
had produced 'a cleft in the entente'.y
The mutual recriminations that were exchanged between
the British and the French Governments as a result of these
instances of intrigue and conspiracy did not lead to any
serious deterioration in the relations of the two Powers,
but they do reflect strongly upon the influence which
financiers exerted in high-ranking circles# While the
grievances of entrepreneurs, shipowners, and industrialists
about French commercial policies largely went unheeded by the
Foreign office, the complaints of City investors and bankers
about rench financial practices almost invariably were
acted upon. On a somewhat different plane but of scarcely
less interest, the fact that German financiers were included
in these wranglings tends to reinforce in an indirect way the
arguments of the contemporary economic theorist Norman Angell
about the 'internationalisation of credit'. For even if the
Anglo-German partnership to the detriment of the French in
China and the Franco-German partnership to the detriment of
the British in the Ottoman Empire did fail to provide any
51 E. Edwards, 'The ^ranco-German agreement on Morocco,
1909', •o.-llsh Historical ievlew, 78 (July 1963), 497.
52 British Documents on the Origins of the War, ed. Gooch
and Temperley, VII, enclosure in no• 148, p. 133.
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evidence for Angell's central thesis, namely that capitalism
by itself is not the cause of war, they did, if in a somewhat
unusual manner, lend support to his contention that 'in the
business of investment nationalities and frontiers are
completely disregarded'. Just as in times of 'political
animosity' the banks of England, France, and Germany came
to each other's rescue, 'regardless of national differences',
so in times of comparative peace and stability the various
bankers and financiers of the various Powers took 'no account
of politico-national rivalries' by seeking assistance that cut
athwart the barriers of the two diplomatic power blocs# In
a word, the capitalist, as kngell so persuasively argued,
had no country.
3# now bpplncspraen figgnpierg tepfl
In itemising all these conflicts and sources of discontent
between -British and French financiers and men of commerce, one
might be tempted to agree with the conclusion of L. •>. Edwards
that the Entente Cordiale had come abcut for diplomatic but
not economic reasons. The Entente was, writes this historian,
'at best, a loose association imperfectly co-ordinated at the
political level and still more so in respect of financial and
K4
commercial policy in zones of expansion'. No doubt there
is much to be said for this point of view? nevertheless, too
many businessmen made too much of a profit out of the
rapprochement between the two Governments to permit such a
statement to go completely unchallenged. British financiers
53 Norman Angell, Eiyope ',g gUcal Illusion (London, 1909), P.U8.
54 e.w. dwards, qp, pife., p. 495
3.
in Egypt stood to gain enormously out of the abolition of
the Caisse de la Fettej it was in part their strong desire
to get rid of France's check on Egyptian monetary matters
that prompted Lord Cromer to insist in 1903-4 on a colonial
convention between the two Powers at virtually any cost.
Indeed, so enormous was their potential gain that in the
opinion of one of Britain's foremost Egyptian experts of
the day the ending of any international control over the
Khedive's finances would soon result in the 'abandonment of
the old system of strict economy for one of speculative
financeNor was it only in Egypt that British financiers
made gains out of the Entente. The 1904 understanding led to
a similar arrangement between Britain and Russia, and it was
not long before City financiers were joining their French
counterparts in floating loans to the Tsarist regime.
Already by April 1906 British investors had shown their interest
in Russia by subscribing to a £90 million loan to the Government
at St Petersburg, Similar offers were later forthcoming\ this
despite the strenuous objections biing made in Radical, socialist,
and even some moderate Liberal cirdles in Britain. The
interest on these loans was enough in itself to attract British
financiers to Russia, but there were other enticements as well.
As a reward for helping to bolster the troubled Tsarist regime
British capitalists were allowed to invest in the more lucrative
manufacturing and industrial concerns as well as State
55 Sec Bilfred Scawan Blunt's article, 'The opinion of Egypt;
financial dangers ahead', in the qw<Uan>
7 May 1904, pp. 9-10.
56 It was the opinion of the Left in Britain that the issue
of loans to Russia served no purpose other than keeping the
reactionaries in power so as to ensure that the Triple Entente
could be welded more readily into an anti-Austrian and
anti-German instrument. (Bee Chapter X of this thesis for
further details^
securities, while a substantial number of British companies
were suddenly licensed to carry on business in lussia. ithin
a few years of the signing of the 19:7 Entente British firms,
many of which had hitherto found the Bussian market completely
inaccessible, were able to engage in various trades and
industries in Bussia, articularly the iron and engineering
en
trades and the chemical industry.
In much the same way, many men of commerce v.no had dealings
with the reneh either at home or abroad profited from the
improved relations between the two countries. Just as not
all British financiers suffered at the hands of French
speculators and investors, so not all British merchants and
exporters faced ruin or even underwent a loss on acc unt of the
inline tariff or the nur: xe A . vidence supporting
this statement can be found in the trade figures for the two
countries. In 1903—4, the value of exports from the United
Kingdom to ranee continued to decline from its highest level
of more thai .125 millions in 19 . In 1905, by which year the
diplomatic rapprochement had time to be felt in commercial as
well as political circles, this trend started tc be reversed}
and by 1906-7 there were staggering increases both in the amount
and in the value of British goods sold in 'ranee.'' Of the
staple British exports tc France, the sales of metals increased
in value by almost fifty per cent, between 1903 and 1908, coals
by more than thirty-five per cent., cotton and cotton
manufactures by thirty-four per cent., and machinery by thirty
<q
per cent. i'he figures are even more impressive when measured
57 C.K.Hobson, The export of "Capital (London: 1914J, pp. 159-160.
53 See Appendix, Table 1.
59 ^»ee , pendix, Table 2.
against the record of French exports to the United Kingdom
during the same period. While the British exports more or
less made a steady increase during these years, France's
cross-Channel extorts made very uneven progress and actually
drooped in Value in 1903 to £47 millions, the lowest amount in
more than a decade.^
Admittedly, not all of this considerably improved
cross-Channel trade can be attributed to the existence of the
Entente Cordiale. World trade as a whole was on the increase
between 1903 and 1907: 3ritish exports to most countries, not
merely to France, were on the rise; and, as hrs already been
seen elsewhere, the improved diplomatic relations between the
two Western Powers had done nothing to compromise the French
61
Government's ultra-protectionist outlook. Nevertheless,
there is much to suggest that the growth which took place in
Anglo-'rench trade at t' is time was attributable at least in
part to the friendlier feelings between the two Governments.
For one thing, the main reason for the rise of Britain's
exports to the world at large at this time, namely, that they
came in the wake of a new foreign investment snree, simply
62
does not apply to British trade with France. France was
60 Gee ppettdix, Table 1,
61 A general summary of international financial, and economic
conditions for the early years of the twentieth century can be
found in Clarham, Economic History of Fodern Britain. Ill, 55-60.
62 j.t is Clapham's opinion that the fifty per cent rise in
British exports between 1901 and 1907 was 'essentially an
investment rise'. 'Britain was accumulating claims on
governments and enterprises of all sorts overseas faster than
ever before', writes Clapham. Manufacturers, and all who
thought like manufacturners, gloried in the swollen exports,
and every one welcomed the good employment which went with
them', bee ibid., Ill, p.53.
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herself an exporter of capital, and alth ugh City financiers
did from time to time make investments in France, such
investments never amounted to much. J For another, the
growth of British exports tc France proceeded faster than
that of British exnorts in total, thereby suggesting that
other factors were at work in the improved trade between
the two countries. By 1908, for instance, nearly seven
ner cent, of all British exports 'went to France, a figure
noticeably above those of the previous six years; and this
despite a drop in the vtlurae of British commerce shipped
across the Channel, Cf course, statistics like these do
not prove everything, but when taken into consideration
along with the great efforts of British businessmen to
bolster ex arts to France they begin to make more sense.
The Anglo-French Entente did rrove a benefit to British
exporters, even if t is was accomplished in a rather unaaual
way and the benefit w s not the one which most 3ritish
businessmen had been seeking first and foremost.
63 Between 1903 and 1910, for instance, British financiers
invested only about £1.6 millions in France out of a total
of more than £500 millions exported abroad during these three
years. Bee Sir George Paish, 'Great Britain's capital
investments in individual colonial and foreign countries',
Journal of the loyal statistical Society. LXXIV (January 1911),
170-171.
64 Appendix, Table 3. Hot that this percentage steadily
increased after 1904, as the Appendix might suggest. In 1913
those goods sent to trance still only accounted for
approximately six per cent, of the total of British exports,
(oee Table VII/14 in illiaa Woodruff's Imoact of estern Man:
■\ Study of Europe's Bole in the World Ecpngmy. 1750-1960TNcvT York, 1966)7 0.317.) It would thus be reasonable to
conclude that the impact of the Entente upon Anglo-French
trade was only a short-lived one, with the exceptional rise In
the amount and value of British exports to France taking place
only so long as British businessmen were willing to work doubly
hard at promoting their goods.
gainst the background of these statistics, the campaign
then being waged against French protectionism was almost
doomed to fail. 41ready the movement to have the French
adopt a more free trade outlook had foundered on the rocks
of Toreign Office reluctance anc .„uai d'Orsay intransig ance.
How its strength was being further sapped by the defection
from its ranks of those exporters and merchants who were
willing to accept improved trade with France as an adequate
substitute for a more comprehensive com ercial treaty between
the twc countries. f course, many chambers of commerce and
individual businessmen still ciid agitate for a commercial
treaty, but not as many as before and not with the same
determination# It was as if they had resigned themselves
to the motion that the Anglo-French entente had, after all,
been Created for ooli ical rather than economic reasons.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ENTENTE AND CULTURAL RELATIONE BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE
France has traditionally held something of a special place In
the hearts and minds of British intellectuals and culture
enthusiasts. Even when diplomatic relations between London and
Paris had been poor, British musicians, painters, poets, and
writers, had all been known to look to France for Inspiration,
while for their part certain French artists and men of letters
had fallen under the influence of some of their British
counterparts. This was most noticeably the case during the
1390s and at the turn of the century when, despite the existence
of recurrent crises between the two Governments, British
artists and intellectuals increasingly went to France In search
of ideas. It was at this time, too, that the middle as well as
the upper classes of British society, seeking perhaps to follow
in the footsteps of the then Prince of hales, visited France in
ever greater numbers. According to one historian, Paris became
•the Mecca, not only of artists and intellectuals, but also of
smart society... • The Moulin Rouge was invaded by English
tourists and adulating crowds flocked to the Great Exhibition
of 1900*.* But if by this time such groups were already
beginning to turn more and more towards France for their pursuits,
and if, as has been alleged, Paris was once again establishing
p
Itself as 'the capital of luxurious living'," then the impact of
1 P.J.V. Rolo, The, Entente Cordiale:, The Grains pnd Negotiation
of the Anglo-French Agreements of 3 April 1904. (London. 1969).
p. 15o.
^ I old., ,\Q<titii 9 j tr»
phe Entente Cordlale on the cultural and intellectual relations
between the two countries cannot be deemed quite as great as it
might have been# For although the diplomatic rapprochement
brought about in Britain an increased interest in virtually all
things French,^ it did not do so on any widespread or permanent
basis. Indeed, in a few intellectual circles the Entente was
looked upon as a temporary, almost insignificant link between the
two nations.
As will be seen, virtually all British writers and men of
letters of the day felt that a study of French culture was a
rewarding pursuit in its own right. For some, however, it was
an undertaking that was imperative if the Entente were to become
an instrument of true friendship between the peoples of the
two nations. As they saw it, French music, literature, and art,
all srovided clues to the nature and psychology of the French
people, that most complex of races and one whose true nature
r
the ordinary person in Britain had so little opportunity of
4
understanding. In view of this tendency to attach a great
deal of importance to the personality and temperament of the
French people, we shall examine first what was said in connection
with this subject before proceeding to the arts in ranee.
i. Iggg&aiigM of jtea £Egag& M&iaaal fifrscflsJac aa& igflBSiaaaafc
The process of attaching labels to any national group Is
3 One historian has found, for instance, that after 1903 there
was a 'sharp rise' in the number of bocks printed In Britain
dealing with France and that between 1900 and 1920 translations
from the French outnumbered those from any other foreign language
by about eight to one. See C. Campos, The View of ranee frora
Arnold to Blocmsbury. (london, 1965), pp. 241-242.(The findings
in this case were based on an examination of publishers' lists
covering the twenty year period.)
4 See, for instance, W. Stephens, French pf Tp-d^y,
(London, 1908), p. vilij also John F, Macdonald, "French life and
the French stage', Oortnightlv ieview. LXXVI (1 October 1904), 728.
J
Invariably a difficult and thorny one, and as far as many writers
of the day were concerned, this was particularly the case with
Frenchmen, Much of the difficulty apparently lay in the
components that supposedly went to make up the Frenchman's
temperament. Not only were these thought to be numerous, more
numerous perhaps than in the make-up of many other groups, one
observer going so far as to say that they provided psychologists
and sociologists with 'one of the most interesting national types
c
ever evolved',J but they cere also thought to vary greatly from
region to region. Already by the end of the nineteenth century
several of the more astute British visitors to Franc© were
\
beginning to take note of certain emotional and physical
differences between Frenchmen from one province and Frenchmen
/
from the next. By the early years of the twentieth century
this perceptiveness was becoming more and more common, and as a
result sweeping generalisations were harder to make. An
alternative and converse problem to such students of France was
that of overcoming stereotyped images of Frenchmen which
prevailed at home. But if all these considerations amounted
to stumbling-blocks in the minds of certain writers, then at least
It could not be said that the task was entirely without rewards.
For as they sew it, the birth of the Anglo-French Lntente
kindled a strong desire on the part of the British people to
learn more about their French neighbours, and they, with their
personal knowledge of France, would be satisfying a popular
demand as well as furthering the bonds between the two countries.
5 H. Lawler-./ilson, 'Life and literature in France'. Fortnightly
Review. LXXVIII (1 November 1905), 8?9.
6 Sylvalne Marandon, L'lmagc fle la :'ranee dans l'.'jigleterre
vlctorlenne- 1843-1900 (Paris, 1967), p. 225.
In the words of one author:
The complete disappearance of those olitical causes of
discord which for so long a period fostered reciprocal
distrust has had, among other consecuences, thst cf
greatly strengthening in the two nations the wish to
know one another better and therefore to clear their
minds of all false impressions and engrained prejudices,
A book that responds strictly to the title of 'Franc© cf
the reach' seems therefore tc be the need of the day. 7
Relieving themselves to be at the vanguard of such an
Important movement, individual writers dwelt at length on
the personality and life-style of the French people.
Of the- various characteristics which many people in
Britain had traditionally attributed to the French personality,
frivolity and an excessive love of pleasure perhaps ranked most
prominently. The notioti that the French were a superficial,
overly light-hearted lot died hard in the minds of a
considerable number of Englishmen in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, as well as in the literature of
the period. The diatribe of the prim and proper Annunciate
against the rench as an immoral and unreliable group of people
who lost the 1870-1871 war with Prussia, for instance, because
they preferred to enjoy themselves in Parisian cafes and
theatres in Arnold Bennett's novel v/hom God Hath Joined was by
©
no means unusual." Frenchmen were quite commonly thought to
have nothing other than their own foibles to blame for their
reverses, military or otherwise, hor was this the only
generalisation. Other shortcomings often cited in the French
character included vanity, garrulousness, and a frugality
bordering on meanness. True, In their ever-changing assessment
7 E.H. Jarker, mnce pf the r^ch, (London, 1908), p.v.
8 E. Arnold Bennett, hen Cod Hath coined. (London, 1906),
pp. 120-121.
of their neighbours across the Channel, many people in Britain
had come to reject some of the worst widely-held Impressions
of Frenchmen. Hence, according to Gylvaine Marandon even
before the advent of improved diplomatic relations between
London and Paris a number of Englishmen had already begun to
view the French as a less bellicose and less vain race than
9
their parents and grand-parents had done in preceding decades.
At the same time, it was gradually becoming recognised
throughout Britain that the French character hod its strong
points as well. Few unbiassed observers could deny, for
instance, Frenchmen their braveness In combat or gallantry
in their treatment of the opposite sex.1(" Nevertheless,
insofar as people in late Victorian/early Edwardian Britain
had any impression of ranchmen at all, it was on the whole an
unfavourable one, and writers and lovers of France in general
had even at the best of times an uphill struggle to convince
their listeners otherwise.
In the maiti, the various writers who took the lead in
discussing this subject concentrated on combatting the more
unfavourable notions about the ^rench character. In particular,
the Frenchman^ supposed frivolity came in for a good deal of
discussion. Matilda Bethaa-Edwards, one of the most prolific
of contemporary authors concerned with France and almost all
aspects of French life,^ was among the first to take up the
9 S. liaranden, op. clt., pp. 202-208.
10 Ibid., pp. 192-195.
11 Matilda Betham-Edvards, born in Suffolk in 1836 and died
at Hastings in 1919, first became Interested in '"ranee after
having met C-eorge Eliot in London in the 1860s. From that time
onwards, she travelled widely in 'ranee, where she spent most of
her time living with French families and making friends, most of
them in republican circles. The bulk of her works are concerned
with the less political side of rench life, although there is a
conspicuous anti-clerical tinge to be found in virtually all of
them. All of Miss Betham-Ldwards books mentioned In this chapter
are based upon materials gathered in the late nineteenth century,
as the author led a retired life at Hastings after 1884.
matter. As far as she was concerned, the reach nation was
not only not light-minded but 'on the contrary, the most
serious in the world*. The behaviour of the French might
from time to time appear to contradict this statement, she
conceded, but this was only because they loved 'to wear a
fictitious heart upon their sleeve, to dandle a mannikin in
12
the eyes of naive beholders'. E.H. Barker, author of
France of the French, one of the more objective works of
this genre, was inclined to agree. It was his opinion that
the reneh were among 'the most industrious, the most prudent,
the most calculating* peoples. 'They even calculate their
pleasures, or rather their means of indulging in them,' he
went on, 'to a nicety'. If the "rench showed an aptitude
for 'histrionics*, it was all due to the fact that most of
them were 'born actors' and had a tendency 'to show more
feeling than they really felt'.^ A third writer, on the
other hand, based this supposed superficiality and frivolity
on what he construed to be the average Frenchman's natural
cheerfulness and innate .1oie de vlvre. 'They have an
extraordinary facility for placing themselves beyond the reach
of everyday annoyance and for living for the cay, "living" in
the fullest sense', this man wrote of the rench. 'Thus the
crowded streets in French cities, the Immense gatherings of
merrymakers in places of amusement, lead the casual observer to
believe that the race has elevated the pursuit of pleasure to
an exclusive occupation*,^
12 Miss Betham-dwards, Home Life in Francef (London, 1905), p.254,
13 E.H, Barker, 9 pp.l?5j 23I(
14 w.L. George, France In the Twentieth Century, (London, 1908),
PP. 371-372.
It was more or less the same when writing about other
defects commonly thought to be part of the French character.
Whatever long-regarded flaw of personality or temperament
that these type of writers happened to hit upon in their books
and articles, they either played down in terms of significance
or denied altogether. Indeed, occasionally they tried to make
such flaws appear as positive virtues. Thus Hiss 3etham-l dwards,
when writing about the one aspect of the Frenchman's character
that most often 'exasperated* English visitors to France,
leisurellness, asked her readers to pause and consider how much
'may not the excellence of French manufactures, handicrafts,
l*r
and produce be thereby accounted for'. y Similarly, another
writer, when commenting about the Frenchman's legendary sense
of thrift, did not deny that the people as a whole were 'probably
the most economical race in the world'. Nevertheless, he did
think that the Frenchman's frugality amounted to something more
than mere stinginess. In fact, In his opinion it went a long
way towards explaining the resilience of the nation in times of
16
great political and military difficulties. But to E.ii. Barker
it was the Frenchman's essentially forbearing nature that
provided the real key to understanding France as a nation. 'The
statement that the French are among the most patient people on
earth may be a little startling to those who have formed general
imnressions from the most dramatic pages of their history', he
wrote. ' e all know that they have had fits of impatience, and
very bad ones, too'. Still, as the French were to his mind
basically a 'good-tempered people, loving a quiet, easy-going
15 Hiss Bethaa-Edward3, or. clt., p.
16 ...L. George, or. cit., op. 365-366.
2 2 •
life, happy over their work, if it is not too trying, and
especially if it affords a margin of money to be saved, or
spent on amusement,' Barker could not help but reach the
conclusion that they were almost 'too ready to let themselves
be governed, and to treat with indifference the work of their
legislators until the causes of dissatisfaction accumulate'.
'Then violent explosions are apt to occur, of which the shock
may be terrific'. But these, he added, were comparatively
17
few and far between, '
3y far the greatest effort of those writers who
endeavoured to give their readers a character sketch of the
typical Frenchman was devoted to challenging what they felt
were 'unfair' stereotyped images. But this is not to say
that they strove to eradicate all preconceived notions of the
French character which prevailed in early twentieth century
Britain. Far from it. Most cf the more favourable impressions
which earlier writers had recorded in books and articles they
continued to mention and, indeed, in many instances stressed by
offering very favourable comparisons with certain traits found
at home. Intelligence, rerhaps the most flattering quality
traditionally attributed to frenchmen in general, certainly
received a good deal cf comment. According to Miss Betham-Edwards,
the French mind was 'pre-eminently logical', its intellect 'above
all things scientific'. The British and other national groups
were not necessarily lacking in this respect, she hastened to
add, but they were unable to apply logic as a mode of reasoning
18
as well as the French. k certain flair for artistry was
17 E.H. Barker, op. clt.. pp. ?32, 234.
18 Miss 3etham-Fdwards, op. clt.T pp. 263-265.
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another long-recognised trait of the French which various writers
of the day emphasised at the exoense of the British aational
character. Comparisons of this sort were even more forthcoming
than they were in the case of intelligence. They also
sometimes came from the most unusual of sources. One British
traveller touring the various cathedrals of the north of
France was so impressed with the architecture that he found
it 'impossible to dilate with sufficient enthusiasm upon the
exquisite art of the French churches...'. A comparison with
the less sculptured English cathedrals, he felt, 'rendered
19
a good idea of the French and English character'. 7 In the
same vein, a visitor to the picture galleries at the
Franco-British Exhibition held in London in 1908, while not
necessarily more impressed with the general layout cf the
French display than the British one, did feel that In one area,
that of decorative treatment, the French exhibition did score
'heavily over ours', the difference being one 'which is
20
unfortunately characteristic of the two nations'.
Of course, in the past neither the intellectual nor the
artistic leanings of the French people had ever really been
called into question by even the most critical student of
France. One supposed attribute of the French character which
had, however, was that of charm. Only recently had British
visitors to France been shouted down with abuse in the streets
of Paris and other French cities. British tourists, many of
whom had not forgotten the days of Fashoda and the Boer War,
were thus wont to look upon any hospitable treatment which they
19 T. Francis Bumpus, pt^ser hpljd^y^ ampng the wlorleg 9f
Northern France: Hep Cathedrals and Churches (London. 1905). p. 13.
20 H. Ileathcote Statham, 'Art at the Franco-British Exhibition',
Nineteenth Century and AfterT LXIV (August, 1908), 269.
2$7.
were accorded in Trance as a most welcome surprise and one
which was worthy of esrccial comment. Hence, an Irishman who
toured ''ranee in a motor car in 1906 was at rains to explain
to his readers that he and his fellow travellers found the
French 'very civil and obliging'; none of them ever met with
'any opnosition or unpleasantness' during the whole of their
pi
travels. " A retired Scottish doctor who spent years
travelling through the various regions of France at this time
discovered more or less the same thing. ; nly once did he
encounter any anti-British feeling there, and this, he hastened
22
to explain to his audience, 'was before the days of the Entente',
Likewise, the Positivist thinker Frederic Harrison, commenting
on how a number of travellers had been telling him that 'they
had not for a long time found Frenchmen more pleasant and
friendly', wrote; 'I have never otherwise found them myself,
but I notice a new sense of ease, content, and confidence in
everything we hear and see'."^ But if British tourists to
and British residents in France made such observations, they
were of two minds whether it could all be put down to the
improved relations between the two countries. To the extent
that the 1 rench people did seem more welcoming than in previous
years tourists and writers could attribute it at least in part
to the entente Cordiale, Thus .'.F. Lonergan, a member of the
Bally .telegraph staff in Paris, argued that the 1904 understanding
'has Influenced not only official France, but has permeated the
people'. Bince the Entente had been established, 'caricatures
21 C. Neville, -onnd "'ranee in n Botor. (Dublin, 1907), P. 5.
22 J.p. Hammerton, In the Track of H.L. Stevenson and Elsewhere
In Id '"ranee. (Bristol, 1907), P. 204.
23 F. Harrison, 'Notes from Paris', Positivist Review. All
(1 June 1904), 120.
of the ~nglish, sneers at John 3ull and his island, even jibes
and jokes about the British tourlst3 and their clothes,' have
24
'all disappeared'. On the ether hand, to the extent that
politeness and charm were considered to be hallmarks of the
2■)
French character they could never be surej and it is
significant that as early as February 1903» a few months before
the famed visit of King Edward VII to Paris, at least one British
resident in 1 ranee was complimenting the French on their courteous
26
and friendly behaviour,
4s regards all of the foregoing descri tions, it must be
said that, taken in their entirety, they made for a highly
one-sided appraisal of the I reach character. If contemporary
readers were tc take what Miss Bethaa-Ldwards, P.H.Barker, and
others said at face value, then their Impression of :rance would
undoubtedly have been that of a country peopled by a folk with a
near monopoly of human virtues. True, the French were recognised
to have their faults, including a certain lack of sentimentality
27
which at times made them appear cruel in British eyes.
Moreover, much of what they had to say was borne out by the
written accounts of several other visitors to France, few of
whoa saw themselves furthering the cMu>e of the Entente, But
24 .',F. ionergan, ortv fears of Pnrls. (London, 1907), p. 267.
25 Miss Betham-Edwards, for one, spoke of friendship as an 'art'
in "ranee, for which the people had a 'matchless genius', Bee
Miss sctham-Edwards, on, cit.. p. 253.
26 "wen -i. Green, 'The people and modern journalism', Monthly
Beview, X (February, 1903), 31-32.
27 It was a source of constant disappointment to such writers
that the ^rench, particularly the peasant class of that country,
needlessly mistreated their animals. See Miss Bethan- dwards,
op. cit.. p. 264 j also S.K. Barker, or. cit.. pp. 261-262.
as an exercise which purported to be objective in its
treatment of the matter concerned, this general portrait of
the French character can only be regarded as one of the more
biassed accounts of the period. Most of the positive aspects
of Frenchman's personality were over-emphasised, while what
had traditionally been construed as the negative one3 were
either ignored or mentioned only in passing.
Nor was it merely a matter of one-sidedness. Taking
a broader view of the matter, it is impossible not to notice
that the very qualities which these writers stressed in their
pBOtrait of the French people were more or less one and the
same as those to which the newspapers gave emphasis in their
articles about France as m whole. The notion of Miss Betham-Edwards
and others that the French were a serious-minded, hard-working,
thrifty, and friendly lot had, as we have already seen
elsewhere, its counterpart in the leader pages of the great
majority of the various organs of opinion in the country.
Biven that the press tended to use these themes to help promote
the idea that France was the ideal nation with which to enter
into diplomatic partnership, it would not be too much to assume
that the above-mentioned writers were hoping to do the same.
It was not that these writers were working hand in hand with
their Fleet Street ooposites to present a certain image of
Prance, but what they did have to say certainly reinforced
the highly favourable image of France being presented in the
press at large.
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?. Ft- crtsill -ncc oru: the imnact cf the inUnte on . .n,,Io- rench
gqltur^l r,ek,U9,Rg«
4s a phrase in itself, the terra 'French culture' meant
different things to different neenle in Britain at this time.
To seme it implied all that was best in the Classical tradition
of the arts, in particular, the expression of seventeenth and
early eighteenth century norms of taste like order, reason, and
harmony. Lxoonents of this point of view held that the works
of the various artists and men of letters of France from the
time of the Renaissance through the Grand Siecle of Louis XIV
to the oolone of the early lSOCs marked the apex of ranch, if
not ; uropean, cultural nd intellectual activity, and as such
they devoted much of their time to studying and analysing the
masterpieces of these periods. Others, a minority, associated
the term with all that was new and revolutionary in the arts.
f-s far as they were concerned, the artistic and intellectual
genius of the. rench lay not so much in the ability to create
within a rigid framework cf rules, but in the ability to give
expression to completely new modes of thought without regard for
convential standards. Hence, they pointed to the flowering in
pre-/.orId ar I Paris of scarcely recognised avant-rarce
movements like cubism and symbolist poetry as evidence that all
was well in the arts 4n early twentieth century France. Ztill
others regarded French culture simply as a reflection in artistic
and intellectual terms of all the main currents of life in
contemporary France. To them French literature meant the realism
of the novels of the late Zola, just as ">ench art meant the
impressionist n©intings cf Pissarc or oerhaps even th©
rso3t-lfanressionlst works of Cdsanne. 411, however, agreed that
France was a major international centre of the arts, with -via
_ s
1-.. i) J. •
as Its focal point. As one writer put it, when consenting about
T>ench plays, 'in the discussion of any theatrical question it
is obligatory to turn to Paris as for a ;Iahomedan to turn towards
23
Mecca.• •'. In short, there was a widespread tendency in
Britain to lock upon rench culture as representative of
virtually all that which was human and universal in the arts
and to regard France as a country occupying a position of nearly
unparalleled cultural supremacy In the world of the early
twentieth century.
Although the various students of the arts in Britain were
inclined to speak of France and French culture in such glowing
terms, this is not to say that they failed to notice that in
certain fields the French, too, were susceptible to outside
Influences or had shortcomings of their own. «'ith regard to
music, for instance, they readily admitted that France's
contribution had not been particularly outstanding. But for
the impact of foreigners, wrote one such student, 'French music
would have made no brilliant figure on the lyric stage of the
2Q
world...'. 7 rench composers might have 'manfully held their
own', acknowledged another, but they did not exert much of a lead
In mapping artistic trends.Nor was It merely French music
that contemporary critics in Britain spoke of in somewhat
disparaging terms. Many of the more recent examples of French
plays and T'rench novels were also thought to be unimaginative
and Inconsequential, if not exactly imitative of other works.
Thus the afore-mentioned anonymous critic, while acclaiming Paris
23 See the anonymous article entitled 'Some recent Yench and
English plays* in the Edinburgh Heviewf CC (October, 1904), 297.
29 E.K. Barker, on. clt.. p. 191.
30 Arthur Hervey, French Music in the Nineteenth Century
(ixmcon, 1903), n. vii.
262.
as nothing less than the theatrical centre of the world, could
not help but note the lethora of frivolous' productions in
the French capital and observed that the 'theatre of ideas has
to maintain an incessant fight for life' there.^ In a similar
vein, an enthusiast of '"rench fiction, while approving the
tendency of young authors in France not to 'degrade' their
talents by 'attempting to outvie Beaudelaire, Maupassant, and
Zola in their own rcvince', was inclined to see the latest genre
of Tench novels, of which Georges Mareschal Ge Bievre's
Un ari en F-terie was a typical example, as 'somewhat foolish'
B?
efforts belonging to a 'new and innocent school of fiction', "
In the eyes of a number of British critics, then, a good
deal of contemporary French art was lacking in seriousness and in
sense of purpose. But if such was the case, then it must be said
that these same critics were often quick to emphasise what they
construed to be the one 'redeeming' feature of such works, that
of providing readers and audiences with character sketches of the
supposedly ty ical Frenchman* It was believed, for instance, that
French fiction 'interprets the moods of society more perfectly
than the nglisb'* hile in Britain 'the novel of human nature'
was the 'ideal romance', in France it was those works which
reflected 'the social, n tional, and psychological nature of the
people with a perfection and promptitude having no precise
BB
analogies in this country', that attracted the largest audiences. J
Needless to say, the characters which were invariably c ,osen to
31




illustrate this point were only those who belonged to the '".ore
respectable sections of 'rench society. Hence, of all the
characters In Octave Hirabeau's 'Fes affaires sont les affaires',
the one when one British reviewer singled out for scrutiny was
the wife in the lay, Madame Lechat, who, we are told, 'exists
in every city, town, and village in France'. Fussy, kind-hearted,
economical, and unimaginative, MMe. Lechat typifies the modern
middle class Frenchwoman 'who is utterly out of place and
unhappy in any but the most orderly, puctual, and thrifty of
34
menaces'■ Similarly, as regards aul .ervieu's 'Le d'dale',
we are asked to consider the plight not of the heroine, but
of the other of the heroine, the staid and upright
Madame Villard-Euval, whose 'convictions and traditional
sentiments' are 'deep-rooted in the hearts of thousands cf
Frenchwomen cf her type'. The marriage of this woman's
daughter to a divorced man is, we are asked to believe, 'a sin
against the religion, not merely cf the Church, but of the family -
a crime'} this because nowhere more than in France 'is the
idea of-la famllle respected, cherished'.^ Perhaps both of
these women can be viewed in a sympathetic light, but by
concentrating on them, rather than on other, less morally-minded
characters, Jrltish theatre critics were helping to project a
most favourable image of Frenchmen. Once again, the 3uprjosed
sericus-raindedne3s and rectitude of the individual, as well as
the sanctity of the family were themes employed, albeit in a
rather subtle fashion, to promote the image of a secure and
trustworthy ""ranee.
34 John F. MacdonaId, op. cit.. n. 732.
35 Ibid.f p. 736.
The British reading public was encouraged to peruse T'rench
novels anc to attend T'rench stage traductions in order to achieve
that tost iranortant of ^oals if the Lntente were ever to take
hold of the minds and hearts of ordinary reople throughout the
country, an understanding of the Gallic character and
temperament, Yet not everyone f vcured such indirect methods.
The more obvious means of reaching this end was, of course, for
people to go to Prance themselves, and with this in mind a
number of prominent figures of goodwill on both sides of the
Channel organised a series of exchange visits between civic,
religious, and trade union delegations. At the head of this
movement was Bir Thomas Barclay, a former jurist and by this
time the Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris,
In 1905 Barclay formed the International Brotherhood Alliance,
an organisation dedicated to the promotion of 'international
visits to each other of working men and women', A year later
he started the notion of 'municipal ententes' in which officials
of leading British and rench cities could visit each other and
compare methods of local government,^ -ven before the launching
of these two schemes Barclay was doing his utmost to bring the
peoples of the two countries together by means of fraternal
visits. As early as July 1904 he had brought ore than three
hundred British trade unionists to Paris to tour the factories
and working class neighbourhoods of the French capital,- But
it was after 1904 that the bulk of these visits occurred: a
36 oir Thomas Barclay, rtflrty fffrgj Anglp-lTgnch ;emlnlscenceg,
1876-1906, (London, 1914), p. 298.
37 The Piraes, 6 July 1904,
tour of British physicians to French hospitals in May 1905; a
visit of London County Councillors to Paris in February 1906;
a visit of Scottish Municipal Councillors in April of that year;
a trip of British businessmen under the aegis of the London
International Commercial Association in October 1906; and a
visit of the representatives of British universities to the
Sorbonne and other French academic institutions, to mention
but a few. Nor was this all. Other, longer-standing
organisations of Anglo-French friendship began to follow Barclay's
lead. The Franco-Scottish Society, which Barclay himself bad
founded in 1895 and whose membership consisted of such well-known
figures as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Marquis of
Linlithgow, and the Canadian premier Sir Wilfred Laurier,
entertained groups of Frenchmen, particularly students and
academicians, throughout the year 1906 in Glasgow, Edinburgh,
and Aberdeen.The Society's English equivalent, the Entente
Cordiale Society, founded by a W.H. Sands in 1904, performed more
or less the same service south of the border, as did the various
English branches of the Alliance Francalse.^ The crowning
event of this movement, however, was the opening of the
Franco-British Exhibition in Shepherd's Bush in the spring of
1908. Started by a group of British businessmen who had been
disappointed by the notable lack of impact of the Entente on
Anglo-French commercial relations, the Exhibition was designed
to 'display in abundance' the industries and products of the
two countries in order to improve trade. Nevertheless, the
38 See the transactions of the Franco-Scottish Society. 1906,
p. xv (appendix).
39 Barclay, on. cit.. p. 303.
social and recreative side of the Exhibition was intended to be
on a scale commensurate with the commercial and business one; and,
significantly, of the more than twenty palaces and exhibition
halls on the site about half a dozen were devoted to Education,
40
Science, the Fine Arts, and kindred fields.
Of these innumerable activities it may be said that they
were well-enjoyed by those who took part and provided many
ordinary British and French people with an insight into each
other's life-style and cultural heritage. But taken as a whole,
they did not capture the imagination of the general public in
\
either country. For one thing, many of the British organisers
of such fraternal exchanges, convinced perhaps that the Entente
had already enjoyed a groundswell of support on both sides of
the Channel, soon shifted the focus of their attention away
from France towards Germany. Aided and abetted by some
powerful industrialists like George Cadbury, the cocoa
manufacturer, not to mention scores of outspoken Radicals and
Socialists, these Anglo-German exchanges for a while received a
good deal more publicity than the earlier Anglo-French ones.
For another, such visits came to be regarded as little more
than a nuisance by politicians and diplomats in both countries.
Thus when in the midst of the London County Council's visit to
Paris in February 1906 the Lord Provost and Council of Edinburgh
proposed a similar tour of the French capital, Sir Francis Bertie
urged the Foreign Office to exert its influence against the idea
for fear of antagonising the French civic authorities. 'These
municipal, musical, and other invasions from across the Channel
will soon become ridiculous', the British Ambassador wrote.
40 The Tiites, 8 May 1908, p. 8. The Exhibition ramdtnec open
for nearly six months.
'Lavino says that the public takes but little interest in thera.
If Edinburgh sends its thirty, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow,
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Bradford, Birmingham, etc., will all expect to dc likewise'.
Already foundering on the rocks of ublic apathy, the movement
to bring the people of Britain and Prance closer together was
almost bound to die in view of this lack of encouragement from
higher circles.
3* Men e-f Letters and the Entente.
Of all the groups that went to make un public opinion in
the Edwardian era, British men of letters provide one of the
greatest sources of disappointment in their treatment of
France and the Entente Cordlale. A highly intelligent,
well-educated, and thoroughly cosmopolitan collection of
individuals, many of whom had had occasion either to live or
to travel in France, Britain's literary set of the early
twentieth century might have been expected to have made a
number of pronouncements about a major diplomatic occurrence
of the pre-Great War period and its impact on the cultural and
intellectual life of the two countries. And yet they remained
comparatively silent. As will be seen, it was a silence based
largely on a belief that things intellectual and ohilosophic
counted for more than things political. Nevertheless, there were
a number of literary figures who did make a reference to the
rapprochement between the two countries, and 't is to what they
had to say that we now turn cur attention.
One of the. few literary figures in Britain who did voice
his sentiments about the Anglo-French Entente quite clearly was
41 Bertie to Eir Charles Hardinge, 11 February 1906, F(oreign
O(ffice) 300/184. William Lavino was the Paris correspondent of
Rudyard Kipling. That this writer should anprove of an
arrangement which amicably settled overseas disputes with a
fellow colonising nation like France scarcely comes as a surprise.
Kipling was a self-avowed imperialist, and one who was something
of a Francophile at that. It is true that at the turn of the
century when relations between London and Paris were not on a
particularly gcod footing Kipling went through an anti-French
42
phase. But in the main he was, as one biographer put it,
'by nature a lover of France, and of the French, who...read his
books as avidly as the English'.Kipling was reputedly fond
of visiting France, and among his closer acquaintances was
Georges Clemenc««u, whose friendship provided Kipling with a
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good understanding of French politics. He was equally fond,
as were so many imperialists of the day, of expressing his
dislike for Germany, and it is quite possibly this sefctiment that
explains the poet's tendency to view the 1903-4 ranprochement in
terms of the current world diplomatic situation. Thus ia a
letter which was openly published in the Figaro to M. d'Humieres,
the translator of a number of his works into French, Kipling
expressed himself 'in hearty agreement...on the advantages to be
derived from a good understanding between France and England, not
only because of immediate utility, but for the sake of to-morrow
Nine years later Kipling used the State visit of President Poincare
to London as a good excuse to publish a poem in the Morning Tost.
42 In 1900 Kinling's feelings against France reached such a
bitch that he wrote a story entitled 'The Bonds of Discipline', in
which the villain of the plot was a French spy who disguised
himself on board Royal Navy ships in order to olan a French
invasion of the country.
43 Charles E. Carrington, Rudyard Kipling: Ills Life and ..crk.
(London, 1970), p. 482. " ———
44 Ibid.T p. 483.
4^ quoted in The Times, 12 Geotember 1904, p.4.
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a poem which he paid tribute to the qualities of the ^rench
national character 'in terms far different from the conventional
view'.' 0 Of course, Kipling did see the Anglo-French Entente
as something more than a mere weapon with which Britain could
advance her interests. Culturally speaking, it seemed appropriate
because it brought together two peoples who were •reciprocally
complementary in temperament and destiny, logically and in
reality'. Both were 'messengers of human enfrachisement1} both
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had to do with 'enslaved peoples'. Still, it must be said
that Kipling tended to view the friendlier relations between
the two countries first and foremost from a political angle,
and it is chiefly for his remarks along these lines that we
should remember him.
Another man-of-letters who spoke in rather plain language
about the political benefits that would accrue to Britain a3 a
result of the 1904 Agreements was the Positivist Frederic Harrison.
A systematic political thinker rather than a literary genius
with only a secondary interest in foreign affairs, Harrison
was not likely to view the Anglo-French Entente solely, or
even primarily, from the pciiit of view of the politics of the
moment. Ever since the 1860s when he, Congreve, and other
leading Positivists put forth their ideas on the ideal foreign
policy for Britain in the book International 'olic.v. Harrison had
become a firm advocate of diplomatic co-operation between the two
..estern Powers. It was to this end that he had advocated supporting
46 Ca rington, or . cit., o. 484.
47 The Times, loc. c:i t.
t-l •
Napoleon III over Poland in 1363, and it was to this end that
he energetically advanced France's case in the 1370-1371 war
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with Prussia, A.ny event like the signing of the 1904
Convention which brought the dream of Anglo-French co-operation
a step closer to reality was not only to be welcomed, but was to
be regarded as a fulfillment of his near life-long campaign.
This helps tc explain the somewhat boastful reminder of his not
long after the inceptipn of the rapprochement that 'our body has
insisted for years that the true nucleus for stable and permanent
peace and progress in Europe was to be obtained by a good
understanding between England and France on the basis of reciprocal
49
obligations and interests'. But if such were his views, he
was also not above making comment about the consequences of the
Agreements for the world at large, 'The alignment of 'Teutonic
Protestant Parliamentary And industrial' England with 'Latin
Catholic republican and dictatorial* France represented 'principles
so various, and comprise the dominant forces so nearly*, he wrote
in one leader-article for the Positlvist heview, 'that in any
policy in which they cordially agree no element of life is
30
likely to be sacrificed, whilst all are certain to be harmonised'.
The impact of the Entente on England was marked, he added in
another editorial, but in France it was even more marked, enabling
that nation 'to meet with any easy smile the heroics of the
51
Kaiser...'. For Harrison far more than for Kipling the
Entente fit into a broader scheme of things; nevertheless, like
43 Marandon, on. cit.. p. 56.
49 T. Harrison, 'The Anglo-French settlement', Positivist Review.
XII (1 ;lay 1904), pp. 99-100.
50 Ibid., loc. cit.
51 Ibid., 1 June 1904, r. 129.
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the latter, the former tended to see it as an anti-German
instrument.
Neither Harrison nor Kipling had a truly first-hand
knowledge of France. One man who did have such a knowledge,
however, was i.ilaire felloe, a writer born in Lngland of ixed
Anglo-'reach parentage, raised and educated in Trance, and
conscrirted into the : rench Army, only to return to the land
of his birth shortly fcofore the turn of the century to become a
naturalised British subject. Considering that '.elloc had
perhaps the best credentials of all literary figures in
Britain to write at length about France, it comes as something
of a disappointment that he had so little to say on the subject.
None of his novels of the period deal with 'ranee; his column
in the Radical weekly the ^oeakor was mainly concerned with
cultural and domestic political matters, not foreign ones; and
even his well-known history of the French capital published in
1907, . aria, was only a second edition of a work. . irst printed
seven years earlier and which contained no reference to recent
Anglo-French developments. Nevertheless, what he did have to
say 'was revealing, in a preface to a book written in 1904 on
French Renaissance poetry, Felloe examined the current climate
of opinion between the two countries. He did not believe that
Britain and ranee were all that similar in terms of culture,
Intellect, and national character; and in saying this he was
hot expressing anything fundamentally different from the Ideas
of writers like Kipling and arrison. 3ut he did believe that
the drawing together of the two countries, far from having taken
place of late, had in reality been underway for a considerable
period of time and that its central feature was some impersonal
force which had little to do with politics. *Hy a law which is
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universe! where bodies are bound In one system', he wrote,
an extreme of separation has wrought its own remedy and
the return towards a closer union is begun. I do not
refer to such ephemeral artificial raanifestations as a
special and somewhat humiliating need aay demand; I
consider rather that large sweep of tendency which was
already apparent fifteen years after the ^ranco-Prussian
War. An avproach In taste, manners and expression well
defined during cur undergraduate years, has now
introduced much of our inmost life to the "rench, to us
already a hint of their philosophy. 52
In other words, the rapprochement between Britain and
France was much more deen-rooted and considerably wider in
scope than the recent professions of friendship would suggest.
The ; ntente Cordial®, while not contradictory to this rrocess,
was basically irrelevant. Not that Belloc always dismissed
the political and diplomatic elements in his analysis.
long "eace*, 'the sterility of Germany', and even 'the
Interesting activities of the Catholic Church', had all
olayed their ^art in the phenomenon which he felt started
In the lBBOs."^ Nor did ho think that the process had by any
means reached its end: 'We shall not live to see that fine
unity of the west which lent the latter seventeenth and
54
eighteenth centuries their classical repose...'. Nevertheless,
he did feel that on the whole intellectual considerations
rather than the more mundane political and diplomatic ones
provided the real key to understanding the nature of the
relationship between the two nations and that the ohenonenon
by which -Britain and France had begun to draw closer together
was a more protracted and subtle one than most people ima;ined.
Indeed, there was a marked tendency in many British
intellectual and literary circles of the time not to attach much
52 II. isHoc, ■vril: -icing bssavs on the Tootr./ of the rench
.renaissance, (London, 1904;, r.xii.
53 I.7JL'4» » loc« cit.
54 Ibid., lpct pit.
importance to the Fntente. Kioling and Harrison apart, there
almrly vps not much Interest in an event which seemed to herald
at most a diplomatic crossroads in the history of the two
nations. To cite a case in point, the various men and women
who went to make up the Blocmsbury group remained quite
unmoved by it. Like Belloc, they tended to think of ''ranee
primarily in cultural ters3, and in cultural terms well-rooted
in the past at that. Contemporary "ranee for thera 'no longer
lent itself to idealised views'? instead, it was the eighteenth
century which was 'intact'.-' And it was only in this rather
vague context that they ever commented about the Third nerubllc
or the osition of "ranee in the world's •olitical arena. Thus
Lytton Jtrachey wrote to Henry James in September 1914 that it
would be almost criminal if France were tc be crushed in the
Great ar, not because she was the ally of ritalnf but because
she was to his mind 'the most civilised country in the world...1.
Meanwhile for their part, many of the more prominent novelists
of the period noticeably refrained from the campaign to portray
France and Frenchmen in all but the most glorious terms. In
Arnold "ennett's i .v, ..ocl afth Joined, for instance, It is a
: rench overness, a lie. bouchon, who has the dubious
distinction of being the one person who breaks up the otherwise
happy Fearn family by seducing the son Charles. Neither
John Galsworthy nor Henry James had 'renchmen or Frenchwomen
playing such unlikeable roles in their novels of this time,
but some of their works did help in a small way to reinforce
55 Campos, or), clt., p. 213.
56 24. . olrcyd, .-trgcHey: A lp r^hy, (London, 1971), P
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Hut M thr-urh most contemporary British of letters for
the r.ost nart eschewed any direct references tc the -mglo-'roneh
Entente, this is net to say that the literature of the --eriod as
a whole did not contribute in some way to the discussion of
international developments, indeed on occasion to the worsening
the 3 ndsf even though not intended to remote hostility between
the British and German peoples, was nonetheless something of a
first step in this direction, "*n anonymously written play
entitled Ma englishman's Home', which was shewn before 1 rg©
audiences in the est End of London at the height of the naval
oanic M IM'-), • ;ic •• novel ..••.•Itten. not Ion., af tec, -vn;, c "r,tt
of li.'.constituted veritable turning points. Ml of these
works had invasion scares as their main themes, with the
policy-makers in Berlin cast as the villains. Yet if popular
novelists and playwrights had a 3©rious message to deliver to
their readers about Germany arid German designs, then it must be
said that they, together with a few critics writing in the
periodical press, had seme corresponding remarks to make about
-a nee and h< ? alleles. Thus within rmths of thi si ;ning of the
1904 colonial Convention a play entitled 'L*Entente Cordial©'
appeared at .London's llhanbra Theatre. Despite receiving mixed
reviews -.nil experiencing a rather short run, it sore I ;an :nagcd
He then went on tc accuse England of giving up to ranee 'that
which was never hers t give' and Vane© of gratefully receiving
'the swag from the swell mobsman's hand; when all the ••olic© are
down the areas or are drunk'. Gee the preface to .1. flalo's
ij& ML (London, 19C4), ■ . xili, xv.
to drive home its main point to those who watched it - namely,
that Britain and ranee, by virtue of having amicably settled
all their squabbles, had set an admirable example to others,
thereby making them the true peace-makers of the world."'" In
a similar spirit, British reviewers were capable of ridiculing
any stage production, even a French one, that challenged the
notion of ranee as a pacific-minded country pursuing her
policies throughout the world with only the best and most honest
of intentions. -rlting about a play then showing in oaris by
Jean Jullien entitled 'L'oasis' In which the heroine, a Catholic
nun, forsakes her religion, marries a Muslim chieftain in the
sands of forth Africa, and declines to return to Europe after
having been 'captured' by a group of French colonial officers,
a critic in the ; dlnburi-h acview concluded: 'There Is some
effective satire on European methods of "civilising" what it
considers "inferior" races, but the play is drowned in verbiage
and cloyed with a rather namby-pamby sentimentalise!, and the
/ I
total impression is of something slightly absurd'. And so
it went on. Comparatively few and far between,writings of this
sort did nonetheless emerge often enough to give the more
serious-minded culture enthusiasts in Britain a very one-sided
view of France.
In summary, then, one can say that there was a conscious
attempt in certain contemporary literary ana artistic circles
in .rltain to discuss ranee and French culture in a political
context. Writers like kiss Betham-Ldwards and E.H, Barker who
had a strong emotional attachment to 'ranee dwelt at length on
60 See, for instance, . unch. 9 September 1904, r. 164.
61 , 'Some recent "French and English plays',
Edinburgh :cvlewT CC (October, 1904), 305.
the physical attractions of that country and on the attributes
of its people in the hope of extendin the friendship between
the two owers to the grassroots level; certain men of letters,
albeit only a few, like Tudyard Kipling and 'rederie arrlson
spoke warmly about the 1904 Convention and regarded it as a
natural outgrowth of the 'complementary' aspects of their history
and culture; in scores of specially written articles a host of
critics reinforced these impressions with remarks of a similar
nature; and even the odd play or book was devoted to this notion*
And yet, for all these efforts, the establishment cf the Anglo-French
Entente cannot be said to have forged any significant new
cultural ties between the two countries. True, there took place
at the outset of this period a series of exchange visits between
ordinary working people, and in 1908 there opened in London a
major exhibition showing the social and cultural as well as the
commercial aspects of British and bench life, 3ut both of these
phenomena were comparatively short-lived and exerted no real
impact on the very people they were designed to attract. The
same can be seen even in the literary tastes of the British
reading public. The sizeable increase of books printed in the
British Isles dealing with France that occurred simultaneously
with the growth of improved relations between the two Governments
tapered off within a few years, and by 1910 there was a 'slight
fall' in the 'selling appeal' of 'ranee, with 3 'slow decline
beginning in 1913'*°2 Precisely why all this should happen is
difficult, though not impossible, to exnlain. The half-hearted
attitudes of the men promoting the exchange visits and
exhibitions played its part, as did the refusal of many of the
62 Campos, on. clt.f p. 241.
sore prominent men of letters to regard the Entente as anything
more than a development of secondary importance in the history
of Anglo-'rench relations. The real ex lanation, however,
undoubtedly lay in the rather arid political nature of the
rapprochement itself. Started by a handful of men on both
sides of the Channel and concerned almost exclusively with
colonial and diplomatic questions, the Entente could not in
the final analysis capture for long the hearts and minds of
the people of Britain without constant encouragement from
higher circles. And this, we have seen, the politicians and
diplom ts were unwilling to provide.
CHAPTER IX
ANGLO-FRENCH-RUSSIAN APTAIRS AS SEEN BY THE BRITISH PRESS, 1903-1907
That the Entente Cordiale might one day have a beneficial
effect on Anglo-Russian relations was a possibility which had
not escaped the attention of most contemporary observers of
foreign affairs. France was now the friend of Britain as well
as the ally of Russia, and with these two Powers at odds over
the war then raging in the Far East, it was both natural and
desirable that she should try and bring them closer together.
As the Westminster Gazette put it, 'It will be a help both to
Russia and to ourselves if the good offices of France are
available now and hereafter to remove the dangerous kind of
friction which has threatened more than once since the war
began'.1 And in August 1907, less than two years after the
hostilities in Asia came to a halt, this hope was more than
fulfilled with the signing of an Anglo-Russian Convention
similar to the one signed by Britain and France in 1904. How
did this 1907 Convention come about? Did the French in fact
play an Important role in the reconciliation? Or did the
impetus come primarily from the British and the Russians
themselves? The answers which the British press gave to these
questions are of interest? for many newspapers did not comment
without having first made some startlingly inaccurate statements
about the current diplomatic scene. The Dual Alliance, they
averred, was a dying force in European politics, and Britain
1 Westminster Gazette. $ April 1904.
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in coming to terms with Prance could accelerate its dissolution.
Even when it became readily apparent that the Franco-Russian
connection was not dead and that the French were steadfastly
working towards a new diplomatic alignment between London,
Paris, and St. Petersburg, the newspapers did not always fully
appreciate the significance of the situation. Many of them
believed that French foreign policy was motivated more by a
desire to spread peace and goodwill than by any urge to
isolate Germany.
Although it was widely hoped in Britain that improved
ties with Russia through France might eventually be realized,
few people believed in the early days of the Entente Cordlale
that any such development was imminent. To a large extent,
this pessimism can be attributed to the poor state of
Anglo-Russian relations at the time. During the recent Boer
War, Russian newspapers and journals took part in the general
campaign waged by the Continental press of poking fun at
British military reverses. Later, when it became apparent
that the tide was being turned, the Russian Government seriously
considered Kaiser Wllhelm's proposal of forming in concert with
France 4 Continental League to isolate Britain. But it was in
Asia, for decades the arena of imperial rivalry between the two
Powers, that Anglo-Russian animus had really intensified.
Anxious to extend her influence over as large an area of that
continent as possible, Russia deliberately stepped up her
expansionist drive at a moment when Britain was unable to offer
much resistance; the military occupation of Manchuria,
increased financial investments in Persia, and repeated attempts
to establish direct relations with the Amir of Afghanistan and
the Dalai Lama in Tibet, were all undertaken while Britain
was preoccupied in South Africa. Britain meanwhile had
concluded an alliance with Japan in January 1902, leaving her
free to counter Russian forwardness in Central Asia while the
latter Power did the same in the Far East. All in all the
situation was not encouraging, and the war that erupted between
Russia and Japan in February 1904 made matters worse. For now
even if all other colonial problems were to disappear, Britain
still could not come to terms with Russia except by the
betrayal of her Oriental ally. With this in mind, many organs
of opinion in Britain chose to treat the subject of a future
Russian Entente with circumspection. They welcomed the idea
in principle but pleaded that diplomatic considerations had
for the time being rendered any such reconciliation impossible.
In the words of The Times, an Angle-Russian rapprochement was
o
as yet 'premature* but 'of no little interest and significance'.
!• Attitudes towards the Dual Alliance
There was another factor which prompted the press to think
that an Anglo-Russian understanding was still a long way off.
This was the worsening state of affairs which the French
themselves were experiencing with the Russians. For nearly a
decade, the press in Britain had looked upon the alliance that
dominated the relations of these two countries as a comparatively
stable force in European politics. True, it was recognized
that there were moments - the Fashoda crisis in 1.398, for
example - when the lack of full support of the one partner for
the policies of the other added an element of coolness to the
relationship. But the frigidity produced during such episodes
2 The, .Tiff?,9, 16 April 1904; see also L^JLy Clyqi&c^,
25 Rarch 1904, for similar sentiments.
was thought to be short-llvedj in Britain, the general feeling
had been that an arrangement which boosted ussia's financial
credit and restored France's diplomatic prestige was too useful
to both sides to wither away as a result of any minor rifts. By
1903, however, many people in Britain were having second
thoughts about the durability of the Dual Alliance. In part,
this can be attributed to the new wave of oppressive measures
which the Tsarist regime was enforcing throughout Russia. In
March 1903, Nicholas II issued a manifesto crushing Finnish
autonomy and placing the Finns under the military rule of the
redoubtable General Bobrikoff; in May of that year,
Government-Inspired anti-Semitism led directly to a large-scale
pogrom of Jews at Kishineffj while throughout the summer of
1903, reports kept coming in of the continuing bad treatment
of the -rmenians and the harsh repression of labour agitation
that was taking place in most of Russia's major cities. The
widespread revulsion with which French public opinion greeted
the news of these developments did not go unnoticed in Britain.
Bach speech in the Chamber of Deputies and each leader-article
In the Ffcench press that condemned the course of events In
Russia was treated a3 evidence of the mounting distaste in
France for the 1894 Convention. Commenting on some
particularly anti-Russian remarks mad© by one French editor
shortly after the Jewish massacres, the Birmingham Daily ost
concluded*
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there is a limit, apparently, to French tolerance, and
that limit# was passed at Kishineff. It is curious,
to say the least of it, that a people so strongly imbued
with anti-oeaitic prejudice, as was shown in the notorious
Dreyfus case, should be so aeenly moved new by the reports
of the outrages of which Jews were the victims, but the
fact appears to be beyond a doubt,.. M. Le roy-Beaulleu
says the policy of Russia towards Finland, one of the
most interesting and thoroughly civilised States in
Furore, has already made the alliance sickening. The
recent massacres may render it loathsome. 3
Nor had the disenchantment been setting in from just one side
of the alliance. In Russia as well as in France, certain
sections of public opinion had become openly critical of the
domestic ana foreign policies of its ally. As early as
April 1903, a war of words had broken out between French and
Russian newspapers about the timid programme of reform* which
Austria and Russia had jointly proposed for Macedonia; at
one point in the exchange the officially-insoired Novove '/remya
accused France of trying to supplant Russia as the leading
4
protector of the Balkan Glavs. Even more significant,
prominent Russian newspapers and journals of conservative
persuasion began to berate daily the French Government for
its 'anti-Christian' role in the disestablishment of the Roman
Catholic Church and in the secularization of the French Army
after the Dreyfus affair. fo many people in Britain, it
Suddenly looked as if the Russians and the French were rapidly
moving towards a breach, if not an outright dissolution, of
3 Birmingham Dally ost. 22 May 19C3. Le roy-3eaulieu was the
editor of the influential Kconomiste Francals. He was also one
of France's most distinguished economists and had ardently
defended since the 1890s the policy of extending loans to
Russia. Kcnce, it would be reasonable for British newspapers
to treat his anti-Russian outbursts as significant.
4 Reported in The Tines. 6 4priX 1903, P.6.
5 Reported 26~.ay 1903, p. 5.
the Dual Alliance,
British Radicals and Socialists in particular held this
view, believing that the estrangement between France and Russia
reflected something more deep«-rooted than the recent press
polemics suggested. As they saw It, the antagonism was
fundamentally an ideological one. The two Powers - the one
a progressive democracy, the oth~e an immobile autocracy - had
established between themselves a bond which was inconsistent
with their differing forms of government. The result was an
'unnatural* alliance imposing certain conditions on then both
which they otherwise would not have accented. By encouraging
small as well as large investments in Russian stocks and
securities, it in effect induced many ordinary Frenchmen -
'the sincerest of Republicans' - to take sides with the
Russian bureaucracy in Its struggle against the people; It
tied France to the whims and vagaries of an unstable Tsarist
foreign policy; while at the other end of the connection, it
secured the financial dependence of a reactionary Russian
Government on a notion whose more advanced political ideas were
looked upon with fear and auspieion at Gt. Petersburg. The
current hostility between France and Russia, wrote the Clarion,
amounted to a 'gulf of Governmental antipathies ,.. widening
daily under the influence of the Combes Ministry's democratic
6
and anti-clerical tendencies'. Possibly this explains why
many left-wing journals like the Labour Leader were doubly
pleased the signing of the 1904 Entente; for as a result
of It they could 3ee France 'awakening from the nightmare of
her alliance with Russia'.''
6 Clarion. 23 October 1903.
7 Labour Leader. 25 November 1904.
But if the Labour Leader sounded optimistic about the
chances of drawing the French away from the ""ussians, then it
must be said that there were others who struck an equally
pessimistic note. J.L. Garvin, at this time a leader-writer
for the Fail.v Telegraph as well as a columnist for the
Fortnightly Review and one of the most outspoken students of
foreign affairs, was one of the first to express doubts. For
him it was inconceivable that any 'competent politician'
could contemplate even for a moment the substitution of the
Entente Cordiale for the 1894 Alliance as the corner-stone of
French foreign policy. France, he said, 'is prepared to make
the friendship with England her second interest. But the
unshaken maintenance of the alliance with Russia will continue
to be m«do under all circumstances at present calculable her
first interest. Her genuine wish is to see both interests
permanently harmonized, but if she must choose, even with a
sigh, she will unhesitatingly sacrifice the former to the
latter'.1' The Times was inclined to agree, arguing that 'a
strong France without the Russian alliance is, under existing
a
conditions, impossible." Whether or not 6«rvm and
The Times echoed the prevailing sentiments in Britain on this
question is difficult to say. For despite their numerous
assertions to the contrary, the newspapers did at times reveal
an inner belief that France and Russia were still firmly
attached to one another. Thus in the early days of the
8 Calchas (J.L. Garvin), 'The Latin rapprochement and
Anglo-Russian relations', T'ortnir.htlv ReviewT LXX'III (June 1903),
954. Garvin, needless to say, was a staunch Tory and in time
was to become a mouthpiece for Lord Northcliffe as editor of
the Qbierver.
9 The Times. 12 4oril 1904.
Far Eastern conflict, when Russia suffered a string of defeats,
seme wondered if the French might he tempted to intervene lest
the war dangerously weaken Russia's resources# Already by
11 February 1904 the Scotsman was warning that 'the French
people, whether as political allies or as financial creditors,
cannot look with equanimity on the confusion of Russia1#
Earlier the Spectator voiced doubt that the French would loin
in the fray at Russia's side# Still, as the Spectator could
not altogether rule out a French intervention, it felt
impelled to say that any such action would force Britain to
10
honour her obligations to Japan made in the 190? Alliance.
Indeed, it was this prospect that led the Observer to clamour
for a speedy conclusion of the Anglo-French colonial
negotiations then in progress. Only by coming to a written
understanding, it argued, could Britain and France prevent the
11
Far Eastern »'ar spreading to Europe. *
ks the Russo-Japanese War progressed, however, such fears
about being dragged into the conflagration gradually subsided.
Undoubtedly the quick proclamation of neutrality made by the
French Government in February 1904 had done much to allay the
anxiety. Bo too did the announcement of the Foreign Office
on 16 March that the talks with the French, temporarily
interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities, were about to
resume. For it now seemed that the two Governments had
heeded newspaper advice and were intent upon making good use
of the favourable diplomatic climate to ensure that the war
1° Spectator. 15 December 1903.
11- Observer, 6 I'arch 1904.
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remained localized in the ar Last, But even more decisive
perhaps was the remarkable manner in which the French were
reacting to the reports that kept coming in from the front of
successive Japanese victories, Rather than rallying to the
cause of their ally, as some newspapers feared they might do,
the French seemed to be doing just the opposite. French
military leaders began to critize openly their ally's war
effort,'*0 Leading French banks, hitherto only too willing to
issue loans to Russia, suddenly grew reluctant to export any
more capital."^4 Nor was this all. Upon hearing of the
'Bloody Sunday' massacre at St. Petersburg in January of that
year, French public opinion burst into a new wave of anti-Tsarist
feeling. The French press, led by Cleraenceau in the Aurora
and Jaure3 ill the HuraanlteT quickly condemned the Russian
Government for the atrocities, and in Paris, Socialists and
prominent intellectuals like Anatole Prance organized meetings
1«5
to promote sympathy for the general strike in Russia.
12 PeUMIX Saaa&J&f 16 "arch 1904? also Jfo-ningiyp ^aily Ppgfr,18 March 1904: and Dally Chronicle. 25 Parch 1904. But at the
same time the newspapers took care to remind their readers that,
in striving to settle all outstanding colonial questions, the
British and French Governments had been motivated more by a
prudent wish to avoid quarrels than by any desire to keep out of
the Far Eastern dispute. As The Times wrote on 4 Parch 1904, the
Entente 'expends to the people on both sides of the water, and
the people here, as in France, are congratulating themselves on
the fact that it was firmly cemented before the present troubles
arose in the Par East'.
13 In May 1984, a Lt.-Col. Rousset, whom the Paris correspondent
The Times describes as 'one of the most prominent and
authoritative French military writers', wrote an article in the
Oaulols in which he severely criticized General Kuropatkin's
strategy at the time of the battle of the ¥alu. Gee The Times,
11 May 1904y p.5.
14 In March 1905, the Russian Government managed to extract
another £20 million loan from the French, but only on the
understanding that this would be the last 'for some time to
come'. See ibid., 8 March 1905, p.5.
15 Reported ibid.T 30 January 1905, p.3.
In Britain, newspapers were now more ready to acknowledge
the view that the Franco-Russian Alliance was a waning force
in European affairs. Gome even believed that it was on the
verge of breaking up. The Daily Chronicle, in summing up the
significance of the reaction in France to the outbreak of
the 1905 revolution, wrote that 1 there is little reason to
16
doubt that the unnatural alliance is doomed*. Others,
however, drew a more cautious conclusion. The ties which
bound France and Russia together, they agreed, were weakening?
but this did not necessarily mean that the end of the 1894
alliance was at hand. For the French knew that to sever the
bonds with their ally would be to risk provoking the Russian
Government to default on its payment of the interest on the
foreign debts. Dissolution, moreover, would leave France
vulnerable tc an attack by Germany• 4s a result, France,
they conjectured, would probably continue her present policy
of refusing to issue any more loans while Russia was at war
with Japan and while she was suffering from internal disorders.
This was a stand which was reasonable enough not to alienate
the Russians; yet at the same time, it was harsh enough to
induce the governing classes in Russia to consider suing for
peace in the Far East and concede important reforms at horae."^
Of course, none of this is to suggest that the press in
Britain was necessarily pleased with the manner in which the
French had dealt with the Russians during the war. 3y and
large it was, feut on one or two occasions there were
expressions of disapproval concerning the excessively
16 Pal 1.7 Chronicle-, 8 February 1905.
17 Dnectator, 28 January 1905; also Economist, 8 April 1905.
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benevolent neutrality which the French were thought to have
bestowed upon their ally. These arose in connection with the
differing interpretations which the British and Tr,rench
Governments placed on the duties of neutrals vis-a-vis the
sheltering and coaling of belligerent vessels. Most countries
were of the opinion thrat ships of war should be granted asylum
in a neutral port for a period lasting no longer than twenty-four
hours at a time and, further, that they should be supplied with
only enough coal to enable then to reach the nearest port of
their country. This had been the position of the British
Government since 1362, when the prospect of having to fuel
steamships during the American Civil ar first made the coaling
of belligerent ships a potentially dangerous Issue. Other
governments were to follow suit, including the Russian and the
Japanese, both of which adopted the British practice at the
outbreak of the Spanish-American Jar in 1893. But not so the
French. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century,
they had consistently refused to acknowledge either of these
regulations, arguing that neither a prolonged stay in a port
of call nor an unlimited supply of coal sufficiently aided a
ship of war to constitute a breach of neutrality, and not
long after war erupted in the ar East, the French Government
issued a Neutrality Circular reiterating this position.
On the fact of it, such differences of opinion ought to
have produced few difficulties, After all, the French
interpretation had already stood the test of previous wars
without leading to any unfortunate complications. Moreover,
both the Russians and the Japanese recognized the 'twenty-four
hour' rule. As long as the two warring Powers practised what
2?0.
they preached, therefore, the possibility of France's
'peculiar' views leading to trouble was remote. But the
Russians did not live up to their word. Not long after
hostilities commenced, Admiral Wirenius, the commander of a
Russian naval squadron in the Mediterranean, anchored his
ships in the French Cast African port of Jibuti for several
days in an attempt to store a number of provisions, including
coal. In January 1905, the Russian Baltic Fleet under
Admiral Rozhdestvensky spent several weeks at Diego Suarez,
the chief French port in Madagascar. Four months later, he
had an even longer stay at Kamranh Bay in Cochin China before
moving on to engage the Japanese Fleet in the Far East. Worse
still, reports from Saigon had it that the ussians had
virtually converted Kamranh Bay into a base of operations.
The French port, it was said, was being used by the Russians
as a starting point from which they could inspect passing
18
steamers in the South China Sea for contraband.
The news of such abuses provoked a good deal of disquiet
in Britain. True, care was taken in high circles to point out
that French neutrality regulations, while obviously working to
the advantage of the Russians, were nevertheless legitimate.
Legal specialists remin&ld everyone that the French rules were
not in contradiction to the dictates of International law?
there were as yet no restrictions cn the amount of time which
belligerent ships could spend in a neutral port nor on the
amount of coal with which they could be supplied,^ And in
13 ZM Hasa, 5 May 1905.
19 T. ... Lawrence, ,nr and Neutrality in the Far Fast (London, 1904),
pp. 120-122. dee also the letter of T.E. Holland, Professor
of Intern,.ticnal Law and Diplomacy at 411 Souls College, Oxford,
to The Times, 21 April 1905.
Parliament, both 9a1 four and Lansdowne ere at pains to
stress that the unlawful provisioning of the 3a 1 tic fleet at
Kamranh day had been the work of private individuals rather
PC
than of the local French authorities. * Yet desnite these
soothing observations, public opinion In Britain was still
not satisfied with France's behaviour. Everything taken into
account, It continued to show an excessive predisposition to
favour the -ussians: French neutrality laws remained
unchanged! while those who illegally supplied the Russians
21
went unpunished. The French, moreover, displayed an
almost callous indifference to the feelings of the Japanese,
Considering that Japan might choose at any moment to invoke
the casus foederis against France, thereby involving Britain
in a war with the Dual Alliance, this attitude seemed
particularly alarming. As Valentino Chlrol, "oreign editor
The Times, complained to that paper's Paris correspondent:
•The French are always impressing upon us the necessity of
our considering Russian susceptibilities. They might with
advantage themselves consider Japanese susceptibilities.
Altogether the policy of France with regard to the Far East
22
is not at the present moment quite reassuring',""
whatever the criticisms that had been directed against the
French, they were more than offset by a genuine sympathy for the
awkward predicament which France had been put into, by the
professions of good faith made by the Tranch Government, and
by a firm belief that a repetition of such incidents was
unlikely. This last point was based on a major new development
20 Hansard, Earl. Debates, Fourth Series, K, of C., CX1V
(9 May 19057, 1351-1352 and F. p* L. CXLV (9 May 1905), 1268-1269.
21 Dully Chronicle, 21 April 1905i also Birmingham Dally Post.
9 May 190%
22 Chirol to William Lavino, 29 December 1904, The Times
Archives F(orelgn) L(etter) R(ook), vol. V, 6-7ff•
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that had taken place In the Far last. In late May 1905,
"idmiral Togo and his squadron annihilated the Baltic Fleet
in a crucial battle off the island of Tsushima in the Sea
of Japan. <*s light be expected, the news of this decisive
defeat was greeted with some relief in Britain; for a
reoccurrence of Russian naval infractions in neutral ports
was now impossible.^ But in France the reaction was
somewhat more pronounced. French newspapers, anxious that
this latest military reversal might lead to a financial
debacle in Russia, took up the cry that the Tsar should
conclude neace. In the French Chamber, there ensued a
prolonged debate on foreign affairs in which Delcasse was
strongly rebuked for having maintained a close partnership
v^ith St. Petersburg. A week later, It was announced that the
French foreign minister had resigned and was being replaced by
Rouvier, the current premier who was not known for his
pro-Russian sentiments. To many people in Britain this
sequence of events meant primarily one thing: France and
Russia were drifting further and further apart. If a number
of newspapers like the Dally Express denied that the two
Powers had as yet been unfaithful to one another, they could
not help but note that, in view of all of Russia's misfortunes,
'it is scarcely a matter for wonder If the invective launched
against M» Delcasse ... should find an echo in quarters where
24
It has hitherto passed unheeded'. The Birmingham J-■ally Post
23 Economist. 3 June 1905.
24 Daily Lxnress. 7 June 1905.
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was less equivocal in its assessment cf the proceedings. T1rance,
it said, was in the process of reconstructing her entire foreign
policy. For a long tine she had been ready 'to appraise
afresh the value of the Russian alliance as a national asset',
and now that the battles of Mukden and Tsushima had destroyed
for a while to come Russia's credibility as a worthwhile ally,
a reanoraisal was certain. ' There is room for these views,
even if events in Morocco provided a more plausible explanation
for Delcasse's fall; and at the time a number cf people in
Britain subscribed to them. Subsequent developments, however,
soon changed this line of thinking.
2. Imoact of the first Moroccan crisis on these attitudes
Between 1903 and the spring of 1905j most organs of
opinion in Britain, when writing about the Dual alliance, dwelt
primarily uron the economic aspects of that arrangement. In
so doing, they had fully exposed the pathetic state of her
finances which made Russia dependent on France, while largely
ignoring the military exigencies which made France ecually
dependent on Russia, Thus v;hen the Tangier crisis did reveal
the other side of the coin, many newspapers were hard put to
explain why the French had panicked by overthrowing their
foreign minister. \s has been seen, some like the Birmingham
Daily Post and the Dally Fxoress attempted to do so in terms
of the dislike felt in France for the Russian connection. 3
they saw it, the pressure emanating from Berlin was a factor of
only secondary importance behind the cabinet reshuffle.
25 :in;iir:,.harn nail:/ ost. 14 June 1905.
26 Ibid., loc. cit.; and Daily Fx--res5, loc. cit.
Others concede that the Russian collapse In the Far Fast did
leave Trance anxious in the face of German aggressiveness but
added that rench fears had quickly subsided in the light of
27
British diplomatic support. Indeed, in some quarters it
had already been claimed that the French ight actually prefer
an alliance with Britain to one with Russia? for unlike the
Russians, the British could both guarantee "ranee's overseas
empire and give her more than adequate naval protection in
pO
Europe/ But with the positive response of the Russian
Government to President Roosevelt's mediatory efforts in the
Far East and with rumours running wild in July 1905 that the
forthcoming meeting between the Kaiser ana the Tsar at Bjcrkoe
portended a new Russo-German alignment, the newspapers adopted
a new tune: Delcasse's fall was ascribed entirely to German
machinations? while Russian supnort for 'ranee became an
urgent necessity if the equipoise in Europe were to be
maintained. 'The balance has been partly redressed by the
good understanding with this country*, stated the Pally Chronicle:
'but the Russian alliance must remain the cardinal factor in
France's external policy, and thus the revival of Russia is
a principal French interest'.2^ Those who had preached all
along the strength of the Dual 4lliance now harped on its
immutability with even greater fervour. The Times, for example,
27 Ecpnqpflq^, 10 June 1905.
28 Morning Pest, f January 1904? also Spectator. 27 February 1904.
What prompted this extraordinary assertion was the outbreak of
the Far Eastern War, which raised the possibility of France
having to choose between her friendship with Britain and her
alliance with Russia. Of course, not everyone shared this
oninion? nevertheless it did, if from a different angle,
tend to reinforce the view of Socialists and some Radicals
that Britain could detach Prance from Russia.
29 Daily Chronicle, 23 September 1905. Gee also Glasgow Herald.
4 July 1905 for similar sentiments.
almost outdid itself in trying to put across this point*
Several times during the summer of 1905 it reiterated the
thesis that the maintenance of ranee's Great "over status
was too much in Russia's 'permanent interest' for the Dual
10
.lliance to lapse into obscurity.
Yet for all their talk about the unhappy condition of
the Dual llionce, the newspapers had never really given up
the notion that ''ranee would have an important part to play
in the reconciliation of Britain and Russia. Even while
Franco-Russian relations had been at a v ry low ebb, the
press remained confident that r'rance still had enough influence
at the court of Gt. etersburg to help effect such a change.
Of course, with the war in the :'ar East producing all sorts
of complications between the two Rowers, the most that could
be expected from the "rench for the time being was an offer
of good offices in order to prevent the conflict from
spreading further afield. And when in 1904-05 war between
3-9 'Che Rimes. 5 and 20 June and 5 September 1905. 'he attitude
of fhe Times towards the ranco-Hussian Alliance is curious. The
Foreign editor of the paner, Valentine Chirol, had learnt from
informed sources that all was not well between Paris and
St. Petersburg. As far back as June 1904, one unidentified
'rench informant had told him of the deplorable impression which
Russian reverses in the 'ar East had been making in French
military circles. Later, the rench Ambassador In London,
Raul Carnbon, had spoken privately but frankly to him about the
growing coolness in Franco-Russian relations. After a holiday
in Egypt, Chirol stopped off in Paris on his way home in
Earch 1905 to meet leading mothers of t'ru reach over am, nt.
.Chile there, he saw Loubet, Rouvier, Releasee and tienne, the
head of the parti colonial, all of whom vowed that no more
ussian loans would be floated in ;aris until peace was made.
And a prominent figure in the Credit Lyonnais verified this to
him while in London in early June 1905. Chirol himself,
moreover, had mentioned more nails being driven into 'the coffin
of the Dual Alliance' in connection with ranee's efforts to
establish a court of arbitration In Paris immediately after
the Dogger kink incident, (Lee Chirol to Lir Charles .arbinge,
16 June 1.9C4 5 10 August 1904 j 1 November 1904 5 20 arch 1905;
and 6 June 1905. The Hardinge of Renshurst Papers, volume VII.
Cambridge University Library.) Ltill, The Tiroes never nublicly
qualified its earlier judgment that the ranco-1 ussian Alliance
was 'a factor of great importance in the politics of Europe'.
Eee I.he Rimes. 11 April 1904.
Britain and Russia had been narrowly everted, the newspapers
were inclined to take the view that it was rrance who had
preserved th« ^eace. In Inly 1904, for instance, they credited
her with the sneedy release of the Malacca, a n. and f. liner
which the Russians boarded and seized without justification in
the led ea. Delcasse and Bonpard, the "rench inbassador at
St. Petersburg, were both thought to have spent a good deal of
tine impressing upon the Russians the need to consider ritish
11
susceotibilities. Likewise, the peaceful settlement of the
potentially explosive Dogger Bank affair in the autumn of 1904
was also widely attributed to French diplomatic efforts. nee
again it was the uai d'Orsay, this time working behind the
scenes in order to secure a special Commission of In uiry
1?
wealing ■ -;th the incido t, that had saved the day."' • or - ore
French activities along these lines confined to the duration
of the war. ven after hostilities in the ar Fast hod come
to a halt, the French continued to act as a pacific mediator
between ritain and Russia. The only difference was that
whereas hitherto the rench had been content to ease the
tension in -Rnglo-Russian relations, they now undertook the
more arduous task of bringing the two Powers into diplomatic
alignment. *t Rlgeciras, the "reach succeeded in getting
the British and the Russians to adoat a common outlook with
regard to the Toroccan question. Shortly afterwards, French
bankers were busily persuading their British counterparts in
the Cit„ to heir float a £90 million loan to Russia. nd in
the summer of 1907, France had a hand in the series of
diplomatic agreements which in effect regulated Britain's and
31 The Times. 23 July 1904.
32 Daily hews, 28 October 1904; also .■ :il.v Chronicle,
3 pril 1905.
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Russia's positions in the Far East.^ Given these developments
and France's role in them, It is no wonder The rimes acknowledged
at the time of the Russian Convention that 'France, ever since
the ententer has thrown the whole of her diplomatic weight into
•54
the scales to bring her ally and her friend together'.
But if the newspapers made such observations, they were of
two minds concerning the desirability of this particular course
of events. Insofar as France was smoothing over difficulties
between London and St. Petersburg, they could delight in the
fact that certain annoying squabbles had been honourably and
fairly terminated without disturbing the tranquillity of Europe.
'She has mediated between two angry friends and pleased them
both', wrote the IfoQsMSL&£ gratefully of France after
the Hull incident; 'she has lived up to her new reputation as
the peacemaker of European politicsOn the other hand,
insofar as France was trying to fuse the Entente Cordiale and
the Dual Alliance together, the press, or a fair-sized portion
of it at any rate, could regard it as singularly pernicious that
she was 'penning Germany in*, thereby creating resentment in
Berlin and opening the door to future troubles.^
33 In June 1907> France and Japan signed an understanding in
which they both promised to respect each other's territorial
possessions in the Far East. A month later Russia, with French
encouragement, came to a similar agreement with Japan. As
Britain and Japan had already promised to guarantee each other's
Far Eastern possessions in their renewed 190^ treaty, this meant
that four Bowers - Japan and the future members of the Triple
Entente - had co-ordinated their diplomatic activity in this
quarter of the glebe.
34 The Times. 2 September 1907.
35 :fench1cgtigr C^arc^pp, 7 November 1904.
36 Nation. 1 June 1907.
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Of course, not everyone in Britain thought that this
last development foreboded ill. Indeed for some newspapers,
particularly Conservative ones, A Triple Entente consisting
of Britain, France, and Russia was of positive value. At a
time when naval and military strength dictated the course of
international relations, it often became necessary, or so they
argued, for weaker nations to combine in the hope of maintaining
peace. And 'if France, Russia, and England agree that there shall
be no disturbance of the European peace, the peace of Europe
will not be disturbed', they added assertively.^ Still
others, notably that most influential voice of British
Liberalism, the Westminster Gazette, greeted ^ranee's diplomatic
raanoeuverings for an entirely different reason. As that paper
saw it, the recent overtures towards Russia indicated that
Europe was on the verge of the long-awaited raillenium of
international harmony and co-operation. The French, it claimed,
were simply acting as a bridge between the British and the
Russians. Later, when the moment was more opportune, the
British would reciprocate by performing the same service for
the French and the Germans, It was all conceived as part and
parcel of a general peace movement which w s beginning to
accrue to the benefit of the world at large,These varying
37 Daily Telegraph. 13 April 1906. In fact, this sentiment was
but a less offensive expression of the more familiar anti-German
theme voiced in the contemporary right-wing press. The Gnectator
was making the same point, only more bluntly, when it wrote on
7 February 1903: 'If we choose to compromise our differences
with Russia, as we have already compromised them with France,
Germany is spellbound, and cannot move by a hairbreadth. ... Our
true policy is to join France and Russia in making a ring around
Germany and isolate her as the mischief-maker of the world'.
38 Westminster Gazettet 3 August 19C5 and 29 June 1906.
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interpretations of French diplomacy reflect well the naive
and simplistic notions which newspapers like the Westminster
Gazette sometimes entertained when considering the problems
that beset pre-World War I Europe. More fundamentally and
more importantly perhaps, they reveal once again the wide
chasm that separated left and right-wing opinion in Britain
on the matter of Entente diplomacy. Differences arose not
only over the motivations that lay behind British and French
policies, but also over the prospects that these policies
augured for the future of Europe.
The British press, then, had a clear idea about how the
Triple Entente Came into being, even if it was not sure about
the significance of the new alignment. Looking back at the
diplomatic activity both preceding and following the August
1907 Convention, it could not help but note that 'in all the
recent approaches to Russia, French diplomacy has been the
mediator and the go-between'.-^ Thus summarizing the origins
of the triplice, the newspapers had demonstrated their ability
to account for Important new developments that arose on the
diplomatic scene in Europe, Yet this had not always been the
case. At the time of the first Moroccan crisis, they had been
at a loss to explain the dismissal of the French foreign minister
Delcasse*. an embarrassment which can largely be traced to the
hasty conclusions they had drawn earlier about the quarrels
between France and Russia. The Dual Alliance, they had contended,
was in the process of dissolution; and in saying this most
39 HaiiML. 13 June 1908.
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newspapers fostered the impression that France was no longer
in n ed of the Russian army as a counterpoise to the Triple
Alliance, dmittedly the relations between the various Powers
had been undergoing change to such an extent that no one could
be sure what the future held in store for any part of the
existing alliance system in Europe - a plausible excuse for
thinking that the rench might one day be able to make do without
the Russians. In Italy, a new wave of irredentist feeling had
arisen as a result 6f Austria's suppression of student
disturbances in the Hapsburg provinces of Trent and Trieste;
the Italians were now more responsive to French diplomatic
advances. In the Balkans, the joint Austro-Russian proposals
for Tiacedcnian reform in 1903 paved the way for a new, albeit
short-lived, spirit of co-operation between Vienna and
ot. 'etersburg. And last but not least, Great Britain had
just emerged from her 'splendid isolation' to enter into a
rapprochement with France. Conceivably, therefore, the signs
of estrangement between "ranee and Russia ight be construed
as one part in the ore general configuration of this process,
but as an assumption, made while Europe was still adhering to
the same balance of forces, it could only lead the newspaners
to make some untenable claims. The assertion that Britain
could detach France from Russia as a result of the 1904 Entente
was one of these claims. And it was quickly dispelled by the
near catastrophe th t erupted in the spring of 1905.
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CHAPTER X
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION ON THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE, 1907-1908
Few people who read the newspapers seriously in Britain
in 1907 could have been surprised by the announcement on
31 August that Britain and Russia had reached a major
settlement of colonial differences. For several years the
press had been telling the public that an Anglo-Russian
rapprochement was a goal of French as well as British foreign
policy, and with the flurry of diplomatic activity between
London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, the public must have
realized that its consummation was not far in the offing.
But if the signing of the 1907 Convention failed to catch
British opinion unawares, it nevertheless did manage to
provoke a public furore the like of which has rarely been
equalled in British diplomatic history. Socialists attacked
it for associating Britain with a repugnant Tsarist autocracy?
Radicals opposed it because of its anti-German implications;
and many moderate Liberals disliked the Anglo-Russian Convention
because of the adverse impact it had on the reform movement In
Persia, Of these criticisms more will be said later. First,
the outcry it produced in right-wing circles will be considered;
and In order to do this a little needs to be written about the
agreement Itself.
1. The 1907 Convention: its terms and its critics
The terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention were published in
Britain on 26 September 1907, nearly a month after the signing
of the accord was originally announced. In comparison with the
earlier Anglo-French Agreements it was a short arrangement, even
though it divided much of Central Asia into spheres of
influence. The most important division occurred in Persia,
where the Convention delimited the growing and hitherto
undefined Russian and British spheres. The Russian sphere was
fixed north of a line starting at Kasr-el-3herin near the
border with the Ottoman Empire and passed through and included
the towns of Ispahan, Yezd, and Kakh and ended 'at the point
on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian
and Afghan frontiers'. The British sphere was established
as running south of a line starting from the Afghan frontier
by way of and including the towns of Gazik, 3irjand, and
Kerman and ending at Bunder Abbas, The two Powers pledged
not to seek any new political or economic concessions in e*ch
other's sphere and promised equal advantages to any foreign
concessions already in existence in their respective spheres.
The region of Persia situated between the Russian and British
spheres was designated as a neutral zone in which the subjects
of both Powers or of any third Power were free to establish
new concessions. In addition, Britain and Russia gave the
customary recognition of Persian integrity and independence.
The remainder of the Convention dealt with Afghanistan
and Tibet. There too the guiding principle behind the
agreement was the creation of buffer zones in order to separate
British and Russian territory in •'sia. With regard to the
former country, Russia recognized it as essentially a British
preserve. She promised not to send any political agents to
Afghanistan and not to have any dealings with that country
except through the medium of the British Government. The
arrangement did, however, grant the Russian Government the
right tc communicate directly with the Amir and his
authorities in order to settle local border questions of a
non-political character arising between the two countries,
Britain for her port promised not to Alter the political
status cuo of Afghanistan and agreed to let Russia enjoy
along with herself full commercial opportunities there.*
As for Tibet, both Governments recognized that country as
being under the suzerainty of China. They agreed to refrain
from seeking any new economic concessions in Tibet, to
respect its territorial integrity, and to enter into
negotiations with that country only through the offices of
the Chinese Government, British and Russian subjects of the
Buddhist faith, however, were allowed to enter into direct
relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama
2
and other representatives of Buddhism In Tibet,
As was the case with the Anglo-French Agreements, the
terms of the Russian Convention drew a great deal of opposition
in Britain, In 1907 as in 19C4, many people believed that the
Government had been worsted in the bargaining for territories
and concessions. Unlike 1904, however, the most critical
discussion of the details of the new Convention did not take
place in the press. Of course, seme of the newspapers favouring
a forward imperial policy in Asia did deliver a few pungent
1 Article V of this part of the Convention stipulated that
this arrangement would not ccme into force until the Amir of
Afghanistan had given his consent. It shculd be noted,
however, that the Amir's subsequent refusal tc do so had
little effect on preventing the implementation of the
agreement,
2 AQflcuflfrE and ;^r>ep§: Gtate Papers. CXXV (1907), Cd. 3750.
attacks on the terms. The Scotsman and the Dally Graphic, for
example, both took the Liberal Foreign Secretary Grey to task
for sacrificing too much in all three areas covered by the
agreement,^ But they were more the exception than the rule,
and it was in Parliament that the real focal point of
opposition to the terms of the 1907 Convention lay,
Cf the men in Farliament who expressed doubts about the
arrangement, Lord Curzon, the former viceroy of India,
Karl Percy, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
in the late Balfour Government, and H.F.B. Lynch, the Liberal
member for Ripon and a businessman with important commercial
ties in Persia, figured most prominently, Curzon*s opposition
to the Convention stemmed almost entirely from the disastrous
impact he believed it would have on Britain's imperial
position throughout Asia, particularly India, It prompted
him to say in early 1908 that Anglo-Russian agreement was
'the most far-reaching, the most important treaty,,, concluded
by the British Government during the past fifty years' - quite
a remark, considering the scope and magnitude of the Convention
with France a few years earlier. In the Lords, Curzon delivered
an impressive speech based on his personal knowledge of Central
Asia, in which he berated point by point virtually every
provision of the agreement. He began by demanding an
explanation for the disproportionately large sohere of
influence which the Convention accorded Russia in the north
of Persia, The preamble to the Convention, he pointed out,
3 3ee Bcotsman. 20, 25, and 26 September 1907? and Daily
Graphic, 3 and 20 Keptember 1907.
4 Hansard, Pari, Debates, Fourth Series, H. of L,, CLXXXIII
(6 February 1908), 1023.
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allocated this sphere to 'certain provinces of Persia adjoining,
or in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier.,.'; but in
effect the Russian zone extended southwards to regions which
could not be properly fit into this description. The boundary
of the Russian zone in the west, for example, commenced at
Kasr-el-oherin, a town more than four hundred miles away
from the Russian frontier. It also included Ispahan, where the
Russians had little trade, and Yezd, a city in the centre of
the country where Russia had no interests at all. On both
geographic and economic grounds, therefore, the Russian sphere
15
was too large.'
But what made this portion of the Convention particularly
disagreeable to Curzon was its allocation of the most promising
areas for the future economic development of Persia to the
Russian zone. Out of the eleven trade routes in the country,
seven were in the Russian sphere. Likewise, eleven of the
twelve largest cities in Persia - including the capital
Teheran - were located within its boundaries. The British
sphere in the south, on the other hand, was small, sparsely
populated, and unproductive. Only half the size of its Russian
counterpart and consisting largely of desert, it contained but
one town of any importance, Kerman, and but one trade route.
Every argument put forward for granting Russia a large sphere
of influence in Persia could be advanced with even greater
legitimacy on behalf of Britain. At Ispahan, it was Britain
and not Russia who had built up a thriving trade for over a
century. At Yezd, a British Indian colony had been established
5 liia., 1005-1006.
'in ccnnection with the Persian community of Parsees'. The
least that could have been expected, Curzon argued, was a
British sphere commencing at these two points where the
Russian zone ended. Worse still, the scuth-western portion
of the country had not been included in the British snhere.
over since the 1880s Britain had enjoyed exclusive navigational
rights along the Karun River, and at the nearby port of Bushire,
British enterprise had been in operation since the mid-eighteenth
century. Yet with regard to this region, the Convention failed
to give Britain the same paramount position it had secured for
Russia in the north. On the contrary, the incorporation of
the south-west of Persia into the neutral zone left 3ritain
'no better off than the latest new-comer' to that area of the
Country.''
Curzon was equally formidable in condemning those clauses
of the Convention pertaining to Afghanistan and Tibet. With
regard to the former country, he complained that Britain gained
nothing, not even the Amir's consent to the arrangement. Bhe
promised not to threaten or allow Afghanistan to threaten the
Russian frontier. But Russia, who for some time had been
building a strong military position on her side of the Afghan
border, made no similar pledge. Britain accorded Russia
equality of opportunity in all of Afghanistan, but the Russians
kept the much sought after markets of Khiva and Bokhara, two
vassal states to the north of the Afghan frontier, closed to
British traders. Moreover, Russia's recognition that
Afghanistan lay outside her sphere of influence was next to
worthless} it was a statement that had been made and broken
6 Ibid.T 1006-1009,
innumerable times since the 1360s. No less incomprehensible
to Curzon were the concessions which the Government had made
concerning Tibet. Only recently Britain had gone to great
expense to stake her claim there by despatching a military
expedition to Lhasa. To put both Powers on an equal footing
in Tibet, a country which was geographically much closer to
British India than to Russia, was an 'absolute surrender1.
To agree to consult the Russian Government about the best
means of evacuating the Chumbi Valley, a matter which was of
7
no concern to St. Petersburg, seemed 'almost a humiliation'.
Curzon's role as leading critic of the Anglo-Russian
Convention in the House of Lords was assumed in the Commons
by Earl Percy. Like Curzon, Percy was disturbed by the
apparent unfairness of the agreement. He too, if in less
detail, voiced complaints abcut an arrangement that seemed
to give Russia a better deal than Britain in Persia,
Afghanistan, and Tibet. Percy was also unhappy about the
slim prospects that it offered of settling permanently
Anglo-Russian friction in this part of the world. By contrast
to the accord with France, the Russian agreement fell far short
of being comprehensive. Both in the Near and the Far East
q
difficulties between the two Governments remained outstanding.
7 Ibid.. 101^-1017, 1019-1022. Cn 7 September 1904, Britain and
Tibet signed a convention in which it was agreed that British
forces would occupy the Chumbi Valley until Tibet paid off in
three annual instalments a £50»000 indemnity imposed on her as
a result of clashes between Tibetan forces and the Younghusband
expedition earlier that year. Curzon's remark refers to an
annex of the 1907 Convention, in which Britain promised Russia
•a friendly exchange of views' if the occupation had not been
terminated by the end of the three years.
8 Apparently Percy considered meaningless the 1907 diplomatic
agreements between France. Japan, and Russia which seemed to
have brought London and St. Petersburg together in the Far East.
303.
ind whereas the 1904 Convention settled disputes in such a
manner as to give Britain and France freedom to pursue their
own policies in different parts of the world, the Convention
with Russia merely left them to prosecute rival policies in
each of the countries affected. Add to this a notable lack
of that cordial spirit which accompanied the French Entente,
and it would not be difficult to cast doubts about the chances
q
of a long-lasting Anglo-Russian settlement. Needless to say,
there were others who voiced the same fears. Already Curzon
had warned the Lords not to expect the Russians to adhere too
loyally to the terms of the Convention: in Afghanistan, they
would probably use their commercial agents for political
intrigues; and in Tibet, they would no doubt re-employ
Dorjieff and other Buddhists to undermine the little influence
10
that Britain did enjoy there. And the Daily Granhic. in
stressing the importance of honeur and good faith in
diplomatic agreements, commented that there was 'no country
11
which has a blacker record in this aspect' than Russia. Rut
9 Ibid.. H. of C., CLXXXIV (17 February 1903), 462-464. Percy
was net alone in his observation that the Anglo-Russian Entente,
unlike the Anglo-French Entente, had not come about as a result
of any particularly friendly feelings between the two countries.
The Glasgow ilerald. for example, noted in its editorial of
30 July 1907 that while the Anglo-French agreement 'was as much
the effect as the cause of the entente cordiale'. the
negotiations then going on between Britain and Russia were 'to
no appreciable extent traceable to a popular demand in Great
Britain for an understanding with the Imperial Government'.
1° Ibid.f H, of L., CLXXXI1I (6 February 1908), 1018, 1022.
Dorjieff was a Mongolian lama who for several years before the
1904 Kottnghusband mission had worked on behalf of the Russians
to counteract British influence at the court of the Dalai Lama.
II Ealk" 3 September 1907,
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it was his reference to the French Entente that distinguished
Percy somewhat from the others. By constantly comparing what
he considered to he a dubious agreement signed by a Liberal
Government with a taore satisfactory one concluded by a
Conservative Government, he seemed to be drawing party
politics into the discussion.
H.P. . Lynch voiced still other concerns about the
Convention. Lynch was one of the heads of Lynch Bros., a
family enterprise which ran steamers on the Karun River and
operated a number of road concessions in the interior of
Persia. 4s such, it was perhaps only natural that he should
protest against an arrangement which placed severe limitations
on the growth of British trade and com erce in that country.
Insofar as he was personally affected, two of Lis firm's roads
in Persia had been placed entirely within the Russian sphere.
12
Another terminated in that sphere. True, by the terms of
the Convention all existing British concessions in the Russian
sphere were guaranteed; but as Lynch quickly pointed out, the
terms also prohibited the establishment of any new British
concessions there. Thus the addition of further facilities to
his firm's roads in the north of Persia such as the laying of
a light railway, for instance, could only ecme through Russia.
Even if the Russians proved amenable, the tendency would almost
certainly be for these concessions to become Russian. British
and Indian trade in Persia, he told the Com ons, was bound to
12 The two roads which had been placed from end to end in the
Russian zone ran from Kum to Teheran and from Kum to Sultanabad.
The third ran from the Karun to Ispbban.
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13
suffer as a r< suit of the Convention. J
But although the extent of his personal interests in Persia
made Lynch sneak out against the commercial clauses of the
Russian agreement, the main fire of his criticisms was directed
elsewhere. As a Liberal who cherished the ideal of self-determinatioi
for all peoples, Lynch's primary concern was that Anglo-Russian
diplomacy did not conflict with Persia's aspirations for
Independence. The preamble of the 1907 Convention, he
acknowledged, did promise tc respect Persian integrity. But
the same pledge had been made to both Bgypt and lorocco, and
14
it had not spared them domination by two of the Great Powers.
Not that Lynch invariably opposed European intervention in
colonial areas, but in this particular case he felt it to be
definitely wrong. Persia was one of the few backward' countries
with a 'reasonable chance' of working out its own salvation. The
lr
growth of the Constitutionalist movement was proof of this. ""' For
.13 Hansard. Pari. Debates, Fourth Beries, P. of C., CILL.XIV
(17 ""ebruary 1908), 544-546. No doubt Lynch was also worried about
the Germans as well as the Russians. German capitalists and
investors had been opening up markets in Mesopotamia for some
time now, and the fear was real in Britain that they would be
lured further east by the terms of the 1907 Convention, which
placed the southern entrances to a numb* r of Persian trade
routes in the neutral sphere. Gee, for example, the letter of
Colonel C.E. Late, the former Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan,
to the Times. 2 September 1907, on this possibility.
14 Ibid., 543.
15 The Persian Constitutionalist movement was both reformist
and nationalist In motivation and for several years had been
engaged in an intense struggle with the Shah to secure a
parliamentary democracy for the country. After considerable
agitation, it did manage to force Muzaf-far-ud-Din Bhah to
concede shortly before his death a new constitution, which came
into being In October 1906 with the convening of the Ma.ilis.
or National Assembly. In December 1907, the Constitutionalists,
with popular support from the provinces, overcame a threat of
the new Ghah, Muharamed 11, to close the Mailis. Their defiance
was s' ort-lived? for in June 1908 the Shan's troops bombarded
the parliament building and had many of the leading reformers
arrested. But for a while, it did annear that the Constitutionalists
had the upper hand, and it would have been reasonable for Ppneh
and other Liberals to have been optimistic about their chances of
success.
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Britaih to conclude an agreement which ran counter to the hopes
and interests of this movement was morally objectionable. For
Britain to do so with Russia, 'the arch-enemy of even elementary
liberties in Asia', was 'a blunder from which British Statecraft -
and British Liberalism - will find it hard to recover'.
'Revolutions', Lynch warned, 'could not be carried on with kid
gloves; and a provision which made Russia the arbiter in so
vast an area was tantamount to handing over the Persian reform
movement to the tender mercies of a foreign despotism'.10
Lynch's warnings and fears about the effects of the
Convention in Persia were widely echoed in the Liberal press.
In Radical newspapers and journals, the consensus of opinion
was that Britain had jeopardized the regeneration of Persia by
placing the capital Teheran and other centres of the reform
movement in the Russian sphere. The Russian Government, these
organs argued, could never tolerate the democratization of
Persia, if only because of the dangerous repercussions such a
development would have on the opponents of the regime at home.
Already there had been anti-Tsarist uprisings in the provinces
Ibid., 547, 550. See also Lynch's letter to the editor
The Times, 10 September 1907, p. 5. This emphasis which
Lynch placed on a 'backward' country's political maturity to
oppose intervention in one instance and then favour it ia
another was also employed by other Liberals. The Radical
weekly the Nation, for instance, justified its endorsement
of French ambitions in Morocco on the grounds that 'it was
hard to believe there was any alternative' but was against
British and Russian interference in Persia because in that
country 'there was hope of a national resurrection'. (See
Nation. 7 September 1907.) But as Howard Weinroth astutely
observes, the real criterion of the Radicals on this matter
was the international political climate. The Radicals might
have sympathized with the Persians when Europe was calm in
1907, but they disregarded the nationalist feelings of the
Moroccans in 1905 and 1911 when imperialist rivalries
threatened a major war. See H. Weinroth, 'British Radicals
and the Agadir crisis', European studies Review, III, no. 1
(19*3), 49.
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of the Caucasus. Should t e liberal forces become ascendant
in neighbouring Tersia, they ight act as an inspiration for
17
the rebels <n Russia's side cf the border. Some felt that
it not only Russia's confiscation of the spoils that
impeded ersia's proper course cf development# The Ration^
for example, opposed 'any partition whatsoever, for any
delimitation of foreign spheres of influence must reduce the
18
integrity and independence of Persia to diplomatic fictions,'
Indied, it was said that the Persian Liberals themselves had
taken this line#*^
But whilst the Liberal 'Left' pointed out all this,
there was another, equally pressing fear at the back of their
minds. The Convention, they maintained, would also have an
undesir ble impact on internal events in Russia# Coming as
it did on the heels of the dissolution of the Duma, the
agreement would create the impression - both in Russia and
elsewhere - that Britain was supporting the reactionary
autocracy in its efforts to stifle reform# And this in turn
was likely 'to prejudice the Russian people against us when
they are strong enough to offer us the national alliance to
20
which we look forward1# Indeed, many were afraid that it
might have the effect of bestowing upon Tsarism something more
17 DaflU ,Graphic> 16 September 1907. The GjranhU was
in fact a Cmservative newspaper, but its editor, Lucien Rolf,
was a Liberal#
1® loc# clt.
19 Manchester Guardian. 1 October 1907.
20 See the letter written by a group of prominent left-wing
figures to the editor of The Times, 11 June 1907, P. 5# Amongst
those who signed the letter were J. Ramsay ifacdonald,
Justin McCarthy, G.3. Shaw, John Galsworthy, J.A. Hobson, and
T. Fisher Onwin.
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than an apparent gesture of British goodwill. Pointing to the
form which the Dual Alliance had taken since its inception in
1891, they envisaged a situation in which an Anglo-Russian
Entente would lead to extensive British financial commitments
to Russia in exchange for Russian diplomatic support in Europe.
Already Britain and France had jointly floated a loan to
St. Petersburg as a reward to Russia for the help she had given
at Algeciras. Now that the British and the Russians had
reached a major settlement of colonial disputes, more loans
could be expected. And Radicals contended that the larger the
Russian debt, the greater Britain's Interest in seeing that the
existing regime survived intact. The effect of a British
Entente on the Russian Government, lamented the Dally News.
Must be to increase its prestige, and above all to
improve its bargaining powers. "From the time of the
Crimean War down to the spring of 1906 no Russian loan
was placed in England. In 1906 the mere expectation of
an entente sufficed to induce the City to subscribe to
Count vitte's great loans. If the mere expectation of
an entente achieved so much, what would the reality
effect?...Little by little we are drifting into the
position of France, and financial interests will tie
our hands so fast that no Government will venture to
take account of anything that happens in Russia.....
And yet we all know, all Europe knows, that without
foreign loans the autocracy must in the end succumb
in its struggle with the people. 21
Such sentiments, of course, were not confined to one section
of the Liberal party. If Radicals voiced reservations about
this asnect of the Convention, Socialists expressed anger.
In a rare pronouncement on foreign affairs, the April 1908
conference of the Independent Labour Party at Hudfiersfield
denounced the agreement with Russia as equivalent to 'giving
21 Daily Dews. 17 May 1907.
an informal sanction to the course of infamous tyranny which
has suppressed every semblance of representation and has
ccnde ned great numbers of our Russian comrades to imorisonm<nt,
pp
torture, and death'• others who either sympathized or
identified with certain persecuted minorities in Russia were
also hostile to it. Lucien wolf, the moderately Liberal
editor of the 'all./ -.-ranhie. found that he could not approve
of any arrangement with a Government that mistreated fellow
p-5
Jews. J And in -ondon, Bernard fares helped establish a
new Russian Committee, an organization which was 'well
disposed to all Russians animated by the desire to improve
24
the conditions of their motherland'. In the opinion of
virtually all these groups, it would have been far better if
Britain had waited for government in Russia to take a more
constitutional turn before making any settlement. This
would have had the advantage of keeping Britain in a
favourable light in the eyes of Russian public opinion without
risking her osition in .sia. Russia, they maintained, was too
weak after the Tar Lastern far and the 1905 revolution to
threaten British India for a generation to coae/';
aced with all this opposition, the Government found
defending the Convention a difficult ta;k. Indeed, to many
of the criticisms they had no adequate reply. True, with
regard to iersia, they did point out that Russia was gaining
22 william Stewart, Jt „ /, 4o:,rar hy (London, 1921),
pp. 261-262.
23 Rax Beloff, Luclen Rolf and the Anglo-Russian ntcnte. 19"7-1914
(London, 1951), PP. 3-4.
24 Toward A. .einroth, 'British Radicals and the balance of
rower, 1902-1014'. Historical Journal. XIII, 4(1970), 666.
ally Lews, b June 19C7; also Ration. 3 June 1907; and
Socialist cview. I (April, 1908), 90-91.
enough ascendance there tc warrant granting her a large snhere
of Influence in the north. 'One would hardly have expected
Ispahan and Yezd to fall within the category of Persian
provinces in close proximity to the Russian frontier', conceded
The Times. 'Nevertheless...it would have been difficult for
this country to oppose her in any of these regions, except at
a risk disproportionate to the Interests we have at stake there...
But at the same time very little was said to comfort those who
feared Russian disloyalty in all three countries covered by the
agreement, still less of an explanation was offeree s to why
the Persian Gulf had not been formally incorporated into the
07
terms,"r Instead, the Government constantly drew attention
to the one concrete advantage which the Convention did gain
for Britain - the sealing off of Seistan and its environs from
a Russian military advance southwards, By comparison, the
welfare of local British commercial interests seemed to be at
most of secondary importance. 'It is the strategical position
which makes the agreement desirable and essential', Grey told
the Commons, 'and when you study th© strategical position you
26 Tire TAfflEgi 25 Beptember 1907. oee also 1
26 September 1907? Spectator. 28 September 1907; and Hansard.
Pari, rebates, Fourth Series, H. of C., CLXXXIV (17 February 1908)
486-488, 5l5-pl6, for similar views.
27 One of the chief complaints about the 1907 Convention was its
failure to keep the Persian Gulf out of Russia's reach. Curzon
and others pointed, out that by its terms Britain was debarred
from opposing Russia's construction of a railway system running
from the north through the neutral sphere down to the ports on
the Gulf, where the Russians would be well poised for a strike
against India. See Hansard. Pari. Debates, Fourth Series,
H. of L,, CLXXXIII (6 February 1908). 1010-12? also P. Landon,
'Views on the Anglo-Russian agreement - I. relative loss and
gain', Fortnightly Review. LXXXII (July-Dec., 1907), 730.
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will find that the key to the whole of H is Geistan'. Fxert
opinion, he declared, had placed the 'highest value' on
reaching an agreement of this sort as a means of guaranteeing
the security of India. And now that this had been effected,
the Liberal Government would be able to honour its pledge to
stem the increase in military expenditure in this art of the
world. Above all, the Convention was a particularly
valuable contribution to peace. For not only had it settled
a number of important disputes, but it had done sc at a time
when the internal disorders of Persia might conceivably have
led to a British or Russian intervention in that country,
thereby raising the soeetre of renewed friction between the
two European Powers, '
23 In point of fact, military opinion in Britain was divided
about the Importance of Seistan to the defence of India. Grey
is said to have based his remarks on a memorandum presented at
a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in March 1906
by Major illiam Robertson, then working in the Intelligence
Division of the War Office. The purpose of the memorandum was
to inform the Government of the military considerations
Involved in making an entente with Russia, and Robertson came
to the conclusion that Persia, particularly the south-eastern
corner of it, was 'the crux of the whole question' as regards
the safety of India. (See Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey:
A dloeranhy (London, 1971), n.l6l.) A year later, however,
the Mar Office issued a survey of the military resources of
the Russian Empire In which it was argued that, In the light
of recent Russian railway construction from the Caspian Gea
and Samarkhand to the Afghan border, an invasion of India -
if it were to take place at all - was now much more likely
to eomo through Afghanistan rather than through Persia via
Geistan. 0,ee Reryl J. Williams, 'The strategic background
to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907', Historical Journal. IX,
3(1966), 363-364.) Thus the Foreign secretary's claim that
the Convention had succeeded in removing the military threat
to India could only be true if the Russians acted in good
faith in Afghanistan. And this, as has been seen, some peonle
regarded as highly unlikely. For Grey's remarks, see Hansard,
Pari. Debates, Fourth Geries, H. of C., CLXXXIV (17 February 1908),
431-482.
29 Ibid.. H. of L. CLXXXIII(6 February 1908), 1042 and H. of C.,
C.-vIJOV C17 February 1908), 494.
By thus emphasizing its strategic and pacific benefits,
the Government was able to win considerable support for the
Convention. In Parliament, the endorsement which it received
from leading members of the Opposition managed to offset the
arguments of imperialist stalwarts like Curzon and Percy.
Former Prime Minister Balfour had his reservations about the
commercial clauses of the arrangement but agreed that it
nevertheless constituted 'a new and genuine addition to the
defences of India'} while for his part, Lansdcwne expressed
confidence in the Lords that Russia would be loyal to both
the spirit and the terms of the agreement.-^0 Other
Conservatives like Lord Cromer, the former Governor-General
of Egypt, welcomed the Convention for yet another reason. As
they saw it, this arrangement marked a new phase of European
imperialism in which all the major colonizing nations would
come together in order to check those nationalist and
'seditious' forces unleashed by the recent victory of yellow
Japan over white Russia in the Far East. Just now Britain
and Russia had come to terras, but other Powers were bound to
follow suit. For the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the
minds of Asians had been such that all nations with possessions
in the East would have to 'exercise even greater care,
watchfulness, and circumspection than, perhaps, at any other
period of their history' .^ 4s the Pall Mall Gazette put it:
'We, and. Russia, and every European Power that has a finger in
the Asiatic pie, have to remember that the time is coming when
30 Ibid.. H. of L., CLXXXIII (6 February 1908), 1334-1335 end
K. of C., CIXOCIV (17 February 1908), 552.
31 Ibfd., H. of L., CLXXXIII (6 February 1908), 1026.
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it may be necessary, before all things, to sustain the solidarity
of all European interests in -sin against the possible denial of
the rights acquired by the European Powers in that continent,. "
It implored the Government to be prepared for the challenge.
Meanwhile, the Government was getting some much-needed
sup ort from its own Liberal press. The cc.nogist greeted the
arrangement for putting to rest for once and for all the
•hussian bogey' in sia. 3cth Morley and the Government of India,
It said, could now get on with the task of cutting the cost of
defending the North-west Frontier,^ The 'estminster Gazette
repeated the words of Grey and Asquith that the entente was a
boon to international peace. Indeed, for that newspaper the
gain to Lurone was so great that to have forgone a good
understanding between London and ~»t. etersburg in order to
clear the national conscience about associating with a
reactionary Power would have been *to sacrifice the greater
morality to the lesser'.-^ and a leading Liberal Imperialist
pacer, the La,ily Chronicle, tried to disoel fears that the
agreement would have an adverse impact on conditions In Mlussia.
Any settlement concerning only csian frontiers could not have
38
much effect in these directions, it argued. ^ Taken together,
these arguments did not remove all left-wing doubts about the
convention, but they did help to pacify many cf its erstwhile
opponents In the hadical press. The Manchester Guardian, while
32 -all .hall Gazette. 7 February 1908. ^ce also
loc. clt., for similar sentiments.
33 economist, 23 September 1907.
34 .estmiaster Gazette, 2 September 1907.
35 -ally Chronicle. 24 September 1907.
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deprecating 'any steps which made it easier for the Russian
Government to finance its counter-revolution', nevertheless
conceded the force of these views. 'v/e do not want to
prejudice the settlement of our neighb ur's internal affairs',
ran its leader article of 2 September 1907, 'but we do want to
avoid quarrels with our neighbour'. Similarly, the Nation
promised to reserve judgment till it had seen the effect the
arrangement would have on the reduction of military expenditure.^
For the time being, at least, the Anglo-Russian Convention would
not be an emotionally divisive issue in Britain.
Nor did it appear in subsequent months that the agreement
would ever again become a source of major controversy. For
despite the continuing quarrel in Persia between Muhammed All Shah
and the Constitutionalists over matters of reform, the Russians
had refrained from intervention. Indeed, there were moments
when it seemed as if they had chosen an active policy of
co-operation with Britain. In December 1907, when the shah's
threat to close the Ha-111s resulted in protests and demonstrations
throughout the country, the Russian and British legations in
Teheran jointly conferred with the Persian ruler and dissuaded
him from taking such a step. That the Russians had, for once,
abstained from interfering on behalf of the ohah against the
reformers was attributed by large sections of the British press
to the arrangement made four months earlier. The ccotsman,
for example, hailed Russia's behaviour as 'the first substantial
fruit of the Anglo-Russian Convention',^ to which the Spectator
hastened to add that without that arrangement, the likelihood
36 Nation. 23 September 1907.
37 Scotsman, ?5 December 1907.
of an Anglo-Russian v/ar would have been much greater.-5 '
2. Persia, the Balkans, and Great Power Politics produce more doubts
But for some, such optimism ended quickly when developments
in the spring of 1908 made it obvious that Russia hod no
intention of allowing the Persians to settle their own affairs.
In April, the Russians fabricated a border incident supposedly
involving nomadic Persian tribes in order to begin a series of
military raids into Azerbaijan province under the guise of
punitive expeditions; in June, Colonel Liakhoff, the Russian
commander of the Shah's Cossack Brigade, took a leading part in
forcibly breaking up the Hal lis: while earlier Hartwig, the
Russian minister at Teheran, had been engaged in secret
negotiations with Muhammed All to strengthen Russia's grin on
Persian finances. In Britain, there were varied reactions to
these developments, or what was known of them. As far as the
Government was concerned, Russia had done nothing to violate
the terms of the 1907 Convention, dhen pressed in the Commons
about the role Liakhoff and his subordinates were playing in
the Fersian capital, Sir Edward Grey replied that they were
merely acting in their capacity as bodyguards of the Bhah and
not as ussian agents.^9 To The Times, the troubles on the
Perso-Caucasian border were yet another example of Oriental
disrespect for European 'rights' and interests. 'The Russian
frontier guards', it wrote, 'have been compelled to regard the
Persian brigands in very much the same light as that in which
we regard the Pathan tribes on our Indian frontier. They have
•watched them with armed vigilance, and, when provoked, have
38 Boectator, 28 December 1907.
39 Hansard. Pari, Debates, Fourth Series, H, of C,, CXCIII
(27 July 1908), 976.
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struck back'.4^ British Radicals, however, had other ideas
about the Russian moves. Immediately after the coup against
the Persian National Assembly, the Dally News pointed out that
Russia's record throughout the crisis had been one of 'alternate
menace and intrigue'.41 A few days later, the Manchester uuardian
voiced the same concern, only more explicitly. If the Russian
officers continued their activities unimpeded, it wrote, there
would be 'an end of (Russia^ neutrality and sooner or later of
42
Persian independence'. It was, in fact, these doubts about
Russian activities that gave birth to the Persia Committee in
the House of Commons. Spurred on by the allegations of
B.C. Browne, the Persian scholar and Professor of Arabic at
Cambridge University, a number of Radical M.F.s banded together
with the intention of bringing pressure to bear on the British
43
Government to safeguard Persia against Russian encroachments. J
But if the Anglo-Russian Convention was producing the
complications in Persia that many Radicals had anticipated, its
effect in Europe went far beyond their worst expectations.
(Already within twelve months of its signing, steps which
unquestionably helped rehabilitate the Russian autocracy had
been taken in the name of promoting friendlier relations between
40 The Times. 25 May 1908.
41 Dail.v News. 24 June 1908.
42 Manchester Guardian. 27 June 1908.
43 Browne was living in England at the time he made his
accusations, but he based them on information he had received
from close friends in Persia, some of whom were important
figures in the reform movement. He charged the Russians with
massing troops along the Persian frontier, anchoring a warship
off the Persian Caspian port Enzeli in order to intimidate the
Constitutionalists in nearby Resht, and suppressing two leading
liberal Muslim newspapers which had been circulating in the
Russian sphere. (See Edward G. Browne, 'The Persian crisis:
a' reply', Fortnightly Review, LXXXIV (July-Dec. 1908), 696;
also his letter to the editor of The Times, 17 September 1908,
p.4.) 4s for the Persia Committee, it acted as a pressure
group both in Parliament and outside. H.F.B. Lynch was its
chairman iii the Commons, where its ranks included some Labour
as well as Radical Liberal members. Professor Browne headed
its extra-parliamentary wing.
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London and St. Petersburg. Almost immediately after the signing
of the compact, the City commenced negotiations with French
44 o
banks for issuing more loans to Russia. And in Hay 1908,
it was announced that Edward VII was planning a trip to the
Baltic port Reval, where he would meet his nephew Nicholas II
on state business. The news of the proposed visit provoked
a furore in Radical and. Socialist circles. H.N. Brailsford,
the leader-writer for the Nation, complained that it
introduced an element of 'emotional cordiality' into Britain's
At:
hitherto formal and correct relationship with the autocracy. y
In Parliament, Keir Hardie said the visit would condone the
atrocities for which the Tsar's Government, and the Tsar
46
personally, must be held responsible'. Yet to many
left-wingers, the King's forthcoming visit portended something
even more ominous than closer links with a repressive regime.
For them, it was the latest of a growing number of indications
that the true purpose behind entente diplomacy was not to
settle distant colonial questions or promote world peace but
rather to encircle Germany and diminish her power and prestige
on the Continent. In the autumn of 1905, the affair of the
Delcasse revelations had alerted them to the possibility that
the Anglo-French Agreements amounted to somethin,_ more than a
friendly understanding.4^ In 1906-7, the repeated statements
44 Daily News. 18 February 1908,
45 H.N. Brailsford, 'Liberalism ana the Russian Government',
Soc^im neYigWt I (July, 1908), 337.46 Hansard, Pari.Debates. Fourth Series, H. of C., CXC
(4 June 1908), 253.
47 In October 1905, French foreign minister Delcassd made a
series of disclosures to Stephanne Lauzanne, editor of the Hatin,
alleging that, at the time of the Moroccan crisis, the British
Government had offered to give France full naval support and to
land one hundred thousand men on the Schleswig-Holstein coast
should war break out x^ith Germany. Lauzanne subsequently
published the allegations in his paper, and a major uproar
323.
cf Ore. nd the "oreign "f- ice about the necessity of
re-est-hi'ching ussia's position and influence in the councils
of .uro;-e' lec! the: to suspect that there s e t :.n act the
|§BI8PS&- -y* 'jjL*'* V. M- ^ -^IT*
eye to he reaching 'nglo- .ussi-ai ntentc as well. nd
no,; in 19r nrd VI , accor. oiiod by :inl- :cr and
L.ir John French, was ;aying an official visitfbssia to
meet the Tsar and his ilitary leaders, a meeting which
f o 11 o. ... ; 1.. -~r. Lie heels of "• c ! rex:deat a P lire a '
visit tn ' .:con, Ira , as yet there ..a. no definite connection
between these events, but as the all:/ dens noted, much of the
French cress had linked them together and discussed them in
en anti-werman context. ' oly thost who prefer to be misled',
it s:id, c jIc be satisfied that the hevsl visit had no
AO
ulterior -*urpose# ' '.long with other left-wing organs, it
pleaded with the -evernaent to have the I.ing cancel the trip.
'.'his storm over the royal visit to Russia had scarcely
passed when the eruption cf a major crisis in the Jalkans in
the autumn of 19C-3 provided the Government's foreign rolicy
critics /.it!: fresh cause for concern. Initially, iritlsh nubile
c inion was united in its approach to the episode, ustria's
annexation of iosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria's repudiation
of Turkish suzerainty were condemned in every quarter of the
press os two ill-conceiv^lppts which threatened to upset a
ensued in rI tain, ranee, and Germany. Lansdowne and the
Foreign fffice immediately denied that any such offer was made.
Nevertheless, sus ieions remained in some .Udical circles that
the Government had ode some sort of secret military commitment
to ranee.
43 See, for example, >rails?crri's letter to the editor of
The 1 ::co. If. e-terser 1?C7. p 5.
49 Fa 1lv News. 10 June 100".
precarious status quo in this c;uarter of Europe. Likewise,
Turkey's appeal to the Great Powers tc help redress the
50
situation met with almost universal sympathy in the newspaper®.
But when in raid-October Grey and his French and Russian
counterparts, Pichon and Iswolsky, announced their intention to
press for a European conference in spite of Austro-Gerraan
objections, differences began to emerge. On the whole,
Conservative and Liberal newspapers supported the Anglo-^rench-
iussian Note. It promised to secure compensation for Turkey,
they said, and besides Grey, by reaffirming Britain's adherence
to the Treaty of Berlin, had cast the nation in the role of
51
protector of international law,'
Certain Radical organs, on the other hand, found little
reason to be happy. While not denying that the Foreign
Secretary's efforts to find a solution constituted an act of
great statesmanship, they were worried by the long-term effects
of his policies. The Nation, for instance, was afraid that by
co-operating with the Russians in the Balkans, the British
Government was in danger of overlooking the menace that
St. Petersburg posed to the recently established Young Turk
regime at Constantinople. 'Russian public opinion is rather
anti-Austrian than pro-Turkish', it warned, 'and it is so
because it is Pan-SlavistThe Daily Hews was worried by
•the grouping of the Powers in two closely-knit leagues'. A.
Triple Entente confronts a Triple Alliance, It noted, 'and
50 Daily Telegraph. 6 October 1908$ also I-^l^y News,
7 October 1908: and Morning ost. 10 October 1908.
51 -estminster Gazette. 8 October 1908; also ralX w&U
16 October 1908$and Daily Telegraph. 5 November 1908.
52 Nation, 24 October 1908.
between the two there is no place for any independent or
CO
uncommitted body of opinion'.Precisely how Europe got
itself into this state of affairs was a matter about which
the Radicals did not agree. For the tanchester Cuordlan. the
rivalry was more apparent than real; it laid the blame on
those who had first mooted the idea of a conference 'as
though Europe consisted not of a Concert but of two hostile
groups of Rowers', adding that 'the bad feeling thus
K4
engendered still persists'. Others maintained that the
unswerving and often blind loyalty of each of the raa^or
Powers to its friends and allies had long ago made this type
of confrontation a likelihood. In this case it was Germany
who had rushed forward to side with Austria; but, they
reminded their readers, Britain's support for France in Morocco
and even her slender excuses to cover Russian behaviour in
Persia had also helped to close the ranks.^ On one point,
however, the Radicals fully concurred: Britain could not
offer any effective mediation between the two sides; for she
had now become too closely identified with the Franco-Russian
group.
Thus by the end of 1903 British public opinion was still
not altogether assured about the 4nglo-Russian Entente. If
the passage of time had silenced those who earlier had
criticised the terms of the 1907 Convention, it had done
nodhlng to allay the anxieties of those who worried about the
53 Rally dews. 20 November 1908.
54 'Manchester Guardian. 27 November 1903.
55 Nation. 14 November 1908.
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moral and diplomatic implications of that arrangement. n
the contrary, fear was as gfeat as ever In Britain that the
Convention had jeopardized Persian and Russian parllamentarianism
and hindered the chances of a permanent Anglo-German
reconciliation. And this fear was to remain widespread
throughout the next several years of crisis and tension before
the outbreak of the Great War.
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SUMMARY MID CONCLUSION
The diplomatic rapprochement known as the Entente Cordiale
which took place In the early years of the twentieth century
had from the moment of its inception the endorsement of the
bulk of the British people, Even before the successful State
visit of King Ldward VII to r,aris in the spring of 1903 a
number of people had been agitating for better relations between
London and Paris, but in its wake this number grew appreciably
so that by 3 April 1904, the date on which the famous colonial
Convention was signed, there was hardly any informed nerson in
Britain who had any strong objection to Improved ties with
France, At first much of this agitation amounted to little more
than a prudent desire to avoid quarrels, as was reflected in
the very widespread call both in newspaper and political circles
first for an arbitration treaty and then for a comprehensive
settlement of outstanding colonial disputes as the ideal goals
to be reached In the relations between the two countries. Not
long afterwards, however, such agitation increasingly took on
the form of a wish to see genuine friendship established with the
French, and it was with this aim in mind that Mir Thomas Barclay
started the notion of 'municipal ententes' and promoted a series
of exchange visits between ordinary working Englishmen and
renchmen.
Needless to say, many of these people who had such high
expectations of the Entente were pleased with the course which
Anglo-French relations took over the next few years, but there
were others who were net, Lome right-wingers in Britain, a
number of whoa had never completely reconciled themselves to
the 'losses' Involved in the 1904 Agreements, noted a certain
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ruthlessness and determination in rrench imperialism which they
felt came at Britain's expense and hence was contrary to what
they construed to be the proper spirit of the Entente. British
businessmen found to their dismay that the diplomatic understanding
between the two Governments had done nothing to lower French
tariffs or create an 'Open Door' policy in France's overseas
empire, while several City financiers discovered to their
disillusionment that the rapprochement had dene frothing to put
an end to the intrigues and sharp practices of their French
counterparts in various parts of the world. Britain's military
and naval leaders and defence strategists, while not exactly
unhappy with the general direction which relations between the
two countries had taken since 1903-4, did nevertheless entertain
throughout these years deep suspicions about France's long-term
aims and, ihdeed, on occasion expressed annoyance with France's
behaviour, particularly during the lusso-Japanese War. Meanwhile,
the Left in Britain was becoming increasingly uneasy about the
very closeness of Anglo-French relations and openly wondered
whether the Entente had got converted into an alliance.
Looking back over the whole matter, it is difficult to see
how it could have been otherwise. Toi many people drew too
many different, and, at times, conflicting interpretations about
the function and purpose of the Anglo-French Entente for everyone
to be satisfied. To Conservatives and Liberal Imperialists it
was a development which bolstered Britain's position in the
world and helped the nation meet the challenge of eltoollt^k.
To Radicals and Socialists, on the other hand, it was a watershed
in the history of the Powers which marked the decline of
imperialist rivalry as a major factor in international relations
and which heralded a series of diplomatic agreements eventually
culminating in world peace. To businessmen and francophiles in
general it was a wide-encompassing arrangement designed primarily
to remove all grievances and antipathies between the peoples of
the two countries. But to the civil servants and high-ranking
Foreign Office men it was first and foremost a diplomatic event
whose less political side was at times a nuisance which
threatened to harm the basically happy relationship between
London and Paris. Given these diverse and sometimes opposing
constructions placed upon the Entente, it was virtually
impossible for any British Government, whether Liberal or
Conservative, to try and 3teer relations with France along a
certain path without causing offence to seme section of the
British public at home. Admittedly, the Balfour,
Campbe11-Bannerman, and Asquith Ministries might well have
retained a more open mind than they did when listening to the
views of those newspapers and ether organs of opinion which
deplored the anti-German direction which the Entente was taking.
But this is not to deny the fundamental delicacy of their
position vis-a-vis the various sections of public opinion.
Not that there was ever much danger of this dissatisfaction
leading to widespread demands for a renunciation of the Entente.
In the first place, many of those who had voiced the greatest
dissent blamed misguided statesmen and politicians on both sides
of the Channel, and not the Entente itself, for any shortcomings
or drawbacks in Anglo-French relations. This was particularly
true of businessmen and the various exponents of a more
pacifist foreign policy in Britain, both of whom went over the
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heads of their governors by establishing contacts with their
equivalents in France to try to secure what they felt to be the
original and proper aims of the rapprochement. In the second
place, the very manner in which the Various writers and editors
approached foreign affairs in their books and articles made such
a possibility remote. Far from presenting France in a completely
impartial and unbiassed light, they insisted upon portraying
her as the ideal country with which to enter into diplomatic
partnership. French foreign policy, they told their readers,
was essentially cautious and pacific; French political
Institutions they said were stable and secure; while the French
people they constantly referred to as serious-minded, hard-working,
and reliable. Confronted with the delivery of these and similar
themes virtually every day, even the most isolationist-minded and
Francophobic of British newspaper readers must have been tempted
to regard the Entente as a blessing.
Of course, editors, journalists, and individual writers
did have some difficulty in correlating these themes with what
was actually happening on the other siiaof the Channel. On
specific occasions of considerable moment, most notably, the
labour disturbances of 1906-7 and the sudden overthrow of the
Combes and Rouvier Ministries, they were able to make such a
correlation, but, as we have seen, only thanks to the most subtle
manipulations of argument. Other events, in particular, the
rather nervous dismissal of M. Delcasse In the spring of 1905,
they were at a loss to explain, much as they had been proved
wrong about the future of the Dual Alliance. Nor could they
really account for the widely differing approaches made in the
two countries to tackle highly similar •problems' like the rise
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of Socialism or the threat posed to the State by established
religions. Instead, writers merely pointed out these differences
and argued that they made for interesting, if not necessarily
instructive, comparisons with events at home. Similarly, they
were never able to tell their readers in specific terms how two
peoples of such differing temperaments could be drawn together
into an enduring partnership. Rather, they contented themselves
with echoing the age-old saying that 'opposites attract* and
that, far from being inconsistent, these differences were of a
complementary and co-ordinating kind. Indeed, the flattering
image which they so persistently sought to portray .of France
was more often than not fraught with imperfections and made up
of half-truths.
Many of these remarks apply to the Anglo-Russian Entente as
well. Once again imperialists berated a British Government for
exchanging too much for too little with a foreign Power; once
again Radicals and Socialists expressed fears that the country
was following a course that was bound to alienate and antagonise
Germany; and once again businessmen complained that in certain
overseas areas, most notably in Persia, the country with which
Britain had entered into agreement had not behaved fully in the
spirit of the original compact. Yet for all these similarities
there was a fundamental difference between the Anglo-French
understanding and its sequel of three years later. The former
was made between two Powers of basically similar types of
government whose peoples, thanks to their close geographical
proximity, had long exerted a ma^or influence over each other in
numerous fields. The latter arrangement could make no such
claims. As a result, whenever sympathisers with the Government
and its foreign policy tried to justify the existence of the
Angle-Russian understanding they could only do so in terms of
strategic and financial considerations, not for reasons of
political and cultural affinities. The distinction is an
important onej for it meant that newspapers could not bolster
the standing of the Anglo-Russian Entente with a series of
underlying and highly inter-related themes, as they had done in
the case of the "Tench Entente, Equally, it lent credence to
the belief that the 1907 understanding was an 'unnatural*
arrangement with no rational explanation, unless it was designed
to encircle Germany, And it was this belief, coupled with the
warnJAgs of certain well-organised groups about the adverse
impact of the 1907 Agreements on the welfare of Fersian and
Russian parliamentarianism, that goes a long way towards
explaining why the Russian Entente was considerably less popular
than the French Entente in Britain,
































































































































TABLE 3: Approximate percentage of British exports to France of the
total value of British exports f 1900-1908.








1900 35^,373,75** 25,877,^53 7.30
1901 3^7,86^,268 23,700,820 6.81
1902 3^9,238,779 22,27^,721 6.38
1903 360,373,672 23,1^,730 6.te
19Q1* 371,015,321 21,702,**05 5.85
1905 1*00,120,895 23,232,663 5.81
1906 ^53,355,251 29,920,000 6.60
190? 517,977,167 35,320,000 6.82
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